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U N D E R T H E E D I T O R S H I P O F

Leonard Carmichael

TUFTS COLLEGE

PSYCHOLOGY

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
HUMAN ADJUSTMENT •

BY NORMAN L. MUNN

BOWDOIN COLLEGE



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TO MY WIFE AND SON
ANNA AND HENRY
I AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATE THIS BOOK

INTRODUCTION

IN THIS BOOK Doctor Munn gives an amazingly complete answer from the modern psychologist's point of view to the great question: What is man?

Every student who wishes to have a general education should study psychology because college-trained men or women today cannot afford not to have a knowledge of the factors which underlie their own mental lives and the mental processes of those about them. In the small American colleges of the years immediately following the Colonial period, it became traditional for the president of the institution to teach a required course for all students in what was sometimes called Intellectual Philosophy. In the old books used in these courses, one is struck by the fact that such basic psychological topics as memory, sensory perception, and feeling were treated at length. Today, of course, as a result of the use of the scientific method, the knowledge of these and related subjects has been greatly advanced, and the student who wishes a general education now more than ever cannot afford to omit psychology from his list of studies in college.

In addition to the basic and possibly unique contribution which psychology can make to a general education, the college study of psychology is of especial significance for students who are preparing themselves for medicine, law, teaching, the ministry, business, or any other field in which the professional man or woman is called upon to deal with other human beings. The present volume provides an excellent first book in psychology for one who wishes to use psychology in later professional life. The book also seems to the editor to provide a very good introduction to further technical study in scientific psychology.

The student who uses the present book as his introductory written guide to psychology will, I am sure, come to feel as he studies its pages that Doctor Munn is not a distant author, but rather a friendly counselor who never forgets to explain and illustrate new topics as they are taken up for consideration.

William James' two-volume *Principles of Psychology*, published in 1890, marked a turning point in books on psychology. Following the publication of this great work, every few years a new general book has been needed to bring together for the college and university student new factual and theoretical material which has been produced by scientific psychological research and investigation. Doctor Munn's book meets this need for modern psychology. He does not forget the importance of the biological and social sciences in the development of the scientific study of man's mental life.

Today, of course, Doctor Munn, as the writer of one of the really comprehensive new general books in psychology, has been faced with a much more difficult task than were textbook writers in this field a generation ago. He has had to select from what is now a vast accumulation of important experimental and theoretical work those items only which seem to be of greatest significance for the modern student who is to be introduced to psychology for the first time. In the editor's opinion, this task of selection and integration of present-day source materials has been performed by Doctor Munn with wisdom. The book also pro-

INTRODUCTION

vides carefully prepared references for reading and study which will help the student who is anxious to pursue further almost any topic in modern psychology.

Doctor Munn's previous contributions to experimental psychology and his other books in this field are favorably known by his professional colleagues. Besides special experimental papers, he has written books entitled *An Introduction to Animal Psychology* and *Psychological Development*. In these earlier and somewhat more technical volumes he has shown himself to be an author who can avoid the error of merely encyclopedic writing while he presents relevant facts and theories in a clear and comprehensive way.

Psychology: The Fundamentals of Human Adjustment is both a serious addition to the professional literature of general scientific psychology and a guide for the new student in this field. It has been prepared by an able psychologist who is also an experienced college teacher.

LEONARD CARMICHAEL

TUFTS COLLEGE

PREFACE

MY REASON for writing this book is one which many of my colleagues in the teaching profession can understand, and with which they will perhaps sympathize. Few of us can teach the introductory course for a number of years without feeling that he could organize its topics into a more logical sequence, choose apter illustrations, find more interesting examples, and, in general, write a book which he would like better and which he hopes would be more appealing to instructors and students than any he has seen. In writing this book I have "written up" my own course and the accumulated notes and ideas of fifteen years of teaching. My interest in visual education prompted me also to give especial attention to illustrations, and I was fortunate in being able to include more illustrations, especially halftone reproductions of photographs, than are ordinarily found in beginning textbooks.

Like most recent textbooks in general psychology, this book is focused on human experience and behavior, with the contributions of several methods and systematic approaches used to paint a picture of man as the psychologist sees him. In writing the book I have undertaken to speak for psychology in answer to the student who wants to know what psychologists can tell him about himself and his fellows. My aim has been to present the problems, methods, facts, and principles of psychology in such a manner as to make the presentation interesting and challenging to the student, and at the same time to organize the material in a manner which the instructor will find "easy to teach."

The book has seven major divisions. Each opens with a brief introductory statement designed to give a general orientation to the chapters which follow. This initial orientation serves to define the wider concepts, to point out implications, and to explain the sequence of the chapters which follow. My purpose has been to make the chapters as brief as possible, and the divisions and the chapters within them are so arranged that an instructor who finds that he must shorten the course can do so without omitting an important topic. For example, in the division on learning, an instructor can omit the chapter on foundations, which is primarily theoretical, yet still have an adequate coverage of the topic of learning. Teachers of short courses will find that several chapters — common social motives, personal motives, feeling and emotion in everyday life, and others — can be assigned for reading, and be easily understood by the student without classroom presentation.

The *Students' Manual* designed to accompany this textbook has simple experiments and exercises which the student may do outside of class. It also has self-testing exercises, with scoring keys in the appendix, which will enable the student to test his assimilation of what he has read. Chapters omitted from classroom discussion can thus be tested by the student himself, and the instructor, if he wishes to do so, can examine his students on the chapters omitted as well as on those discussed in the classroom.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I WISH to acknowledge several important contributions which others have made. First of all, there are the contributions of the many psychologists upon whose research I have drawn. Some of them have provided me with original illustrations, each of which is used with recognition of its source.

Anatomical drawings for which no source is indicated were the work of Mrs. W. M. Deacon. Most of the other original drawings were made by Phil London. Photographs without any reference as to source were taken in the Vanderbilt Laboratory of Psychology by Mr. B. S. Holden, of the George Peabody College for Teachers.

Helpful criticisms of the manuscript were contributed by several of my colleagues at Vanderbilt University. Doctor Sam Clark, of the Anatomy Department of the School of Medicine, was especially helpful, for his criticisms of Chapter 3 enabled me to avoid several pitfalls. Doctors Franklin Paschal, Meredith Crawford, and Eugene Bugg, of the Vanderbilt Psychology Department, each read and offered valuable comments on several chapters. Several of my students also gave helpful suggestions. Doctor Leonard Carmichael, as Editor of the Houghton Mifflin Psychology Series, read the entire manuscript. His chapter by chapter and page by page criticisms and suggestions have contributed much to whatever value the book may have as an introductory text.

Several students have, from time to time, served as typists and proof-readers. Among these, Pat Smith has proved especially helpful. Last but not least I wish to acknowledge the encouragement and help of my wife.

NORMAN L. MUNN

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

TO THE STUDENT

YOUR EXPERIENCE AND BEHAVIOR have much in common with the experience and behavior of other people. Even your problems of adjustment — the frustrations to be overcome, the aspirations to be achieved, the emotions to be controlled, the personal and interpersonal conflicts to be resolved — are shared by many others. So look upon this as a book about yourself — not as a treatise on some hypothetical human being. While studying it, continually ask yourself, “How does this apply to me?” Remember, too, that the study of psychology can give you insight into the conduct of other people. It should increase your understanding of why they behave as they do and, through this understanding, improve your ability to predict, perhaps even control, their behavior. Applications of psychology in the home, in the classroom, in the professions, in business, in industry, in warfare, and in the perpetuation of peace are focused primarily on the prediction and control of human conduct.

You will observe that this book is divided into seven main divisions, each of which has a brief introduction and from two to five chapters. Be sure to read the introductions whether or not they are assigned, for these deal with concepts and definitions which are taken for granted in the chapters which follow. Each chapter has a rather lengthy summary designed to bring to a sharper focus the material considered in the body of the chapter. It may be profitable for you to read the summary before you read the chapter, then reread it after reading the chapter. This is in accordance with the principle that ideas are most readily conveyed to others when you tell them what you are going to tell them, tell them, and then tell them what you have told them.

Students are often confused by a profusion of names and dates which serve to identify the author's sources. My policy has been to mention very few names in the body of the text, and then only the names of people who are historically important or especially identified with certain theories. Following the custom in many present-day textbooks, I have placed an inconspicuous number at the end of quotations or passages dealing with specific researches. If you wish to identify the person whose contribution is involved, turn to the end of the chapter and locate the number. There you will find the author and source, perhaps also a few notes concerning the study. Unless the instructor requires it, you should make no effort to memorize the names of these authors.

All major psychological terms have been defined when first used. Thus, if you come upon a word the meaning of which is not clear, locate this word in the index and turn to the page on which it was first mentioned. There, from an actual definition and from its context, you can get its meaning. A good dictionary to aid further in the development of your psychological vocabulary is Warren's *Dictionary of Psychology*. This will be found in almost any library.

Information on how to study, brief exercises and experiments to parallel each of the chapters of the textbook, and a large number of true-false, matching, and completion questions are to be found in the *Students' Manual* designed to accompany this book. The objective self-testing exercises should help you determine, after reading each chapter, how well you have grasped its contents. An appendix of the *Manual* contains scoring keys for these exercises.

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Part 1

SCOPE AND METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY

IT IS DIFFICULT to give the student a meaningful definition of psychology until he is acquainted with certain aspects of its long and interesting history. This is due, in part, to the fact that the word *psychology*, which is derived from the Greek words *psyche* (soul or mind) and *logos* (discourse), no longer implies a study of the soul or of the mind. The difficulty in giving a meaningful definition is further increased by the fact that the scope of modern psychology is so broad that no simple definition could possibly do it justice. The brief historical survey in Chapter 1 will introduce the fields of psychology and lead to a definition of what psychology is today.

The scientific status of psychology depends on its methods — not on what it studies. Its methods are basically the same as those of the other natural sciences, but the nature of its subject matter introduces methodological problems which the other sciences do not have. Some of these problems, and the methods by which psychologists handle them, are considered in Chapter 2.

Chapter 1

Origin and Scope of Psychology

PSYCHOLOGY originated in the curiosity of our primitive ancestors about the nature of their experiences and activities. One thing which mystified them greatly was the fact that, while asleep, they seemed to wander forth, vanquish their enemies, pursue the maidens of their desire, and gather dainty morsels with which to appease their appetites. Mystifying also was the more or less frequent inability of a savage to control his behavior in the face of temptation. Why did he do what was forbidden and then feel fear, or perhaps shame? Why, when he wished to appear brave before his enemies, did his limbs tremble? Why did a man who was strong and active at one moment become weak or inactive at the next?

THE INVISIBLE MAN

Both our prehistoric ancestors and many primitive men who live today in savage tribes have given similar answers to these problems. They assume the existence of a man within man — an invisible man not subject to the confines of space and time. While the savage is asleep, this invisible man goes forth to fight, to woo, and to hunt, finding a convenient exit through the mouth or nostrils. It is this inner man who forces the savage to perform the forbidden act and then makes him afraid or ashamed. The same invisible man causes the savage's limbs to shake in the presence of his enemies. When the invisible man leaves and fails to return, the human body lies cold and still, incapable of further action. In the hope of averting such a

catastrophe, some primitive peoples fasten fish-hooks to the mouth and nostrils of a sick person, believing that, should his inner man try to escape to more comfortable quarters, it would be held fast.¹*

Instead of answering these questions by assuming the existence of a man within man, other primitive peoples have at times claimed that the breath, or some other invisible substance, causes or controls man's behavior and experience.

THE PSYCHE

As early as 500 B. C. the Greeks had gone beyond the idea of a man within man. It was obvious to them that the invisible inner man, even assuming his existence, was no explanation at all, for one would still have to explain his behavior. The Greeks sought a more subtle explanatory principle. They did, however, retain the idea of an invisible something as the cause of behavior and experience. This they named the *psyche*, which means soul or mind. "Soul," as they used the term, had no more religious implication, however, than does the word *mind* today. The Christian concept of a soul developed much later, and will not be dealt with in this book, because its consideration belongs to technical treatises on religion.

Greek philosophers tried to discern the nature of the psyche by observing and describing behavior and experience — the "manifestations of the psyche." Some of their

* These numbers refer to citations and notes which appear at the end of the chapter.

observations led to conclusions now known to be false. However, their description, with their classification, of various aspects of behavior and experience has greatly influenced modern psychological thought. The body of knowledge which these philosophers accumulated became mental philosophy, literally, the study of the mind.

Some of the earliest Greek theorists, who speculated on the physical nature of the universe, thought of mind as an inner flame; others as a kind of water; and still others as motion. Some said that it was synonymous with breath — for breath, as well as a man's mind, appears to leave the body at death.

The two outstanding Greek students of the mind had a much more sophisticated concept of its nature than did their predecessors. Plato (427–347 B.C.) identified mind with ideas, which he thought of as immaterial, in contrast with the body in which they are imprisoned. Ideas, he claimed, exist in their own right, independent of man. They merely reside in the body during life. Thus, in effect, Plato substituted independently existing ideas for the independently existing invisible man of the savage.

To Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) mind was not something apart from the body, causing it to move and to have experiences, but the functioning of the body itself. He illustrated this by saying:

... if the eye were an animal, vision would be its soul... as vision and pupil on the one hand constitute the eye, so soul and body in the other case constitute the living animal. It is therefore clear that the soul is not separable from the body, and the same holds good of particular parts of the soul, if its nature admits of division, for in some cases the soul is the realization of these very parts.²

Aristotle regarded the body as having several functions, whereas the eye has but one. Among these functions are vegetation (bodily maintenance), sensitivity (responsiveness to surroundings), and reasoning. Plants, he claimed, have only the first type of function, animals only the first and second, but



Figure 1. Aristotle
(From Visconti's "Iconographie Grecque.")

man has all three. Aristotle believed that ideas are produced by the influence of the environment upon the organism. He taught that movements associated with objects in the environment are carried to the sense organs, which in turn cause these movements to be conveyed to the heart. Here they leave impressions which are the source of ideas. Combinations of ideas are produced by reasoning. Ideas acquired during one's lifetime, rather than an invisible inner man, breath, or fire, are the controlling factors which, according to Aristotle, underlie behavior and experience at any given moment.

THE ORGANISM

Like his predecessors, Aristotle was greatly handicapped by lack of precise knowledge about the internal structure of the human organism. Dissection of the body was prohibited until about 300 B.C. It is not strange, therefore, that Aristotle, in the light of his limited information, regarded the heart as most intimately involved in behavior and experience. He attributed to the brain, now known as essential to experience, merely the function of cooling the *pneuma* (blood and air) when this is heated by passion.

Our modern ideas concerning behavior and

experience, although they owe a great deal to thinkers like Aristotle, are based fundamentally upon what we have learned about the detailed physical structure of the human organism. The more men discovered about this structure, the more they were led to agree with Aristotle's view that behavior and experience are functions of the organism.

Descartes (1596-1650) did much to direct the attention of investigators to correlations between functions of the organism on the one hand and experience and behavior on the other. It was Descartes' contention that the organism is a complicated mechanism which may be activated by light, sound, and other stimuli without the agency of an immaterial inner substance. Animals, he said, function on a purely mechanical level. They have no soul. But man, though a mechanism and capable of behaving in as mechanical a fashion as animals, has a soul which at times directs and at times is itself influenced by the mechanism. This, of course, was a different concept of soul from that of Aristotle.

Descartes thought of the sensory nerves, which connect the sense organs with the spinal cord and brain, as capable of exerting pulls upon the openings of pores in the brain. Nerves going from the brain to the muscles were thought to be tubes through which "animal spirits" flowed from the opened pores to the muscles, causing these to contract or relax.

The animal spirits resemble a very subtle fluid, or rather a very pure and lively flame, and are continually generated in the heart and ascend to the brain as a sort of reservoir. Hence they pass into the nerves and are distributed to the muscles, causing contraction; or relaxation, according to their quantity.³

This concept may be amplified by another quotation from Descartes in which he points out that the organism is capable of moving without any influence from an immaterial inner substance. He says,

... the machine of our body is so constructed that all the changes which occur in the motion of the

spirits may cause them to open certain pores of the brain rather than others, and, reciprocally, that when any one of these pores is opened in the least degree more or less than usual by the action of the nerves which serve the senses, this changes somewhat the motion of the spirits, and causes them to be conducted into the muscles which serve to move the body in the way in which it is commonly moved on occasion of such action; so that all movements which we make without our will contributing thereto (as frequently happens when we breathe, or walk, or eat, and, in fine, perform all those actions which are common to us and the brutes) depend only on the conformation of our limbs and the course which the spirits, excited by the heat of the heart, naturally follow in the brain, in the nerves, and in the muscles, in the same way that the movement of a watch is produced by the force solely of its mainspring and the form of its wheels. . . .⁴

Although Descartes said that it is unnecessary to conceive of a soul activating the body, he claimed, as we have seen, that a soul does exist in man. He supposed that, by causing the pineal gland at the base of the brain to move this way or that, the soul may control the direction in which animal spirits flow.

Despite his inadequate concept of the structure and functions of the nervous system, Descartes was pointing the way toward the interpretation of behavior, and ultimately of experience, in terms of activities of the sense organs, nervous system, and muscles. Nevertheless, many years elapsed before this interpretation was finally established.

PHILOSOPHY, PHYSIOLOGY, AND PHYSICS

The history of psychology for more than two hundred years after Descartes is to be found in the fields of philosophy, physiology, and physics.

Philosophy

The philosophical method of dealing with psychological problems produced many keen observations and descriptions of experience and behavior, but its chief emphasis was upon speculation concerning such interesting, yet

probably unanswerable, questions as "What is the nature of mind?" and "How are mind and body related?" Preoccupation with such questions did not greatly advance the understanding of experience and behavior. Little was revealed that such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes had not already disclosed. The fact that philosophers could not agree in their speculations about the bases of experience and behavior was not so disconcerting as the fact that speculation without scientific methods of observation offered no apparent basis of agreement. The student of psychology in those times tended either to align his thought with that of one or another of the outstanding philosophers of the day or to remain hopelessly confused. Like Omar Khayyam he might say,

Myself when young did eagerly frequent
 Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument
 About it and about, but evermore
 Came out by the same door where in I went.

Physiology

Physiology was, by contrast, down to earth; so much so, in fact, that to some philosophers the ultimate significance of physiological investigation seemed trivial. Yet, physiologists, by following the same procedure, could agree on the observations which they made. Circulation of the blood, separate sensory and motor fibers in the spinal cord, the different functions of parts of the brain involved in voluntary movement, and the velocity of the nerve impulse, are only a few of the discoveries which physiologists made. Physiologists also discovered relations between sensory structures and experience, relations which are naturally of great psychological interest.

All such advances were made through experimental methods of observation. The physiologists asked specific questions capable of being answered by experimental means. They then arranged suitable experiments. For instance, in studying the functions of the brain, they asked, "What will happen to this animal's behavior if we remove such and such a portion of its brain?" By removing the

particular portion of the brain, they obtained an answer to the question. Anybody skeptical of the truth of this answer had merely to repeat the experiment under comparable conditions and himself observe the results.

Physics

The experimental method in physics provided valuable information on psychological as well as on purely physical problems. Physicists discovered how conscious experience is related to the characteristics of physical phenomena, such as sound and light waves. For instance, they might ask the question: "Which colors, when mixed in appropriate proportions, will arouse all other color experiences?" and answer it by mixing the colors in various proportions and discovering the laws of their combination.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when psychology branched out as a field of investigation separate from philosophy, physiology, and physics, it was concerned chiefly with the nature of experience; hence it borrowed extensively from experiments made by the physicists.

We thus observe that, at a time when psychologists within philosophy were in a stalemate, finding no basis of agreement on the issues which concerned them, physiologists and physicists were gaining dependable information on the physiological and physical aspects of behavior and experience. This advance may be credited to the fact that they gave up mere speculation in favor of experimental investigation. Similar investigations launched psychology upon its scientific career.

PSYCHOLOGY AS A SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE

The nature of science

A science is an organized body of reliable information. Such a body of knowledge does not grow as a result of speculation alone, nor does it develop from random observations. Its accumulation depends on the use of special procedures which constitute scientific method. In the early stages of a science, moreover, the

importance of the procedures used far outweighs that of the information obtained.

Psychology, like every other science, acquired scientific status when (1) its observations became systematic rather than aimless; (2) its observations became impersonal — that is to say, when psychologists honestly sought information instead of attempting to prove their own ideas by a prejudiced selection of facts; and (3) it became possible for any qualified investigator to repeat the observations of another, under essentially the same conditions, and to verify the results.

Philosophers frequently satisfied the first two criteria, but only rarely did they satisfy the third. Aristotle systematically collected information on association of ideas. His observations of his own experience and his collection of the observations of others were doubtless impersonal; his laws of association have, in essence, been verified. This is a rare exception in the history of mental philosophy. One mental philosopher, as we have indicated, was usually unable to verify the conclusions of another.

The requirements of science are most closely fulfilled when investigators use experimental methods; when, instead of observing what occurs spontaneously, they change aspects of nature and note the effect of these changes on phenomena which come within the range of their inquiry. Psychology most clearly achieved scientific status when it became experimental. As we shall see, experimental procedure in psychology was first applied to analyses of conscious experience.

Analysis of consciousness

The formal launching of psychology as a separate science occurred in 1879 when Wilhelm Wundt opened his Psychological Institute at the University of Leipzig. Wundt was a physiologist and philosopher who had made contributions to both of these fields. In addition to his experiments in psychology, he was to continue making important contributions to philosophy.

The new movement was not so much a re-



Figure 2. Wilhelm Wundt

(From a bronze plaque by Dr. Felix Pfeifer. Courtesy of Dr. Edwin G. Boring and Dr. Karl M. Dallenbach.)

volt against mental philosophy as an attempt to get psychology out of an impasse, by utilizing the experimental methods which had proved so fruitful in the natural sciences of physiology and physics.

No science is, in an absolute sense, independent of philosophy. Psychology has never completely broken away from philosophy and one can assert with some degree of assurance that the two disciplines will always have much in common, for scientific endeavors, psychological or otherwise, are preceded and followed by speculation. Today there is a flourishing branch of philosophy, the philosophy of science, which undertakes to examine critically the aims, methods, and conclusions of all sciences.

Scientific psychology at first took over the same apparatus and methods with which physiologists and physicists had been investigating behavior and experience. Very soon, however, psychologists were finding new problems and devising apparatus and procedures of their own.

Most of the early psychological experiments dealt with experience. There was only incidental interest in a scientific study of behavior as such: that is, in what persons said and did. Individual observers were trained to attend to and describe their experiences while the experimenter made various changes in light, sound, and other external conditions. He also made experimental changes in physiological conditions (fatigue, hunger, and thirst). The method of attending to and describing experiences under known external and internal conditions was called *experimental introspection*.

The chief aim of Wundt and his students was to discover, as it were, the ingredients of conscious experience. Conscious experience, it was claimed, could be analyzed into its elements (sensations, and so on), just as matter is analyzed into atoms. Especially was there an effort to discover the relations between stimuli, physiological structures, and particular types of experience. Because of emphasis upon conscious experience, psychology was at that time designated the *science of consciousness*.

The functions of consciousness

While some psychologists were trying to discover what consciousness is by analyzing experiences and relating them to environmental and organic factors, other investigators of consciousness were more interested in what consciousness does; that is, in its functions. Perhaps the most important impetus for such a "functional" approach to the study of consciousness came from the Darwinian doctrine of evolution.

Darwin, in discussing the struggle for existence, had pointed out that organisms which have the most adequate means of adjusting to their environment are those most likely to survive. How consciousness might aid survival of organisms possessing it appeared, therefore, worthy of scientific study. Introspection revealed that learning a motor skill makes one vividly conscious at first of one's activities. As the habit approaches perfec-

tion, however, consciousness gradually recedes. The perfected habit then is carried out automatically, without necessary participation of consciousness. Thus it appeared that consciousness contributes to the survival of organisms by aiding them to learn.

This approach to the study of consciousness failed to advance an understanding of what consciousness is, or even, to any appreciable extent, what consciousness does. Nevertheless, it proved very important in shaping the further development of psychology. Seeking to discover the functions of consciousness in adjustment, psychologists were led to investigate the learning process itself. They eventually paid attention less to consciousness and more to the environmental and organic conditions which produce efficient learning. Such a change of emphasis made what had previously been regarded as a science of the functions of consciousness a science of behavior as well. Psychology as a science of behavior, however, had still other antecedents, some of which we shall now consider.

THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY

Individual differences

Even at Leipzig, psychology was not long confined to the study of consciousness. J. McKeen Cattell, one of Wundt's American students, was interested in the nature and rapidity of reactions to various stimuli, such as colors, letters, and words. His investigations involved analysis of consciousness, yet emphasis was on behavior, on what the persons who served as subjects did or said. Partly as a result of stimulation received from Francis Galton, an Englishman who had previously studied inheritance of psychological characteristics, Cattell turned his attention to individual differences in the reactions of his subjects.

This interest very soon led to the direct measurement of individual differences by means of standardized tests. Out of such research grew the intelligence and aptitude tests which later became important in the fields of

educational and vocational psychology. Moreover, statistics became a psychological tool, for those who studied individual differences had to determine group trends, the magnitude of differences, the reliability of observed differences, and the relation between differences in one trait and differences in another.

Memory

While Wundt was developing an experimental science of conscious experience at Leipzig and an interest in individual differences and statistical analysis was developing under the influence of Galton and Cattell, a German philosopher named Hermann Ebbinghaus began the experimental investigation of memory. This was an aspect of life about which philosophers had engaged in much discussion, but which had not yet been subjected to scientific investigation.

Ebbinghaus investigated several important problems related to memory. In these investigations behavior rather than conscious experience was the prime object of attention. Ebbinghaus published his results, and other psychologists took up the experimental study of memory, introducing new and better techniques and attacking additional problems. Research in this field contributed much of major psychological interest. Since memory research was capable of answering many practical problems of education, it became an important aspect of the field of educational psychology.

Animals enter the psychological laboratory

Psychology was expanding in further directions. Interest in the doctrine of evolution led several English biologists and philosophers to turn their attention to psychological processes in animals.

Observations of animal behavior were at first quite incidental. There was usually no attempt to carry out systematic experimental studies. The method commonly in use was anecdotal. A psychologist who used this method might let it be known that he was planning a book on the evolution of intelli-

gence and would like owners of pets or other observers of animals to report any examples of intelligence which they had noticed. As the descriptions of behavior came in from all and sundry, he would classify them and, from the accumulated evidence, such as it was, attempt to portray the evolution of intelligence from, say, goldfish to man. One difficulty with such information is that the unscientific observer wants to tell a good story, usually one in which the animal is assumed to have "almost human" intelligence. Illustrative of the anecdotal method is the following:

An Australian lady, reporting on the burial of deceased comrades by soldier ants near Sydney says, "All fell into rank walking regularly and slowly two by two, until they arrived at the spot where lay the dead bodies. . . . Two of the ants advanced and took the dead body of one of their comrades, then two others, and so on until all were ready to march. First walked two ants bearing a body, then two without a burden, then two others with another dead ant, and so on, until the line was extended to about forty pairs, and the procession now moved slowly onward, followed by an irregular body of about two hundred ants. Occasionally the two laden ants stopped, and laying down the dead ant, it was taken up by the two walking unburdened behind them, and thus, by occasionally relieving each other, they arrived at a sandy spot near the sea." A separate grave was then dug for each dead ant. "Some six or seven of the ants had attempted to run off without performing their share of digging; these were caught and brought back, when they were at once attacked by the body of ants and killed upon the spot. A single grave was quickly dug and they were all dropped into it." No funeral procession for them.⁸

One suspects that the good lady's imagination ran away with her scientific veracity. This anecdote about ants could be matched with others concerning not only animal, but also child and adult behavior.

Science cannot advance far on the basis of such anecdotes. As we have already pointed out, it must have systematic and reliable information, and it must know the precise conditions surrounding a given event. The scientific approach is to ask specific questions

and arrange conditions which will force an answer to them. Hence, animal psychologists soon discarded the anecdotal method in favor of experimental investigation. Investigators asked questions such as, "At what level of evolution does the ability to learn first make its appearance?" They then devised problems to test the learning ability of animals at various stages of evolution.

In many such experiments, animals were deprived of food until hungry. They were then offered a chance to discover the shortest way to a source of food. The experimenter asked, "How many trials are required before the animal can go directly to food?" "How many errors are made in learning the most direct route?" "How much time is consumed in successive trials?" Animals of different species could then be compared in terms of the number of trials, errors, and time required to learn a well-defined problem. Information concerning vision, hearing, motivation, reasoning, and other psychological processes was gathered by similarly direct experimentation. At the beginning of this century, there were already important centers for such experimentation in Russia, England, Germany, and the United States.

One should not get the impression, however, that all animal psychology necessarily has evolutionary implications. Physiologists and psychologists find that animals are valuable tools for the investigation of many problems which, because of ethical, humane, and practical considerations, cannot be solved by the direct use of human subjects.

Suppose that the psychologist wishes to discover which parts of the brain are of especial significance for given types of behavior; for example, the process of learning. If observations were restricted to human subjects, he could base his conclusions only upon occasional cases where, due to disease or accident, the nervous system was injured. Adequate tests of psychological functions both before and after onset of the disturbance would not, in most instances, be available. The location and amount of injury to the brain could not

be evident to the investigator unless the individual died and his brain became available for observation.

When animals are used, however, their behavior can be tested before and again after specific brain injuries have been produced under anesthesia. Changes in behavior after the operation may then be attributed to known injuries, and the functions of the various parts of the brain may be established for animals of that species. Furthermore, to the degree to which their brain has the same basic pattern as man's — though somewhat simpler — the results may be used to interpret human brain functions.

Apart from its solution of particular problems, animal psychology influenced the procedures used in research with human beings. It demonstrated that much information previously thought to require introspection could be obtained by experiments on behavior. It also affected the theoretical basis of psychology. After all, learning is learning and vision is vision whether it occurs in man or animal. The more we know about a process in one organism, the more it must affect our interpretation of this process in another. The relative simplicity of the animal is often a help rather than a hindrance. Medical students learn something about the structure of fish, cats, and other simpler forms before they begin to dissect human organisms. Likewise, the builder of skyscrapers begins by building simpler structures.

Psychology enters the nursery

Philosophers and educators have always speculated about the importance of child development in determining the nature of adult experience and behavior. It seems surprising, therefore, that careful investigation of child behavior has so recent an origin. Fifty years ago there was no published information concerning the sensitivity, learning ability, emotion, and other psychological processes of children, except that contained in a few scattered biographical accounts written by parents. Some of these accounts supply much valuable

information, but most of them are full of anecdotes in which it is difficult to separate fact from fancy. The most comprehensive and thorough biographical account, written by a physiologist named Preyer, is *The Mind of the Child*, published in 1882. Preyer listed the reflexes of his child at birth, and at various age levels beyond. He also reported observations on such processes as voluntary activity, imitation, sensitivity, emotion, and reasoning. It was not until the present century, however, that systematic observations of many children, under known conditions of stimulation, were carried out. These observations were frequently experimental.

When experimental investigations with children were finally undertaken, many of the methods used were similar in principle to those developed in animal psychology. The reason for this is readily apparent. Young children, like animals, are unable to report the nature of their experiences. Only their behavior can be observed directly. Nevertheless, investigations of behavior yield valuable information concerning sensory functions, learning ability, emotion, and other psychological processes.

Investigating the psychological processes of children is important for two reasons. In the first place, it makes possible a reconstruction, as it were, of the origins and early development of adult behavior and experience. Such reconstruction gives a better understanding of why we experience and act as we do. In the second place, the reliable information gained from such investigations is of practical value to parents and educators. How is one to direct the development of children intelligently, unless the aspects of their surroundings to which they respond, the level of their learning ability, the nature of their interests, and characteristics of other important psychological processes are known?

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL

Personality

The sphere of psychology expanded to include the study of insane, neurotic, and re-

tarded individuals. Until such abnormalities of behavior came within its scope, psychology was concerned primarily with investigation of processes (vision, perception, learning, and so on) which are similar in all normal human beings. Emphasis was on the process itself, not on individual manifestations of it. Interest in individual differences did, as we have seen, finally develop. But even this interest was more or less abstract. The investigator wanted to know the extent and nature of individual differences. He was not especially interested in Mary Smith or Henry Jones. There was little or no investigation of personal problems with a view to diagnosing their causes and suggesting remedial treatment.

When psychologists were finally led to undertake such investigation, they developed the concept of personality, a concept which takes into consideration not only psychological processes, but also the combined characteristic pattern which all of these exhibit in particular individuals. Medicine, and particularly that branch of it known as *psychiatry*, played a leading part in this broadening of psychological interests.

The insane

Until a hundred and fifty years ago insane* people were, in general, thought to be wicked, possessed of the devil. They were thrown into prison along with thieves, prostitutes, and murderers, or locked up in "lunatic" asylums. When they were not neglected, these unfortunates were beaten, purged, or bled. The aim was not so much to cure as to weaken them so that they could be handled more easily.

Physicians paid little attention to insanity, for medicine was concerned with bodily ills, not with the manifestations of demons. Psychology was still mental philosophy, hence not concerned with such problems. Into this situation came a French physician, Pinel, who is generally regarded as the father of psychiatry,

* Insanity is a medico-legal term, not a psychological one. Most of the legally insane are today referred to by psychiatrists and psychologists as *psychotic*. (See Chapter 25.)



Figure 3. Pinel Releasing the Insane from Their Shackles

(From a copy in the Central State Hospital, Indianapolis, of a painting by Tony Robert-Fleury. Photographic reproduction, courtesy of Dr. Max A. Bahr.)

a branch of medicine concerned with the study and treatment of mental disorders. It was Pinel's belief that insane people are ill rather than wicked, or controlled by supernatural forces; and that they should receive humane treatment. When he became superintendent of a "lunatic" asylum in Paris, Pinel's first act was to remove the irons from his charges and to take them out of dungeons in which they had been locked for years. (Figure 3.) By treating them like human beings, he was able to restore many to sanity. But Pinel and those who followed him were scientists as well as humanitarians. They observed, described, classified, and attempted to discover the causes of insanity.

Following the work of Pinel and others of his kind, physicians turned their attention increasingly to the description, classification, and study of the origins of insanity. They found, among other things, that such factors as syphilitic destruction of brain tissues, hardening of the arteries of the brain, and de-

generation of the nervous system through action of drugs, account for some forms of insanity. Such insanities they classified as organic. On the other hand, certain kinds of insanity were found to occur without apparent injury to the organism. These were classified as functional, as due to abnormal functioning of a structurally intact organism.

But how could a normal structure come to function so abnormally? The answer was that the functionally insane person develops wrong ways of regarding himself and his relations with those around him; that his habits of thinking are deranged.

Such an emphasis on habit and thought processes at a time when psychologists were beginning the study of these in normal individuals gave psychiatry and psychology a common ground. It helped draw the attention of psychiatrists to normal psychology, and it at the same time aroused the interest of psychologists in abnormal as well as in normal behavior. The mental test movement,

which was developing in psychology at the same time, contributed to this rapprochement of medicine and psychology, for tests could aid in diagnosis of abnormal as well as normal reactions. Since that time psychologists and psychiatrists have jointly contributed to our understanding of insanity.

Psychologists are interested in the insane for several reasons. In the first place, any form of behavior and experience, normal or abnormal, comes within the legitimate scope of psychology. In the second place, if the psychologist knows what happens to a mechanism when it breaks down, and especially the causes of breakdown, he can better understand its normal functions. In the third place, if one knows what conditions produce insanity, he may be able to prevent its occurrence or even cure it. Prevention of insanity and of the disorders which we shall discuss next is the aim of a branch of psychology known as *mental hygiene*.

The neurotic

Many persons who have nothing organically wrong with them suffer from psychological disorders known as *neuroses*, or *psychoneuroses*. These people may be paralyzed, may lose their memory, may take "fits," may lose sensitivity of one kind or another, may suffer "imaginary" aches and pains, may worry constantly without adequate cause, may remain in states of indecision, may be queer, or may be morally perverse. How scientific attention was attracted to such relatively minor abnormalities is an interesting story only the barest outline of which can be given in this preliminary survey of the scope of psychology.

Hypnosis played a major part in bringing neuroticism to the attention of scientists. In 1766, Mesmer, a Viennese physician, reported that he could produce trances and remove some of the neurotic symptoms mentioned above by applying magnets to his patients. He believed that some force left the magnet and, by entering the body, effected a cure. Mesmer discovered later, however, that magnets were not necessary. The same effects

could be produced by making motions with his hands. It then appeared to him that a force, which he called "animal magnetism," went from him to his patient.

After investigating Mesmer's claims, scientists came to the conclusion that animal magnetism did not exist, and that Mesmer was a quack. This pronouncement, while it placed Mesmer and "mesmerism" in ill repute, did not rule the phenomenon of hypnosis out of existence. Nor did it account for the cures which Mesmer had undoubtedly produced.

About a hundred years ago several English physicians revived interest in mesmerism. One of these, Braid, introduced the term "hypnosis" or "nervous sleep" as a substitute for mesmerism. The new name, Braid's prestige, and the fact that the phenomenon was attributed to brain fatigue rather than to something mysterious, gained hypnosis a certain amount of medical recognition. For a time it was used to produce anesthesia during operations. In India a surgeon performed hundreds of painless operations, including amputation of limbs, while his patients were hypnotized. After chloroform and ether came into use, however, hypnosis was seldom used as an anesthetic.

A famous French physician named Charcot read of Braid's work with hypnosis and was impressed by the fact that hypnotized persons exhibit symptoms essentially like those found in the form of neurosis known as *hysteria*. At the suggestion of the hypnotist, for example, a person may become blind, lose the use of his limbs, forget his name, lose sensitivity, or have convulsions. Because of these facts, Charcot was convinced that hypnosis is a form of hysteria. This view failed to receive general acceptance. Many psychiatrists, while admitting the value of hypnosis in treatment of hysteria, did not regard it as a form of hysteria, or as essentially abnormal. They found that any person willing to accept, and capable of concentrating upon, suggestions from a hypnotist may be hypnotized.

Other investigators, several of whom came under Charcot's influence, made contributions

which later were found to have significance for the understanding of normal personality. One of these was Janet, who introduced the concept of personality integration. He pointed out that neurotic people tend, as it were, to be divided within themselves, whereas normal persons represent an internal unity; that is to say, are integrated.

Freud, a Viennese physician who had worked with neurotic people before coming under Charcot's influence, developed the methods and concepts now known as *psychoanalysis*. He and an associate named Breuer had been using hypnosis to analyze and treat neurotic disorders. During the course of this work, Freud was impressed by the fact that a hypnotized person often remembers desires and experiences which are completely beyond recall in waking life. He was led to the conclusion that desires and past experiences of which we are not aware (which are unconscious) may influence our conduct. Among them, the sexual desires were believed by Freud to be quite important. It was his contention that, even though we are taught from early childhood not to think of sex or express sex interests in any direct way, such interests nevertheless manifest themselves indirectly. Freud emphasized the importance of dreams as such indirect means of expression. He eventually ceased to use hypnosis as a way of finding out what unconscious motives and past experiences were bothering his patients. Analysis of dreams, and also free association — what patients said during sessions in which they were required to express everything which came to mind — were substituted for hypnosis.

Freud developed a number of ideas about neurotic and normal personality which, because they are based primarily upon observations of abnormal people and appear to rest upon insufficient proof, have been looked upon by psychologists as not scientifically demonstrated. Moreover, many psychologists and psychiatrists believe that, in his analysis of dreams and in his interpretation of everyday conduct, Freud placed too much emphasis

upon sex. They do give him credit, though, for having pointed out the influence of urges that are not recognized by the individual as determining his behavior, and especially of urges derived from childhood experiences.

We thus see that interest in hypnosis led to the study of neurotic people and finally to development of other methods than hypnosis for treatment of their ailments. Moreover, observation of the abnormal yielded many ideas later applied to interpretation of the normal personality.

The feeble-minded

Feeble-mindedness, like insanity, was once regarded as a manifestation of supernatural influences. The feeble-minded were frequently beaten to "drive the Devil out of them." Humane treatment, together with an attempt to understand the nature and causes of feeble-mindedness and the best methods of educating individuals so afflicted, did not make very great progress until relatively recent times.

One of the most significant factors in the initiation of this movement was the attempt by Itard, a teacher of the deaf, to educate a "savage" boy whom hunters had found living like an animal in the woods of southern France. The boy was judged to be about ten years old when discovered in 1798. He was naked, walked on all fours, made unintelligible sounds, ate like an animal, and bit those who attempted to handle him. Pinel, the psychiatrist whose work with the insane we have already discussed, regarded the boy as mentally deficient. Itard, however, was interested in getting evidence on a controversy in which philosophers were engaged. John Locke had claimed that all ideas are, in the last analysis, derived from the senses, and that the mind is a *tabula rasa*, a blank sheet, until sensory experiences have left their impressions. The educational implication of the concept was that, in order to make an individual intelligent, the only requisite was to give him enough ideas of the right sort. Others argued that ideas are inborn, and that the function of education is not to pour in

ideas, but to draw out those already present in germinal form. It occurred to Itard that, were he provided with sufficient ideas, the savage child might develop to the point where he could assume a normal position in civilized society. After five years of intensive training, however, the boy made such meager progress that Itard regarded him as incapable of being civilized.

Itard's efforts had not been without effect, however, for the boy had learned to make new sensory discriminations, to recognize objects, to understand a large number of words, to write a little, and even to read simple material, although with poor understanding of its meaning. He also learned to perform simple motor skills. That the boy was feeble-minded appeared certain. It was apparent that, while training led to improved adjustment, its influence was limited by the boy's deficiency. Whether the deficiency was in-born or merely due to early lack of educational opportunity was not determined. Hence, the controversy which stimulated Itard's work was by no means settled.

When Itard took the "savage" boy into his care, diagnosed his deficiencies, and developed methods calculated to overcome these, he was initiating a movement which led to the development of clinical psychology, a field whose function it is to determine the basis of behavior difficulties of all kinds, and to suggest methods of correction. Many other men played an important part in this movement. One of them was Seguin, a pupil of Itard.

Seguin devised methods of training mentally handicapped children. When he came to this country in 1848, he was instrumental in establishing special institutions for the sympathetic care and training of feeble-minded individuals. In the course of his work on the education of feeble-minded children, Seguin devised his formboard, a device consisting of variously shaped openings into which appropriate blocks were to be fitted. Formboards of various kinds are now used in diagnosing the intelligence level of feeble-minded and illiterate individuals.

The first psychological clinic for diagnosis and treatment of the behavior defects of children was opened at the University of Pennsylvania in 1896, under the direction of Witmer. Its express purpose was "the study and remedial treatment of mentally or morally retarded children, and of children suffering from physical defects which result in slow development or prevent normal progress." There are now many such clinics to which parents, schools, juvenile courts, and other institutions may bring children in order to discover the level of their intelligence, their aptitudes for various kinds of work, the nature of their behavior problems, and of their school difficulties. On the basis of his diagnosis of each individual's problems, the clinical psychologist gives advice concerning treatment. The development of such clinics, while given an impetus by the work of men like Itard and Seguin, has been aided in the present century by the development of psychological tests.

PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL PHENOMENA

Experience and behavior are functions of living organisms. Psychology is thus a biological science. The nature of its subject matter, however, brings it also within the general framework of social science. Psychologists are interested in many problems which sociologists investigate, and they in turn contribute to the general field of social science. Sociology and psychology therefore overlap in certain respects.

All but the lowest organisms are influenced by and influence the behavior of others. In other words, they exhibit social behavior. Man is pre-eminently a social organism. His very existence during the early years of life hinges upon ministrations of other human beings, ministrations which provide extremely intimate and almost continuous social contacts. These contacts transform his biological nature, his purely animal nature, into human nature. The content of his experience, the nature of his attitudes, the form of his conduct, and, in general, his personality, are thus products of social as well as biological in-

fluences. Even when human individuals become relatively independent of others, they not only maintain their social contacts, but extend them by forming associations, congregating, and interacting in numerous ways. Such interaction, although many of its aspects are not readily brought within the laboratory or clinic, can hardly be ignored by a science whose scope includes investigation of human behavior.

Psychology must take into consideration two general social factors. One of these is the *influence of social environment* upon development of the individual's psychological characteristics. The other is *group behavior*, and the forms of interaction involved in it.

Influence of the social environment

Psychologists and sociologists have investigated the influence of home relationships, neighborhood contacts, friendships, and other social factors upon the development of individual characteristics. An understanding of personality, and especially of abnormalities like neuroticism and certain types of insanity, requires reconstruction of the individual's earlier social environment. Moreover, when we are interested in comparing the psychological characteristics exhibited by individuals of one national or racial group with those of another, cultural environment is of great significance. Psychologists have sometimes regarded certain psychological differences between races as inherited, only to discover later that they depend primarily upon diverse cultural environments. This is a field in which anthropology and psychology are mutually helpful.

Group behavior

Sociologists and psychologists have investigated the behavior of crowds, audiences, nations, and other social groups. How group situations affect individual behavior has been observed both in everyday life and in the laboratory. Sometimes attention is not upon group behavior as such, nor upon the individual's reactions in a group situation, but

upon the processes thus involved. Imitation, co-operation, conflict, and other such processes of interaction have thus been investigated. Much of this work has been experimental. Some of it has been done with animals and children, as well as adults. Other social phenomena which come within the range of psychological investigation are fashions, fads, public opinion, prejudice, propaganda, censorship, certain aspects of religious behavior, and war. Concepts derived from work on hypnosis and suggestion have been found applicable in the interpretation of many such group phenomena.

The psychological investigation of social phenomena is a division of social science designated as *social psychology*. It lies, as we see, on the borderline between sociology and psychology. To sketch its origins would take us into the history of both sociology and psychology, but primarily sociology. This is because most of the early students of social behavior were sociologists. It was not until psychologists extended the scope of their investigation to include behavior as well as experience that they exhibited much interest in social phenomena.

THE DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY

Our discussion of its origin and growth has shown that the most adequate brief definition of psychology is "the science of experience and behavior." All scientific psychologists are contributing, directly or indirectly, to one or both of these two general divisions of psychology. Some emphasize the study of experience, some the study of behavior, and others regard both fields as equally worthy of their attention. Psychologists look upon experience and behavior as adjustments of the organism to the stimuli which impinge upon it.

Although the term *psychology* is retained, psychologists no longer believe that they are investigating something apart from the organism. If a *psyche* exists, its invisibility removes it from the realm of scientific investigation, for scientists are unable to investigate anything outside the range of their senses, or

which cannot be brought within this range by means of language or by means of instruments such as microscopes, galvanometers, radio amplifiers, and cameras.*

Not all that passes as "psychology" in everyday life is scientifically established. Among common psychological "rackets" that psychologists have investigated and found to have little or no basis in fact are *phrenology* (claiming to discern psychological traits by locating bumps on the skull), *physiognomy* (claiming to read character from such facial characteristics as the distance between the eyes, the height of the forehead, the shape of the nose, and so on), and *graphology* (claiming to determine the nature of psychological traits, including skills, from analysis of handwriting). There are also certain "psychologies" for improving one's personality, "keeping mentally fit," or enabling one to "climb the ladder of success." Some of the principles involved in these "psychologies" have been borrowed directly from scientific psychology. Many of them are based upon the personal experience and, in many instances, imagination, of their authors. They have not been subjected by their proponents to experimental or other scientific tests. Only a knowledge of the well-established facts of psychology would make it possible for one to discern what, if anything, is sound in any of these "psychologies."**

GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY

General psychology, with which we are primarily concerned, cuts across various fields in order to give a survey of the science of psychology as a whole. Chief stress, how-

* It has been claimed that, since the psyche is beyond range of scientific investigation and psychologists do not profess to study it anyway, some other term which better represents the actual scope of investigation should be substituted for "psychology." Several terms have been suggested, including *behaviorism* and *anthroponomy* (from *anthropos*, man; and *nomos*, law), but tradition is so strong that "psychology" will doubtless remain.

** For a good critical discussion of phrenology, physiognomy, and graphology see W. L. Valentine, *Experimental Foundations of General Psychology* (Revised Edition), Farrar and Rinehart, 1941, Chapter 2. General discussions of the "psychological underworld" are to be found in D. H. Yates, *Psychological Racketeers*, Badger, 1932, and L. R. Steiner, *Where do People take their Troubles?* Houghton Mifflin, 1945.

ever, is upon investigations of various kinds (behavioral and experiential), regarding various organisms (animal, child, adult, normal, or abnormal), and various phenomena (individual or social), and what they indicate concerning human behavior and experience. Consideration is given especially to fundamental aspects of human nature, and to the processes which may be discerned as operating in the behavior and experience of human beings in general. Anything which contributes to an understanding of these aspects and processes, regardless of the more specialized field of psychology from which it may come, is the concern of general psychology.

SUMMARY

Psychology originated in primitive man's speculations concerning the causes of his experience and behavior. These speculations led him to think that the phenomena of experience and behavior are caused by an invisible inner agent. Early Greek philosophers gave us highly sophisticated speculations about these phenomena and their causes. Aristotle, however, interpreted experience and behavior as functions of the organism in response to stimulation rather than as manifestations of some invisible inner agent. Descartes gave even greater emphasis to the organism by regarding it as a mechanism controlled by external forces which, by affecting the sense organs and the nerves, cause muscles to contract or relax. Although he regarded the human mechanism as controlled partially by an immaterial agent, the soul, Descartes' emphasis was upon the response of organisms to their environment. Thus, Aristotle and Descartes both prepared the ground for a science of psychology.

Science collects facts, systematically organizes them, and seeks their explanation. As long as experience and behavior were thought to be mysterious manifestations of an inner man, or of some other invisible agent, there was little desire to collect and systematize relevant facts. There was no need to seek for an explanation of experience and be-

havior, since the "explanation" was already given.

Speculation about behavior and experience, even when it regarded these as functions of the organism, did not progress very far. It could not produce a body of well-established information, for those who speculated could not agree.

In physics and physiology, however, indisputable facts about nature, and about those aspects of it in which psychology is interested, were being discovered through use of experimental methods. Men could now repeat the investigations of each other, confirming or discrediting their results. A body of indisputable facts could be gathered, organized, and their relations determined. The possibility of placing psychology on such a scientific basis led Wundt to establish his psychological laboratory.

Wundt and his students analyzed conscious experience by experimental means. With apparatus borrowed from physics and physiology, and later supplemented by new kinds adapted to their peculiar needs, they attempted to describe the relations between aspects of experience, variations of stimuli, and sensory and nervous structures. They were, in a sense, attempting to determine the nature or "content" of consciousness.

Other investigators, without necessarily disparaging the aims of Wundt and his followers, became interested in the "functions" of con-

sciousness. These psychologists believed, especially, that consciousness facilitates the learning process. This process they came to investigate in all of its aspects. Eventually, however, they studied learning as a form of behavior and paid relatively little attention to conscious processes.

Psychology finally extended its scope to include all kinds of behavior, whether manifested by the normal or the abnormal, by children or adults, by animals or human beings, by individuals or groups. Much of the work in these fields was experimental. That which did not lend itself to experimentation (for example, study of single cases and of crowd behavior) was nevertheless scientifically investigated whenever its study involved impersonal and systematic observation, organization of the facts observed, and an attempt to discover their explanation.

Psychology today concerns itself with the scientific investigation of experience and behavior. Courses in general psychology cut across the various specific branches or fields of psychology, like abnormal, social, sensory, and so on, so that the beginner may get a broad survey of methods, facts, and principles. He might then obtain a more thorough understanding of himself and others, and thus become better fitted to solve the personal problems of adjustment which constantly confront him in everyday life.

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Chapter 2

How the Psychologist Works

STUDENTS often ask, "Is psychology a science?" They know that physics, chemistry, and other studies of physical phenomena have traditionally been called sciences. But psychological phenomena seem so different from the physical, and psychological problems were so long dealt with philosophically rather than scientifically, that a genuine doubt about psychology's scientific status naturally arises. The answer to the student's question was given in the preceding chapter — psychology is a science to the degree that its methods are scientific.

GENERAL ORIENTATION TO PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH

In psychology, as in every other science, methods of obtaining relevant facts are of vital importance. Scientific speculation either deals with facts or is of such a nature that collection and systematization of facts offers a check on its correctness. Relevant facts do not, of course, arise spontaneously as needed. They must be sought.

Research is focused upon specific questions. Collection of information, psychological or otherwise, would be practically worthless if carried out in a purely random fashion. The psychologist does not search merely for facts. He seeks information concerning problems which interest him; problems which, if solved, would have practical or theoretical value or both.

The nature of a problem is influential in determining methods of investigation. If the problem concerns conscious experiences, such

as feelings, the experimenter uses an introspective approach. He asks the experiencing individual to describe feelings aroused under known conditions.

If some aspect of behavior is to be investigated, a behavioristic approach is used. The learning of motor skills, for example, is primarily studied in terms of errors or successes rather than experiences. If the investigator seeks additional information on the individual's experiences while learning, both behavioristic and introspective approaches are used.

The special problem under investigation may require information concerning an organism's history. For example, "What is the influence of man's animal ancestry upon his behavior?" "Is the individual's intelligence influenced, and if so to what extent, by his heredity?" "To what degree do childhood experiences determine the personality of adults?" These and similar questions require what, in general, is referred to as the *genetic method*. We say that a psychological investigation is genetic whenever it concerns the history of psychological processes. In gathering genetic information, one may utilize any or all of the more specific methods which we will consider shortly.

A psychologist does not, of course, start out to investigate experience or behavior in general. He asks and attempts to obtain answers to specific questions. Suppose, for example, that the following question suggested itself: "What sort of organic modification occurs when learning takes place?" This is more specific than a general question about behav-

ior, or even learning. But even this question, although focused on a particular aspect of behavior, is too general. Before he can start to work, the investigator must narrow his attention to questions which are still more specific. For example: "Which is the simplest organism capable of learning?" "What kind of nervous structures does this organism have?" "How does the learning of an animal who has these structures compare with that of an animal who has additional structures?" "What happens to a habit when particular parts of the brain are removed?" "How is learning affected by the intervals between practice periods?" Each of these questions becomes the starting-point of a research project or perhaps of several investigations. It is only after many specific, yet relevant, questions have been answered, that significant light can be thrown upon the more general problem of how organisms are modified when they learn.

Theoretical and practical aims

Investigations undertaken by all scientists usually have as their aim the determination of general principles or laws. Certain investigations may, however, have practical rather than theoretical aims. In psychology, for example, an investigator may wish to determine the most efficient means of teaching shorthand. After his results have been obtained, they may be used to facilitate the teaching of shorthand. The investigation of such a problem, although it comes within the general framework of learning, is not motivated by a desire to understand the fundamental question of how man learns. Nevertheless, results obtained in pursuance of such a specific practical aim frequently contribute information about general principles, with which psychology, as a science, is most directly concerned.

Whether their interest is in behavior or experience, whether it is confined to one stage of development or is genetic, and whether it is practical or theoretical, psychologists use some variation of the following methods: (1)

naturalistic observation, (2) *experimentation*, and (3) *clinical procedure*. A further procedure, which applies more to analyzing and interpreting facts than to discovering them, is the *statistical method*.

NATURALISTIC OBSERVATION

Many social and other forms of behavior must, if we are going to study them at all, be investigated as they occur naturally. The sciences of astronomy and geology are confined almost entirely to naturalistic observation; biology is obliged to use naturalistic, in addition to other means of investigation. This is partly because events occur in nature which cannot be brought into the laboratory. Other events, if they occurred in the laboratory, would be greatly distorted. This is especially true of certain psychological phenomena.

Let us consider a few questions which call for naturalistic observation by psychologists. Suppose that an investigator wished to study social interaction in a society devoid of culture. He would, of course, have to study animals, for even the most primitive human beings now living have a complex culture. If his interest were primarily in noting how men might act if deprived of all but their animal nature, the investigator would observe animals as much like man as possible; namely, anthropoid (manlike) apes.

Laboratory investigation would, of course, be out of the question. Even if it were possible, the results would obviously have little, if any, bearing on the question at issue. The psychologist's only recourse, then, would be to go to the jungle. There, without making his presence known to the animals, he could observe their social relations. A good investigator would not, however, set out for the animals' habitat until he was trained in scientific observation and as familiar as possible with available information on the animals he wanted to observe. He would also decide upon the specific question, or questions, to be answered. If possible, he would prepare to take moving pictures, so that he and others might study the behavior at their leisure.¹

Having specific questions in mind is important, for no single person can concentrate on all aspects of social behavior at once. Relevant questions like the following might be asked: "How many animals appear in each family group?" "How many of these are adult males?" "How many are infants?" "Is the mating of given males restricted to particular females or is it promiscuous?" "Does individual-to-individual conflict occur?" "If so, what form does it take?" "Do the animals co-operate?" In this way, the investigator, either in his thinking or in writing, has a "questionnaire" which his observations are to answer. His observations then would be planned rather than haphazard.

Naturalistic observation is used in child psychology to answer such questions as: "What is the average age at which the first word is spoken?" "Do nouns or verbs predominate in the vocabulary of three-year-olds?"² "How do children of five years express anger?"³ In abnormal psychology, questions like the following call for naturalistic observation: "What social conditions contribute to the incidence of insanity?" "What are the chief types of mental disorder?"

Other branches of psychology use naturalistic observation from time to time when the nature of the problem investigated demands it. In other words, they make an objective and systematic study of phenomena which occur without the investigator himself instigating them. Wherever possible, however, the method of naturalistic observation is supplemented by use of experimental procedures, for the experimental method offers advantages not possessed by any other

EXPERIMENTATION

To discover the significant relations between the nature of the organism, its surroundings, and its conscious experience or behavior, all significant factors must be brought under the closest possible control. In other words, these factors must be subject to independent variation by the investigator. An experimenter cannot, like the naturalistic ob-

server, wait for the experience or behavior in which he is interested to occur spontaneously. A naturalist has little, if any, precise information concerning factors which underlie the phenomena observed. He can describe behavior and note general conditions, but that is about all.

Behavior and conscious experience are influenced by many factors. When an organism has some conscious experience or exhibits behavior, these processes are influenced by: (1) the type of organism — animal or human, child or adult; (2) what has been learned — skills and information; (3) the present condition of the organism — hungry or fatigued; and (4) stimuli — light and sound waves which fall within range of sensory structures. Experimental procedure changes one of these factors at a time, while holding the others constant. The effect of this variation is then recorded.

The type of organism to be investigated and its previous training are usually determined before the experiment proper begins. Therefore the chief factors to be varied or held constant in the experiment, once it is under way, are the stimuli and the general physiological conditions.

External and internal stimuli

What do we mean by a stimulus? Psychologically speaking, it is any factor, outside or inside the organism, which initiates activity of some kind. Aspects of the world which fail to arouse activity are not stimuli. Typical external stimuli are light waves, sound waves, contacts, changes in temperature, and odorous substances. Typical internal stimuli are fatigue products, lowered blood sugar, presence of adrenalin in the blood, and nerve impulses which serve to arouse further nerve impulses.

Control of external stimuli is brought about by use of sound or light proof rooms and various types of apparatus. Control of internal stimuli may involve deprivation of food, administration of caffeine, injections of adrenalin, removal of the stomach to prevent con-

tractions from serving as stimuli, cutting the spinal cord to prevent nerve impulses in the lower part of the body from reaching and stimulating nerve centers in the brain, and so forth. Obviously, controls like the latter, unless they occur by reason of accident or disease, are possible only in animals. The animals are, of course, anesthetized to avoid pain.

Control of the organism

In addition to varying external and internal stimuli, the experimenter may vary the general condition of the organism. It is obvious that variations in internal stimuli come under this general heading. Some organic controls, however, are not directly in the nature of stimulus control. We shall mention just a few.

With adult human subjects, it is often necessary to develop a set or attitude prior to presentation of stimuli. That is to say, the individual is told to attend to one kind of stimulation and not others, or to react in one way to a red light, say, and in another way to a green one. He may be told that he is being tested for one thing, while he is really being tested for another, or that he is being given an injection of alcohol, when the injection is really sterile water. The chemist, physicist, and biologist do not have to introduce controls of attitude or set in the materials with which they work. But in psychological investigation with human adults, such attitudes are extremely important and must be controlled. We shall observe an excellent illustration of this type of control shortly.

Another control of the organism involves heredity. The investigator frequently desires that heredity be held constant. Suppose, for example, that he wishes to know whether children develop motor skills faster when given early training in these skills than when left to develop at their own pace. He must use two groups of children, one trained and one untrained; but groups, which, if left to themselves, would presumably develop at the same rate. Rate of development, however, is in-

fluenced by heredity. Heredity must therefore be held constant. Identical twins have the same heredity; hence, the factor of heredity may be controlled by using them for subjects. When identical twins are located and split into two comparable groups, one group is then trained, while the other develops without training.

In experiments with human beings, other methods sometimes obtain a less perfect control of heredity. We shall meet some of these other methods in our discussion of research on intelligence. Variation in heredity, while other factors are held constant, is accomplished by differential breeding, which is possible to control only in animals, or by selecting groups of human beings known to come from markedly different stock.

Control of the organism sometimes involves removal of structures, such as nervous tissue, glands, or sense organs. In such experiments, which are of course confined to animals, there is an operated and an unoperated group. Sham operations are frequently performed on the "unoperated group," so that all factors other than the crucial one (say removal of brain tissue) will be controlled. A comparison of the performances of the groups makes it possible to determine the function played by the part of the organism that has been removed.

The independent variable. The factor varied constitutes the independent variable of an experiment. It is customary to refer to the stimulating circumstance or condition of the organism that is varied as the *independent variable* of an experimental investigation. There is never more than one independent variable in a given experiment for, if an experimenter is to know the basis of the behavior or experience in which he is interested, he must note the changes produced by one factor at a time. If two or more factors were varied, he obviously would not know which had produced the phenomena observed. All stimulating and organic conditions, except the independent variable, are therefore held constant.

The dependent variable. Responses are the

dependent variables of an experiment. In addition to varying a stimulus or an organic condition, while other stimuli and organic conditions are held constant, the investigator observes the responses of the organism. In many instances, he measures the responses which have resulted from his manipulations of stimuli or organic conditions. These responses are the *dependent variables* of an experiment. They depend, in other words, upon the one factor varied by the investigator.

The organism experimented upon is customarily referred to in psychological investigation as the *subject*. Responses (or reactions) of the subject may, for purposes of convenience, be classified under one or more of three headings: (1) *Gross behavior* which any observer may see, such as threading the pathway of a maze, typing, speaking, pressing a key, or blushing (2) *Internal physiological activity*, such as accelerated heartbeat and increased blood sugar, which must be ascertained by means of instruments or chemical tests. (3) *Conscious experience* which, as we have seen, is described by the subject. We may place such activities as thinking, seeing, hearing, sorrowing, and so on, under the latter classification.

The responses investigated in an experiment, therefore, may be aspects of gross behavior, internal physiological activity, conscious experience, or all these together. Sometimes the investigator is interested in only one kind of response. At other times, he is interested in and collects data on several aspects of behavior, experience, and internal changes simultaneously. It is apparent, then, that although an experiment never involves more than one independent variable at a time, it may involve several dependent variables.

The general nature of psychological experimentation may now be made more concrete by describing an experiment which involves many of the factors already mentioned. We have selected an investigation on the psychological effects of smoking.⁴ This will be analyzed in terms of its independent variable, its controls, and its dependent variables.

An illustrative experiment

The aim of this experiment was to discover what, if any, are the psychological effects of smoking a large pipe of tobacco. Smoking versus non-smoking was the independent variable. The dependent variables were typical psychological and muscular functions, such as speed of adding, steadiness, rate of learning, and speed of reading four-letter words aloud.

It is perhaps obvious that, in an experiment of this nature, reactions may be influenced by various factors other than tobacco. Such factors must be held constant throughout the experiment. Let us examine some of the important constant factors.

The attitude of the subject is one such factor. He may expect tobacco to slow him up, or perhaps to speed his reaction. He may actually want to prove that tobacco does him no injury, hence put forth a greater effort when he smokes than on control tests when he does not. For this reason, it is necessary to prevent him from knowing when he is, and when he is not, smoking. This sounds impossible of control. Nevertheless, it was controlled very nicely by having two pipes which were alike in all respects, except that one furnished warm moist air, and the other contained tobacco, by having the subjects blindfolded throughout the experiment, by making as much noise — such as scratching matches, knocking pipe, and so on — on “non-tobacco” as on “tobacco” nights, by having the pipe placed in the subject’s mouth, held there while he smoked, and withdrawn by the experimenter, by having the subject blow the smoke out without inhaling, and also not allowing him to swallow his saliva until some time later, by having the experimenter smoke the tobacco during non-tobacco sessions so that the right odor would be present, and by letting the subject see the burnt-out ash in the pipe which had been smoked on some nights by him, but on “non-tobacco” nights by experimenter alone. Reports from the subjects after the experiment was complete proved that they were never suspicious of the fact that merely warm moist air was being “smoked” during some sessions. One subject actually went through the motions of blowing smoke rings while “smoking” the tobaccoless pipe.

The tobacco used was of uniform grade, determined by chemical analysis. If this factor were

uncontrolled, one might find variations due not to tobacco smoking as such, but to different types of tobacco. The amount of tobacco was constant, namely, five grams.

Adaptation to tobacco was controlled by using habitual smokers. Another group comprising subjects who, while they did not smoke, were not nauseated by tobacco, was used for comparative purposes.

Individual differences in intelligence, speed of reaction, sex, age, and so on, were held constant by using the same subjects for both smoking and non-smoking sessions, as indicated above. The scores of a subject after non-smoking sessions served as controls for those made by the same subject after smoking. If two groups of subjects had been used, both would have been equated, as nearly as possible, in terms of individual differences.

The time of day might markedly affect results, hence, it was held constant by having tests at approximately the same hour, which was one and a half hours after supper

Smoking and non-smoking tests were alternated in random fashion to reduce the possibility that subjects might get the suggestion that there were tobaccoless days. If, for example, a subject smoked one day, failed to smoke the next, smoked the next, and so on, he might guess that there was a different condition on every other day. Thus the alternation of s (smoking) and c (non-smoking control) days was *s s c s c c c s c s c c c s c s*, for the eighteen days of the experiment.

Psychologists have noted that, when an individual gets near the end of a task, he frequently has an end spurt. It was thus necessary to control this factor. The investigator told his subjects that he would need them for twenty days. After the tests on the eighteenth day were completed, however, he told the subjects that they were no longer needed. It was then that he obtained their verbal reports and found definitely that they had failed to suspect his controls.

The detailed results of this experiment need not concern us here, since our interest is primarily in method. It may be said, however, that the efficiency of learning was not, in this experiment, significantly influenced by tobacco smoking. Muscular steadiness, however, was greatly decreased. In some instances, different results were obtained for habitual smokers from those for non-smokers.

This experiment provides a fairly good idea of the experimental method in general, for it involves most of the important types of control which investigators of adult human psychology are called upon to use. Each experiment, however, requires specific controls more or less peculiar to it; hence, one should not get the idea that every experiment involves all or even most of the controls mentioned above. When the subjects are animals, for example, controls like most of those in the above experiment are of decreased importance. On the other hand, organic conditions — hunger, thirst, injuries to the organism, and so on — not involved in this study, may assume much importance in investigations with animals.

THE CLINICAL PROCEDURE

You will recall from what was said earlier that the clinical method is applied to a particular individual or case. It is used for practical purposes: namely, the diagnosis and treatment of a disorder which brings the person to the clinician. We have already pointed out that only after many cases are compared may information of general theoretical significance be apparent. Our chief interest here is in noting the kinds of information which clinical psychologists gather for their diagnosis.

The clinical psychologist frequently uses standard tests which might throw some light on the nature of the problem confronting him. If a boy is making poor progress in school, it may be because he has low intelligence, because his hearing is poor, because he is slow to react, or because he makes more than the normal number of eye movements in reading. Measurement under standard test conditions is the only reliable means of determining the nature of an adjustment problem resulting from low intelligence, or from sensory, motor, and other organic deficiencies.

But the problem may result partly or wholly from such factors as poor early training, bad school conditions, inadequate home environment, or undesirable social relations in the neighborhood and community. In-

formation about these may be revealed by a case history.

The individual's past is usually reconstructed in the form of a biographical account. Data for the biography are gathered from interviews with the individual and with his associates. Workers especially trained for the task frequently obtain information concerning his immediate social situation.

The results of relevant tests, the biography, and information concerning the immediate social setting of the individual's behavior, usually place the clinical psychologist in a position to discern the sources of trouble and to make suggestions for correction of the behavior problem.

Although a particular method may be more relevant to some psychological problems than to others, many problems require use of all three methods. Thus, a psychological research frequently involves naturalistic, experimental, and clinical material. In other words, a psychologist, in investigating the problems which interest him, utilizes any or all reliable means of gathering his information.

STATISTICAL PROCEDURES

Statistical analysis is an application of mathematics which enables the psychologist to arrange his findings so that he will discover their significant trends and relationships. As we have already indicated, psychologists first used statistics in the study of individual differences. Today, however, the statistical method is an indispensable tool in several fields of psychology.

Statistical devices are used to supplement naturalistic observation, experimentation, and clinical procedure. Suppose, for example, that a naturalistic observer notes the number of times person-to-person conflict occurs in each of a hundred groups which differ in size. If he wishes to know the average number of conflicts per group, the average size of groups, or the relation between the size of the group and the number of conflicts within it, he must resort to statistics.

In the interpretation of experimental data,

likewise, an investigator often needs to determine trends and relationships, and even the probability of his getting different or similar results in a repetition of an experiment.

Statistical procedures are indispensable, also, in standardization of intelligence, personality, and other psychological tests, for they disclose the degree of relationship between test scores and other things: success in school, flight performances, social adjustment. In clinical practice, moreover, the interpretation of an individual's performance on standardized tests is to some extent dependent upon prior statistical analysis of scores made by large groups of individuals. The individual score, in other words, is compared with norms (namely, averages determined for large groups which represent the population at large).

Statistical procedures, and interpretations based upon statistical analysis, are too involved for adequate presentation in an elementary course. However, a brief introduction to them is given in Chapter 22.⁵

SUMMARY

We have observed that psychologists, if they are to obtain scientifically sound information concerning psychological processes, must make planned observations which are focused upon specific problems. These problems are usually framed as questions to be answered. If a question refers to conscious experience, the psychologist uses introspection, that is, he requires the subject to describe his conscious experience. If the psychologist's question pertains to behavior, on the other hand, he uses behavioristic methods. This means that the subject's observable responses (such as success in hitting a target, or recital of what has been memorized) are recorded. Many problems call for use of introspective and behavioristic methods simultaneously.

Whenever a problem requires knowledge of the past history of psychological processes, the investigator makes a developmental or genetic study. He may, for example, observe development of processes in animals ranging

from lower to higher; or in an individual from one stage of growth to another.

The ultimate aim of psychology, as a science, is to determine the laws of human experience and behavior; and in this connection the stimulating and organic conditions of which psychological processes are functions. Such an aim does not preclude solution of practical problems, like discovery of the most efficient methods of learning or the best means of enabling one to avoid psychological ills

The practical and scientific aims of psychology, whether they relate to experience or behavior, and whether or not they call for a genetic approach, are achieved by use of specific methods which may be designated as (1) the method of naturalistic observation, (2) the experimental method, and (3) the clinical method

Naturalistic observation is the only available method, when one wishes to study behavior which either could not be produced in the laboratory or which would be distorted if produced there. In using this method, the investigator observes behavior as it occurs spontaneously, that is, without his instigation. Observations are not haphazard, however, for specific questions must be answered. The method of naturalistic observation is widely used in studies of social behavior. Sometimes it precedes experimental investigation, providing preliminary information by which experiments can be designed.

The experimental method in psychology is a technique for controlling factors which influence experience and behavior. Such factors are: (1) the kind of organism, (2) its previous training, (3) its condition at the time of

observation, and (4) the stimuli, both external and internal, which activate it. In an experiment, such factors are varied one at a time, while others are held constant. This is what we mean by experimental control. The varied factor is referred to as the independent variable of an experiment. Responses of the organism, whether in the nature of experience, physiological changes, or gross behavior, are designated as dependent variables. The experimenter's task is to determine the stimuli and organic conditions upon which these responses depend. Our description of the experiment on effects of smoking illustrated some problems involved in arranging psychological experiments.

Clinical methods are used to diagnose behavior difficulties in individuals; hence, their immediate aim is practical. In gathering data for his diagnosis, the clinical psychologist uses standard psychological tests, reconstructs, as it were, the individual's history; and gathers information on the social situation which surrounds the individual. By these means an attempt is made to locate the sources of difficulty and to make suggestions concerning corrective measures.

No psychologist necessarily confines himself to a particular method of approach. Any method, or combination of methods, which promises information of value in understanding experience and behavior, is utilized.

Statistical procedures provide a means of analyzing and determining the significance of results after these have been gathered by the methods described. Certain statistical procedures will be considered in Chapter 22 and in later discussions of intelligence and aptitude.

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5. Some instructors may wish to introduce a more detailed discussion of statistics at this point, assigning Chapter 22 now instead of later in the course. If this is not done, the student may make at least a rapid survey of the statistical chapter to supplement what he has just read.

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Part 2

PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

A GOOD WAY to learn the psychological significance of an organism's structures and functions is to trace them from their beginnings. This is the genetic approach. We will begin in Chapter 3 by tracing the development of response systems from the ameba to man. At the human level, the neurological foundations of behavior and conscious experience will have special attention. In Chapter 4 a brief survey of human psychological development, from conception to maturity, will show us something of how we got to be what we are. Maturation and activity, which are underlying factors in development, will be given special attention in the final chapter on psychological growth, Chapter 5.

Chapter 3

Origin and Psychological Significance of Response Systems

ALL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES are responses of organisms to stimulation. This fact is often represented by the formula $S \rightarrow O \rightarrow R$, where S represents stimuli; O the organism; and R the organism's response. Stimuli, it will be recalled, may be either internal or external. Furthermore, a response may be internal or external.

We may focus upon (1) the stimulating conditions which arouse the organism's response; (2) the organism which responds; or (3) the characteristics of the response itself. It is obvious, however, that aspects of the world are not stimuli until they act upon an organism; and that responses do not, like the grin on the Cheshire cat of *Alice in Wonderland*, exist in a disembodied state. Consequently, the organism and its characteristics are of central importance for psychology.

Before aspects of the world can initiate responses, and thus become stimuli, the organism must, as it were, be attuned to them. This attunement is what we mean by *sensitivity*. The sensitivity of all but the simplest organisms is determined by *receptors* (sense organs). Certain structures within the eye, for example, are receptors for light. Other receptors exist in the ears, the skin, the tongue, nose, muscles, and internal organs. As receptors become more and more elaborate, organisms tend to become increasingly attuned to the intricacies of their environment. In other words, aspects of the world which previously failed to stimulate now become stimuli.

Attached to receptors are nerve fibers which connect with other parts of the nervous system and, eventually, with *effectors* (muscles and glands). When stimuli impinge upon receptors attuned to them, they initiate receptor activities which, in turn, discharge energy in attached nerve fibers. An electrochemical disturbance (nerve impulse) traverses the nerve fibers. It passes along them in a manner somewhat analogous to the successive explosions which run along a fuse when one end is lit.

When nerve impulses reach effectors, these structures react: the muscles by contracting or relaxing; and the glands by increasing or decreasing their secretions. The evolution of muscles and related structures is of great psychological significance, for, as legs, hands, and other effector organs develop, the organism becomes increasingly expert at moving around in and manipulating its environment.

The basic function of the nervous system is to conduct impulses from receptors to effectors. As the nervous system developed from lower organisms to man, interconnections of receptors and effectors, and of different parts of the system itself, became extremely complicated, especially at the head-end of the organism. This neural (nervous) evolution reached its climax in emergence of the human cerebral cortex, responses of which underlie our most intricate psychological processes, such as recalling past experiences, thinking, and planning. As a great neurologist has

pointed out, the cerebral cortex may be considered "the master of destiny."¹

A SIMPLE RESPONSE SYSTEM

Ameba, the one-celled organism shown in Figure 4, provides a good example of the limited response repertoire found in animals lack-




Figure 4. Ameba About to Ingest Another Organism

Stimulated by the other microorganism, ameba sends out pseudopods which engulf it. Note, also, the movements of pseudopods at a distance from the source of stimulation (From Faust, E. C., "Some Biological Interrelationships," *American Scientist*, 1945, vol. 33, p. 14.)

ing specialized receptors, neural mechanisms, and effectors. This organism responds to light, temperature, and chemical and mechanical stimuli; yet no part of its body is more sensitive to these than is any other part. A stimulus may be applied to any region with approximately the same result.

The parts of the ameba which are distant from the stimulated area also respond. This demonstrates that, although the animal has no nervous system, its protoplasm conducts the effects of stimulation from one part of the body to other parts. Despite absence of specialized motor structures, movement toward, away from, and even around, stimulating objects may occur. Fingerlike projections reach out from almost any part of the body. As the ameba moves along, the rest of the organism appears to flow into these projections.

Sensitivity to special aspects of the environment is very limited in the ameba. For example, only the temperature, intensity, loca-

tion, and movements of light initiate responses. Color, shape, and finer visual details of objects make no impression, for their reception requires structures which the ameba does not possess.

Because the ameba has no nervous system which would provide definite channels for rapid conduction of stimulation effects, its movements are slow and lacking in precision. Absence of a nervous system also limits the animal's learning ability. Organisms which possess a nervous system are somehow modified by what happens to them, so that, upon repetition of a situation, they react to it, not as a new situation, but as having been met before. They get to food more quickly and with a decreasing number of false moves. They avoid harmful situations more effectively than they did on first acquaintance with the same situations. Only the simplest modification of behavior appears in the ameba. It is so temporary that some have questioned whether we are justified in saying that the ameba learns.²

SPECIALIZATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RECEPTORS

Evolution of organisms from ameba to man brings a gradual loss of general, unspecialized sensitivity and an increasing modification of tissues to produce receptors adapted to specific tasks. For example, among the receptors developed, one would include the eye to receive light waves and the ear sound waves. This specialization process underlies development of all senses. Visual receptors, however, are the most highly specialized.

Visual receptors

An early stage in evolution of visual receptors is marked by the appearance of a small pigment spot. Such spots are found in many lower animals including the jellyfish. The chief advantage of this primitive "eye," as compared with undifferentiated sensitivity of the whole body surface to light, is that the organism may respond to weaker intensities of stimulation than were hitherto effective.

Moreover, the source of stimulation may be more accurately located. In still higher organisms, the pigment spot is found at the bottom of a small pit, where it cannot be stimulated directly unless the source of light is approximately opposite.

The compound eye of insects, which comprises a large number of "pits" packed closely together, represents a distinctive advance in reception. Different parts of an object now stimulate separate parts of the eye; hence, the total effect is probably that of a patchwork or mosaic. We know, as a matter of fact, that animals having compound eyes distinguish the shape of objects by means of vision.³

A later stage in visual specialization is marked by appearance of a cuplike structure, the *optic cup*. At the bottom of each cup is the *retina*, a layer of pigmented cells especially sensitive to light. The optic cup first appears in marine animals, where it is open and filled with liquid. There is nothing here which represents a lens. An eye of this type is shown in Figure 5 A. The focus of such an eye is fixed, as in a pinhole camera.

A little higher in the scale one finds the cup's opening fitted with a fixed-focus *lens*, which undergoes no change as objects at different distances are fixated. The fixed-focus eye receives a clear image only of objects at a specified distance from it. Some animals, of

which the octopus is one, have a lens which in order to provide a clear focus, moves toward or away from the retina. In this way the animal does not have to move nearer to or farther away from the object in order to obtain a clear image. This eye (Figure 5 B) is somewhat analogous to the folding camera in which the lens is moved forward or backward to achieve a focus for objects at different distances.

In organisms ranging from fish to man, the lens maintains a fixed position at the opening of the optic cup (Figure 5 C), and a focus is achieved by changes in lens curvature. When near objects are fixated, the lens bulges, but when distant objects are fixated, it flattens.

Below the level of monkeys, most animals having two eyes obtain two separate views, or only partially overlapping fields of their environment, rather than the single view which we experience. This is because their eyes are located at the side rather than in front of the face. You have doubtless observed how chickens, for example, turn one eye and then the other toward a piece of grain before pecking. During the course of evolution, the eyes moved toward the front of the face until both obtained a similar view. Moreover, the eyes became movable, making convergence possible. Ability to move the eyes also made possible the visual pursuit of objects without




Figure 5. Stages in the Evolution of the Eye

A, the eye of *Nautilus* (after Conn). This eye has no lens; hence the focus is fixed. B, the eye of the octopus (after Gegenbaur). Here there is a lens which provides a focus by being moved toward or away from the retina. C, the human eye in which focus for objects at different distances is provided by changes in the curvature of the lens.

necessity of moving the head. One important result of the changed position and related functions of the eyes is tridimensional vision. This is the ability to perceive the visual environment as having depth, instead of the flatness of a photographic representation.

Only the gross anatomy of the eye has so far been considered. Specialization also took place in the cells of the inner photosensitive surface (the retina) of the eye cup, and in related parts of the nervous system. Changes in the retina and in its neural connections eventually made color vision possible. Such changes will be given closer consideration in the chapter on vision. A small area of marked sensitivity, which is known as the *fovea*, also appeared. It is upon this area that light rays are focused to produce a clear image. Outside it the image is relatively blurred.

Other receptors

The trend of evolution in senses other than vision is one, too, of general sensitivity followed by increasing specialization. The sense of hearing (audition) was preceded by general sensitivity of the entire body to mechanical vibration. Eventually, special auditory receptors and nervous structures evolved, and served to pick up even relatively weak air waves generated by distant vibrating objects. An analysis of these waves, by the auditory receptors and the brain, underlies the variety of auditory experiences.

With increasing specialization of the ear and its neural connections, there came the ability to discriminate small differences in the loudness and pitch of sounds. Such discrimination is of obvious significance for language and for the production and appreciation of music.

The entire body surface of ameba is sensitive to chemical stimuli (general chemical sensitivity), but there are no specialized chemical senses such as taste and smell. During the evolution of organisms these specialized chemical senses gradually developed. Receptors especially sensitive to chemicals in a liquid form appeared in the tongue and lining

of the mouth. These, and related neural structures, made possible the sense of taste. Similarly, structures especially attuned to chemicals in gaseous form developed in the upper part of the nasal cavities. They and their neural connections mediate the sense of smell.

General skin sensitivity to contact and to temperature gradually became specialized, although not so much as in the cases of vision, hearing, taste, and smell, all of which have receptors in highly localized regions instead of widely distributed over the body. Eventually there developed the specialized contact senses (pressure and pain), and the specialized temperature senses (warm and cold).

The static sense (equilibrium) which enables us to know the position of our body, even when other senses are not operative, begins with the appearance in certain marine animals of a small saclike structure lined with hairs. Sand and other particles placed in the sac by the animal itself move and stimulate the hairs, as the position of the body is changed, thus enabling the animal to sense its position. As increasingly elaborate structures evolved, the sense of equilibrium increased in accuracy.

Other receptors developed in the muscles, tendons, and joints, providing the structural basis of kinesthesia, the sense which enables us to know the position of our limbs even when we cannot see them. Receptors also developed within the internal organs. These sensitized animals to internal stimuli. The organic senses (hunger, sex, and so on) depend upon these receptors and stimuli.

Especially notable in the evolution of receptors is the increasing ability of higher organisms to respond to stimuli at a distance. This ability is evident in the senses of vision, hearing, and smell, which are often referred to as the distance senses. The utility of being able to respond to stimuli before they touch the body is obvious.

SPECIALIZED EFFECTOR ORGANS

From the standpoint of psychology, the

most important effector organs are those which serve the functions of locomotion, manipulation, and speech.

Organs for locomotion

In a discussion of locomotor activities, the ameba again provides an excellent point of departure. As already indicated, no one part of its body is more specialized for locomotion than is any other. In organisms a little higher than ameba there are hairlike processes (cilia) which serve as effectors for locomotion. Paramecia, illustrated in Figure 6, are pro-




Figure 6 Reactions of Paramecium
(After Jennings)

pelled by movements of cilia. These structures are among the earliest specialized organs of locomotion and represent an important step in effector evolution, for they leave the rest of the organism free to carry on other functions. Moreover, cilia enable the animal to move through its environment with greater speed and skill than is possible in an organism like ameba.

In animals ranging from fish to man the functions of locomotion are taken over by a variety of organs, such as fins, wings, tails, arms, and legs. The highest specialization of effectors for locomotion, however, is found in the wings of birds, and in the arms and legs of animals ranging from monkey to man. Man is the only animal whose arms are completely free from the needs of locomotion. They have become specialized for manipulation.

Organs for manipulation

The ameba has little or no manipulative ability—that is, the ability to change the location of objects in its environment. When

edible substances are available, the animal does not grasp, it “flows” around them. Cilia may bring objects within range of animals possessing them, but they are not specialized for manipulation. Many insects manipulate objects with their mouths and limbs. Fishes, amphibians, and reptiles manipulate with their mouths, but they are almost completely lacking in other manipulative organs. Birds manipulate with beak and limbs. Lower mammals, such as rats and squirrels, manipulate with their forepaws as well as with their mouths. Animals from monkey to man, however, are able to manipulate with mouth, hands, and feet.

When the monkey level is reached, one observes a marked increase in manipulative skill. The forepaw has become a hand and hence is used to grasp objects. Likewise, the feet have developed into grasping organs. In man, however, the ability to grasp objects with any notable degree of skill was retained by the hands and lost by the feet.

The dexterity of human hands is much greater than that of any other animals, including monkeys and apes. The ape's thumb (Figure 7) is very small and, for the most part,



Figure 7. Evolution of the Hand
(Courtesy of American Museum of Natural History.)

a passive member of the hand. In man, however, the thumb is relatively large. At the same time, it is capable of active movement in opposition to the hand as a whole and to each of the fingers separately. This great flexibility of the human hand may be related to the fact that man's ancestors assumed an upright posture, thus completely freeing the hands from locomotor activities

Some of the significant advances in behavior made possible by evolution of hands are: (1) ability to explore unseen parts of the body; (2) increased ability to court, struggle, escape, obtain food, and make shelters; (3) increased flexibility of gestural communication; (4) the use of stones, sticks, and other weapons in hunting and combat; (5) invention of tools; (6) production, use, and control of fire; and (7) writing. Invention of tools, control of fire, and writing are exhibited only by man. They require not only manual dexterity as such, but also a superior brain

With man's assumption of an upright posture and development of manual skill came relative freedom of the mouth from crude manipulative duties. Structures of the throat and mouth finally evolved into specialized effector organs, which, combined with a complex brain, led to the origin of speech.

Part of the skill involved in all of the above activities is, of course, due to receptor as well as neural and effector evolution. As a matter of fact, receptors, effectors, and neural mechanisms developed in close association. Each would be of little significance without the other

ELEMENTARY NERVOUS SYSTEMS

The nervous system is a mechanism specialized for conduction. Its primary function, as we have seen, is to transmit the effects of stimulation from receptors to effectors.

The entire body of ameba conducts the effects of stimulation. Some animals a little higher in the scale have muscles which contract when intense stimulation is applied directly, although no neural mechanisms are present.

A later stage in development of the nervous system is illustrated in Figure 8 A. Here we observe nerve fibers connecting muscles, which lie below the surface, with receptors in the skin. In the sea anemone, part of whose nervous system is illustrated in Figure 8 B,




Figure 8. Evolution of the Nervous System

A, muscle cell below the surface, but connected to it by means of a receptor. B, receptor-effector nervous system found in parts of the sea anemone (After Parker)

there are two links between receptor and effector. Nerve fibers carry impulses from receptors to a network of fibers, which is itself connected with the effectors. This is referred to as a *nerve-net system*, because fibers which convey impulses to muscles are fused together in the form of a net. Thus, instead of going from a receptor to a muscle over their own "private" channel, the impulses spread out within the net and activate many muscles. Part of a typical nerve net is shown in Figure 9. Nerve-net systems are found in many



Figure 9. Part of the Nerve Net of a Polyp (After Max Wolf.)

lower animals, including the jellyfish. Presence of such a net accounts for the fact that stimulation applied to any part of a jellyfish sets the whole animal in motion..

Neurons

From the nerve-net system the next step is appearance of a system in which each unit is structurally separated from the others, and in which each is capable of functioning separately, causing precise localized responses to stimulation on particular parts of the body — such as occurs, for example, in withdrawing the hand from a hot object. The unit of this system is the *neuron*.

Each neuron is a cell body and its projections. Some typical neurons are pictured in Figure 10. A *nerve* is a bundle of nerve fibers

Sensory or *afferent neurons* convey impulses from receptors to the spinal cord and brain. Motor or *efferent neurons* transmit impulses from the brain and spinal cord to the effectors. *Association neurons* are confined to the brain

and spinal cord, where they provide connections between sensory and motor neurons and between association and other association neurons.

Afferent and efferent neurons possess long hairlike fibers which are microscopic in size. These fibers may have several branches. Association neurons have relatively short fibers. Their bulk is primarily cell body. Since the cell body has a grayish appearance when stained, large groupings of association neurons, which appear primarily in the spinal cord and outer surface (cortex) of the brain, have a grayish appearance. They are frequently referred to as *gray matter*. The nerve fiber is itself usually covered by a relatively thick fatty sheath. This is whitish in appearance. Large groupings of fibers make the regions in which they appear look white, hence the designation *white matter*.

Fibers which conduct impulses toward the cell body of a neuron are known as *dendrites*. Those which conduct impulses away from the cell body are known as *axons*. The treelike




Figure 10. Some Typical Neurons

projections which appear on many axons are called *end-brushes*.

The electrochemical disturbance known as the *nerve impulse* is recorded galvanometrically as a change in electrical potential. Each successive impulse traveling along a given fiber has the same potential, regardless of the nature of the activating stimulus or the intensity of stimulation. If the fiber responds at all, in other words, it responds completely. This is known as the *all-or-nothing* principle. Different kinds of neurons — afferent, efferent, and association — respond in the same all-or-nothing fashion and there is no indication that an efferent response, say, is any different, in terms of activity within the neuron, from an afferent response.

After a neuron has responded to stimulation, there is a brief interval during which it cannot again be activated, no matter how intense the stimulus. This interval is the *absolute refractory period*. Its shortest duration is about one thousandth of a second. After this brief period, there is another, known as the *relative refractory period*, when a sufficiently intense stimulus may activate. A stronger than normal stimulus may thus activate before the neuron has recovered normal excitability. Within certain limits, moreover, the more intense the stimulus, the earlier in the relative refractory phase it can activate a fiber. A strong stimulus, therefore, may activate the fiber at briefer intervals than a weaker one, causing more impulses per second to travel the fiber. The stronger the stimulus, in other words, the greater the frequency of nerve discharge. Each impulse activated by a strong stimulus has the same potential as one activated by a weaker stimulus (the all-or-nothing principle), but there are more impulses per second with the stronger than with the weaker stimulus (the frequency principle). In a single nerve fiber, therefore, the effect of differences in stimulus intensity is the arousal, not of different kinds of impulses, but of more frequent impulses.

According to the membrane theory of nervous transmission, each nerve fiber has a semi-permeable membrane with positive ions on the outside and negative ions on the inside. While in this state, the fiber is said to be *polarized*. Each part is, in effect, a microscopic battery with its negative and positive poles. When the fiber is stimulated, the membrane in that region becomes more permeable, letting the positive ions pass through and unite

with the negative. A wave of negative electrical potential sweeps the fiber. This *action current* or *propagated disturbance* is the nerve impulse. Its speed of transmission differs for fibers of different thickness, but averages four miles per minute. Shortly after the impulse passes a region, the original position of the ions is re-established. The fiber in this region is then ready to react again. After the whole fiber has recovered (absolute refractory phase), the nerve impulse may again traverse it.

The synapse

The axon of one neuron and the dendrites of another are not fused, but are in close contact. Such regions of contact are known as *synapses*. The nervous system whose units we have been describing, we refer to as *synaptic*. In crossing a synapse, nerve impulses are slowed up. An impulse must, as it were, "jump" across. Just how it does this is not known.

Some impulses do not go beyond the synapse. Some get across to certain fibers but not to others. Hence, unlike the nerve-net system, this one is highly selective. Instead of spreading out in all directions, the impulses pass along relatively precise channels and tend to activate specific effectors. Some interconnecting neurons are schematically represented in Figure 11.

Two important functions achieved at the synapse are *facilitation* and *inhibition*. One type of facilitation is known as *spatial summation*. This occurs when impulses coming over one or more fibers, but with insufficient intensity to cross the synapse, are enabled to cross because other impulses also converge on the synapse. A simple example can be given by referring again to Figure 11. An impulse coming over neuron A reaches the synaptic connection with neuron C, but cannot by itself bridge the gap. However, an impulse coming to the same synapse from neuron B at about the same time, and which by itself could not cross, will *summate* with the first to force a passage. Spatial summation may, of course, involve a large number of neurons. *Temporal summation*, another type of facilitation, occurs when an impulse too weak by itself to bridge the synapse is enabled to cross because the effects of a succession of impulses in the




Figure 11 Some Synaptic Junctions

same fiber summate. Facilitation is thus present whenever stimuli too weak to arouse a response arouse it either (1) through simultaneous operation of other stimuli (spatial summation), and (2) through their own continuance (temporal summation).

Neural inhibition is believed to be mediated at the synapses. If you scratch the "saddle region" of a dog whose brain has been severed from the spinal cord (spinal dog), the dog's foot will come up to scratch the region (scratch reflex). If, however, you at the same time stick a pin in the dog's foot, a protective response of the leg (protective reflex) will be aroused, completely blocking (inhibiting) the other response. If you cut a frog's skin, he will hop. But if he is engaged in the sexual embrace, cutting has no effect. Sexual activity inhibits the normal protective reflexes. It is apparent that certain activities, or conditions, of the nervous system preclude the possibility of certain other activities taking place at the same time.

In synaptic terms, some impulses coming into the synapse, rather than facilitating the passage of other impulses, block their passage (inhibit them). Conditions at synapses may also change so as either to block or to allow passage of impulses. Certain

drugs (nicotine) have inhibitory effects on synapses, while others (for example, strychnine) have facilitative effects — literally opening up all synapses and producing chaotic conditions. Normally, for example, contraction of the biceps muscle leads automatically (through inhibition of impulses normally causing contraction of the triceps) to relaxation of the triceps. But strychnine, by providing free passage across the synapses for all impulses, destroys this balance of facilitative and inhibitory effects.

Nerves

Nerves are bundles of fibers, each bundle very much resembling a cable as illustrated in Figure 12. The white fatty sheath (myelin), which covers many fibers in the nervous system, may be seen covering each of these fibers. It serves as an insulator. The human optic nerve, which carries impulses from the retina to the brain, is a "cable" containing about four hundred thousand separate fibers. This is one of our largest nerves. All the other nerves are somewhat similar bundles of nerve fibers. When the intensity of stimulation in a receptor is increased, more of the fibers in the nerve may respond. We have already mentioned that increased stimulation also in-



Figure 12. Cross-Section of a Nerve
(From "The Nervous System," courtesy of Encyclopaedia Britannica Films, Inc.)

creases the frequency of response in individual fibers.

Nerve-net and synaptic systems compared

One should not gather, from what has been said about the synaptic nervous system, that each neuron, while structurally separated from other neurons, functions in complete independence. Although the nerve fibers in a synaptic system are not fused together structurally, as in the nerve net, and hence fail to provide a more or less uniform discharge to every part of the system, the opposite situation — that is, complete independence — is not present. The activity of each neuron is made possible only by the activity of receptors or of other neurons. Moreover, neurons within the central nervous system are so numerous and so intricately related that it is impossible to activate one without at the same time activating many others. As an impulse crosses a synapse, it usually activates many adjacent neurons, not one alone. The course of impulses through the nervous system from receptors to effectors, and from association to other association neurons, then, is not absolutely discrete. It is, as compared with conduction in the nerve net, only relatively discrete.

The opportunity for impulses to pass from one neuron to other relatively discrete ones is most evident in the spinal cord and lower brain centers, where the number of association neurons is comparatively small, and where their connections are relatively simple. This accounts for the fact that the spinal cord and lower brain centers provide the chief connections for stereotyped or uniform responses, such as the knee jerk, walking, breathing, and digesting. In the upper levels of the brain, however, there are so many possible avenues for transmission of nerve impulses that preformed connections are less frequently found. As we go from lower animals to man, the increasing complexity of nervous activities makes independent action of neurons, or discrete systems of neurons, less prevalent.

THE REFLEX-ARC SYSTEM

Theoretically, the simplest connection between receptors and effectors occurs in the so-called *reflex arc*, which involves the following structures in the order given: receptors, afferent neurons, association neurons, efferent neurons, and effectors. These structures and their relations are illustrated in Figure 13. The connections between a particular level of the spinal cord and upper levels of the nervous system are also illustrated. These connections are not part of the reflex arc as such, but are included in the illustration because only under unusual circumstances, such as when a section of the spinal cord is cut off from other parts of the nervous system, does the reflex arc come close to functioning as a unit uninfluenced by and not influencing other parts of the nervous system. As a matter of fact, it is only for purposes of convenience that we are justified in speaking of the reflex arc as a system in itself. Impulses traveling within it may be shunted to almost any part of the nervous system, and its activities may be facilitated or inhibited by impulses reaching it from higher levels.

You will also observe from Figure 13 that nerves emerging from the spinal cord possess two branches, an afferent and an efferent. The afferent branch emerges from the back or dorsal part of the cord, while the efferent branch emerges from the front or ventral part. Comparable nerves emerge from each side of the cord. A nerve from only one side is represented in our diagram. Although each nerve is actually a bundle of fibers, the illustration shows only one of each kind of fiber.

The nerve impulse travels from the receptor over the afferent neuron to the dorsal portion of the spinal cord. As illustrated, cell bodies of afferent neurons are outside the spinal cord. Association neurons, whose cell bodies are in the gray matter, carry the impulse toward the dendrites of the efferent neuron. If it crosses the synapse, the impulse then passes along dendrites, through the cell body, and along the axon to the effector, in this case a muscle.




Figure 13. Diagram Illustrating the Reflex-Arc System

Impulses from receptors travel toward the spinal cord over afferent neurons of the spinal nerve. There they initiate impulses in the association neurons. These impulses in turn arouse efferent neurons along which impulses travel to the muscles. Nerve fibers also carry impulses toward the brain and from the brain down to various levels of the spinal cord. Note that cell bodies of afferent neurons are outside of, and cell bodies of association and motor neurons within, the spinal cord. These connections are in the gray matter. Note, too, that afferent fibers connect with the back or dorsal and efferent fibers with the front or ventral portion of the spinal cord. (From "The Nervous System," courtesy of Encyclopaedia Britannica Films, Inc.)

The axon branches to innervate many muscle fibers

What we have just described is the simplest possible nerve connection involved when, say, the hand is burned and one quickly withdraws it. One's consciousness of the burn depends upon impulses running up the spinal cord and terminating in the brain. In other words, as impulses initiated by the burn come into the spinal cord over the afferent fiber, they are transmitted to fibers running toward the brain, as well as to association and efferent fibers on the same level of the spinal cord. Should one decide to resist the impulse to withdraw his hand, the usual reflex connections would be inhibited by impulses coming down from the brain and crossing to efferent fibers.

In considering the reflex-arc system, we have referred only to connections between external receptors and effectors. Somewhat similar connections exist between receptors in

such internal organs as the lungs, stomach, and intestines and the effectors of these organs. The arrangement of fibers to which we refer is known as the *autonomic* nervous system. Functions of the autonomic system are important aspects of emotional life. We will consider them when we reach the topic of emotion

EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL NERVOUS MECHANISMS

The central nervous system handles all connections between receptors, effectors, and association neurons. It comprises the brain and spinal cord. Although some of the connector functions of the spinal cord have already been considered in discussing the reflex-arc system, the evolution of centralization and its significance has not been discussed.

Elementary forms of centralization

In the course of its evolution, the nervous

system has become increasingly centralized. Without some central mechanism for coordinating incoming and outgoing impulses, one part of the organism would act in complete independence of other parts.

The behavior of a starfish, the nervous system of which is represented in Figure 14, illustrates the significance of central mechanisms. When a starfish is turned on its back, the rays work together in such a manner as to right the animal. There is nice co-ordination, each ray playing its proper part at the right time. A recent experiment has demonstrated that if the nerve ring which connects with the fibers of the separate rays is severed in one place, activity of the rays becomes inco-ordinated. When the ring is severed in two opposite places, the animal acts in such an inco-ordi-

nated way as actually to pull itself apart.³ The nerve ring makes it possible for the reaction of a particular ray to be regulated by what other rays are doing.

The earthworm has a highly centralized nervous system. Fibers from each segment are connected with a *ganglion* (group of nerve cells). The ganglion integrates movements of the structures of this segment. Moreover, ganglia at different segments are interconnected, so that movements in one segment are co-ordinated with movements in other segments. The nervous system of the earthworm has a still further degree of centralization. In the head are two relatively large ganglia connected by a ring. This mechanism, which is illustrated in Figure 14, receives impulses from other ganglia and relays impulses to them. This is the worm's "brain," which provides the animal with a central "switch-board" mechanism.

Evolution of the brain

In organisms ranging from worms to man, one notes a gradual increase in the size and complexity of the brain. Larger bodies and a greater number of highly specialized receptors and effectors demand larger and more complicated brains to integrate their functions. The brain structures which perform these elementary tasks are, as a group, referred to as the "old brain." Eventually there appear brain structures in addition to those required for sheer sensory and motor integrations. These comprise the "new brain."

The actual size of the brain is not in itself of great psychological significance, for several animals have brains much larger than man's. The human brain has an average weight of about three pounds compared with ten pounds for an elephant and fourteen pounds for a whale. The ratio of brain weight to body weight is much more significant psychologically than mere brain weight. This ratio is about 1/50 for man, 1/500 for the elephant, and 1/10,000 for the whale.⁴

The psychological significance of brain-weight-body-weight ratios is apparent when




Figure 14. Two Primitive Forms of Centralization
A. Starfish (after Herrick). B. Earthworm (after Hesse).




Figure 15. The Brain from Fish to Man
(Courtesy of American Museum of Natural History.)

we consider the rôle played by the brain in control of the organism. As animals grow larger, more brain tissue must be present for mere sensory and motor connections, and for control of physiological functions such as respiration and digestion. A brain concerned entirely with these elementary tasks, no matter how large, is no more advantageous than a small one which serves the same functions in a small animal. Behavior controlled by the larger brain is as simple and routine as that controlled by the smaller one. The larger the

brain in proportion to body weight, however, the larger the amount of neural tissue not reserved for routine sensory, motor, and physiological activities.

Association neurons of the "new brain" make up a large proportion of the brains of higher animals. Their special functions are not determined at birth; hence, these neurons may, as it were, be molded by changing circumstances. They provide the neural basis for such psychological processes as learning complex skills, remembering, and thinking.

Evolution brought significant changes in the external appearance of the brain. Many of these external changes indicate alterations in internal structures, and particularly in the number and distribution of association neurons. Some of the most obvious developments are illustrated in Figure 15, which shows the brains of representative animals ranging from fish to man. Especially noticeable is an increase in the size and complexity of the cerebrum, cerebellum, and brain stem. The latter is what remains after both the cerebrum and cerebellum are removed. One will note, also, that olfactory bulbs (top of lower figures) become relatively smaller during evolution.

The cerebrum

In animals ranging from fish to bird, the cerebrum comprises only a small part of the total brain structure. Moreover, its functions are concerned largely with smell. For this reason, the early form of cerebrum is sometimes referred to as a "smell brain." Olfactory structures become relatively small as the newer cerebrum develops. This is illustrated in Figure 15. In the human brain the olfactory bulbs are almost buried under the relatively massive cerebrum; other olfactory tissues within the brain are correspondingly small.

In addition to growing larger, the cerebrum underwent obvious surface changes. Rats and rabbits have a smooth cerebrum. Beginning with animals like the cat and dog,

however, a wrinkling becomes apparent. In general, the higher the animal's evolutionary status, the more wrinkled its cerebrum. Such wrinkling is due to the fact that the cerebral cortex, which is a sheet of gray matter covering the cerebrum, evolves faster than the skull. The area of the cortex can continue to increase under such restricted conditions only by folding inward (invaginating). The cerebral cortex is the most significant part of the cerebrum, and is often referred to as synonymous with it.

From lower animals to man, there is an increasing dependence upon the cerebrum for all complex psychological functions. Visual discrimination provides a good illustration of this fact. No part of the fowl's cerebrum is necessary for distinguishing a triangle from a circle of the same size and brightness.⁵ When the visual portions of the cerebrum of a rat, cat, or dog are removed, however, such discrimination of visual detail becomes impossible. Only a crude brightness remains. Destruction of the visual areas in man's cerebrum is even more disastrous, for total blindness results. In the higher organisms, motor processes and those of learning become more dependent upon existence of the cerebrum.⁶ For this reason, cerebral injuries in man are more harmful to his psychological processes than are similar injuries in animals.⁶

The cerebrum is actually a twin structure. It consists of bilaterally symmetrical halves known as the *cerebral hemispheres*. These are




Figure 16. Cross-Section of the Human Brain, Showing the Right Cerebral Hemisphere and Its Position in the Skull




Figure 17. The Brain Viewed from Below

connected through a large system of fibers, the *corpus callosum*. When the human cerebral hemispheres are separated by a cut through the corpus callosum and the right one is viewed from its inner side, the characteristics diagrammatically represented in Figure 16 are apparent. A view of the cerebral hemispheres from below (Figure 17) shows their relation to the olfactory bulbs, cranial nerves, cerebellum, and other structures.

The cerebellum

The functions of the cerebellum are not entirely known. Its evolution, however, is closely associated with appearance of skills requiring the co-ordination of many muscles, such as swimming, walking, flying, talking, and writing. We know, too, that cerebellar activities are set off principally by impulses from kinesthetic and static receptors. The cerebellum therefore plays a part in controlling equilibrium.

The cerebellum is larger and more complex in birds than in lower animals; it reaches its greatest complexity in man. Its destruction in birds and higher animals leads to abnormal muscular reactions, such as tremor, rigidity, and absence of co-ordinations which normally involve the cerebellum.⁷

The brain stem

The brain stem contains several nerve cen-

ters, some of which are complicated "switch-board" mechanisms. These serve to sort out and relay the incoming impulses to appropriate regions. The brain stem is also the place of entry for nerve impulses from the tongue, nose, eyes, and ears; and of exit for motor impulses which control effectors in the head region. These sensory and motor impulses are conveyed through twelve pairs of cranial nerves, the names and specific functions of which need not concern us here. The brain stem is concerned primarily with routine unconscious behavior. Together with the cerebellum and the primitive part of the cerebrum, it comprises the "old brain."

The chief anatomical divisions of the brain stem are the *medulla*, *pons*, *midbrain*, *hypothalamus*, *thalamus*, and *striate body* or *striatum*. Some of these structures are shown in Figures 15, 16, and 17. Figure 18 suggests their external characteristics and relative position more clearly than other figures.

In addition to providing an avenue for all impulses running between the spinal cord and higher centers, the medulla contains neural connections which automatically control several vital physiological processes, such as respiration and blood pressure.

As its name implies, the pons is a bridge. Its fibers connect both sides of the cerebellum with each other, each side of the cerebellum with the opposite side of the cerebrum, and these structures




Figure 18. The Human Brain Stem, Showing Position of Cerebrum and Cerebellum




Figure 19. How the Various Levels of the Nervous System are Interconnected

A. Connections of an afferent (viz., kinesthetic) path from spinal to cortical levels. B. Some connections made by efferent (motor) impulses in going from cortical to spinal levels. (Simplified from Papez, J. W., "The Brain Considered as an Organ: Neural Systems and Central Levels of Organization," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1937, vol. 49, pp. 217-232.)

with various parts of the brain stem. It is especially important for equilibrium and motor coordination.

From the standpoint of psychology, the most significant functions of the midbrain are those involved in the head and eye reflexes to visual and auditory stimuli.

Within the hypothalamus are centers for control of emotional behavior and wakefulness, as well as several other processes of less interest to psychologists. The rôle of the hypothalamus in emotion will be considered when we discuss emotional behavior.

The thalamus is an elaborate switchboard mechanism, whose chief function is to send incoming sensory impulses to appropriate regions of the cerebral cortex. Impulses originating in the skin are sent to one part of the cortex, those from the ears to another part, and so on. The thalamus also receives impulses from the cortex. Sensory and motor connections between the thalamus and lower levels underlie much of our unconscious automatic behavior. The cortex exerts an inhibitory control over these connections, and, when it is removed,

automatic reactions are often magnified. In lower mammals, and to a certain extent in man, the thalamus mediates a crude sensitivity for certain kinds of stimulation. A simple form of learning also occurs on a thalamic level.

Although some sensory impulses reach the striatum (corpus striatum), it does not convey them to the cerebral cortex. It is primarily a motor structure. Injuries to the striatum often produce motor disturbances, such as tremors, rigidity, and Saint Vitus's Dance. Together with the cerebellum, the striatum is believed to function in coordinated behavior.

Some interconnections of the structures already described are shown in Figure 19. This figure illustrates A, an ascending path (sensory) and B, a descending path (motor), connecting the various levels of the nervous system.

THE HUMAN CEREBRAL CORTEX

The cerebral cortex is connected with the brain stem and spinal cord through sensory

and motor projection fibers, as illustrated in Figure 20. These have two kinds of termination in the cortex: (1) End-brushes of axons running from the thalamus and other structures of the brain stem to the cortex. These carry sensory impulses to cortical areas specialized for their reception. (2) Dendrites of neurons running from the motor area of the cortex to lower centers and eventually to effectors. Some of these descending fibers go to the thalamus, and from there to the stri-




Figure 20. Projection Paths of the Human Cerebrum (After Starr)

atum and other centers. Other fibers travel, without interruption, all the way from the cortex to levels of the spinal cord. These then connect synaptically with efferent neurons. They are the pathways for voluntary motor action.

Various parts of the cerebral cortex are interconnected by the tracts illustrated in Figure 21. Tracts run from one hemisphere to the other through the corpus callosum, which is also illustrated.

The cortex is such an intricate structure that no pictorial representation can do it justice. Nevertheless, Figure 22 A gives a crude idea of the types of cortical neurons and some ways in which they interconnect. In Figure 22 B are shown some of the neurons in a microscopic portion of the motor area.




Figure 21. Association Paths of the Human Cerebrum (After Starr.)

Surface characteristics of the human cerebral cortex are shown in Figure 23. This also indicates the chief divisions of the cerebrum, their names, and functions. The *fissure of Rolando*, which runs from the top of the cortex downward at about the center, separates the *frontal* and *parietal* lobes. From the lower front part of the cerebrum the *fissure of Sylvius* runs horizontally, separating the frontal and parietal regions from the *temporal lobe*. The *occipital lobe* is at the lower back part of the cerebrum.

The tracts, and connections mediated by cortical association neurons, make the cerebral cortex a closely knit system. Activities in one region influence those in others. However, the cortex is by no means a nerve net. Functions of the visual area are different from those of the auditory area. One area receives impulses from the eyes, the other from the ears. Likewise, there are special regions from which impulses going downward (to muscles and glands) are started on their journey. Even within and between association areas there are certain limits to the direction in which nerve impulses travel. They do not spread indiscriminately.

How functions of cortical regions were discovered

The functions of different regions of the cerebral hemispheres were discovered by use of the following procedures: (1) By tracing nerve fibers from one part of the nervous system to another. When nerve cells in the eye




Figure 22. Some Cortical Neurons and Their Interconnections

Note, in A, that some axons, a, stay close to their cell bodies (type 1), while others run in a horizontal direction (type 2), from lower to higher levels of the cortex (type 3), from higher to lower levels of the cortex (type 4), from cells within the cortex to the brain stem and spinal cord (type 5), and from lower levels of the nervous system into the cortex (type 6). Types 1-4 are purely connector in function, type 5 motor, and type 6 sensory. Note the types of connection possible in the illustration as an impulse (sensory) reaches the cortex via the neuron of type 6. (After Hathaway.) B shows a section of the human cortex in the motor region and, better than A, suggests the actual complexity of neural interconnections (after Cajal).

are destroyed, for example, the attached fibers degenerate, and the degeneration is traced back to centers in the brain stem. Destroying cells of connecting nerve fibers in the brain stem causes degeneration which is traced to




Figure 23. Left Cerebral Hemisphere of a Human Brain

the occipital lobe. (2) By destroying regions of the cortex in animals and observing sensory, motor, and associational defects resulting from the operations. (3) By observing the effects of accidental, or necessary operational, injuries to the human cortex. Much information of this sort has been obtained by brain surgeons in the course of their practice, and by neurologists working on the battlefield. (4) By electrical stimulation of the cerebral cortex in animals and in human beings about to undergo brain operations. Since patients are often conscious and able to carry on normal conversation with the surgeon during electrical stimulation, and even during the brain operation itself, much information concerning the cortex and experience may be gathered.

SENSORY FUNCTIONS OF THE CORTEX

Specialized sensory areas are found in the parietal, temporal, and occipital lobes. Their

location, as well as that of association areas, has been indicated in Figure 23. They are called *sensory projection areas* because impulses originating in receptors are, as it were, projected upon them.

Somaesthetic sensitivity

A portion of the parietal cortex located just behind the fissure of Rolando serves as a terminal or projection area for impulses originating in the skin and in kinesthetic receptors. It is called the *somaesthetic* (or body feeling) area. Impulses reaching it from receptors in the skin provide, under normal conditions, the basis of our experiences of temperature and touch. Experiences associated with movement of body parts also normally depend upon impulses sent to this region.

When the somaesthetic area is stimulated electrically in human beings, there are reports of temperature, touch, and movement experiences. These experiences are localized not in the brain, but on or in the body. For example, a man about to have a brain operation was stimulated electrically on the exposed somaesthetic cortex. As the electrode was moved around within this area, the patient reported feelings of warmth and numbness in his limbs, stroking of his finger (although the finger was of course not stimulated), and also feelings of movement in his limbs.⁸ Another patient said that he had "electric feelings" in his limbs.⁹ In each instance the limb in which the feelings were localized was on the side opposite to that stimulated. The reason for this is that impulses reaching the right cerebral hemisphere from skin and muscles come from the left side of the body. There are no pain, olfactory, gustatory, visual, or auditory experiences associated with stimulation of this area.

A skin sense apparently not represented in the cerebral cortex is pain. No pain has been reported as a result of electrical stimulation in any of the lobes. Moreover, patients have tumors removed from various areas of the cortex and even the cutting involved arouses no pain experience. As already suggested, the

patient is frequently conscious, and carries on a conversation with the surgeon while he is operating. This suggests that pain sensitivity is mediated by the thalamus and not by the cortex. It is interesting to note, furthermore, that sensitivity to touch and temperature continues to exist in human beings after removal of parietal tissues. Thus, while the cortex is normally involved in skin sensitivity, it is not essential. Thalamic connections are sufficient.

Such independence of the cortical projection areas does not exist in the cases of vision and hearing. The thalamus mediates elementary visual and auditory sensitivity in animals like the rat. But human beings are completely blind or deaf if the respective cortical areas are destroyed. Only unconscious reflex response to visual and auditory stimulation occurs in such cases.

Visual sensitivity

Impulses coming from visual receptors end in the occipital lobe. As shown in Figure 23, their terminus is at the tip of this lobe. The visual area in the right cerebral hemisphere receives impulses from the right half of each eye and in the left cerebral hemisphere from the left half of each eye. (See Figure 155.) If the visual cortex of the right hemisphere is destroyed, the right half of both eyes becomes blind. Total blindness resulting from cortical injury could occur only if the visual areas were destroyed in both cerebral hemispheres.

The epileptic is often warned of a coming fit by flashes of light, whirling colors, and similar visual experiences. In such cases there is frequently irritation of tissues in the visual cortex caused by tumors or other abnormal conditions. This irritation arouses visual experiences such as might occur if the eyes from which the fibers come were themselves stimulated. A patient whose exposed visual cortex was stimulated electrically said she saw "something pink and blue." Stimulated again, but at another point, she saw "a star." Another patient saw "whirling colors" while the surgeon was cutting into his visual cortex.¹⁰

Auditory sensitivity

Nerve impulses initiated in the ears eventually find their way to the auditory area of the temporal lobe. Destruction of the auditory cortex in one hemisphere causes only minor defects of hearing.¹¹ The reason for this is that each ear has representation in both hemispheres. (See Figure 176.) If both auditory areas are destroyed in man, however, he is completely deaf.

Auditory experiences are often reported just preceding epileptic fits involving the temporal lobes. Electrical stimulation or cutting of the auditory areas results in humming, buzzing, and even musical sounds.¹²

MOTOR FUNCTIONS OF THE CORTEX

The motor cortex of human beings is a relatively narrow strip of tissue which runs along the frontal portion of the fissure of Rolando, as illustrated in Figure 23. Within this area are large cells shaped somewhat like pyramids, hence the name *pyramidal* is attached to them and their axons. Destruction of pyramidal cells leads to a degeneration of their axons, which are then traced to levels of the brain stem or spinal cord on which synaptic connections with efferent neurons occur. Some of the axons originating in these cells cross to the opposite side of the body in the medulla. Those not crossing at this level do so just before they connect with efferent neurons. For this reason, the motor area of one cerebral hemisphere controls the opposite side of the body. Destruction of the motor area on one side is followed by loss of voluntary movement on the other side of the body. Although voluntary movement is lost in the corresponding limb when a portion of the motor area is destroyed, the individual is able to move the limb reflexly in response to strong stimuli. This is because reflex arcs are still functioning.

It was once thought that paralysis produced by cortical injuries is permanent. Experiments with rats and monkeys, however, demonstrated that limbs paralyzed by destruction of cells in the motor cortex sometimes recover

their functions. This suggested that paralyzed human beings, if given suitable training, might also recover the use of paralyzed muscles. The suggestion proved worth while, for massage and attempts to move paralyzed members in various ways have frequently yielded successful results.

There was a soldier aged thirty years who, as the result of a lesion in the motor cortex, had been paralyzed in one arm for six years. Massage and passive exercise of the arm (i.e., exercise produced by another and by the individual himself with non-paralyzed muscles which enabled him to move the arm as a whole) began to show results after four months. By repeated attempts to move the paralyzed muscles themselves, the soldier eventually regained ability to bend his elbow, raise his arm, flex his wrist, and so on. He even played ball, but with relatively poor skill.

Then there is the somewhat similar case of a woman of fifty-eight who had been paralyzed in one arm for years. The psychologist-physician who worked with her, as well as with the soldier just mentioned, reports that after some weeks of re-education she was able to

perform many complex movements of the arm including those required in sewing. About eight weeks after I began to work with her I found that she had acquired the ability to oppose the forefinger and thumb. I then took a wide muslin bandage on which I turned over a hem. I took two stitches to indicate how and what I wanted her to do. Then handing her the threaded needle and cloth she found that she was able to do this work. At first her movements were slow. She made only twenty-one stitches in five minutes, and the individual stitches were irregularly placed and irregularly directed. At the end of five weeks, she averaged thirty-three and five-tenths stitches in five minutes, but they were fine and regularly placed.¹³

Both of these individuals had injuries in the motor cortex. Pyramidal cells were irreparably destroyed. Yet the parts normally controlled by these cells recovered their functions. The reason offered is that neighboring cells were, as a result of the training proce-

dures, "induced" to take over the lost functions. This substitution of neighboring cells for those lost is referred to as *vicarious functioning*. Such functioning rarely, if ever, occurs in cases of injury to sensory projection areas, but it is often reported in cases where motor or association tissues are involved

Electrical stimulation of the motor cortex has led to the discovery of regions (see Figure 23) which control various parts of the body. When the upper region is stimulated electrically, for example, the lower limbs on the opposite side of the body, or parts of them, are forced to move. When the lower region is stimulated, the face may twitch, the mouth be opened or closed, and so on. The points from which these responses are aroused usually change somewhat from time to time. Sometimes stimulation on a particular point arouses a response, and at other times it does not. The reason for this is probably that what occurs in a particular region at any moment is influenced by what has been and is occurring in neighboring cells with which it is connected. Two authorities on epilepsy, who have themselves stimulated many human brains, say

The cerebral cortex is not a key-board which can be struck with the expectation that an invariable response will be the result. It is a structure containing many different neural circuits which subserve many functions. Stimulation at a point may activate one of these circuits and not others, so that a single response occurs and not a mixture of responses, but the other elements are there just the same. Response from an individual point in the cortex depends upon antecedent influences and coincidental influences of many types.... Functional localization exists in the cortex, not in "centers" or "points," but in arcs and patterns that extend into various regions of the brain. For example... one point may invariably yield movement of the thumb. We are entitled to conclude from that fact, not that thumb movement is represented at that point, but only that a part of neural connections involved in causing the thumb to move is to be found there.¹⁴

ASSOCIATIVE FUNCTIONS

The cerebral cortex is a device not only for

receiving sensory and initiating motor impulses, but also, through its association neurons, for connecting, relating, and integrating them. Its connecting, relating, and integrating functions, plus its susceptibility to modification during an organism's lifetime, provide the foundations of such psychological processes as learning, recalling past experiences, and thinking. As far as relatively simple learning processes are concerned, the associative functions of a rat's brain are not specialized. The more brain tissue one removes, the greater the number of errors made in learning a maze. But it does not matter from what area we remove a particular amount of tissue.¹⁵ This principle of mass action, and its explanation, are considered more fully in the chapter on foundations of learning. In the present instance we are interested primarily in the human cortex and in typically human psychological processes. Here we find specialization of particular regions for complex associative functions like language processes, recall, and reasoning. It is convenient to refer to these specialized association areas as *sensory*, *motor*, and *frontal*.

When modified tissues of sensory and motor association areas (see Figure 23) are destroyed, the situations which modified them lose their significance. Consider, for example, the condition known as *aphasia*, or loss of speech functions. The individual with aphasia learned, as a child, to read, write, speak, and to understand speech sounds made by others. Destruction of cortical association tissues, however, "wipes out" what he has learned. This shows that "traces" of some kind are left to represent past experience. Rearousal of these traces allows one to reproduce, as it were, the circumstances which made them. With the traces gone, corresponding gaps in experience are present.

Destruction of the auditory speech area is followed by auditory aphasia, or inability to understand spoken words. This is not a sensory defect as such, for the person may hear perfectly well. Nor is it basically a motor defect, for he may speak and write. He has

merely lost the meaning of speech sounds. In this regard, the aphasic individual is as handicapped as an infant who has not yet acquired an understanding of speech

Destruction of the visual association area is followed by loss of ability to understand written language. The individual sees perfectly well, for he may trace the letters. He has merely lost his understanding of them

Likewise, ability to speak and to write in a meaningful fashion is lost after destruction of association areas near the motor cortex. The individual may be able to move his vocal mechanisms and to make marks with a pencil, but the sounds and marks have no meaning. They are as meaningless to us as the untutored vocalizations and scribbles of a child. What was learned has been lost, because the neural traces produced while learning was taking place have been destroyed

Brain injuries are not usually confined to a particular area; hence, aphasia usually involves a mixture of the abovementioned conditions. Moreover, aphasia in the right-handed is usually associated with injuries in the left cerebral hemisphere and in the left-handed with injuries in the right cerebral hemisphere. This underlies the view that the left hemisphere, as far as both handedness and speech functions are concerned, is normally dominant.¹⁶

That individuals with aphasia may recover their lost functions is demonstrated in re-education experiments similar to those already discussed in connection with recovery of motor functions. A psychologist who has worked with many such cases comments as follows concerning the recovery process:

The individual begins with nothing and slowly, as a child, he reacquires what he has lost. It is mainly by a process of trial and error, as in the case of animal learning. The patient is asked to name an object, or to read a printed or written word. This he cannot do, let us say. The word is then given him verbally and he tries to repeat it. He may or may not succeed, and if asked again within five minutes he may give an entirely different collection of sounds. By repetition he may eventually

be able to say the word whenever it is demanded, but the learning process is slow, and there are many errors before definiteness and certainty of response are attained.¹⁷

Similar instances could be cited of individuals who, as a result of training, recovered ability to read, to name colors, to write, and to play pieces of music

Which of the remaining brain tissues substitute for those lost is not known. Some believe that the opposite cerebral hemisphere is modified in the relearning process; others that association tissues neighboring upon those destroyed take over their functions. At least we can conclude that new modifications are produced somewhere within the cortex, and also that new connections of nerve fibers are established. The psychologist whom we have already quoted gives the following analogy, but with the caution that it should not be taken too literally

Let us suppose that a storm in the mountain has broken the telephone cables connecting this city [Los Angeles] with northern points, or that the main station through which northern messages go has been destroyed by fire. For the time being communication is suspended. The social function is lost. Direct messages are impossible. But relays and indirect communication may be possible. The telephone lines to Salt Lake City, those from Salt Lake City to Sacramento and to San Francisco may remain sufficiently intact to function. If these accessory, but circuitous lines are working, it is still possible, though with some difficulty, to get communications through to the north. The functional loss is compensated for by less direct activities.¹⁸

Frontal association areas

The frontal association areas are important for certain complex associative processes. This has been shown in experiments with animals ranging from rats to apes; and in observations on human beings who have injuries in both frontal lobes. The processes particularly affected are recall of recent experiences, reasoning, and motivation. Marked personality changes are at times involved.

Monkeys and apes, for example, normally remember under which of two identical cups they have seen food placed. The typical experiment is to confront an animal with two upturned cups, one to his right and one to his left; to put food under either cup while the animal is looking; to place a screen between the animal and the cups; and to disorient him so that he cannot continue to stare at, or keep his body turned toward, the correct cup. After a predetermined interval, the experimenter raises the screen and releases the animal. To be scored correct, the animal must go directly to the cup under which food was placed. The right and left position of the correct cup varies in a random order from trial to trial, both cups are smeared with food so that no odor cue will be present to guide the animal, and the experimenter is hidden from view so that no attitudes or movements of his will be seen. In short, the animal can respond with consistent accuracy throughout a number of tests only if he remembers under which cup the food was placed. Monkeys and chimpanzees tested in the above fashion normally exhibit consistent accuracy after periods ranging from several minutes to several hours.

When association areas outside the frontal lobes are destroyed, there is no disturbance of ability to recall the correct cup. Moreover, destruction of only one frontal area has no effect. It does not matter whether the area destroyed is in the right or the left hemisphere; hence there is, so far as memory is concerned, no dominance of one side. When both frontal association areas are completely destroyed, however, ability to recall where the food was placed is completely lost. Animals do not remember the location of the food even for as long as one or two seconds. Partial destruction of both sides does not abolish ability to recall, but it does reduce the time which may elapse between seeing the food placed and ability to locate it correctly.¹⁹

An interesting further outcome of such experiments is the personality change which occurs. The normal animal shows much excitement while the cups are baited, and espe-

cially after he has made an error and lost the opportunity to get food on that trial. But the operated animal remains quite passive and undisturbed. As some investigators have put it, "It was as if the animal had joined the happiness cult of Elder Michaux, and had placed its burdens on the Lord."²⁰

Removal in human beings of large amounts of association tissue in one frontal lobe has practically no influence upon scores made in intelligence tests, tests of memory, and reasoning.²¹ When large areas of destruction occur in both frontal lobes, on the other hand, there is often a weakness of memory for recent events which is comparable to the findings for monkeys and chimpanzees. There is, however, no loss of childhood memories. A marked disturbance of reasoning ability often follows such operations. The individual's reasoning may become hazy, he may go off on tangents, and he may be unable to plan effectively for the future.²² Sometimes, following such operations, the defect appears to be emotional and motivational more than intellectual as the following quotations suggest.

In one of the most carefully controlled studies of frontal-lobe function, an intelligent patient was studied intensively for many months. Because of a tumor, a large part of both frontal lobes had to be removed (the right specimen weighed 108 grams, the left specimen, 121 grams, thus making a total cerebral loss of 229 grams). This operation was performed by Dandy. The subject was a stockbroker who owned a seat on the New York Stock Exchange. As a result of the operation just described, the patient's personality underwent certain changes, but they were less intellectual than emotional alterations. Whereas before the operation the patient had been rather taciturn, he now became boastful. After the operation, he showed less regard for the feelings and welfare of his family than before. The simple elements of old and new associative material, however, could still be completely understood by the subject. He seemed less able, however, to utilize diverse material in forming complex syntheses than had been characteristic of him before. Yet he was still able to solve mathematical problems involving the use of algebra, and it was still possible for him to memorize a poem when he was asked to do so.

This case is interesting in relation to the famous "crowbar case" reported many years ago in which a laborer lost a large part of the frontal part of the brain in a blasting accident and showed very little intellectual change following his recovery from the accident though his temper became more violent and his general emotional control less effective than it had been ²³

... The present evidence seems to indicate that a loss of the frontal lobes rather subtly affects the entire mental life of the human individual. The emotional and motivational, as well as the intellectual, behavior is changed characteristically, though sometimes only very subtly, in unfortunate individuals who have lost large parts of their frontal lobes. This observed fact suggests that the frontal lobes are involved in the intellectual functions characterized by "drive." The frontal lobes also seem to involve the capacity of an individual to synthesize past learned acts or associations into very complex conceptual wholes ²⁴

SUMMARY

All psychological processes are responses of organisms to stimuli, hence, those characteristics of animals which enable them to respond to stimuli are of central importance for psychology. The response systems of organisms grow out of the properties of protoplasm, as found in the ameba. These properties are: (1) sensitivity to stimulation, (2) conduction of the effects of stimulation to other parts of the animal than those stimulated, and (3) movement of body parts. The growth process is characterized by a gradual specialization of previously undifferentiated tissues. This specialization process ends in the production of receptors, effectors, and neural structures.

As specialized receptors emerged and developed increasing complexity, the organisms possessing them became capable of responding to more and more environmental detail. There was added to simple brightness sensitivity an ability to respond to visual details, such as the shape and size of objects, their color, and their depth. Response to air vibrations at a distance became possible, and the organism developed the ability to discern

noises and tones. Skin sensitivity was refined to produce separate contact, temperature, and pain senses. From specialization of a common chemical sense came the senses of taste and smell. These and other receptor changes gradually broadened, as it were, the sensory horizon of organisms in which they occurred.

With specialization of effectors and development of effector organs, such as fins, wings, and limbs came a corresponding increase in ability to move around in the environment and to manipulate it. This specialization reached its highest manifestation in the human hand, which is the basis of our control of fire and invention of implements and weapons. Even language is partly due to development of the hand, for hands freed the mouth and throat from needs of manipulation other than eating and allowed specialization of effectors for speech. Receptor and effector changes were closely correlated with the development of the nervous system.

Development of neural mechanisms began with the appearance of fibers connecting receptors in the skin with muscles situated some distance below. After this came a nerve net which spread impulses to all parts of the organism. Neural connections then became more specific, finally producing reflex-arc mechanisms; the sensory, motor, and association neurons made contact through synapses.

Neural evolution involved increasing centralization of function. Centralization of a relatively simple kind is found in the nerve ring of the starfish and in the ganglion of each segment of earthworms. The highest degree of centralization, however, occurs in the brain, which was foreshadowed by the cerebral ganglia of earthworms. We have considered the various developments in the brains of animals ranging from fish to man. The most significant of these were an increase in the size of the cerebrum relative to body weight, invagination of the surface to provide more space for association neurons of the cortex, and an increase in the relative amount of the cortex given over to functions of association. The

final psychological results of neural evolution were ability to recall past experiences, to reason, and to speak

In addition to containing specialized projection areas for the somæsthetic, auditory, and visual senses, the cerebral cortex has specialized regions which play a large part in the control of voluntary motor activities. Vicarious functioning of other neurons may, however, follow the destruction of motor tissues.

Association functions of the human cortex, although somewhat specialized, are less specialized than sensory and motor functions. The modifiability of cortical association neurons during an individual's lifetime is espe-

cially important. Connecting, relating, and integrating activities of the cortex are necessary for language functions, recalling, and thinking. Brain injuries often produce personality changes. An understanding of these functions is increased when we refer to aphasia and to the decrease of memory and reasoning abilities which follow injuries of cortical association areas.

The rôle of brain functions in motivation, emotion, learning, remembering, thinking, perceptual processes, intelligence, and personality will receive further consideration in later chapters dealing with these topics.

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Chapter 4

From Conception to Maturity

WE HAVE SEEN that man's psychological processes are the final outcome of a long biological history which began with the sensitivity and behavior of animals like the amoeba. Our concern so far has been with the development of the psychological processes of man in general. We now turn our attention to the psychological significance of the individual's biological history.


To cover the whole range of development from conception to maturity would require a volume in itself. It is the early stages, however, which are most significant for us. During these stages all the basic psychological processes make their appearance. The individual's later development involves the use and elaboration of these processes.

In considering psychological development, it is well to start from the beginning of life, from conception. The reason for this is that, at the moment of conception, forces are set in motion and conditions begin to operate which are influential in shaping the course of all future development. No psychological processes are evident until long after conception, but factors present from the time of conception determine, to a very large extent, what these processes will be.

LIFE BEGINS

Each of us begins life as a single fertilized cell smaller than the head of a pin. At first an ovum (egg), such as that shown in Figure 24, develops, and becomes susceptible to fertilization. Soon after fertilization takes place the ovum divides to form two cells. These di-

vide to form a total of four, these again to form a total of eight, and so on, until a small ball of tightly packed cells is formed. Shortly after the ball of cells appears, liquid enters



**Figure 24. An Unfertilized Human Ovum
Magnified 450 Times**

Post-ovulation age is from two to three days. (From Hefig, I. T., and Rock, J. "Information Regarding the Time of Human Ovulation, Derived from a Study of Three Unfertilized and Eleven Fertilized Ova," *American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology*, 1944, vol. 47.)

and forces the cells apart. This forms a cavity in the cellular mass. The human body develops from one group of these cells. The remaining cells form a protective envelope, a liquid-filled sac in which the fetus develops until the sac's rupture precipitates its birth.

At about two weeks after conception, during which period the child is known technically as an *ovum*, a portion of the sac becomes attached to the uterus. This is the portion from which the child is later suspended, as shown in Figure 25, by the umbilical cord. From the time of attachment to the uterus until two months after conception, it is technically an *embryo*. It now begins to get its




Figure 25. A Human Embryo and Its Maternal Attachment
(After Kingsley)

nourishment from, and excrete waste products through, its mother's circulatory system. This exchange occurs at the point of attachment, by seeping of materials through neighboring membranes rather than by actual joining of the embryo's with its mother's circulatory system.

Meanwhile, the embryo's cells are multiplying and it is becoming larger. In addition to multiplying, however, the cells are differentiating — that is to say, changing in shape and internal structure. Some are becoming nerve cells, others bone cells, still others muscle cells, and so on. This process continues until the embryo gradually assumes human shape. By the end of two months from conception, it has a primitive nervous system, the rough patterns of human eyes and ears, the forerunners of human bones and muscles, and elementary hands and feet. It is, however, without sensitivity and without movement, except that its heart is beating and its muscles, such as they are, could be made to twitch if pinched or subjected to other intense stimulation applied directly. From this stage (two months) until birth, it is known as a *fetus*.

Shortly after the fetal period begins, the child's response systems develop to the point where stimulation of the face or head, with even a thin hair, would be sufficient to initiate activity. This would arouse activity not only in parts stimulated, but in the trunk and limbs. The fetus's skin receptors are now

sensitive to stimulation, and its effectors are sufficiently developed to respond to nerve impulses. If it could be available for observation, the fetus would now be a fitting subject for psychological investigation.

GROWTH OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM

The nervous system is the first response mechanism to emerge from the multiplying and differentiating cells of the organism. At first a crude pattern is laid down, then the spinal cord, brain stem, and cerebrum gradually emerge. While this process is going on, the receptors and effectors also appear. Upon first appearance, these are but crude patterns of their mature development. Finally, the receptors, neural structures, and effectors are linked together, as described in Chapter 3.

Origins of the nervous system

Shortly before the ovum is attached by the umbilical cord to the mother, a groove appears in the outer layer of cells. This groove, clearly seen in Figure 26 A, is the forerunner of the central nervous system. It consists primarily of primitive nerve cells. Growth of these cells provides the fibers which later connect receptors and effectors and different neural structures.

The neural groove soon folds inward and closes off to form a hollow tube, as illustrated in Figure 26 B. At the upper end of the tube, three bulbs appear. The uppermost bulb (forebrain) elaborates to form, among other structures, the thalamus, striatum, and cerebrum. From the middlemost bulb (midbrain) develop the centers for visual-motor and auditory-motor reflexes. Among structures produced by growth of the hindmost bulb (hind brain) are the cerebellum, pons, and medulla. The lower part of the neural groove becomes the embryo's spinal cord.

The reflex-arc system

An early stage in development of the child's reflex connections is illustrated in Figure 27. Nerve fibers grow out from the spinal cord, and eventually into developing receptors and




Figure 26. Stages in the Early Growth of the Nervous System

- A. A nineteen-day human embryo (after Ingalls)
 B. Development of the neural tube
 C. Formation of three brain vesicles and their derivatives (after Luckley)

effectors. Primitive nerve cells, from which axons grow toward effectors, are situated within the cord. Fibers also grow toward the receptors. They grow, however, from cells on the outside of the cord rather than from within. These fibers connect with receptors




Figure 27. Diagram to Illustrate Early Growth of the Reflex-Arc System

Arrows indicate the direction followed by growing nerve fibers. Fibers connect both sides of the cord. Only the right side is shown. (Based upon a drawing in Arey, I. B., "Developmental Anatomy," 4th edition, p. 413.)

some time before the receptors begin to function. Fibers grow from the same cells into the spinal cord. These eventually make synaptic connection with motor fibers, either directly or by means of association neurons. Association neurons develop from nerve cells within the spinal cord and brain. Cells within the spinal cord send fibers toward the developing brain, which eventually serve to convey sensory impulses from lower to upper levels. Nerve cells in the brain send long fibers downward, and these fibers become motor pathways.

Growth of the brain

Stages in the development of the three bulbs which appear at the upper end of the neural tube are shown in Figure 28. Note that invaginations of the cerebrum are late in appearing. They are first evident around the sixth month. At birth, however, invaginations are superficially similar to those of the adult cerebral cortex. The cerebellum, which




Figure 28. Changes in External Appearance of the Human Brain Between the Early Fetal Period and Birth

The brain viewed from above and behind. Observe the increase in size and the appearance of invaginations by the seventh fetal month. (After Retzius and Broman, from Gilbert, M. S., "Biography of the Unborn." Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1939, p. 84.)

is relatively simple at four months, has also increased a great deal in complexity by the time of birth.

When the child is born, its brain is approximately one fourth of the adult brain weight. Most of the growth which takes place after birth is in the cerebral hemispheres. This growth is partly due to continuation of processes started before birth (maturation), and partly due to the effects of stimulation and activity (exercise).

More marked, even, than the gross changes in complexity already mentioned are developments occurring within the microscopic structure of the brain. Nerve cells multiply rapidly. Many migrate to the surface, there to form the cerebral cortex. The fibers of each cell grow out to make synaptic connections with fibers from other cells, thus forming the cortical association system. Some parts of the child's cerebral cortex become specialized to serve as terminals for reception of visual impulses, others for reception of auditory impulses, and so on. Fibers grow into these from cells in the sensory regions of the brain stem. From cells in the motor areas of the

cortex, fibers grow downward to the spinal cord. Here they eventually make functional connection with motor neurons and provide channels for later voluntary control of movement. Some cells send fibers to the opposite side of the brain, forming the corpus callosum, which co-ordinates the functions of the two hemispheres.

Probably almost all the child's more than nine billion brain cells are present when it is born, for postnatal growth of the nervous system is due primarily to increases in the size and length of neurons rather than in number.

GROWTH OF RECEPTORS

Receptors and effectors are, of course, growing at the same time that fibers from the central nervous system approach them. However, the most important parts of some receptors are outgrowths of the nervous system itself. This is especially true of certain skin receptors, and of receptors in the nose, eye, and ear. The latter three are partly outgrowths of the brain.

Receptors in the nose are direct outgrowths of the olfactory bulbs, which lie directly above the nose. The eye begins as an outgrowth of the brain. A stalk grows from the brain stem toward the outer layer of the body. As it nears the outer layer, part of this layer thickens and turns inward (invaginates), eventually forming a lens. The optic nerve and retina are differentiations of the primitive optic stalk which grows out from the brain stem.

The ear begins as an invagination of the skin. A small sac develops to form the structures of the inner ear. Fibers grow to these structures from the brain stem. Fibers from the auditory nerve, accessory structures of the inner ear, and the middle and outer ear develop from neighboring tissues.¹

All receptors are well along in their development before the third month of prenatal life. Some of them begin to function as early as the third month, while others have to wait until appropriate stimuli are presented at the time of birth. Those which begin to function early are the receptors for touch sensitivity, for

kinesthesia, and possibly for static or equilibrium sensitivity.

EFFECTOR DEVELOPMENT

Soon after the neural groove develops, a shell of cartilage envelops it. This cartilage differentiates to form the vertebral column and skull. Other parts of the skeleton are also first laid down crudely in the form of cartilage. As the child grows, these differentiate and ossify to form the separate bones of its skeleton. The tendons and striped muscles develop at the same time and become attached to the growing skeleton.

The limbs first look like buds on the sides of the body. As they grow outward, crude patterns of hands and feet appear. The growth of these is illustrated in Figure 29. At the stage of development shown here, motor axons are growing toward the muscles. It is early in the third month, however, before they make functional connection; that is, before impulses traveling to muscles over the axons can arouse a reaction.

The other effectors (the glands) are of two general kinds. (1) *ductless* or *endocrine*, which pour their secretions into the blood stream directly, and (2) *duct*, like the tear and salivary glands, which secrete elsewhere than into the blood stream. The endocrine glands (thymus, adrenal, and so on) develop earlier than the others. Their secretions play an important

part in the development of the fetus. The duct glands, on the other hand, play no known rôle in development or in behavior until the child is born.

BEHAVIOR OF THE UNBORN

Mothers are usually not aware of fetal movements until between the fourth and fifth months after conception. That movement actually can, and probably does, occur before that time is shown by several types of observation, including application of a stethoscope to the mother's abdominal wall. The most enlightening observations, however, have been made on fetuses which, because the mother's health required it, were delivered prematurely by means of a Caesarian operation. Unless they are six to seven months old from the time of conception, these fetuses cannot live more than a few minutes, even when placed in a solution like that from which they came, which is kept at the mother's body temperature and diffused with oxygen.

The first response

Studies with human fetuses delivered by Caesarian operation and placed in a solution like that mentioned have shown that the earliest functioning of receptor-effector connections appears between the eighth and ninth weeks. Stimuli applied below the neck at




Figure 29. Development of the Human Limbs Between the Fifth and Eighth Weeks
(After Arey, L. B., "Developmental Anatomy." New York: Saunders, 1940, p. 159.)




Figure 30. Response to Tactile Stimulation of the Face in a Human Fetus of Approximately 8.5 Weeks
 (Courtesy of Dr. Davenport Hooker.)

this time arouse no activity. However, stimulation of the face or head with a hair produces a complicated response involving the whole body. Such a response, in a fetus of about 8 5 weeks, is shown in Figure 30

The head turns away from the stimulus, the arms move down, the rump is rotated, and the body arches away from the side stimulated. Within one to a little over two seconds, the fetus returns to its original posture. Many of the structures involved are moved, not by their own functioning, but passively through activities of neighboring structures. Similar movements are sometimes made by a fetus of between nine and ten weeks, even though no stimulus is applied.² These are the so-called "spontaneous" movements. They probably result from internal stimulation of some kind.

Growth of the response repertoire

During the fourth month following conception, many new and more specific responses appear. Several reflexes exhibited by newborn babies can be aroused at this time. During this month, also, the entire body surface becomes responsive to stimulation. The greater specificity of behavior, with the possibility of arousing it by stimulation applied anywhere on the body surface, is due to growth of receptors and effectors and their nervous connections.

The activity of fetuses during their fifth month of life is so great that the mother is clearly aware of it. Among new responses which appear at this age is the grasping reflex. Weak grasping occurs when the palm is touched.³ Complicated reflexes involving both sides of the body also appear at this stage of development. When one foot is stimulated and responds, for example, the opposite hand also reacts. This type of reflex, which appears in crawling and walking activities, has been called a *trot reflex*. Slow rhythmic movements, like those involved in breathing, have likewise been observed in the fifth month of prenatal life.

The sixth month brings strengthening and further complexity of reflex activities. A few

new responses appear. One of these is faint "crying" upon exposure of the fetus to air. From the seventh month until the normal time of birth, there is a good chance of survival following delivery. This is because the response mechanisms have developed to a stage where breathing, sucking, and other vital activities can occur.

The growth of behavior which we have sketched is due primarily to development of receptors and effectors, and of their interconnections through the spinal cord and, later, the brain stem. While the cerebral cortex is growing rapidly during the latter part of this period, its rôle in the integration of behavior is apparently either small or nonexistent. Its removal in some early fetuses has had no effect upon behavior. Even at the time of birth there is apparently little dependence of behavior upon functioning of the cerebral cortex. This is shown by the following facts: (1) children born without a cerebrum manifest normal reflexes; (2) motor abnormalities due to birth injuries to the cerebrum do not show up until some months after birth; and (3) brain waves (electroencephalograms) are only elementary in newborn babies.⁴

BIRTH AND AFTER

From the standpoint of psychology, the chief importance of birth is that it introduces the child to new, more complex, and more intense stimulation. The world is immeasurably wider after birth than before. Moreover, it includes social as well as nonsocial stimuli. The child is now influenced, in other words, by contacts with parents, other children, and neighbors. The fact that it is now an independent organism, carrying on its own respiratory and digestive functions, is of greater physiological than psychological interest. It does, however, provide new forms of stimulation and new kinds of sensitivity. The child may, for example, now become hungry and thirsty. This was hardly possible while it was obtaining nourishment from the mother's circulatory system.

Sensitivity at birth

The sensitivity of newborn babies is gauged from behavior elicited by various forms of stimulation. For example, if the child withdraws its hand when it is pricked with a needle but not when it is merely touched, pain sensitivity is assumed to be present; if the eyes follow a moving visual object, visual sensitivity is present, if there is a different response to red from that to green of the same brightness, color vision is present; if the sucking response is different for salty from that for sweet milk of the same temperature, taste sensitivity is present, if sucking differs for milk at a temperature of 40° C and a temperature of 22° C, temperature sensitivity is present; and so on. Psychologists have systematically studied all kinds of sensitivity in human infants, and the general conclusion is that every sense is functional at, or within a few weeks after, birth. Some of these senses, however, require more intense stimulation at birth than they do later.⁵

Behavior of the newborn

The behavior of newborn human beings may be characterized in several ways. (1) There are a large number of reflexes, most of which may be aroused prior to birth. Practically all adult reflexes are present. There are also a few reflexes (such as the spreading of the toes to stimulation of the sole) which disappear later in infancy. (2) There are a number of complex behavior patterns (such as being startled in response to certain stimuli) which obviously involve the co-ordination of several reflexes. (3) There are diffuse, generalized, or mass responses of the body. These are not easily described, and are usually referred to as mass or generalized activities to distinguish them from the more specialized reflexes and reflex patterns.⁶

Which comes first, reflex behavior or activity of the whole organism? There has been much discussion concerning this issue. Some believe that behavior is at first generalized and that specific responses (reflexes) emerge from, or differentiate out of, such diffuse or

generalized patterns. Others take the view that reflexes come first and that all larger behavior patterns are combinations of these.

With a few exceptions, the evidence favors the first alternative.⁷ Most behavior, both unlearned and learned, prenatal and postnatal, is at first widespread, involving many body parts. Responses of greater specificity — those narrowed down to particular parts of the organism, as in the case of reflexes — usually appear relatively late in fetal life. Some fetal responses, however, are quite specific. Note the downward movement of the hands in Figure 30, and their return to the original position. Such a response at this age, however, does not occur separately from responses of the body as a whole. Later, it is a separate response. It may be elicited without movement of the rest of the body.

We see the same process of behavioral differentiation after birth. The baby's first efforts to crawl involve many responses unnecessary for efficient crawling. Gradually the unnecessary responses drop out. The same is true of walking. The child spreads its feet too far apart, lifts its knees too high, flexes its knees too much, and, to aid balance, moves its arms in ways which are unnecessary to achieve efficient walking. In grasping objects, too, the hand is first used as a whole. The child "palms" the object. Later on, however, activities of the hand as a whole make way for precise finger-thumb opposition.

LOCOMOTION

Development of locomotion in human infants has been studied extensively. Two aspects have received particular attention: (1) the *sequence of locomotor development*, and (2) the *mechanics of locomotion*.

The sequence of locomotor development

The early motor development of children usually follows a similar sequence. This sequence is illustrated in Figure 31. A particular child, although it will probably follow this sequence closely, may reach any one of




Figure 31. Some Stages in the Motor Sequence
(After Shirley.)

these stages at a greater or less age than that indicated. Some children, for example, walk as early as ten or eleven months; others not until they are about two years old. In the former case, the stages may be telescoped; in the latter, they are drawn out. Occasionally, too, a child skips one or more stages. Sometimes, for example, walking occurs before creeping.⁸

An interesting phenomenon associated with the motor sequence is control of the upper before the lower parts of the body. This head-to-tail (cephalo-caudal) sequence is found in development of motility in all vertebrates.

The mechanics of locomotion

When mechanics of locomotion are considered, we differentiate between the locomotor sequence from the initial stages of prone progression to creeping and the sequence from standing to walking.

In early stages of prone progression, the abdomen remains in contact with the floor. The baby at first merely raises its head and moves its hands and feet in an inco-ordinated manner. Later, it raises its chest. The baby cannot, at this stage, support its weight on hands and knees, but moves by sliding and pivoting on the abdomen. When the crawling stage is reached, there is movement forward, but with the abdomen still on the floor. The baby's movements, at first clumsy, are co-ordinated so that an object may be approached more or less directly. Finally, the abdomen is raised from the floor, and creeping begins. From this point on, the further development of creeping usually consists in better co-ordination of hands and legs, and an increase in the speed and amount of creeping. Sometimes, however, a child straightens his legs and walks on all fours, in monkey fashion.⁹

When the child stands up, his biggest mechanical problem is balance. He now has only two points of contact with a surface. These are small, the center of gravity is high, and the weight of the body relatively slight. All three factors contribute to the initial unstable equilibrium. He partially overcomes this handicap, at first, by spreading the feet. Eventu-

ally, he counteracts it by proper co-ordination of muscles.

When the child steps out, a new integration of sensory and motor functions is required. At first he keeps his feet wide apart, often walking in such a way as to lift them as little as possible from the floor. Sometimes, however, he raises his feet too high. Moreover, the child tends to walk flat-footed at first. Heel and toe progression comes later. Although, in the first stages, the hands are held up and outward to aid balance, they are later dropped and normally flexed at the sides. The development of upright locomotion is characterized by increased speed of walking and, finally, by running.¹⁰

PREHENSION

Prehension is voluntary grasping. We refer to activities involved in reaching and grasping as *prehensile*. Grasping, as we have seen, is possible in prenatal life. The normal newborn child has a very strong grasp, often sufficiently strong to support the body. Early grasping activities, however, are reflex responses of the hand as a whole. They occur only when an object is placed in the hand. No reaching toward objects and voluntary grasping is evident until several months after birth.

If a baby of about twenty weeks is placed at a table top, as shown in Figure 32, and a cube is placed in a position equidistant from both hands, only fixations of the object with the eyes and random movements of the arms are apparent. With increasing age, however, the hands are brought more and more directly to the cube. Later, one hand is used instead of two. During the first half year, there is fluctuation from one hand to the other. Finally, the activity of the right or left hand predominates — usually, of course, the right.¹¹

The voluntary grasping response itself undergoes a gradual change. Some steps in the sequence from reflex to voluntary grasping are illustrated in Figure 33. Note that the palming response, which involves indiscriminate use of the hand as a whole, appears first.




Figure 32. Testing Development of Prehensile Activity in Babies

(Courtesy of Dr. Arnold Gesell)

Gradually, the fingers are opposed to the thumb. Finally, at around a year, forefinger-thumb opposition appears. This, as we have seen, is a form of manipulatory skill present to a high degree only in man.¹²

LANGUAGE

Walking, forefinger-thumb opposition, and language are the most significant achieve-




Figure 33. A Series of Steps in Developmental Sequence of Grasping a Cube
(After Halverson.)

ments of infancy. All three play important rôles in later psychological activity. Language, however, is of the greatest psychological significance, for it not only enables the child to influence others and learn from them, but it is intimately involved in his thought processes; that is, in recalling, forming concepts, and reasoning

Gestures

Language includes gestures, speech, and writing. However, not all gestures are linguistic. They become language only when used to represent something else, such as distaste, refusal to comply with a request, and agreement. For example, the child's first grimace upon receiving castor oil is not language. It is purely reflex. But when the grimace is attached to the sight of anything or to an idea that one dislikes, it becomes part of a gesture language. Likewise, turning the head from side to side, in our society, is a language response only when it means "no"; nodding the head, only when it means "yes." The child learns such language responses long before he is able to speak, but individual children, depending upon their social contacts, learn them at widely different ages.

Speech

Speech is preceded by vocalizations, such as grunts, cries, vowel sounds, consonants, and combinations like *ma*, *ba*, *goo*. As in the case of gestures, these become linguistic only after they represent something. Even the babbling stage, where the infant vocalizes *ma-ma*, *uggle-uggle-uggle*, *lul-lul-lul*, and so on, is not speech. Some of these sounds become speech, on the other hand, when they represent objects or situations, and especially when their meaning (what they represent) can be communicated to others.

Suppose, for example, that the mother shows special pleasure to the child every time he happens to vocalize "ma-ma," a response at first apparently accidental. If the mother's attention to the vocalization occurs sufficiently often, and if the child is able to make the response voluntarily, he will eventually say "ma-ma" when he hears her, when he

wishes to call her to him, or, perhaps with pointing, when he wants her to leave him. The sounds "ma-ma" have ceased to be mere vocalization, they have become speech.

The first word is acquired at an average age of about ten months. New words, all of them nouns at first, come very gradually. Toward the end of the second year there is usually a rapid spurt and new words are learned daily. One study showed an average of 1 word at 10 months, 3 at 12 months, 10 at 15 months, 22 at 18 months, 118 at 21 months, 272 at 24 months, 446 at 30 months, 896 at 36 months, and 1222 at 42 months.¹⁸ Although nouns always predominate, the other parts of speech gradually appear.

The child often uses a word under such circumstances, and in such a manner, as to suggest a phrase or sentence. "Mama," for instance, may mean not a mere naming of the parent, but "Mama come here." In such cases "mama" is really a "word-sentence."¹⁴

The child's vocabulary is usually fairly extensive (one hundred words or so) before he puts words together in actual phrases and sentences. About two words is the average length of phrases at around two years. By five years the average is about five words.¹⁵

Writing

Like gestures and vocalizations, the marks made by the child gain linguistic significance only after they represent something and can be used to communicate with others. One problem in development of writing is learning to make correct drawings (letters), another is learning what these signify. True written language is present only when the drawings represent something other than themselves and can be used to convey meaning. It frequently happens, however, that the child learns the meaning of written symbols before he can reproduce them.

SUMMARY

Duplication of cells occurs soon after fertilization. The ovum divides to form two cells, these to form four, and soon, as cells continue to multiply in this way, a spherical mass appears. Liquid enters the mass and separates

certain groups of cells. Some of the cells form a fluid-filled sac in which the individual develops until the time of birth. Others give rise to the individual himself. The fluid which surrounds an individual during the embryonic and fetal stages is an important factor in development. Also important is nourishment received, somewhat indirectly, from the mother's circulatory system.

The neural groove is the first part of the future response mechanism to appear. It deepens and its edges invaginate to form a tube. The lower part of the tube becomes the spinal cord. Within the developing spinal cord are primitive nerve cells from which fibers grow toward tissues that are to become muscles. On the outside of the spinal cord are primitive nerve cells which send fibers toward the growing receptors and also into the spinal cord. Cells within the spinal cord develop fibers which connect sensory and motor neurons. Other cells within the spinal cord send fibers upward. These eventually carry sensory impulses toward the brain. Fibers grow from nerve cells in the brain toward lower levels of the nervous system. These fibers eventually become motor pathways. They are the channels for later voluntary movement.

The brain first appears as three bulbs at the forward end of the neural tube. These bulbs differentiate to form the structures of the brain. The outer surface of the cerebrum is at first smooth. As the cerebrum grows in size and internal complexity, however, its surface invaginates, and many wrinkles appear. This gives added room on its surface for billions of nerve cells that are to become the cerebral cortex. Practically all of the esti-

mated nine billion or more nerve cells of the adult brain are believed to be present at birth. Further growth is primarily in the size of neurons, and in the nature of connections between them.

Although some of the receptors do not normally function prior to birth, most of them function when first stimulated after birth.

The limbs, which are our most important effectors, begin as small buds. Although they are well developed at birth, they must undergo further growth and training before we are able to use them effectively.

Reflex activity appears soon after receptors and muscles are interconnected by nerve fibers. Responses of human fetuses delivered by Caesarian operation begin in the third month of prenatal life. The initial response is relatively diffuse, involving the whole organism capable of responding at the time. As the fetus gets older, however, specific reflexes become increasingly apparent. By the fifth month, most of the reflexes of newborn infants are already present. Their further development until birth is primarily in strength. A few new reflexes appear after the fifth month.

Motor and language responses are among the most important activities of the child. Development of locomotor and prehensile responses follows a rather uniform sequence, but the time of appearance of items in the sequence differs from one child to another.

Language consists of gestures, vocalizations, and drawings, which, through the processes of learning, have come to represent certain objects and situations, and which may be used as representative of these in communication with others.

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Chapter 5

Factors in Psychological Growth

WHY IS IT that you developed into a human being rather than a rat, dog, or chimpanzee? Why is it that you became a male rather than a female, or vice versa? Why is it that your physical characteristics at birth were more like those of your parents and close relatives than like those of unrelated individuals? Why is it that your psychological characteristics are human, masculine, or feminine, and resemble those of relatives?

The answer to these questions is twofold. A human being has certain characteristics partly because he receives a particular biological inheritance and partly because he develops under particular environmental conditions, some of which are present from the time of fertilization. Certain aspects of his physical and psychological development result from an interaction of hereditary factors and internal and external environmental conditions, which are much alike in all human beings. Growth resulting from such interaction is known as *maturation*.

HEREDITY

The ovum from which the child develops contains hereditary factors characteristic of human beings rather than other animals. If the child is a male, it inherits certain factors not received by females, and if it is a female, it inherits certain factors not received by males. Moreover, the hereditary factors that it receives are more like those of its parents and close relatives than those of unrelated individuals. The child receives one set from its mother and one set from its father at the time of fertilization. The combined sets are in the

nucleus of the cell from which it develops. Except for the mature reproductive cells, the sets continue to exist, in fact, in every cell of the child's body.

Chromosomes

The dark area in the center of the cell pictured in Figure 34 is the region of the nucleus. From the standpoint of heredity, this is the most important part of the cell, for within the nucleus are structures known to contain the hereditary factors. Because they show up when the cell is stained, these structures are named *chromosomes*, or colored bodies.

The number and individual shape of chromosomes differ a great deal from one species to another. Each unfertilized human ovum has twenty-four chromosomes. These differ from each other in size, shape, and internal makeup.

Although the sets of chromosomes in various unfertilized ova look alike, actually they differ in chemical and other details. Such differences are more pronounced when the ova come from different individuals than when they come from the same individual, and they are more pronounced in unrelated than in re-




Figure 34. Diagram of a Cell




Figure 35 Human Chromosomes Observed with a Microscope

(From Evans, H. M., and Swezy, O., "The Chromosomes in Man, Sex, and Somatic," Biological Memoirs Monographs, University of California, 1929, 9)

lated individuals. Differences within the chromosomes of the ova are the physical bases of hereditary differences among individuals.

When the human ovum is fertilized, twenty-four additional chromosomes are brought in by the sperm. This set of chromosomes looks alike in every human sperm cell. As in the

ova, however, the chromosomes differ internally from one sperm to another and differ more in the sperms of unrelated individuals. These variations provide another physical basis for hereditary differences.

All forty-eight chromosomes, the twenty-four already in the ovum and the twenty-four brought in by the sperm, soon combine in a single nucleus, as illustrated in Figure 35. If the resulting individual is female, the chromosomes from mother and father make twenty-four pairs. If, on the other hand, it is male, the mother and father contribute twenty-three paired chromosomes, but the other two are not paired. One of these is called the X chromosome, the other the Y chromosome. The cell illustrated is from a male, for it has a Y chromosome.

Genes

Every chromosome has internal structures distributed over its entire length. Normally, these are invisible, even under the microscope. In the giant salivary glands of fruit flies, however, they are clearly evident, under a microscope, as shown in Figure 36.

Genes are arranged somewhat as lines in the spectrum. They are often described as "small packets of chemicals," which, being catalysts, influence the growth of surrounding sub-




Figure 36. A Chromosome from the Giant Salivary Gland of the Fruit Fly

(From Painter, T. S., "Salivary Chromosomes and the Attack on the Genes," *Journal of Heredity*, 1934, vol. 24, p. 464).

stances without themselves undergoing any change. Their chemical influence is exerted most directly upon the jellylike substance (cytoplasm) which surrounds the nucleus.

Action of genes on cytoplasm changes the shape and other characteristics of cells. It is through the influence of the genes (plus certain environmental conditions) that some cells become neurons, some muscle fibers, some bone structures, and so on.

When the fertilized ovum is about to divide, its chromosomes (and genes) are duplicated. A complete set is subsequently passed on to each of the resulting cells. This process of duplication and division is shown diagrammatically in Figure 37, where, for purposes of simplification, only two pairs of chromosomes are represented.

Since they have identical chromosomes (and genes), the cells which result from this division are of identical heredity. Sometimes, instead of remaining together as parts of a single organism, the cells separate and form two organisms. The result, if they continue to develop normally, is identical twins. Sometimes they separate only partially, and form Siamese twins. Identical quadruplets may be formed when cells separate at the four-celled stage.*

In all subsequent divisions of cells, up to the time of puberty, the chromosomes are duplicated, as we have described. Each cell has the same heredity. At the time of puberty, however, cells set aside for reproductive purposes undergo a different kind of division. Instead of the chromosomes being split and duplicated just prior to cell division, one member of a pair goes to each new cell. Thus, each cell has only one half of the chromosomes, twenty-four instead of forty-eight. The ovum gets only one half of the mother's,

* The heredity of fraternal twins differs as much, on the average, as that of children from the same parents, but born at different times. This is because fraternal twins are produced by fertilization of different ova by different sperms. Even their prenatal environment differs from that of identical twins, for they develop in different embryonic sacs, while identical twins develop in the same sac




Figure 37. Division of a Fertilized Ovum to Produce Two Cells

and the sperm only one half of the father's chromosomes. Different ova (or sperm) produced by the same individual receive different combinations of chromosomes. Which twenty-four of the forty-eight chromosomes shall go to a particular ovum or sperm is determined by "chance." Fertilization re-establishes the full complement of chromosomes. Which sperm (which set of twenty-four chromosomes

from the male) will unite with which ovum (which set of twenty-four chromosomes from the female) to produce the new individual is again a matter of "chance." The laws of inheritance are laws relating to (1) the "chance" assortment of chromosomes within ova and sperm, and (2) the "chance" association of particular sperms and ova at fertilization.

An example of inheritance

Suppose that a female mouse with a certain inherent defect which produces a whirling or waltzing type of locomotion is mated with a mouse which runs normally. Suppose, too, that the female whirler and the male runner come from pure stock, so far as this trait is concerned. The whirler has the genes r and r , one in each of a pair of chromosomes. The runner, on the other hand, has the genes R and R , one in each of a pair of chromosomes. Use of the capital R in this case indicates that running is *dominant*, and the whirling *recessive*. If the combination Rr should occur, the animal would be a runner. The gene R would dominate. Although it is transmissible to offspring, r would have no effect.

We mate, then, an RR (male) with an rr (female) mouse. How many different kinds of sperm, with respect to this one trait, can occur? The answer is that there can be only one kind. All sperms will carry the R gene. How many different kinds of ova can the female mouse produce? The answer is that all of her ova will carry the r gene. What combination of genes, with respect to this trait, will the offspring (hybrids) have? They will, of course, have the combination Rr , and, since running is dominant, they will be runners. But suppose that we now mate these mice. What is most likely to be the result?

So far as the trait under discussion is concerned, both male and female mice will have two kinds of reproductive cell. There will be R and r genes in the sperms, and R and r genes in the ova. But which sperm will unite with which ovum at the time of fertilization? There are three possible combinations: that is, RR , Rr , and rr . What the new mouse will

become depends on which combination it happens to receive, and this, as shown by the diagram in Figure 38, is predictable only in terms of probability. There is one chance that the mouse will get the combination RR , to two chances that it will get the combination Rr , to one chance that it will get the combination rr . The ratio is

$$1 RR : 2 Rr : 1 rr.$$

The first possibility will produce runners with no recessive gene for this trait; the second possibility will produce runners with a recessive gene; and the third possibility will produce whirlers. There are three chances that the mouse will be a runner to one that it will be a whirler.

If dominance were not present, the first combination would produce runners; the second would probably produce some sort of compromise between running and whirling; and the third would produce waltzers.

This illustration is the simplest we can take. Sometimes many different genes are




Figure 38. Inheritance of Whirling in Mice
(Modified from Sinnott and Dunn.)

involved in the determination of a trait. Their possible combinations, both within ova and sperms and at the time of fertilization, are not as clearly predictable as in the present example. When we follow more than one trait at a time, like running or whirling and color, the situation is also complicated.¹

ENVIRONMENT

You have probably thought of environment as merely that which surrounds an individual — what is outside his body. As a matter of fact, the hereditary factors have an environment much more intimate than this. Their most intimate environment is that within the cell, the part of the cell which surrounds the chromosomes. This is known as the *intracellular environment*. It is largely cytoplasm.

Somewhat farther removed is the environment of the cell as a whole — the other cells which surround it, push against it, and influence it in various ways. This is the *intercellular environment*. It represents the influence of cell upon cell. Sometimes this influence comes from a distance. The organism's glands secrete and send their products through the blood stream to cells in other parts of the body, thus influencing their development. Likewise, neural activities may produce bio-electric currents which attract and in other ways influence the development of cells in their neighborhood, but with which they are not necessarily in physical contact.

Then there is the external environment of the organism before birth — its external prenatal environment. This includes the amniotic fluid which surrounds the individual, the food and other substances coming to it from the mother's blood stream, and pressures exerted upon it through surrounding tissues.

After birth there is the broader external environment with its immense variety of physical and social contacts. This is what we customarily think of as the environment.²

HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT

Some babies are born with physical and psychological abnormalities which depend almost

entirely on defective heredity. Others are born with similar abnormalities, but which in their case are determined almost exclusively by a defective intracellular, intercellular, or prenatal external environment. A study of such cases suggests the respective parts played in prenatal development by hereditary factors and environmental conditions.

Hereditary abnormalities seldom occur in isolation. They crop up here and there among related individuals. These anomalies occur, too, in related persons with different mothers, which would mean different prenatal environments. Some examples of such hereditary defects are the "lobster claw," which appeared in a man and both of his children, the absence of hands and feet, which happened in a father and six out of twelve of his children; and idiocy, which has occurred repeatedly through generation after generation of certain families.³

Abnormalities resulting from defective prenatal environments are isolated occurrences. They appear in related individuals no more often than in those who are unrelated. In many instances, the environmental defect is apparent. Here, for example, is a boy whose arm is withered because the umbilical cord twisted around it during the fetal period. Here is a physical monstrosity whose prenatal quarters were too cramped, or who maintained during the fetal period a position not conducive to normal growth of certain structures.

If the mother's blood stream does not supply enough calcium, abnormalities of the skeleton appear. If her blood sugar is too high as a result of diabetes, the pancreas of her fetus may work excessively. This excessive functioning may continue at birth, reducing the blood sugar of the infant so much that, unless special treatment is given, it dies from an insufficiency of glycogen (hypoglycemia).

Many cases of abnormal head and brain development are believed to result from improper prenatal conditions — perhaps chemical inadequacies of the mother's blood. Head injuries at birth, either through prolonged pressure on the head during a difficult labor or from instrumental delivery, often result in

feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, and other defects. All defects produced in these ways are, of course, environmental. Heredity has nothing whatsoever to do with them.

Sometimes, too, there is a disturbance of intracellular and intercellular conditions. Such disturbances are at times hereditary, in which case they run in families. Quite often, however, they are due to some deviation in the extremely complicated intracellular and intercellular relationships. When the normal sequence of these relationships is interfered with, the baby may be born with marked physical defects. It may, for example, have a hare-lip, missing body parts, slits in place of ears, extra limbs, or be joined, as in Siamese twins, to another individual. The two-headed baby born in Russia several years ago is possibly another example. Some babies are born without a cerebellum, some without a cerebral cortex, and others with parts missing almost anywhere in the nervous system.⁴

Environmental changes prior to birth normally follow the same sequence in all human beings. By contrast with the constant hereditary factors, prenatal environmental conditions are variable. The intracellular, intercellular, and prenatal external environments are constantly changing. But the changes follow a sequence which is alike for all normal human beings. In every normal human embryo or fetus of the same age, these environments are quite similar. The fact that they vary with age rather than with the individual shows that they arise from the similarities rather than from the differences in heredity. They are laid down under the influence of human genes. Despite differences in our genes, we do have the same number of genes and genes specialized for the production of the same basic structures and conditions of early growth. In other words, just as we have genes which contribute to the production of eyes, ears, and so on, we have genes which contribute to the production of similar intracellular conditions, similar dominance of certain cells over other cells, and a similar amniotic sac, placenta, and so on.

The only environmental conditions before birth which are not in some way influenced by hereditary factors are the more or less accidental ones already mentioned — like deviations in cellular growth, restrictions within the uterus, and insufficient nutrition provided through the mother's blood stream.

The postnatal environment

The external environment after birth is extremely variable, and unrelated to the sort of genes which the individual has. No two human beings, even living in the same home and going to the same school, have the same environment. Geographically and socially their environment may seem the same. From the standpoint of its effect on their development, however, it may be quite different. Different individuals within the same environment meet different people, and are influenced differently by the same people. They develop different interests and attitudes, and they identify themselves with different groups — religious, political, and recreational.

The fact that the postnatal environment is so variable and its effects so unpredictable makes it difficult for us to determine, with any high degree of assurance, the relative influence of heredity and environment on postnatal psychological development.

Every one of us is a product of both heredity and environment. We could not develop without genes, and the genes could have no effect without normal surrounding tissues. But is the difference between Mary Brown and Jane Smith due to a difference in their heredity, or in their environment? Unless they are identical twins, with different names, as in some cases to be mentioned shortly, they have a different heredity, and some of the difference between them is attributable to this. They certainly have somewhat different environments, even if living in the same home. And part of the difference, especially in psychological characteristics, is attributable to this. The difference, therefore, between two or more individuals is normally attributable to both heredity and environment.

Which is more important in producing these differences — heredity or environment? The answer depends upon what traits are under examination. Any difference in the appearance and other physical characteristics of Mary Brown and Jane Smith at birth is due primarily to their different genes, for it is probable that their environments before birth were similar. Even after birth, the difference in their environments would produce only superficial differences in physique. But how about traits like intelligence? One may be much brighter than the other. Here again, the difference in their genes may be important, but we cannot be as sure as in the case of physical traits.

The only scientific procedure that can be used in determining the relative influence of heredity and environment on physique, intelligence, personality, or other characteristics is to hold heredity or environment constant while the other is varied. The possibility of carrying out such experiments with human beings is limited. We cannot mate persons of known heredity so as to control the inheritance of their offspring as, for example, we can mate mice or rats. Nor can we subject human beings to a constant environment, because what appears to be the same environment is not psychologically the same.

EXPERIMENTS WITH HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT — HEREDITY CONSTANT

Nature has provided us with some help in holding heredity constant by occasionally producing identical twins. Normally, these are reared together in the same home and, while their environment is not psychologically the same, it is more similar than in the case of individuals not so intimately related.

Is the physical and psychological similarity of identical twins due to their identical heredity, their similar environment, or both? We cannot vary their environment, merely to see what effect this will have. But again, nature, or perhaps we should say society, has come to our aid; for identical twins are some-

times adopted into different homes and localities.

Take, for example, Richard and Raymond, pictured in Figure 39. Richard was adopted at the age of one month by a truck farmer. His foster father moved from one job to another, and Richard attended many different schools. Raymond, his identical twin brother, was adopted at the age of fourteen months by a physician. His home and school environments were superior to those which surrounded Richard. When the two boys were ten years old, they looked like duplicates, which is what one might expect from what has been said about inheritance of physical traits. In I Q (intelligence quotient) the two boys were also, despite their widely different environments, remarkably similar. The I Q of one was 106, and that of the other 105. In



Figure 39. Richard and Raymond
(From Newman, H. H., Freeman, F. N., and Holzinger, K. J., "Twins: A Study of Heredity and Environment," Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937, p. 212.)

personality traits, however, there were marked differences. On some of the tests of personality, the boys differed by from fourteen to twenty-seven points. Their personalities, considered as a whole, probably were much more alike, however, than those of individuals differing in heredity.

Nineteen such pairs of identical twins reared in different environments have been tested. In appearance and other purely physical characteristics, they are practically duplicates. The difference in their I Q 's, however, varies between one and twenty-four points. Personality traits are sometimes very much alike and sometimes very different. These differences are usually much wider than in the case of I Q.

The average difference in the I Q 's of identical twins reared together is about five points. In identical twins reared apart, the difference is around eight points. The difference of five points between identical twins reared together is small compared with the average difference of approximately nine points which exists between fraternal twins reared together. It is, of course, much smaller still compared with the average difference in I Q existing between pairs of unrelated individuals selected randomly.

Identical inheritance thus makes individuals very much alike, not only in physical traits, but also in intelligence. They tend to be alike even when reared in widely different environments.⁵

EXPERIMENTS WITH HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT — ENVIRONMENT CONSTANT

Here we must take an animal experiment, for, as already suggested, no two human beings live in the same environment or react in the same way to the same aspects of their surroundings.

One hundred and forty-two white rats were each given 19 trials in an enclosed alley maze (see page 105 for a picture of a similar maze). The number of entrances into blind alleys (errors) for each rat was determined. The smallest number of entrances was 7, and the

greatest number 214. Rats making very few errors were designated *bright*, and those making many errors were designated *dull*.

Keeping the environment (food, lighting, caging, temperature, and so on) constant, the experimenter bred the brightest rats in each generation with each other. Likewise, he bred the dullest with the dullest. After following this procedure for seven generations, two races of rats — a bright and a dull — were developed. The situation the investigator had at the beginning and the one he had after seven generations of selective breeding are illustrated in Figure 40.

At the beginning, the rats were distributed so that most of them made scores in about the middle of the two extremes. After seven generations, however, there was a bimodal distribution — a distribution in which many rats (the bright) made low error scores, and many other rats (the dull) made very high error scores. Few animals had ability in the middle of these extremes. Selective mating was continued through the eighteenth generation, but without producing any greater difference than that indicated.

Bright and dull rats were then mated. What the investigator obtained in the progeny of this cross and in a further cross between the extremes of this group is illustrated in Figure 41. One can see that mating bright and dull rats, in both instances, produced a distribution much like that with which the experiment began. There were now few bright and few dull rats. Rats of intermediate ability predominated.⁶

In the same environment, therefore, marked differences in learning ability were produced by selective breeding, which means, of course, selecting genes.

We have seen in these two sections on experimental studies of heredity and environment that, when heredity is held constant and environment varied, the variations in environment produce differences in psychological characteristics; and that, when environment is held constant and heredity varied, the variations in heredity also produce differences in




Figure 40. Inheritance of Maze Learning Ability in Rats

The upper figure is to be interpreted as follows: In the parent (P) generation, consisting of 142 rats, the number of errors made in 19 trials ranged from 5 to 214. The intermediate number of errors was made by around 12 per cent of the rats. Smaller percentages of rats made the successively lower and successively higher number of errors. The lower figure represents the seventh generation in which the dull (large number of errors) were mated with dull, and the bright (small number of errors) were mated with the bright. It shows two races, a bright and a dull, with slight overlapping near the center of the error range. (From Tryon, R. C., "Genetic Differences in Maze-Learning Ability in Rats," 39th Annual Yearbook, National Society for the Study of Education, p. 113.)




Figure 41. The Effect of Mating Bright and Dull Rats

Observe that the bright rats had error scores ranging from 9 to around 80, while the dull rats had error scores ranging from around 80 to around 200. Very few rats had scores ranging from 30 to 100. In a cross of bright and dull rats, however, most of the rats had scores in this intermediate range. (From Tryon, R. C., "Genetic Differences in Maze-Learning Ability in Rats," 39th Annual Yearbook, National Society for the Study of Education, p. 115.)

psychological characteristics. Since the same subjects and the same psychological processes were not involved in these two types of variation, we are not able to say how much difference was produced by one type of variation as compared with the other.

There is a strong suggestion, however, that larger individual differences can result from hereditary variations than from environmental variations. The differences between rats and men are due almost entirely to the differences in their heredity. The differences from rat to rat and man to man, however, are partly hereditary and partly environmental in origin. Heredity plays a predominant rôle, no doubt, in producing differences in physique. Extreme variations in intelligence — like the difference between brightness and dullness — are most likely hereditary in origin. Smaller differences in intelligence, on the other hand, are sometimes attributable to heredity and sometimes to environment. This will become more clearly apparent in the chapter on intelligence.* In the chapter on personality,† moreover, it will be evident that heredity and environment both contribute to differences in personality traits, but that environmental variations produce larger differences in personality than they do in the cases of physique and intelligence.

MATURATION

Structure and behavior are said to result from maturation when their development depends solely upon conditions which characterize the race. Maturation in man depends upon the existence of human genes and human intracellular, intercellular, and external prenatal conditions. The genes, as we have already seen, play an important rôle in producing such environmental conditions.

Because the early environmental conditions play a rôle in development, it would not be correct to say that any structure or function which matures is inherited. Nevertheless, these environmental conditions are so intimately related to our racial heredity — our

typically human heredity — that inheritance plays the major rôle in maturation.

Even after birth, mechanisms which started earlier continue to develop. The intracellular and intercellular conditions, as well as the genes, are still operative. Thus, maturation occurs after birth as well as before. The chief influence of the postnatal environment on maturation is to accelerate it (as sexual maturation is accelerated in some climates) or retard it (as sometimes happens when nutrition is inadequate for normal development).

Development resulting from maturation is to be contrasted with that which depends on stimulation and response, or on the activity of receptor, neural, and effector mechanisms. That you have a biceps muscle depends on maturation, but its size in you as compared with its size in another, especially if you have exercised it a great deal more than he has, is not due to maturation. That you have a brain which is typically human depends on maturation, but your habits and your knowledge, which are represented by modifications of the brain, are not due to maturation. They develop as a result of stimulus-response activities involving the brain — as a result of how your brain is used. Habits and knowledge are learned, acquired. Some of us have certain habits and certain information which others do not have. These developments are thus individual rather than racial. Anything³ which depends on maturation, however, is present in every normal member of our race.

This does not mean that there is no relation between maturation and learning, for what we learn often depends on how mature we are. You cannot teach a newborn child to walk, however much stimulation and help you provide, but you may teach it to suck at the sight of a bottle. You cannot teach a child of six months to pick up a pellet with forefinger and thumb, but you may teach it to lift the hinged lid of a box. And you cannot teach a one-year-old the multiplication table, however much you try, but you can teach it to bring objects near by pulling on the string attached to them.

* See Chapter 23.

† Chapter 25.

The point can be illustrated further by reference to an experiment in which an infant chimpanzee, Gua, and an infant child, Donald (Figure 42), were reared in the same home environment and treated in the same way, even to the extent of kissing and similar endearments. One aim was to see how much the chimpanzee would be humanized by a human environment. An interesting outcome of the experiment was that, in certain respects, Gua was "humanized" earlier than Donald, who was two months older. In learning to skip, co-operate with her foster parents, obey requests, kiss to "make up," open doors, anticipate her bowel and bladder needs, eat with a spoon, drink from a glass, and understand such expressions as "kiss-kiss," "come here," "shake hands," and "bad girl," Gua was ahead of Donald. She learned faster than Donald because she was more mature. Although younger than Donald, the chimpanzee was ahead of him both physically and psycho-

logically. However, a chimpanzee reaches the upper limit of chimpanzee maturity much faster than a human being reaches the upper level of human maturity.

Even at the early ages when Gua surpassed Donald in many things, Donald surpassed Gua in others. At fifteen months, Donald surpassed the chimpanzee in almost everything but strength. The experiment was terminated when Donald was nineteen months old and Gua sixteen and one half months old.

Two outcomes of this experiment are especially relevant to our discussion of the relation between maturation and learning. The first is that Gua, although of an inferior race, was superior in certain respects to the child — superior because of greater early maturity. The second outcome of interest to us here is that Donald, even with his relative immaturity, could learn certain things — like speaking — which Gua could not learn, regardless of



Figure 42. Donald and Gua

This upright form of locomotion, which occurred even when Gua's hand was not being held, is not found normally in chimpanzees. It is one activity which Gua learned as a result of her close association with human beings. Both infants were dressed alike, ate alike, slept in similar beds, played with the same things, and were treated alike in all important respects. (From Kellogg, W. N., and Kellogg, L. A., "The Ape and the Child," New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933, p. 275.)

how mature she became. From the standpoint of evolution, men are more mature than chimpanzees, and even a human child soon becomes superior in learning ability to the most mature ape. The superiority of human maturity as compared with ape maturity is, of course, chiefly dependent upon the difference in inheritance.

The clearest instance of development resulting from maturation is growth of structures prior to the time at which they function. Basic sensory structures result solely from maturation. The structures of the eye develop even when there is no visual stimulation and no visual activity. Nerve fibers grow out to, and make connections with, sensory and motor structures, even though no nerve impulses are traversing them. Likewise, the muscles and their supporting structures grow to approximate normal proportions and interrelations long before movement occurs. If one wishes a good illustration of structural maturation after birth, sexual development provides one, for development of sex glands and of secondary sex characteristics does not depend upon sexual activity.

The earliest responses clearly result from maturation. Sensory, neural, and motor structures must develop before activity can occur. When stimulated for the first time, these structures function in the only way possible. Their functioning under such circumstances is due to maturation alone.

Various fetal reflexes result solely from maturation. Two of these, the knee jerk and the pupillary reflex, clearly illustrate maturation. When stimulation is first applied to the patellar tendon, the foot kicks forward. Likewise, when light first strikes the eye, the pupil gets smaller.

Even after structures have begun to function, further development is not due entirely to activity. There is good evidence, from experiments with animals and human infants, that maturation alone accounts for some early postnatal structural and behavioral growth.

MATURATION OF BEHAVIOR EXPERIMENTALLY DEMONSTRATED

There has been a large amount of research on maturation of behavior. While most of this has, for obvious reasons, been done with animals, there have been a few significant observations on children.

Experiments with animals

Research on development of swimming behavior in salamander and frog tadpoles has yielded conclusive evidence of behavioral maturation. The question to be answered in this research may be stated as follows: "If an activity is prevented until after the normal time of its appearance, will the response mechanisms continue to develop in such a manner as to make this activity possible when the first opportunity for its stimulation is given?" As far as tadpoles are concerned, the answer is affirmative.⁸

A large group of salamander eggs was separated into two groups. After head and tail buds appeared, but before any movements took place, one group was placed in a solution of chloretone, a drug which does not interfere with structural growth, yet prevents all movement. The other group was placed in ordinary tap water, which is the normal medium for development.

Tadpoles living in tap water went through the usual sequence of tadpole development. They made movements of the head and trunk, they curled up to form a C, and, finally, by reversing the movement of the body before the C had been completed, formed an S. After forming an S, they made the opposite (θ) reaction. This double S reaction is their normal swimming pattern. When it occurs sufficiently often and with adequate vigor, it enables the tadpoles to rise from the bottom of the dish and move rapidly through the water. While these developments occurred, the drugged animals were motionless.

After tadpoles reared in tap water had been swimming very actively for five days, the drugged animals were removed from the chloretone and placed in tap water. Within six minutes some of these moved in response to stimulation. Within a period of thirty minutes, all were swimming in the typical tadpole manner, although perhaps not

quite so adequately as tadpoles with previous practice.⁹ Whereas it normally requires several days to progress from the first movements to the swimming response itself, the previously inactive animals required but thirty minutes. Apparently their swimming mechanisms were developing, even though not used.

Was the period prior to swimming due to after-effects of the drug? Was it a period during which rapid learning occurred? The answers to these questions were provided by a control experiment in which animals reared in tap water until they were swimming normally were placed in chloretone. These animals, of course, became motionless. After twenty-four hours of inactivity they were removed from the chloretone and placed in tap water. Like the control animals of the previous experiment, these tadpoles, which had already been swimming, required up to thirty minutes before swimming again. It is thus clear that the delay in the swimming of drugged tadpoles was due to wearing off of the effects of the chloretone, not to learning.

The only possible conclusion is that the swimming of tadpoles results from maturation, from growth of sensory, motor, and nervous mechanisms to the point where, without any previous activity, they function as soon as appropriate stimulation is provided.

Further evidence of maturation is to be found in experiments on birds, rats, and human infants. The normal vocalizations of birds do not depend upon training or imitation. In one recent experiment, canaries were reared in separate soundproof cages, so that they could not hear the songs of their species. At about the usual time for these songs to appear, however, the isolated canaries began to sing them. The obvious conclusion is that singing the typical canary songs is dependent upon maturation rather than learning.¹⁰

Rats were separated from members of the opposite sex until the time of puberty and then given an opportunity to mate. Their mating behavior was indistinguishable from that of rats reared in contact with animals of the opposite sex. Since they had no previous opportunity to practice this response and had never seen it performed by others, it was clearly due to maturation.¹¹

MATURATION IN INFANTS

Investigations on maturation in human beings are difficult, if not impossible, to carry out in a manner as straightforward as with animals. One cannot prevent all activity. Nor can one isolate human beings as one does tadpoles, rats, or canaries. The closest approximation to such controls with human subjects is provided in an experiment in which infant fraternal twins were reared from the age of one month to the age of nine months under conditions of relative restriction.¹²

Restriction of activity

The infants were prevented from reaching, sitting, and standing until after the time at which these activities normally occur. Restriction consisted in keeping the child on its back, having the bedclothes tucked in so tightly as to prevent withdrawal of the hands, and preventing any social stimulation which might encourage reaching, sitting, or standing.

None of the three responses occurred in either child when appropriate conditions were first provided. Although reaching for a dangling ring normally occurs by the 200th day, neither child reached for the ring when it was presented for the first time at the 245th day. Thirteen days elapsed before reaching began. Sitting alone normally occurs before the 245th day. The twins were given their first opportunity to sit at the age of 262 days. However, one did not sit alone until the 298th day. The other sat alone on the 326th day. Standing with help is normally present by the 270th day. Nevertheless, it was not present in these infants when they were first tested at 364 days. Within three days, however, they were standing with help.

The investigators pointed out that, even after they gave the children an opportunity to reach, sit, or stand with help, no encouragement or training of any kind was provided. The activity which preceded reaching, sitting, and standing with help was *autogenous* — that is, initiated by the children themselves. Evidence for maturation resides in the fact that,

although the responses did not appear immediately when there was opportunity for them to do so, they did appear within a relatively short time. For example, three days was sufficient to make up for the weeks of activity which normally precede standing with help. This is doubtless because, although activities which normally precede standing were prevented, the receptors, bones, muscles, and nervous mechanisms called for in standing were undergoing normal development. All that was necessary for their appropriate function was a little practice and perhaps confidence in using them.


Restriction of activity and behavioral development in Hopi Indians

Another interesting study of the effect of restricted activity on development of behavior was made among Hopi Indians.¹³ As soon as a Hopi child is born, it is bundled up in a cotton blanket, which keeps its hands extended at the sides. The child is then bound to a stiff board. Pieces of cloth pass around the bundled child and the board, in such a manner as to prevent flexing of the legs, bringing the hands to the mouth, putting feet in the air, and even turning the body. A similarly bundled Navaho child is shown in Figure 43.

For the first three months, the infant is released from this position only about one hour daily while being cleaned and bathed. After three months, increased freedom is given.

In spite of the enforced extension of the limbs, the young Indian infant, when freed from his bindings for the bath or for the changing of bedding, takes the usual flexed position. Although his hands are held downward, perhaps twenty-three hours in twenty-four, when he is at liberty, he puts them to his mouth and carries objects to his mouth as do white babies. He reaches for objects and handles them at approximately the same time as do white children. He reaches for his toes and puts his toes in his mouth. Sitting, creeping, and walking follow in the usual sequence.¹⁴

While the orthodox Hopi method of cradling infants is that described above, the con-



© Muehler and Walker

Figure 43. A Baby Bundle

(Courtesy of American Museum of Natural History.)

tact with white culture has led many Hopis to cradle their infants as white people do. This difference in the practice of cradling in the same race, and among people who are, in other respects, of similar culture, provided "experimental" and "control" groups for a study of maturation. The average age of walking was tabulated for 63 children reared in the orthodox way and 42 reared in the manner of white infants. Children who were bound to the boards during infancy walked at an average age of 14.95 months. Those reared without binding walked at an average age of 15.05 months. The difference is not significant. It is obvious that prevention of activity incident to cradling in the orthodox manner had no retarding effect on motor development.

The development of Johnny and Jimmy

Another method of obtaining information on the relative influence of maturation and activity in early development is to train one

group in certain activities and not to train a comparable group, then compare the performance of each. If the trained group is ahead of the other, its gain is attributable to practice. If both groups are alike in final performance, the practice has been without avail, and the development is attributable to maturation.

One experiment of this nature involved twins thought at the time to be identical, but later found to be fraternal. One twin (Johnny) was given extensive practice in a wide variety of activities — some characteristic of the race (like crawling, standing, and certain reflex activities) and some found only in individuals

(like swimming, skating, and climbing inclines), while the other (Jimmy) received no practice. During the early part of the experiment, while his brother was getting practice several hours daily, five days a week, this child was merely lying in his crib behind a screen. The experiment lasted for almost three years, with certain check-ups at later age levels.

Johnny and Jimmy, whose pictures appear in Figure 44, were much alike in development of all racial activities, despite the difference in their practice of these. This suggests, of course, that maturation without practice pro-




Figure 44. Johnny and Jimmy

Reaching rewards by arranging pedestals and by using sticks. (From McGraw, Myrtle B., "Growth: A Study of Johnny and Jimmy," New York: Appleton-Century, 1935.)

duces these activities. For individual activities, however, the trained twin was far ahead of the other, as one might expect. When given an opportunity to learn these activities, however, Jimmy usually acquired them much more easily than they were acquired at an earlier age by Johnny. In other words, while his maturation did not produce these activities, Jimmy's relatively greater maturation at the time the activities were learned aided his learning.

Jimmy was more timid and less co-operative than Johnny. The investigator attributes this to the effects of early training on Johnny. It is possible, however, that this difference had some inherent basis, for the twins, as already mentioned, were not identical. If they had been identical, it could definitely have been attributed to training.¹⁵

Co-twin controls

Among several other experiments on maturation in infants are those involving comparison of the growth of behavior in identical twins, when one was allowed to develop with no unusual attention, while the other was given special training. The reason for using identical twins is that, since they have identical heredity, they will tend to mature at the same rate. Thus, any difference in their development may be attributed to factors apart from maturation.

All of such studies have shown a strong influence of maturation, especially in reflex, manual, and locomotor activities characteristic of the race. These activities develop in the untrained almost, if not exactly, as early as in the trained one. Activities which do not necessarily appear in all human beings — skating and climbing, say — are influenced by maturation only in that they are learned more quickly by older than by younger infants. As in the case of Johnny and Jimmy, the older infant has an advantage due to his greater sensory, neural, and motor maturity.¹⁶

GROWTH FROM MATURATION AND ACTIVITY COMPARED

Maturation involves multiplication of cells. It also involves their differentiation and increase in size before the time at which they begin to function. The experiments discussed above demonstrate, furthermore, that maturation underlies some development even after normal functioning begins.

What kinds of change are wrought by functioning, by exercise, or activity? Everybody knows that exercising a muscle increases its size and strength. Not so widely known, however, is the fact that this increase in size results merely from enlargement of muscle fibers already present; that no new fibers are thereby produced.¹⁷




Figure 45. Growth of Neurons as a Result of Neural Activity in Neighboring Fibers

The upper figure shows dendrites growing toward a center of stimulation; the lower figure illustrates movement of the cell body itself toward the source of stimulation. (After Kappers, Huber, and Crosby.)

It has been claimed that neural activity affects the growth of neighboring nerve fibers. Dendrites, for example, grow from primitive nerve cells toward regions of neural activity. Sometimes the cell bodies themselves shift toward the active region. Both types of movement are illustrated in Figure 45. According to one theory, the dendrites and cell bodies are positively attracted by electric currents associated with activity.¹⁸ There is no evidence, however, that new nerve cells are produced by neural activity.

Maturation apparently provides the basic structures of the organism and is responsible for some of their early growth. Activity, on the other hand, influences the further growth of structures already present. It increases the size of muscle fibers, the nature of nervous connections, and possibly the growth of other parts of the response mechanism.

SUMMARY

Our inheritance is determined by the genes, small packets of chemicals located in the chromosomes. We get a set of twenty-four chromosomes from each parent. There are thus forty-eight in the cell with which our life begins. These are duplicated during cell division so that every cell in our body except the reproductive cells (ova or sperm) has the same hereditary factors with which the original cell began. Ova and sperm have one half the original number of chromosomes. In formation of these cells, the chromosomes do not split to form duplicates, but one of each pair goes to a different cell.

Although every individual has the forty-eight chromosomes which characterize the human race, each differs in the constitution of these. All have the same number of genes, but the genes differ in certain respects. This variation plays a large rôle in making human beings differ both physically and psychologically from one another.

We are products of environment as well as heredity, for the genes do not function in a vacuum. They are surrounded by cytoplasm which they modify without themselves chang-

ing. In modifying cytoplasm, they change their own environment from time to time. This is the intracellular environment. Genes, by playing a rôle in the duplication and differentiation of cells, contribute to development of the intercellular environment, which again places limitations on their further functioning. The genes also play a part in development of the amniotic sac, placenta, and other external structures. The amniotic fluid in which the child grows, and the mother's blood stream from which it gets nourishment and through which it secretes waste products, are part of its external prenatal environment. These prenatal environments are similar in all normal human beings, but unusual conditions sometimes arise and markedly alter them. In this event, the individual, if it lives, is usually a monstrosity of some kind. When such abnormalities run in families, they are attributable to heredity. When they occur sporadically, however, they are usually due to defective prenatal environments or to accidental disturbances of cellular growth and differentiation.

The postnatal environment is never the same, psychologically speaking, for two human beings. We not only respond to different aspects of our surroundings, but we respond to the same aspects in different ways. Some of the differences in our intelligence and personality are attributable to differences in our external environments after birth. This is demonstrated when identical twins are reared in widely different environments. Differences produced by variations in environment are usually greater in the case of certain personality traits than in the case of I Q.

Experiments on rats have shown that hereditary variations in the same environment produce marked differences in learning ability. In the rat, at least, these differences are very much larger than one could produce by environmental variations. Man is more responsive than the rat to variations in his environment so variations may produce larger changes in intelligence and personality than would be possible in the rat. It is probable,

however, that very wide differences in human intelligence (as the difference between brightness and dullness) are attributable largely to heredity. More will be said about this in the chapter on intelligence.

Maturation is growth resulting from the interaction of genes and early developmental conditions which characterize the race. This growth does not depend on exercise. Development of structures before the time at which they function is the clearest example of maturation. Behavior which appears when these structures are first activated is, of course, due to maturation.

Experiments on animals and children have demonstrated that certain activities which appear after birth are similarly independent of exercise. Even where activities do not result from maturation, but must be learned, they are often learned more readily by the more mature organism.

The basic structures and functions of the organism, those characteristic of the race, result from maturation. Activity, on the other hand, produces no new structures. What it does is to influence the size, interconnection, and functioning of structures already provided.

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Part 3

LEARNING, REMEMBER- ING, AND THINKING

TO LEARN is to modify behavior and experience. This does not mean, however, that every modification is learned. Some modifications result from natural growth processes which develop even when the organism is inactive. We have already discussed such modifications as examples of maturation.

Learning differs from maturation in two important respects. In the first place, it is modification resulting from activity rather than modification resulting from natural growth. In the second place, it leads to the development of responses which characterize the individual. Responses which result from maturation are present in all normal members of the race, whereas those which result from learning may or may not be present in a particular individual.

Not every modification which results from activity is learned. Activity of our muscles sometimes produces the modification known as *fatigue*. Continued activity of certain sense organs produces *sensory adaptation*. For example, our receptors for smell may be modified so that we are insensitive to a certain odor. In fatigue and sensory adaptation, however, the modification produced by activity soon disappears. Modification resulting from the learning process, on the other hand, is relatively permanent. It lasts for days, weeks, months, years, or even for a lifetime.

The term "activity" perhaps needs elaboration. In the most general sense, it means any functioning of receptor, effector, or neural mechanisms. This is implied in our discussion of activity, as contrasted with maturation. But receptor, motor, and neural functions take many forms. There is repetition of stimuli and of the reflex responses activated by them. There is repetition of an act, with or without the intention to perform it. There is trying this and that way of achieving the solution to a problem. There is practice, like that of music or dancing. There is observation of an act, with or without the intention to copy (imitate) it. All

are activities which underlie learning, although some of them, as will become apparent later, lead to more efficient learning than others.

At the present time nobody knows precisely what happens in the nervous system when even the simplest animal acquires the simplest act. All we know is that some kind of modification occurs. We know this because, when brain tissue is removed, acquired proficiency is reduced or eliminated. If we had information on the precise neural correlates of learning, even at the elementary level found in lower animals, it would be a stepping-stone to the understanding of neural correlates at more complex levels. Thus investigations of animal learning may contribute much to an understanding of human learning.

Motivation is extremely important in learning. Observing this fact from the following discussions, some readers may wonder why the topic of motivation was not placed before that of learning, and especially thinking. In turning to motivation, however, we find that human motives, and reactions affiliated with them, are, to a large extent, learned. We find also that much of the conflict of motives which characterizes human behavior is on the level of thought processes.

The following chapters start with the simplest examples of learning and proceed more or less gradually to the most complex examples. Probably the simplest learning, and possibly the basis for much learning of greater complexity, is acquisition of *conditioned responses*. Relatively simple learning is considered in Chapter 6. The following chapter deals with learning of various skills, both motor and verbal, and of varying degrees of complexity. In Chapter 8 we pause, as it were, to consider some important foundations of all learning. This chapter follows Chapters 6 and 7, which it might have preceded, because it seems pedagogically more sound to have an over-all view of the phenomena of learning before digging into the underlying factors, the conditions which produce it. After considering foundations of learning, we proceed to the discussion of *remembering* and *forgetting* — retaining or failing to retain what has been learned. We shall see, in this connection, that how well one retains is related to the conditions of learning, considered in Chapter 8. The final chapter of this section deals with *complex learning processes* found in animals below man, but especially evident in man — processes which many psychologists discuss without relating them to other topics dealt with in the present context. It seems logical, however, to include the discussion of these processes, *thinking, reasoning, concept formation*, and the like, within the general framework of learning, for they involve manipulation of what has already been learned, and produce, as a result, still further learning.

Chapter 6

The Conditioned Response

OUR SIMPLEST LEARNED ACTIVITIES, and those learned earliest, are called *conditioned responses*. Among these are sucking at the sight of the milk bottle, grimacing and withdrawing at the sight of distasteful medicine, smiling in response to another's smile, and withdrawing from anything that has injured or frightened us.

DESCRIPTION OF A CONDITIONED RESPONSE

The child at first does not suck at the sight of the bottle. It sucks only when the nipple is placed in its mouth. But the sight of the bottle always precedes stimulation of the mouth, and thus the sucking response itself. After a few views of the bottle, each followed by stimulation of the mouth, the sight of the bottle itself brings out the sucking response. We then say that sucking has been conditioned.

Sucking in response to stimulation of the mouth is an *unconditioned response*. Stimulation of the mouth is an *unconditioned* or *unlearned stimulus* for sucking. The visual aspect of the bottle is the *conditioned stimulus*. Sucking in response to the visual aspect is a *conditioned response*.

The situation before conditioning occurs, may be illustrated as follows:

<u>Unconditioned stimulus</u>	<u>Unconditioned response</u>
Stimulation of mouth →	Sucking
<u>Conditioned stimulus</u>	<u>Response</u>
Visual bottle →	Fixation, perhaps, but not sucking

After the conditioned stimulus has been asso-

ciated with the unconditioned stimulus a number of times, and sucking in response to the conditioned stimulus has developed, the situation is as follows:

<u>Unconditioned stimulus</u>	<u>Unconditioned response</u>
Stimulation of mouth →	Sucking
<u>Conditioned stimulus</u>	
Visual bottle ↗	

The previously neutral stimulus, as well as the unconditioned one, now elicits sucking.

CONDITIONING TECHNIQUES

Although conditioned responses such as the above had been observed for centuries, it was not until the early years of the present century that scientists saw their theoretical and practical significance. The first to study such responses systematically and to point out their implications for psychology was a Russian physiologist named Pavlov.

While doing experiments on gastric secretions in dogs, Pavlov observed that stimuli frequently associated with the presentation of food arouse salivation, a response originally elicited only by food (or acid) placed in the mouth.

The experiments on conditioned salivation

Pavlov made an opening in the dog's cheek so that secretions of the salivary gland would run out where they could be measured. He measured the amount of secretion in drops and in volume. The original conditioning arrangement is illustrated in Figure 46. Pavlov later developed a more elaborate technique.




Figure 46. Collection of Saliva in Pavlov's Early Experiments

Observe that the drops of saliva, as they fall upon the platform above the calibrated glass tube, activate a recording mechanism which makes a scratch for each drop on a moving smoked drum. (From Yerkes, R. M., and Morgulis, S., "The Method of Pavlov in Animal Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1909, vol. 6, p. 257.)

He placed the animal in a separate room and presented the stimuli by squeezing bulbs or pressing buttons. Observations were then made through a window. These changes in technique led to improved control of extraneous stimuli, including stimulation from movements of the experimenter. Pavlov found, as a matter of fact, that any unusual stimulation during the experiment was likely to interfere with conditioning, even to the point of inhibiting responses already conditioned.

Development of a conditioned salivary response to tone is illustrated in Table 1

TABLE 1. DEVELOPMENT OF A CONDITIONED SALIVARY RESPONSE TO A TONE OF 637.5 VIBRATIONS PER SECOND
(Anrep: *J. Physiol*, 1920)

<i>Number of presentations of sound and feeding</i>	<i>Number of drops of saliva in 30 seconds</i>
1	0
9	18
15	30
31	65
41	64
51	69

No drops of saliva were secreted when the tone was first presented. A test with the tone, but no food, after 9 presentations of tone and food elicited 18 drops. A similar test after 15 presentations yielded 30 drops.

After 31 presentations, 65 drops were elicited by the sound alone. Ten further presentations, and the test with sound alone yielded 64 drops. A further ten presentations brought a further increase in the number of drops.

Following the general procedure already described, Pavlov and his associates conditioned the salivary response of dogs to a wide variety of stimuli—visual, auditory, olfactory, and cutaneous. Pavlov pointed out that in each case a "new nerve path" had somehow been opened up between eye, ear, nose, or skin, and the salivary mechanisms. These paths were assumed by him to involve the cerebral cortex, hence, he referred to his work as "investigation of the physiological activity of the cerebral cortex." We now know that, while conditioning of an intact animal involves the cerebral cortex, conditioning also occurs in animals deprived of their cortex.¹

Pavlov did not stop when he had shown that a wide variety of previously neutral stimuli may, by association with food, come to elicit the salivary response. He described many phenomena which show that conditioning is far more complex than at first appeared. Pavlov also related many of his observations to aspects of everyday human life, especially habit formation, sleep, and development of neurotic behavior. He believed that all learning is ultimately reducible to conditioning of

reflexes. To use his own words, "different kinds of habits based on training, education, and discipline of any sort are nothing but a long chain of conditioned reflexes."²

Pavlov's procedures were soon modified to fit them for use with human subjects, both child and adult. A suction cup placed in the mouth over the salivary gland allowed investigators to collect saliva without the operation required when dogs are used. Some experimenters later did away with the suction cup, using standard cotton pads instead. A cotton pad was placed in the cheek before presentation of the stimulus and weighed after presentation. Its increased weight provided a measure of the amount of saliva secreted. The research on conditioned salivary responses in children, and to some extent in adults, has verified the phenomena observed by Pavlov in dogs.³

Conditioned withdrawal

Bechterev, another Russian physiologist, used the so-called "protective reflex" in place of salivation. This is withdrawal of a limb from painful stimulation, such as an electric shock. Conditioning of a dog by Bechterev's

procedure is illustrated in Figure 47. Electrical stimulation of the foot produces withdrawal. If a bell, or any other previously neutral stimulus, is sufficiently often associated with shock, it eventually arouses the withdrawal response by itself. Bechterev's method was applied to human subjects, both in his laboratory and abroad.⁴

In an experiment on babies, weak electrical stimulation was applied to the hand or foot.⁵ The unconditioned response was limb withdrawal. When this was recorded on a smoked drum through a thread-and-pulley arrangement, a record like that which appears at the top of Figure 48 was obtained. A beating metronome was in this case used as the conditioned stimulus. Note that there was no response to the metronome alone at the tenth presentation. On the eleventh presentation there was a slight response, as though in anticipation of the coming shock, but on the twelfth presentation there was a response to the metronome as pronounced as that elicited by the shock. At first, the child moved hands and feet when shocked, even though only one foot was shocked. Finally, it withdrew only the stimulated foot.




Figure 47. Conditioning a Withdrawal Response
(After Culler.)




Figure 48. Conditioned Foot Withdrawal in a Child of Twenty-Six Months

(After Marinesco, G., and Kreindler, A., "Des Réflexes conditionnels. I. L'Organisation des Réflexes Conditionnels chez l'Enfant," *Journal de Psychologie*, 1933, vol. 30, p. 873.)

A situation used to condition finger withdrawal in adults is illustrated in Figure 49. The unconditioned stimulus is a shock to the finger, and the unconditioned response is lifting the finger. As the finger is lifted, pressure is exerted on a small tambour, thus causing a writing lever to move upward and record the response on a moving smoked drum. If a bell, say, is rung just before the shock is given, and the bell-shock sequence is repeated sufficiently often, the subject eventually lifts his finger when the bell rings and before he receives a shock.

Conditioning of other responses

The conditioned-response technique has been applied to a number of responses other

than salivation and withdrawal. One of these, sucking in infants, has already been mentioned. Others include the knee jerk, eye wink, pupillary contraction or dilation, respiration, sweat-gland activity, skin temperature, fear reactions, vomiting, and grasping.

A device used to develop conditioned grasping in children between four and fifteen years of age is shown in Figure 50. Conditioning with this device has been obtained in from two to eighty-eight trials. The method is especially notable because it rewards the child if he times his response appropriately.

Conditioning involuntary responses

In the finger-lifting and in the bulb-squeezing experiments, the subject could oblige the




Figure 49. Conditioning Finger Withdrawal

(After Watson, J. B., "The Place of the Conditioned Reflex in Psychology," *Psychological Review*, 1916, vol. 23, pp. 89-116.)




Figure 50 Ivanov-Smolensky's Conditioning Technique

The child sits with the bulb R' in its hand. It is instructed to squeeze this bulb whenever it sees a piece of chocolate slide past the window V . If the squeeze is properly timed, the float at a' goes up so as to admit the piece of chocolate to the curved platform R . The child then takes possession of it. The experimenter, in an adjoining room, releases the chocolate by squeezing the bulb R . As this bulb is squeezed, a mark is made on the revolving drum. The subject's squeezing of his bulb is also registered. A bell (or a light) is presented a few seconds before the chocolate falls. This is the conditioned stimulus. When conditioning has occurred, the response is made before the chocolate is released. (After Ivanov-Smolensky, A. G., "On the Methods of Examining the Conditioned Food Reflexes in Children and in Mental Disorders," *Brain*, 1927, vol. 50, p. 139.)

experimenter by voluntarily responding to the "conditioned stimulus." But there are certain responses over which we have no control. One of these is the pupillary reflex. The subject could not contract or dilate his pupil to please the experimenter.

When a bell is rung, the pupil dilates, as it also does when illumination is lowered. Increasing illumination causes the pupil to contract. If, now, a bell is rung, and this is followed by an increase in illumination, the pupil dilates in response to the bell and contracts in response to the increased illumination. Upon repeated stimulation with the bell, followed by the increased illumination, however, the pupil eventually reacts to the bell as it does to the light — in other words, it contracts. Likewise, the pupil may be conditioned to dilate in response to a bell more than it dilated before conditioning.⁶ The pupillary response has also been conditioned to stimulation pro-

vided by the gripping of a dynamometer in the hand; to the subjects' repeating the words "contract" or "dilate," and even to the thought "contract" or "dilate."⁷ But we shall have more to say about these results in discussing voluntary behavior (Chapter 14). Psychologists have conditioned several other involuntary responses, including sweat-gland activity and changes in skin temperature.⁸

That conditioning is not necessarily voluntary is also demonstrated by experiments in which the subject is feeble-minded, hypnotized, or absorbed in some other activity. In each of these instances, he is conditioned without any knowledge of what is taking place. In one such experiment, normal subjects learned a maze and, at times, sucked lollipops while red or green lights flashed on. Subjects did not know that their salivary responses were being conditioned, but thought the problem to be one of maze learning. Their salivary re-

sponses were conditioned more readily than in the subjects who, instead of being distracted, knew what was going on.⁹

The direction of conditioning

When the conditioned stimulus is first applied, the subject may make some response to it, and may continue to make that response, even after conditioning has occurred. Thus, a bell may cause an animal to prick up its ears, although it does not cause it to salivate. Why, then, does not the ear-pricking response become conditioned so that food arouses it? Why, in other words, does the conditioning go from bell to salivation instead of from food to ear-pricking?

The answer is that conditioning is in the direction of the more relevant response or, perhaps we should say, the prepotent response. Salivation of a hungry animal in response to food is a vital activity. It is relevant to the metabolic processes of the animal. Pricking the ears, however, is of no such biological significance. Thus, the salivary response dominates. Withdrawal of the foot from an electric shock, contraction of the pupil in response to changes in illumination, blinking of the eye in response to a puff of air, and grasping in response to food which grasping makes accessible, are all biologically significant responses, since they either prevent injury or provide a reward.

Classical and instrumental conditioning

Procedures involving the same sequence of stimuli, regardless of the organism's response, have been referred to as *classical conditioning* procedures. In classical conditioning, the organism receives the shock, whether it lifts its foot or not; and it receives the food, whether or not it salivates in response to the conditioned stimulus.

On the other hand, procedures which allow the organism to escape shock by responding to the conditioned stimulus or to receive a reward by squeezing a bulb are examples of *instrumental conditioning*. This conditioning is called *instrumental* because the organism's

response to the conditioned stimulus is instrumental in its escape from shock, or in its obtaining a reward.¹⁰

NEGATIVE CONDITIONING

Negative conditioning, or *negative adaptation*, is a common occurrence in everyday life. It is learning not to make a response. If a sexually mature male rat is shocked every time it approaches a female, it soon avoids females. If cockroaches are given an electric shock when they run into the dark, they soon make for light instead of darkness. Alcoholics develop an antipathy for alcohol as a result of drinking alcohol containing a drug which produces violent vomiting. A child who avoids the fire after being burned, who refrains from putting his finger into electric light sockets after once being shocked, or who gives up thumb-sucking after he has had several experiences of sucking nasty-tasting thumbs, provides further illustration of negative conditioning.

THE RELATION OF CONDITIONED TO UNCONDITIONED RESPONSES

Upon superficial observation, it appears that conditioning is merely the arousing of an old response by a new stimulus. This, however, is not always true. In Pavlov's investigations, salivation was elicited by a stimulus which previously failed to arouse it. Thus, salivation (the old response) previously elicited only by food or acid was now elicited by a previously neutral (new) stimulus like light, sound, or touch. But salivation is an exception to the rule. It has been shown in the case of withdrawal, and many other responses, that the reaction, once it has been conditioned, is in some respects a new one. The response to an electric shock applied at the foot, for example, is diffuse. A dog stimulated in this way barks, struggles, and lifts feet not directly stimulated. Eventually, however, the dog lifts the foot stimulated, and that is all. Likewise, the baby who moves all limbs when one is first stimulated electrically comes to move only the latter limb. Behavior that

was general in nature has become specific. Withdrawal occurs both before and after conditioning, but it is not the same withdrawal.

When the conditioned stimulus always precedes the unconditioned stimulus, conditioned responses are usually anticipatory. That is to say, the organism makes a response to the conditioned stimulus which suggests a getting ready for the unconditioned stimulus. The subject may become tense, it may assume an expectant attitude, or it may exhibit an abbreviation of the response made to the unconditioned stimulus. Thus, if respiration is being conditioned, onset of the conditioned stimulus (tone) may produce a slight change in respiration, which is followed, when the unconditioned stimulus (shock) is presented, by a large change in respiration.

SOME SEQUENCES AND TIME RELATIONS

In all of the examples of conditioning so far mentioned, the conditioned stimulus has preceded the onset of the unconditioned stimulus or has been presented at the same time as this stimulus. Pavlov believed, on the basis of certain experiments performed in his laboratory, that the conditioned and unconditioned stimuli must either be presented simultaneously or the conditioned presented shortly before the unconditioned stimulus. Later

research has indicated, however, that conditioning sometimes occurs when the conditioned stimulus follows the unconditioned. This is called *backward conditioning*.

The relative efficacy of different sequences and time intervals in conditioning finger withdrawal (Figure 49)* is illustrated in Figure 51. Observe that the frequency of conditioned withdrawals — here taken as a measure of effectiveness of conditioning — was very low when (1) sound followed shock, (2) sound and shock were simultaneous, and (3) sound preceded shock by more than one second. The most effective procedure was to present the sound less than one half second before the shock.

Several other experiments, both animal and human, and involving a variety of conditioning techniques, have yielded results in close conformity with these. They all show the sequence *conditioned stimulus — unconditioned stimulus* to be the most effective. The most effective time interval varies, in different studies, between a small fraction of a second and one second.

GENERALIZATION AND DIFFERENTIATION

Generalization

If a dog is conditioned to salivate in response to a tone, it will very likely make the




Figure 51. Conditioned Finger Withdrawal with a Sound Presented Simultaneously with and at Various Intervals Before and After a Shock to the Middle Finger

(From Wolfe, H. M., "Time Factors in Conditioning Finger-Withdrawal," *Journal of General Psychology*, 1932, vol. 7, p. 90.)

same response to tones differing from the one involved in conditioning. It may even make the response to bells, buzzers, and other sounds. If a child is conditioned so that it makes a fear response to a white rat (Chapter 15), it may be afraid, also, of a white fur coat, a white rabbit, and a mass of absorbent cotton. These are examples of stimulus generalization. Conditioning occurs to a certain class of stimuli rather than to a specific stimulus. Any one of this class may elicit the response.

The same phenomenon is demonstrated by stimulating different parts of the skin after vibration at one point has been conditioned as illustrated in Figure 52. The unconditioned stimulus was a shock to the right hand, and the unconditioned response, a change in electrical resistance of the skin (due to perspiration). This change in electrical resistance is known as a *psychogalvanic response*, or a *galvanic skin reflex* (see Figure 117).

When conditioning to vibration on the shoulder had been obtained, so that changes in electrical resistance previously associated with shock were now made to tactile vibration alone, the other points indicated in Figure 52 were stimulated. Vibration on the middle of the back yielded a galvanic reaction, but smaller than that on the shoulder. Stimula-

tion of the thigh likewise elicited a galvanic response, but one smaller than that on the middle of the back. A still smaller galvanic reaction was elicited by stimulation of the calf. Conditioning of other points than the shoulder region also demonstrated generalization. These results verify for man the comparable results found by other investigators, including Pavlov, for dogs and sheep.

Pavlov attributed this generalizing tendency to a spread of effects from the region stimulated to other parts of the organism, especially to other parts of the brain than those primarily excited. He referred to the phenomenon as *irradiation of excitation*.

Differentiation of stimuli

Although conditioning is usually to a class of stimuli rather than to a specific stimulus, specificity is obtainable if the appropriate procedures are used. If you wish to condition to a tone of 256 cycles and not to a tone of 500 cycles, you reinforce only one of them. You present both tones, but each in a varied sequence. The unconditioned stimulus follows only one tone, that for which specificity of response is desired. Suppose that the tone selected for conditioning is 256 cycles, and that the unconditioned stimulus is food. Then you will present food every time that a




Figure 52. Arrangement for Conditioning the Galvanic Skin Reflex to Vibration of the Skin

The subject lay in a box-like compartment which separated him from the rest of the environment. Headphones in which there was a constant buzz prevented him from hearing outside noises. The unconditioned stimulus (an electric shock) was administered to the right hand. The unconditioned response was sweating of the left hand, indicated by changes in electrical resistance of the skin (galvanic skin reflex). Changes in electrical resistance were recorded by using electrodes and a sensitive galvanometer. Vibration of the skin at one of the spots where the electrically activated vibrators appear was the conditioned stimulus. The conditioning sequence was vibration of the skin followed by shock. (From Bass, M. J., and Hull, C. L., "The Irradiation of a Tactile Conditioned Reflex in Man," *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, 1934, vol. 14.)

tone of 256 cycles is sounded, but never when the other tone is used. Eventually, if the two tones can be differentiated, the animal salivates in response to 256 cycles and not in response to 500 cycles.

Stimulation of any point on the skin, as in Figure 52, may likewise be made non-effective, if it is presented frequently but never followed by electric shock, or whatever the unconditioned stimulus happens to be. In other words, the organism comes to discriminate between reinforced and non-reinforced stimulation.

Differential conditioned reflexes provide us with an important tool for analysis of sensory stimulation. Animals and infants cannot tell us what they sense, but their differential conditioned reactions tell the story just as well as words could tell it. If we wish to know how small a difference in loudness a dog can discriminate, for example, we condition its withdrawal response to a certain intensity of stimulation and not to another widely different intensity. The latter is presented frequently, but not reinforced. After the animal withdraws its foot for one sound and not for another, we gradually reduce the difference in loudness. The smallest difference to which it responds is thus determined.

Sometimes, as the difference in reinforced and unreinforced stimulation becomes too small for the animal to discriminate, a "nervous breakdown" occurs. Another chapter deals with such "neurotic" behavior.

ELIMINATION OF CONDITIONED RESPONSES

Conditioned responses are sometimes fragile, disappearing within a few weeks after formation. On the other hand, some conditioned reactions, even when studied under relatively artificial laboratory conditions, last for years. Many of those developed in everyday life last as long as we live.

Experimental extinction

Once a conditioned response has been formed, how may it be eliminated? The method most widely used is to present the


conditioned stimulus repeatedly without reinforcing it — without following it with the unconditioned stimulus. Thus, if the bell that has been eliciting a salivary response is rung without presentation of food, the amount of saliva decreases gradually. Finally, there is no salivation in response to the conditioned stimulus. The shoulder region of the subject in Figure 52 was conditioned so that it yielded a galvanic skin reflex. Vibration of this region was then repeated, without presentation of shock. There was a gradual weakening of response and, finally, complete elimination.

Spontaneous recovery

An experimentally extinguished response usually returns later. Pavlov called this phenomenon *spontaneous recovery*. If the response is continually extinguished, it grows progressively weaker at each spontaneous recovery. Finally, it fails to return.

HIGHER-ORDER CONDITIONING

Pavlov found that, once conditioning was well established, he could use the conditioned stimulus as the "unconditioned" stimulus for further conditioning. In other words, if the animal had been conditioned to salivate in response to a bell, Pavlov could now use the bell instead of food to obtain further conditioning. The situation is as follows:




Pavlov failed to obtain higher than second-order conditioning in dogs, but he believed that there is no discoverable limit to the orders of conditioned responses which man acquires under conditions of everyday life.

Development of a second-order conditioned response is difficult in the laboratory, because of the occurrence of experimental extinction. The bell, for example, must be reinforced frequently with food so that salivation to it does not extinguish while it is being used as the "unconditioned" stimulus.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONDITIONING IN HUMAN LIFE

Conditioning and acquisition of speech

Speech, at least in its early stages, provides many examples of conditioning. Every time the baby makes a sound, such as *da*, he hears himself say it. Thus, whatever stimuli make him exhibit the response in the first place are always associated with his hearing *da*. This is all that we need for development of a conditioned response. Very soon a conditioned reflex circle is established. This may be diagrammed as follows:




In other words, the baby says *da* and hears himself say "*da*." The latter, having become a conditioned stimulus for the vocalization *da*, leads the child to say "*da*" again. So he babbles *da-da-da* . . . until fatigue sets in or some other stimulus gets the right of way.

Once a child copies his own response in this way, the next step is to copy — or attempt to copy as far as he is able — the response of someone else. If someone else says "*da*," the child repeats it. But if the person says "*door*," the child, because of the similarity of this sound to "*da*," says "*da*." Later, he learns by other means to say "*door*."

Getting the meaning of words — relating them appropriately to objects and situations — can also be accounted for in terms of condi-

tioning. The child says "*ma-ma*," for example, and the mother appears. This happens a few times, and the mother (or anyone even remotely resembling her) is represented by the vocalization "*ma-ma*." The situation may be diagrammed as follows:



Children also learn, through the conditioning process, the relation between sounds made by others and the objects, situations, and acts associated with those sounds. For example, they hear the word "*doll*" said while a doll is simultaneously present, and thereby learn to associate the object and the sound that represents it.

Acquiring attitudes

Many of our attitudes — our tendencies to respond positively or negatively to objects, situations, persons, or ideas — are acquired early in life through the conditioning process. We put our hand on the hot stove and thereafter have a negative attitude toward hot objects. Our parents fondle us, give us toys, and allow us to engage in such pleasurable activities as sucking lollipops and eating ice cream. Consequently, we develop positive attitudes toward them. We like them and seek rather than avoid their presence.

Conditioning and other learning

Pavlov, as we have seen, believed that all learning is reducible to conditioned responses. Habits, for him, were chains of conditioned reflexes, arousal of one reflex serving as the stimulus for arousal of the next.

Few, if any, modern psychologists would agree entirely with Pavlov in this contention. As already indicated, there is very good reason

to believe that conditioning is responsible only for relatively simple learning.

Research on conditioning in children has shown that they are not readily conditioned (at least by laboratory procedures) after they reach the age of four or five years. Older children and adults do not condition very readily in most laboratory situations. This suggests that conditioning is important in acquisition of behavior only during the early years of life, or, if it appears in an older individual, it is during his preoccupation with other things than conditioning situations as such.

A psychologist who has placed especial emphasis upon this limited rôle of conditioning in human learning believes that his results point toward:

a general recognition and corroboration of the view that pure conditioning is only the "animal" and the "casual" form of human learning, which manifests itself best only when the symbolic and attitudinal behavior experiences of the human subjects are either underdeveloped or lowered or decomposed or elsewhere preoccupied (young children and subnormal adults, fatigue, hypnosis, emotional stress, absorption in some other activity), and that to say that one's learning is no more than mere conditioning is more of an insult than a theory.¹¹

It is important to observe also that conditioned-response procedures usually involve responses (reflexes) already within the organism's repertoire. Some of these may be associated one with the other by conditioning, and others may be differentiated out of a more general behavior pattern, but nothing essentially new is produced thereby.

Actually, we learn many responses not in our repertoire at birth. Speech, for example, is not merely a combination of sounds already in the child's repertoire of vocalizations. Many speech sounds are novel, resulting from new manipulations of the vocal apparatus. Many of our manual skills also call for novel responses and cannot be adequately envisaged as chains of reflexes.

Some practical applications

Psychiatrists find conditioned-reflex princi-

ples helpful in the interpretation of abnormalities, like morbid fears, aversions to food, compulsions to steal, and other neurotic behavior. Pavlov himself wrote a book entitled *Conditioned Reflexes and Psychiatry*.¹² Much of the work on experimentally produced neuroses (Chapter 14) has been stimulated by research on conditioned responses.

Conditioning is often a practical technique for the elimination of undesirable behavior. Let us take *enuresis* (bed-wetting) for example.¹³ The child who wets the bed beyond the age when children normally have control over urination does so because, while he is asleep, the stimuli provided by bladder tensions are not sufficiently strong to wake him before bed-wetting occurs. Putting it in another way, he is not sufficiently sensitive to the signals coming from his bladder. He has not been conditioned to respond to these stimuli. But they can be made effective by conditioning. The child is required to sleep on a mat with fine wires inside. Wetting the mat short-circuits the wires. This short-circuiting rings a bell. The child is instructed to get up and go to the bathroom whenever the bell rings, whether or not he needs to urinate further. Before going to the bathroom, he breaks the circuit by opening a switch. After several nights, the bladder tensions wake the child before the bell rings. Weak as his bladder tensions are, waking and getting up have been conditioned to them.

Another practical application of conditioned-response procedures utilizes the experimental-extinction principle. Persons who are afraid of enclosed places, elevators, cats, and so on, normally avoid the feared situations, and experimental extinction cannot occur. These people are sometimes cured by repeatedly forcing the feared situations upon them.¹⁴ Thus, a man who had avoided elevators for years was cured by forcing him to ride up and down in an elevator. This method must be used with great care, however, for some individuals become even more fearful as a result of such treatment.

A psychologist has cured individuals of

nail-biting and other undesirable habits by a process resembling extinction.¹⁵ He made them bite their nails on schedule. Since the individuals must now bite their nails many times when the usual tension or nervousness is absent, there develops what amounts to a dissociation of tension and nail-biting.

Another practical application of conditioned-response technique is that of discovering the existence of sensory capacities in babies, the feeble-minded, and the insane. Here, for example, is a child believed to be deaf. For some unknown reason, it makes no response to sounds of any kind. When its foot is pricked, however, the limb is withdrawn. A bell is presented several times just in advance of the prick. If, now, the baby comes to withdraw its foot at the sound of the bell, we know that, whatever the cause of its lack of normal response to sounds, its auditory mechanisms are functioning.¹⁶ Conditioned-response techniques have also been used to determine how well babies differentiate stimuli

SUMMARY

A response is said to be conditioned when some previously non-effective stimulus arouses it. Thus, the bell, through being presented with salivation, comes to elicit it.

All conditioned-response techniques call for association of an effective (unconditioned) stimulus and a non-effective (conditioned) stimulus. They differ, however, according to the nature of the response conditioned (salivation, withdrawal, and so on) and according to the presence or absence of an escape or reward element (classical or instrumental conditioning).

The most effective sequence is one in which the conditioned stimulus (for example, bell) precedes the unconditioned stimulus (for example, food). The most effective time interval between the two stimuli is a fraction of a second.

Conditioning in older children and adults is actually easier to accomplish when the subject does not know that he is being conditioned. The response which has the greatest biological significance, which is most conso-

nant with the organism's needs, is the one conditioned.

The conditioned response is not always the previous unconditioned response, now being elicited by a previously neutral stimulus, for some conditioned activities are merely anticipatory, and others become much more specific than they were before conditioning occurred. Thus, the animal that struggles and barks in response to shock before conditioning comes merely to lift its foot.

The conditioned response is often aroused by many stimuli other than the stimulus used in conditioning. This is stimulus generalization, believed by Pavlov to depend on irradiation of excitatory processes. Specificity is obtained by presenting various stimuli, but reinforcing only one of them. Thus, a bell is always followed by food, but a buzzer, tone, and so on, is never followed by food. The subject then salivates to a bell, but not to the other stimuli. We say that a conditioned differentiation or discrimination has developed.

Conditioned responses are eliminated by a process known as experimental extinction. The procedure used in experimental extinction is repeatedly to present the conditioned stimulus without reinforcement. Under these conditions, the response gradually disappears. It may, however, recover after a time. This is known as spontaneous recovery.

Once a stimulus has come to arouse a response, it may be used in association with other stimuli in such a way as to make them, also, arouse the response. This is higher-order conditioning. To illustrate this process, a bell that produces salivation is paired with light (which does not elicit salivation). Eventually, the light also arouses the response. According to Pavlov, there is theoretically no limit to the orders of conditioned responses which human beings may acquire in this way.

Conditioning is the basis of many relatively simple behavioral acquisitions — early stages of language, acquisition of attitudes, and so on — but the claim that it accounts for all learning, no matter how complex, is not supported by experimental evidence.

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Chapter 7

Acquiring Skill

LEARNING TO SALIVATE, or to withdraw a limb at a signal, to develop positive or negative attitudes toward previously neutral situations, or to repeat *Da* when one hears himself or someone else say it, are hardly within the category of skilled performance. These conditioned responses are too simple to be called skills. In addition, they are earlier in time of appearance than most skills.

We have already pointed out that some regard skills as mere chains of conditioned responses, and that such an envisagement is, on the surface at least, far from revealing. Here we must take a global approach to the acquisition of skill, and not the highly analytical approach which a conditioned-response envisagement would require.

Skill as such is proficiency in the performance of a task. The task may be typing, playing a musical instrument, driving a car, flying a plane, sending and receiving telegraph messages, speaking, reciting a poem, or the mastery of some art or science.

It is customary to differentiate *motor* and *verbal* skills. In motor skills, the activities involved are predominantly overt, although implicit processes, like silently talking to oneself, may play some part. Verbal skills are those in which language activities predominate. One of the purest examples is reciting a poem or a lesson. Although such skills are called verbal, they obviously involve motor activities. One speaks with his vocal musculature and, as we shall see in the chapter on thinking, even, to some extent, thinks with it. Motor skills in their purest form are found in animals below man, for they do not verbalize.¹


LEARNING IN ANIMALS

Skills are acquired only when there is some reason for acquiring them. They are not acquired, in other words, merely because stimuli impinge upon the organism's receptors. Nor are they acquired merely for the sake of acquisition.

The chief reason for acquiring any skill is inadequacy of present adjustment. As long as the environment is optimal — as long as it more or less readily satisfies every need — the organism stays, so to speak, in a rut. In research on animal learning, therefore, we disrupt the organism's relation to its environment in some way and force it to make a readjustment. We then study the type of readjustment achieved, how many repetitions of the situation are required, how many inadequate responses occur, and, in general, the efficiency with which the animal learns the new adjustment.

Maze learning

The device most widely used to study acquisition of skill by animals is some form of maze. A rat, for example, is deprived of food, water, a sexual partner, or perhaps its litter. The object of which it has been deprived is placed at the end of a maze pathway, like one of those illustrated in Figure 53. The rat is placed at the entrance of the maze and given an opportunity to explore it. Being hungry, the animal is very active. It runs hither and yon, starts back toward the entrance, runs in and out of blind alleys, re-enters the same blind alley repeatedly, but eventually reaches



Enclosed Alley



Elevated Path

Figure 53 Two Varieties of Maze Used to Study Learning in Rats

In the enclosed-alley maze, the animal runs through passages; in the elevated maze, it runs along an open pathway, which allows a more comprehensive view of the maze than in the enclosed-alley variety. The upper items show the units out of which the enclosed-alley maze is constructed. This is one of many types and patterns of enclosed-alley mazes. (Courtesy of C. J. Warden and Wahman Manufacturing Company.) The elevated maze is also made from interchangeable units. (From Miles, W. R., "The Comparative Learning of Rats on Elevated and Alley Mazes of the Same Pattern," *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, 1930, vol. 10, p. 241.)

food. This random, hit-or-miss type of activity has been called *trial-and-error*.

When we again place the rat in the maze, its behavior is usually much less random than before. The animal loiters less, enters fewer blind alleys, returns to the entrance less often, covers less distance, and gets to the food in less time than formerly. In successive trials, there is gradual elimination of errors (blind-alley entrances), and a gradual fixation of correct turns. There is also a reduction in the total distance traveled and in the time required to get from entrance to exit. Eventually, the rat achieves a level of skill which enables it to go from entrance to exit without error and in the shortest possible time.

If more than one path is open to it, and one of these is much shorter than the others, the animal will most likely learn the shortest.² It sometimes happens, however, that the rat running a maze with several possible avenues from entrance to exit, varies its route from trial to trial instead of always following (fixating) a particular path.³ This fluctuation is more likely to occur when the various pathways are so similar in length that the animal cannot differentiate them in terms of distance.

Worms, snails, ants, cockroaches, fishes, frogs, snakes, birds, and a large variety of

mammals, ranging all the way from rat to man, have learned maze problems. The complexity of the mazes has varied from a single T-shaped unit, in which either a right or left turn attains the goal, to many units. A simple T-unit is near the limit of learning ability in worms and snails, but ants and the other animals mentioned above learn mazes which have a large number of units.⁴

The problem box

A problem box used to study learning in cats is illustrated in Figure 54. Similar boxes, of varying complexity, have been used to investigate the learning process in a large number of animals from birds to man.

The animal may be placed inside the box, in which case the motive involved is escape, or perhaps also to obtain food observed through the bars. Quite frequently the animal's task is not to escape, but to get into the box, thus gaining access to food.

Problem boxes are usually attacked in a trial-and-error fashion similar to that exhibited in maze learning. The animal manipulates various parts of the box until, more or less by accident, it hits upon the correct response or series of correct responses. As in the case of maze learning, there is a gradual




Figure 54. Cat Opening a Problem Box

Cat gets leverage on cross-bar, and as this is turned the door drops, permitting escape and access to food. (From a study by Dr. C. N. Winslow. Photographs from Pix, Inc.)

elimination of errors and a gradual fixation of correct responses. After a number of trials, the animal manipulates the correct bolts, latches, or strings without error and in the shortest possible time.

Learning by imitating

Monkeys and higher animals sometimes learn simple problem boxes by copying the performance of experts. They are able to learn in this manner, however, only when the basic responses are already in their repertoire. For example, if a monkey has already learned to lift latches, pull strings, or slide bolts, and these are involved in the problem, but perhaps in different positions or different combinations from those in original learning, the subject may make the proper manipulations after watching another monkey make them. If the constituent responses are completely new, however, learning on this basis rarely occurs, even in man.

What we have been describing is learning by imitation. An apparatus used in imitation studies with monkeys is shown in Figure 55. Observe that two identical cages are placed side by side and that, in the corresponding position in each cage, there are identical puzzle boxes. The imitator is trained until it is




Figure 55 Apparatus Used to Study Imitation in Monkeys

(From Warden, C. J., Field, H. A., and Koch, A. M., "Imitative Behavior in Cebus and Rhesus Monkeys," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1940, vol. 56, p. 313.)


an expert in opening the puzzle box. In the imitation tests, the untrained animal or imitator watches the trained one manipulate a puzzle device, after which it is given an opportunity to manipulate the duplicate device in its own cage. If the monkey fails to open the box within one minute after the demonstration, it is regarded as having failed in that particular test. A new puzzle device is inserted, and the test repeated, perhaps this time with knobs, chains, or strings instead of latches. One of fifteen monkeys tested in this way solved twenty-three out of twenty-four problems by imitation. For the group as a whole, learning by imitation occurred in only 46 per cent of the tests.⁵

Animals below the level of monkeys have been trained to imitate simple acts like turning to the right or left so that, after many trials, they learn to get a reward or avoid punishment by doing what the animal in front of them does. But it is doubtful whether any of these animals could learn by once passively observing the performance of another, as in the above tests.⁶


Use of tools

Learning in monkeys and higher animals is often investigated by use of tool problems. The hungry animal is put in a cage and a lure, such as a banana, is placed at some distance outside. The food can be brought within reach sometimes by using attached strings, sometimes by using a rake, sometimes by using a stick, or perhaps an appropriate combination of sticks. The food may be suspended high above the subject, so that the only means of access is by stacking boxes or swinging on a near-by rope.

In Figure 56, we see a chimpanzee fitting two sticks together in order to reach food which either stick by itself is too short to reach. The initial attack on such problems by animals and young children is usually of the overt trial-and-error variety. One stick is used, then the other. One stick may be pushed out with the other until the food is touched. Sometimes the sticks are fitted together, yet



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
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Figure 56. Chimpanzee Joining Sticks so that Food May be Reached

Finding that food is inaccessible with one stick, the chimpanzee picks up the two sticks, fits them together, and pushes the combined sticks toward the food — a dish of ice cream. After pushing the end of the double stick into the ice cream, the chimpanzee withdraws it and licks off the delicacy. (From the film "Monkey into Man," by Huxley and Zuckerman. Courtesy of Walter O. Guttlohn, Inc., Educational Films, American distributors.)

without the subject realizing that joined sticks provide a means of solution.

An unusually bright chimpanzee studied by the German psychologist, Wolfgang Kohler, reacted to the two-stick problem in much the manner described above until, with apparent suddenness, it saw the relation between solution of the problem and the joined sticks.⁷

Sultan, as before, pushes one stick with the other toward the objective, and as this pseudo-solution does not satisfy him any longer, he abandons his efforts altogether, and does not even pick up the sticks when they are both again thrown through the bars to him. The experiment has lasted over an hour, and is stopped for the present, as it seems hopeless, carried out like this. As we intend to take it up again after a while, Sultan is left in possession of his sticks, the keeper is left there to watch him.

Keeper's report "Sultan first of all squats indifferently on the box, which has been left standing a little back from the railings, then he gets up, picks up the two sticks, sits down again on the box, and plays carelessly with them. While doing this, it happens that he finds himself holding one rod in either hand in such a way that they lie in a straight line, he pushes the thinner one a little into the opening of the thicker, jumps up and is already on the run toward the railings, to which he has up to now half-turned his back, and begins to draw a banana toward him with the double stick."

This behavior was repeated on several occasions after Kohler was called to the scene.

Such sudden solution of a problem, apparently by seeing the relation between one aspect of it and other aspects, has been designated *insight*. This is perhaps synonymous with what, in human beings, is known as "getting the idea" or "seeing the point." One psychologist calls it the "Aha experience."

Only limited insight is possible in typical maze situations where but a small portion of the pathway is apparent at one time. This is true also in certain problem situations where significant aspects of the mechanism cannot be perceived. Sudden learning which suggests insight has been observed most often in tool-using situations, because, in these, all aspects of the problem are presented simul-

taneously. Such situations make it relatively easy for the subject to "put two and two together."

The predominant use of maze and puzzle-box situations by early American investigators of animal learning, and the use of tool situations, where all relevant aspects of the problem are visible, by German psychologists, once led Bertrand Russell⁸ to remark that to all appearances,

Animals studied by Americans rush about frantically, with an incredible display of hustle and pep, and at last achieve the desired result by chance. Animals observed by Germans sit still and think, and at last evolve the solution out of their inner consciousness.

Insight is rare in animals, not quite so rare in children, and quite common in human adults. In human adults certainly, and perhaps also in animals and children, insight is often preceded by implicit trial and error, a process which involves thinking of the various possible moves instead of actually making them. But animals are unable to report what is going on inside of them, hence we are unable to say what implicit processes are associated with a performance like Sultan's.

HUMAN LEARNING

Mazes, problem boxes, and tool-using situations have been used extensively with human subjects. Many are adaptations of apparatus first used with animals. Of all such devices, mazes have been most widely used.

One reason for this emphasis on a type of behavior somewhat removed from activities of everyday life is that all individuals who learn a maze pattern devised by the experimenter "start from scratch." They may have learned to throw darts, to shoot arrows, or to perform many other acts, but none of them has learned to find his way through this particular maze pathway. If we compared individuals in learning to throw darts, for example, those who had already acquired some proficiency would have an advantage over the others. If we used almost any other everyday


form of activity, the same situation would arise. On the other hand, maze performance is a novel skill. This is an important point, not only in comparing the learning ability of one individual with another, but also in comparing the effectiveness of different conditions and methods of learning. It would be impossible to equate control and experimental groups for training under different conditions if some individuals had already, and to an unknown degree, learned the activity used to measure learning.

Human maze learning


Mazes for research with human subjects may be made sufficiently large for the subject to walk through them. It is customary, however, to use small mazes which the subject traces by moving a pencil along a grooved path, by moving his fingertip along a raised wire path or by tracing printed forms with a pencil. Each of these varieties is illustrated in Figure 57.

Stylus and finger-relief mazes are learned while the subject is blindfolded. This places him somewhat in the position of an animal running the enclosed-alley maze, for he perceives only a small portion of the maze at a time, and is unable to use insight to any marked degree. Paper mazes, on the other hand, are more like the open-alley maze used with animals, but they are so complicated that, even though the subject can see the whole layout, he cannot immediately discern the correct pathway. He must "figure it out" either by overt trial and error, by observing and relating its details, or both.

Human learning in stylus and finger-relief mazes does not, as a rule, proceed any more efficiently than learning of comparable maze patterns by white rats. This is very rudely brought home to students who, after watching rats learn a maze and being irritated or amused at the lack of insight displayed, find themselves using an overt trial-and-error approach, retracing, re-entering blind alleys, and, in general, doing almost everything a rat does. The number of trials required to learn,



Stylus Maze



Finger-Relief Maze



Pencil-and-Paper Maze

Figure 57. Three Human Mazes

This stylus maze is one devised by Foster and Tinker. Finger-relief mazes often have a single wire. Observe that this double wire maze has a multiple-T pattern. The pencil-and-paper maze is from the Porteus Maze Test.

the number of errors made, and the time consumed, are not greatly different in rats and college students. Sometimes the rats come out slightly ahead and sometimes the students.⁹

There are certain aspects of the situation that may favor the human being, and certain others that may favor the rat. Let us see what these are.

The human subject perhaps has an advantage in that, after a few trials, he can formulate certain aspects of the problem verbally. He perhaps says to himself, "I made that mistake before. I'll have to watch my step next time I get into this region", or, "If I keep the stylus pressing against the right-hand side at this point, I'll not miss that correct pathway." He may develop a visual representation of the pathway. After he has learned a maze pattern blindfolded, the subject can often draw a fairly good picture of the path. His superior reasoning ability would give the human subject a great advantage if the maze involved some logical pattern which he could figure out. But mazes like those under consideration usually do not involve any logical pattern. The individual is forced to use elementary processes comparable in many respects with those used by rats.

Motivation, on the other hand, is probably in favor of faster learning by the rat. A hungry rat running the maze or a rat swimming it acts as though life itself depended on getting to the end. No human subject is so intensely motivated while learning a maze. He learns it, in the first place, because he is required to learn it or because he wishes to oblige the experimenter. While he is learning, the human subject may be motivated by a desire to get through with his task as soon as possible so that he may do something more interesting, he may work hard for fear that the experimenter will think him stupid, or he may go through the trials in a routine and disinterested manner.

The rat is not only better motivated, but it is less distractible than man. Instead of giving full attention to the task, human subjects often respond to extraneous things — like the sound of planes overhead, voices down the hall, and their own personal discomforts. As the task becomes routine, they may even day-dream — their thoughts far away from the learning situation.

Moreover, the rat usually learns the maze with one trial a day for several days, whereas the human subject usually learns it at one sitting — with

massed rather than distributed practice. Massed learning, as will be observed more fully in the next chapter, is usually not so efficient as distributed learning.

Poor motivation, distraction, and massed practice, all interfere with efficient learning. In the maze-learning situation these may easily cancel whatever advantage comes from man's superior intelligence.

Pencil-and-paper mazes, like that illustrated in Figure 57, are hardly comparable with the usual varieties of maze. The subject may start tracing with a pencil, and retrace wherever necessary, until he reaches the goal but this is not the characteristic approach. Learning of such mazes is likely to be observational rather than manual. The subject looks the situation over and, with his eyes, follows one possible lead after another. When the correct pathway is evident, he then takes pencil in hand and traces it. Trial-and-error is involved here, as in other forms of maze learning, but it is likely to be implicit more than overt. In other words, the individual largely thinks his way through the maze.

Problem boxes

Human solution of problem situations is often in marked contrast with that of animals. Problem boxes like those already described are usually solved at a single glance by human subjects. Thus, puzzle boxes used to study learning in human subjects must be much more complicated than those used to study learning in animals.

Part of man's ability to solve problems more complicated than those solved by animals below him comes from his greater manual dexterity. More important, however, is his better ability to learn by observation, to see relationships, and to reason.

Consider, for example, the problem box shown in Figure 58. This apparatus is probably too complicated for any animal below man to manipulate appropriately. It must be opened by inserting the buttonhook into appropriate holes, placing the hook over certain rings, and lifting them off pegs. But the proc-




Figure 58. The Healy Puzzle Box

ess requires something more than motor dexterity. One must observe the holes; whether the buttonhook will fit into them; whether it will enable the rings to be loosened; and the sequence in which the rings must be lifted. If the problem is to be solved readily, careful observation and a certain degree of insight are necessary. A chimpanzee would probably not even grasp the nature of the problem. He might, to be sure, make a simple problem out of it by smashing the box. Human idiots fail to grasp the nature of such problems. A normal human subject, however, keeps within limits set by the instructions. He undertakes to open the box with the buttonhook alone, and not to break the glass cover or any of the cords to which the rings are attached.

In solving such problems, human subjects sometimes exhibit a more or less random, more or less trial-and-error, approach which is clearly apparent to any onlooker. They pull the string with the buttonhook, turn the box over and around, and pull at the latch. Then, suddenly, they get the idea of inserting the hook into a hole and trying to get at the rings in that way. They try loosening one ring, but soon discover that another must be loosened first. This sort of behavior continues until, perhaps after an insight or two, the subject gets the box open.

It occasionally happens, on the other hand, that a subject will solve the problem on an observational basis entirely. He looks the

situation over and makes no overt move until satisfied that he can open the box without error.

I once handed the Healy puzzle box to a girl in elementary psychology hoping to demonstrate trial-and-error learning to the class. But she looked at the box a minute or so, then opened it swiftly, without a false move. Upon being asked how she did it, the student replied that she "figured it out." She thought of one move after another, some correct and some incorrect, but made no overt response until she had "figured it out." After this implicit trial-and-error process reached completion, the student put into practice what she had learned observationally. It may have seemed to some that she learned the solution by a sudden "flash" of insight rather than by trial-and-error. Much of the sudden learning observed in man and animal may be the outcome of some such implicit trial-and-error process.

Complex motor skills

In acquiring complex skills of everyday life — like typing, flying, playing a violin, or operating a lathe — one may use overt trial and error, implicit trial and error, or a combination of these. In the course of his trial-and-error activity, the learner may get insights which speed the learning process. He may start to learn such skills from the ground up, as it were, or he may be given verbal instructions, demonstrations, or both, as well as actual practice.

At the present time, learning of many ath-

letic and industrial skills is facilitated by moving-picture demonstrations of skilled performance. One cannot learn skills of very great complexity merely by attempting to copy the performance of an expert, but the sample performance does provide two decided advantages.

(1) It shows the correct performance, thus enabling the learner to save time and effort which might otherwise be wasted in making incorrect approaches. Suppose, for example, that you were a Hottentot who had never seen or heard of a bicycle — that you had not the least idea what the entire device or its various mechanisms were for, but you were shown a moving picture of a man riding a bicycle. Then, although you would be far from acquiring skill in riding, you would at least know that the device was for transportation, that one sits on a certain part rather than another, and that moving it required pushing the pedals with the feet. Human beings are often called upon to learn industrial skills just as foreign to their past experience as cycling is to the past experience of the Hottentot. In such instances, seeing a skilled performance saves a great deal of time which would otherwise be spent in trial and error.

(2) Observing skilled performance not only

gives general orientation like that described, but it also gives the observer certain insights at the start which, if he ever acquired them during practice, might come only after a long process of trial and error.

Observe, for example, the two methods of performing an industrial operation, illustrated in Figure 59. The original method, probably hit upon in a blind trial-and-error fashion, enabled the worker to solder-coat five blocks per minute. The new method, worked out by an "efficiency expert" and taught partly by demonstration, made it possible for the worker to solder-coat more than nine blocks per minute. In the old work pattern, both hands (represented by dots) were used, but the left merely reached into the supply pan. The other hand performed essential operations. In the new method, however, both hands simultaneously reached the supply pans, each carried a block to the flux pot, each to the solder pot, each to the knock-off plate, and each to the stock pile. It is obvious that the insight which underlay this new arrangement of materials, thus greater use of the left hand, and this more efficient use of the right hand, could not, if learned at all, be acquired by the worker as readily as by demonstrational means. By such means he does not




Figure 59. Comparison of an Inefficient and an Efficient Method of Performing an Industrial Operation (From Poffenberger, A. T., "Principles of Applied Psychology." New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, p. 387. Adapted from Morgenson, A. H., "Common Sense Applied to Motion and Time Study." New York: McGraw-Hill, 1932, p. 58.)

have to get the insights himself, they are given to him from the start.

A blind trial-and-error attack on problems is often called *practice*, to differentiate it from *training*, where skilled performances are observed, and the learner is given certain instructions concerning his performance, perhaps even taught the principles of operation involved.¹⁰

VERBAL SKILLS

Some motor skills are acquired by man partly through memorizing. That is to say, he intends to remember which acts lead to the best results, what he has observed in a skilled performance, and what he has been told by his instructor about operation of the tool or machine in question. Most verbal skills acquired by older children and adults are clearly learned by memorizing. The individual repeats the material with the intention to recall or recognize it later.

Learning to speak

Speaking is a complex motor skill, as well as a symbolic or verbal one. It is acquired partly on the basis of reflex vocalizations which appear during early infancy, but also on the basis of imitation and trial-and-error activity.¹¹

Ability to make combinations of sounds which closely approximate those of adults (namely, "doll" instead of "da," the original vocalization) develops gradually. There is no doubt that maturational factors are involved in this development. Vocalizations produced by adults cannot be copied by the child until auditory-vocal mechanisms, including their cerebral connections, have sufficiently developed. Nevertheless, it is obvious that children learn to speak, just as they learn other manipulative habits. Saying the word "doll," for example, calls for a complex integration of lung, throat, mouth, and tongue movements in properly timed succession. The sound *d* is produced when the tip of the tongue is placed between the slightly open teeth in a certain way, and air is expelled from the lungs. Saying *o* calls for an appropriate manipulation of lungs, vocal cords, tongue, and mouth, as well as of resonance cavities within the throat and

mouth. The *l* sound requires manipulation of lungs, vocal cords, tongue, and mouth. Saying "doll" in the adult way, calls for a rather definite temporal patterning of these movements. Such patterns are gradually acquired. Adequately stimulated by his fond parents, and later by formal teachers, the child vocalizes in a trial-and-error fashion, until he achieves the acceptable patterns. Thus he learns to say "doll" instead of "da," "stomach" instead of "tummy," "sugar" instead of "fugar," "light" instead of "yite," "elephant" instead of "fant," and so on.

Memory experiments

Verbal skills frequently involved in laboratory studies of learning include recitation of poems or narratives; recitation of lists of words, digits, syllables, or other symbols; and substitution of one kind of verbal material for another, for instance, substituting digits for words or forms. Very little need be said about such materials at this point, for they will be dealt with in more detail in the chapter on remembering, which concerns not the process of memorizing as such, but what is retained after such a process.

The most useful type of verbal material for experimental purposes is the nonsense syllable, or some modification of it. Ebbinghaus pointed out that poems, narratives, words, digits, and similar meaningful material give certain individuals an advantage over others. If one has already learned a poem, for example, his laboratory learning of it does not start from scratch. He has an advantage over somebody who has never before seen or heard the poem. The problem is the same as the one considered in relation to motor skills, where the maze was found to have advantages, for scientific work, not possessed by activities more in line with everyday skills.

Typical nonsense syllables are *fej*, *guk*, and *ril*. Such syllables, of which an almost endless variety may be devised, are usually arranged in lists, either singly or paired. In the first instance the subject merely learns to reproduce them in order, as he would a list of words. This is the simple recall method of learning. In the second instance, however, he




Figure 60 A Memory Drum

learns to repeat the paired syllable when its partner is presented alone. This learning of paired associates is like learning vocabulary lists, where the foreign word is presented and one gives its English equivalent, or vice versa.

A type of apparatus widely used to expose syllables, or other verbal materials, either singly or in pairs, at controlled time intervals, is shown in Figure 60.

Substitution learning

Learning to substitute one symbol for another is a variety of code deciphering. The subject may be presented with a page of material like the following.

LAXDOCQBGY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

YLOQBCDAGQOBXLYCDXQGYDXOA
LXBOAOXDXALDBGQYOCDXLGCDCQ

At the word "Go," he uncovers the page and begins substituting below each letter the number indicated in the code at the top. The subject continues to do this until time is called. On the next trial he is given a duplicate sheet, and the procedure is repeated. After a few trials, the subject has memorized the key, and further improvement depends merely upon speed of substitution. Substitutions much more complicated than in this sample are often used in such research.

LEVELS OF COMPLEXITY IN HABIT FORMATION

Many complex skills, both motor and verbal, involve an integration of simpler skills.

Some involve successively higher stages of integration as learning proceeds. They are, for this reason, referred to as *habit hierarchies*.

Take typing, for example. One first learns to hit the correct keys. These learned responses may be designated *letter habits*. After habits of striking the correct keys have progressed to the point where the individual is fairly proficient, he finds that he is developing *word habits*. Letters like T, H, and E, instead of eliciting noticeably separate responses, arouse a single response. The individual looks at the word "THE" or thinks it, and the separate responses seem to take care of themselves. After a while, *phrase habits* appear. Common phrases like "Very sincerely yours" are typed without the typist having to pay any attention to either the separate letters or the separate words. The situation in typing may be represented schematically as follows:

Letter habit	<u>T</u> <u>H</u> <u>E</u> <u>B</u> <u>O</u> <u>O</u> <u>K</u> <u>I</u> <u>S</u> <u>D</u> <u>U</u> <u>E</u>
Word habit	<u>T</u> <u>H</u> <u>E</u> <u>B</u> <u>O</u> <u>O</u> <u>K</u> <u>I</u> <u>S</u> <u>D</u> <u>U</u> <u>E</u>
Phrase habit	<u>T</u> <u>H</u> <u>E</u> <u>B</u> <u>O</u> <u>O</u> <u>K</u> <u>I</u> <u>S</u> <u>D</u> <u>U</u> <u>E</u>

Flying a plane, or any similar motor skill, first involves learning to use the separate controls correctly. As this series of separate habits is being mastered, however, the student is also learning second-order habits, like coordinating the movements of stick and rudder bar. With further practice, there develops a smooth patterning of movements, such as those made in doing complicated maneuvers.

After complicated skills are practiced for a long while, they tend to run their course automatically. There are many examples of this in everyday life. Think of the concentrated attention that one must give to riding a bicycle for the first time. One is aware of movements made in balancing the vehicle, in guiding it, and in working the pedals. After considerable practice, however, these balancing, steering, and pedaling activities take place automatically — one does not have to think of them. One may day-dream or engage in a conversation while riding. One eventually




Figure 61. Error Curve for a College Student Who Learned a Stylus Maze

rides with as little thought as is involved in walking

LEARNING CURVES

Learning curves illustrate progress in the acquisition of skill by showing the rate at which errors, for example, are eliminated or correct responses fixated. Practice periods, trials, or uniform intervals after which performance is sampled, are represented along the base (abscissa) of the graph. Errors, time, correct responses, or other indices of progress or lack of progress are represented at the left side (ordinate) of the graph.

Figure 61 is a graphic representation of progress made by a college student in learning a stylus maze. The curve is based on errors (blind-alley entrances with retracing eliminated). It shows a more or less gradual elimination of errors as the result of practice. A curve based upon the average performance of a group would fluctuate less than this one.

A time curve for the same maze and same student is presented in Figure 62. Here, again, we observe that continued practice causes a gradual lowering of the curve.

Learning a letter-digit substitution problem




Figure 62. Time Curve for a College Student Who Learned a Stylus Maze

is graphically portrayed by the curves shown in Figure 63. Here we have plotted correct responses, so that the curve gives a direct representation of increase in efficiency. The number of substitutions per trial increases gradually as practice continues. Observe, too, that the individual curve (lower) is more variable than that based on average performance of the group.




Figure 63. Learning Curves for Letter-Digit Substitution

Figure 64 gives a comparison of time curves for solution of two puzzle problems. The first curve represents learning to open the Healy puzzle box; the second represents learning to assemble the Wiggly Block.

The second curve falls more slowly than the first, because the Wiggly Block, although offering possibility of a few significant insights, is largely a trial-and-error problem. A subject may realize, before or while he is working on the problem, that the block wiggly on all sides must go in the middle, that the blocks wiggly on three sides must go in the center of a side, and that the blocks with two flat edges must be corner blocks. Ordinarily, however, the problem is tackled in an overt trial-and-

error fashion, with infrequent insight, if any, and the curve falls gradually. In the case of the other puzzle, however, the subject grasps the problem better than he grasps that of the Wiggly Block. Once he realizes what he must do, he performs without error. The sudden fall in the curve after the first trial occurs because, once having grasped the nature of the problem, the subject merely rehearses what he has already learned. Further improvement often occurs, but this is an improvement merely in the speed of performance — nothing essentially new is learned.

When the learning curve changes suddenly, as in the Healy illustration of puzzle-box learning, there is a suggestion that insight




Figure 64. Learning Curves for the Indicated Problems

into the nature of the task has emerged. There is no way, of course, to represent implicit trial and error, much of which may accompany the overt movements. Implicit trial and error may be going on while the curve is at a high level, erroneously suggesting that no progress in solution is being made.

The physiological limit

Learning curves tend to approach a limit beyond which performance cannot improve. The physiological limit, in the case of error curves, is set by the problem itself. One cannot make less than zero errors, hence the curve ceases to change when the error score is consistently zero. In the case of time curves, the physiological limit is approached as the individual gets to the point where he cannot manipulate any faster. He is like the skilled runner whose legs cannot go faster. When correct responses are plotted, the curve cannot rise above the place where performance is perfect. Thus, in the curves for learning of nonsense syllables represented in Figure 65, the highest possible point is that at which all syllables in the list are correctly reproduced.

Often a skilled worker fails to attain the full efficiency of which he is capable. He

acquires sufficient skill to "get by" and then stops. It might seem, at first glance, that he has reached his physiological limit. But stiffer competition, higher standards of performance demanded by his teachers or employers, or the introduction of bonuses for output above a certain level, lead him to improve his efficiency. The learning curve then rises, showing that the physiological limit was not reached. In a well-known industrial study, for example, experienced typesetters increased their average output more than 40 per cent after a bonus system, dependent upon output above a certain minimum, was introduced.¹²

Plateaus

As we have just suggested, learning curves sometimes exhibit a leveling off, followed by a further rise. A stretch of little or no apparent improvement, followed by further improvement, is known as a *plateau*. It may be produced by a variety of factors most important of which are: (1) insufficient motivation as in the case of the typesetters, whose greater output after introduction of a bonus system was described above; (2) insufficient integration of simpler habits into higher order habits like the letter and word habits of a typist or telegrapher; (3) a conflict between old habits and those being acquired, as when a person who has typed by the "hunt-and-peck system" has difficulty in acquiring the touch method because his older, less adequate mode of behavior, until it is suppressed, interferes with improvement.¹³

The best-known example of a plateau is that illustrated in Figure 66. Here we have a steady rise in letter and word curves for receiving up to what is apparently the physiological limit for these relatively simple habits. The receiving curve based upon connected discourse, on the other hand, shows a flattening out until the simpler habits have been perfected, then, it rises. The rise is apparently due to an integration of simpler habits into higher order habits. The sending curve shows no plateau.




Figure 65. Curves Based upon the Learning of a List of Ten Nonsense Syllables




Figure 66. Learning Curves for Telegraph Sending and Receiving
(After Bryan and Harter)

TRANSFER

Learning one skill sometimes influences the acquisition of other skills. This influence may be positive, whereby the acquisition of one type of performance facilitates learning of another. The influence of earlier learning on later learning may, on the other hand, be negative, as when acquisition of one skill interferes with acquisition of another. In the first instance we have positive transfer of training, often referred to merely as "transfer of training" or "transfer of learning." In the second instance we have what is commonly called *habit interference*.

Bilateral transfer

One of the simplest examples of positive transfer is to be found in experiments showing improvement in performance with the left hand as a result of practice with the right hand. This is *bilateral transfer* or *cross-education*. Sometimes transfer is from one limb to another, as from hand to foot, or vice versa.

In the early studies of bilateral transfer, the skill used was mirror drawing, which utilized a device like that illustrated in Figure 67. The subject is required to trace the star-shaped pathway with a stylus, moving in a clockwise direction and attempting to avoid




Figure 67. Mirror Drawing

contact with the sides of the path. In the apparatus illustrated, each time the side is touched, an electrical contact is made and an electric counter records the error. The time taken to trace the star is also recorded. What makes the task a difficult one is that the subject does not see the path, except in a mirror, which, of course, produces a near-far reversal to which he must learn to adjust.

Experiments using this and other problems have shown that practice with the right hand improves performance with the left. Two equivalent groups of subjects are customarily used, a control and an experimental group. Both groups are given one trial with the left hand. One of these (the control group) does nothing further for the time being. The other (experimental group) is given a large number of trials, say fifty, with the right hand. After this training period is completed, both groups are given a further trial with the left hand. The procedure just described may be presented in this fashion —

Control Group

Left hand (rest period) Left hand

Experimental Group

Left hand (Practice with right hand) Left hand

After this procedure has been followed through, the improvement in performance made by the control group is subtracted from the improvement made by the experimental group. This indicates the amount of improvement in the left hand through practice with the right. A control group is made necessary by the fact that the second trial with the left hand, because of what was learned in the first trial, would show some improvement, even if no training with the right hand occurred.

In one investigation of transfer in mirror drawing, the error scores of the control group dropped 55 per cent, without intervening practice with the right hand, while those for the experimental group dropped 76 per cent. Thus the per cent of transfer from right-hand practice to performance with the left hand was, from the standpoint of errors, about 21

per cent. Time scores for the control group dropped 46 per cent. Those for the experimental group dropped 82 per cent. Thus the transfer in terms of time was 36 per cent.¹⁴

Transfer in maze learning

Learning a maze tends to make easier the learning of another maze. Results of numerous experiments on animals, children, and adults lead to this conclusion.

In studies of transfer from one skill to a similar one, like one maze performance to another, we must use control and experimental groups. One procedure is to form two equivalent groups, then have one group (experimental) learn maze A, while the other (control) does not. Finally, both learn still another maze, which we shall call B. Usually, in such experiments, the group which first learned maze A learns B in fewer trials, with fewer errors, and in less time than does the group which did not learn maze A. In one such study with human subjects, the experimental group learned maze B in 68 per cent fewer trials, with 89 per cent fewer errors, and in 87 per cent less time than the control group, which had no previous training on maze A.¹⁵

Transfer from one type of activity to another

While there is, as we have seen, a great deal of transfer from right-hand performance to left-hand performance of the same activity, and from one maze pattern to another, there is negligible transfer from one type of activity to a quite different type. We might expect that having played tennis would facilitate the learning of badminton or some other similar skill, but we would not expect that it would facilitate learning baseball or some other dissimilar skill. It happens that research on transfer of motor skills has dealt almost entirely with similar activities and has generally shown a large amount of positive transfer. Research on transfer from one activity to a dissimilar activity has, for the most part, utilized verbal materials.

Transfer in verbal learning

Results similar to those reported for trans-

fer of skill in mirror drawing and maze performance have been reported for verbal skills. When comparable lists of nonsense syllables are learned one after the other, there is a gradual reduction in the trials required to learn successive lists. It is as if the subject is learning how to learn this type of material.¹⁶ Somewhat similar results have been obtained with school children who memorized poems, digits, and other verbal materials. They learned similar materials with greater facility than did children not given the previous training. Where dissimilar materials were learned, however, transfer was negligible. Thus, children who memorized one kind of material usually did not memorize another kind any better than they would have without the previous training. Where improvement did occur, it was attributable to a carry-over of procedures, attitudes, or the like.

Three groups of children who were found to be equivalent in ability on the basis of memory tests, were required to memorize poetry, tables, and the substance of prose selections. A fourth group, comparable with the others, did arithmetic problems requiring no memorizing. This training continued thirty minutes daily, four days per week, for three weeks. All four groups were then required to memorize nonsense syllables, prose selections, the data of maps, and various other materials. There was some transfer from learning poetry and tables to learning nonsense syllables, since children who previously learned poetry and tables gained from 66 to 85 more points in memorizing nonsense syllables than did those who had memorized the substance of prose selections, or who had merely done arithmetic problems. This improvement, however, probably came, not from improved memory, but from application of techniques learned with one type of material to learning of another type. In some instances, as when the children went from nonsense syllables to the substance of prose, there was actually what appeared to be negative transfer. Those who had learned nonsense syllables apparently learned a technique which interfered with their memorizing of ideas involved in prose passages.¹⁷

Transfer of the nature indicated is usually short-lived. The subjects soon forget the

techniques used, and their attitudes of concentration on the task weaken. After a lapse of time, the performances of control and experimental groups are equalized.

In an experiment on memory span for digits (the longest list of digits that can be recalled after a single reading), one group of children was given 78 days of practice, while a comparable group received no practice. Both groups had an initial span of 4.33 digits. The experimental group, as a result of the 78 days of practice, increased its average memory span to 6.40 digits. The control group, although given no practice after the initial test, increased its span to 5.06 digits, a gain of .73 as compared with 2.07 digits. But in a further test given four and one half months later, the difference between the experimental group and control groups was no longer evident. Further training given to both groups did not increase the span of the experimental group any more than it increased that of the control group. It was concluded that "the improvement brought about by training in this case is due to subtle techniques rather than to increased fundamental capacities."¹⁸

Bases of transfer

Where transfer occurs, either in motor or verbal learning, it comes from (1) *similarity of contents*, (2) *similarity of techniques*, (3) *similarity of principles*, or (4) *a combination of these*.

Similarity of contents. There is transfer from one maze to another, largely because mazes have much in common. They are somewhat alike in construction, and they require similar reactions. Familiarity with one brings a certain familiarity with others, even though they differ from the first in pattern. Drawing a star while watching it in a mirror is similar whichever hand is used. With the left hand one must move in the opposite direction to that which seems correct, and one must make the same opposite movement with the right hand. Practice with one hand is, for this reason, almost bound to facilitate performance with the other. Likewise, lists of nonsense syllables have much in common, even though the syllables are different. Each syllable follows another, to which it must be

associated. When we come to school subjects, the same similarity of contents is often found, and where it is found transfer is likely to occur. There is transfer from mathematical skills to mechanical engineering skills, because both involve the same symbols and symbolic relations. Transfer from one language to another occurs if the symbols and grammatical construction are alike. There is very high transfer from Spanish to Portuguese because of this similarity; and there is a certain amount of transfer from English to French because many words are similar.

Techniques. In an experiment on bilateral transfer, the subjects were required to toss a ball into the air and catch it in a cup to which it was attached by a long string. While practicing with the right hand, they often said, "I've got to get that cup a little lower so that the ball won't bounce out"; "I must toss the ball higher before trying to catch it"; or, "It's better to watch the cup than the ball."¹⁹ When they were called on to take their trials with the left hand, these subjects used the same methods that they had figured out when practicing with the right hand. Some of their transfer, therefore, depended upon a carry-over of techniques.

Relevant in this connection also is what we have already said about learning how to learn. There are courses in how to study which aim to teach the student how to organize his learning so as to make him maximally efficient. Any transfer that comes from such courses is a transfer of study techniques.

Transfer in terms of techniques also occurs if, having learned the scientific approach to problems in one subject, the student applies the scientific method to problems in other fields. Likewise, if the student takes a course in formal logic and thereafter thinks more logically, or tests his thinking in terms of logic, the procedures of formal logic have been transferred. Occasionally, a student who has learned in mathematics to formulate a problem by letting x equal this, y that, and so on, applies the same type of formulation to comparable problems in everyday life.

A word of caution is, however, in order. Having taken a course in how to study, in scientific method, in logic, in mathematics, or any other subject, does not guarantee that transfer will occur. The teacher with his eye on transfer will do well to give practice exercises in which transfer is called for. In other words, he will teach how to transfer the methods to practical situations. Transfer, even though possible, does not take place automatically.

Some instances of insight may involve application of techniques. Suppose, for example, that a chimpanzee has, in the jungle, learned to reach otherwise inaccessible objects by swinging toward them on a vine. Now in the psychological laboratory, he is confronted with an apparently inaccessible banana. A rope, however, is hanging near-by. If the animal sees the similarity between the rope and the vine, or between his jungle method and the one now possible, he may solve the problem immediately.

Principles. Transfer of principles is not always clearly different from transfer of techniques, because the use of a technique may involve the application of principles.

An experiment which clearly involves transfer of principles is illustrated by the following: Children learned a problem in which one of several doors containing figures, and above which figures appeared, was to be opened in order to get a hidden toy. The principle which the children were to learn by their trial-and-error activities was this: "The correct door is always the one whose figure matches the one above it", or, "none of the wrong doors have figures which match those above." After having learned this problem with figures, many children learned, without any further training, new problems in which colors alone were used. Having learned the principle with figures, they applied it to the color problem. Transfer was 100 per cent.²⁰

A study of puzzle solving in human adults showed that, when subjects were taught the principle involved in solution of one problem, they solved, without any error, new puzzles

which involved the same principle. Those who did not learn the principles involved failed to show much transfer.²¹

In one of the best-known experiments on transfer of principles, a group of boys was given instruction in principles of refraction, while another comparable group received no such instruction. Both groups were then called upon to hit an underwater target with darts. This they accomplished with approximately equal success. But when the target was shifted to a new position, the boys with a knowledge of the principles of refraction made a much more rapid readjustment than did those with no knowledge of these principles. The investigator came to the conclusion that generalization, or application of principles to new situations involving the same principles, had occurred.²²

Formal discipline

Studies of transfer have failed to support the contention, once quite prevalent, that training in certain subjects, like Latin and mathematics, serves to strengthen particular psychological functions. This doctrine, known as that of "formal discipline," has often been used to justify inclusion in the curriculum of studies which, although having no apparent practical value for certain students, are said to be useful in "improving memory," in "improving judgment," in "strengthening the scientific intellect," or in "giving elasticity to mental functions." The evidence from experimental investigations shows that transfer, where it occurs, is due to similarity of contents, of techniques, or of principles, not to development of particular psychological faculties or functions.²³

Habit interference

Negative transfer needs but brief mention, for transfer, if it occurs at all, is usually positive.

The most effective method of producing habit interference experimentally is to require the organism to learn the reverse of what it has previously learned. Thus, a rat that has

learned to respond positively to a white area and to avoid a black area is now required to learn to respond positively to the black area and avoid the white; a rat that has been turning to the right in a T-shaped path is now required to turn to the left; or a rat that has been finding food in the northernmost part of the maze is now trained in a maze having food in the southernmost part.²⁴

Habit interference is often demonstrated in the laboratory by using an apparatus like that pictured in Figure 68. Subjects learn to sort cards into pigeonholes having the same symbols as the cards. After high speed and accuracy have been attained, the position of the symbols is changed. Thus, the card with a certain number on it goes into the upper right-hand hole during original learning, but into the lower left-hand hole during the transfer tests. Learning the new positions is easier for one who has not learned the former positions than it is for one who has learned them.

We see habit interference in everyday life. The person who has learned to drive a car with a left-hand drive has unusual difficulty in learning to drive one with a right-hand drive. Anybody who has habitually guided a sled with his feet experiences a certain amount of interference when he learns to guide a



Figure 68. A Card-Sorting Apparatus Used to Study Learning and Habit Interference

plane. Pushing the rudder bar with the right foot sends a sled to the left, but it sends a plane to the right. Sometimes, too, the pilot, when wishing to turn, will try to use the wheel rather than the rudder bar. Some flyers have found themselves in difficulty because their training plane differed in certain respects from the plane they were finally called upon to fly.

A recent accident was reported which occurred when a pilot, in attempting to correct for under-shooting a field, pulled back on the throttle and pushed the stick forward, resulting in a nose dive into the ground. This incorrect pattern of adjustment was due to the fact that the pilot was flying a plane in which the controls were placed differently from those in the plane in which he was trained. He was used to advancing the throttle with his right hand and pulling back the stick with his left hand; and the "left-hand-back, right-hand-forward" habit pattern transferred itself automatically, to the pilot's astonishment and resulting distress.²⁵

Habit interference in verbal activities also occurs at times. After the end of the year 1945, you may continue for some time to write 1945 instead of 1946 on your checks, and you may continue to write May after June has arrived. Likewise, after your telephone number, or that of a friend, has been changed, you may continue for a time to use the former number.

Negative transfer, like positive, occurs on the basis of similar content, techniques, or principles, but it involves interference rather than facilitation. The contents, techniques, or principles which make for negative transfer are opposed to those required by the new situation. This has been formulated along these lines: when we are called upon to make old responses to new situations, transfer may be positive. However, when we are required to make new responses to old situations, transfer may be negative.²⁶ Think of the pilot accustomed to reacting in one way with a sled, who failed to react correctly to the right-turn situation in his plane.

SUMMARY

Skill is proficiency. It may be predominantly motor or predominantly verbal, but motor skills in man are to some extent verbal, and verbal skills are partly motor. When we engage in an activity with the intention to remember, we are said to be memorizing. Basically, however, memorizing is probably no different from other learning. Animal learning is the clearest instance of motor acquisition uncomplicated by verbal elements.

In studying animal learning, we disturb the animal's adjustment, then observe its success in achieving a readjustment. One way of disturbing adjustment is to place a maze, a puzzle box, or some other obstacle between the animal and satisfaction of some need, such as the need for food, water, or sexual activity. Increasing proficiency is indicated by a decrease in time, errors, and distance traveled in overcoming the obstruction, or by an increase in correct responses. Trials required before the criterion of learning is attained also give a measure of learning ability.

Maze learning in rats and human subjects is characterized by trial-and-error activity which, in man, is known to be partly implicit. Human learning of stylus and raised finger mazes is no more efficient than learning of comparable maze patterns by rats. One reason is that man's superior reasoning processes cannot be exercised very greatly in such situations. Another reason is that the rat is usually better motivated than the human subject. The chief value of the maze in studying human learning is that the subjects are likely to "start from scratch."

In solution of problem boxes and tool-using situations, human subjects are far superior to other animals. Whereas both animals and men solve such problems by an overt trial-and-error attack, man is more likely to solve them by implicit trial and error and by observation. While animals below man sometimes solve such problems by grasping significant relations (or using insight) and by copying the performances of others (or imitating), they

are more likely to use overt trial and error. Even where animals do learn problems by using insight and by imitating others, man solves problems of much greater complexity than the animals can solve on these bases.

Man's acquisition of complex skills is often facilitated by observation of skilled performance. This does not mean that he learns complex skills by imitation alone, but it means that observation of skilled performance short-circuits, as it were, some of the trial and error that occurs in learning. Such observation also gives insights that might not otherwise occur.

Verbal learning is that in which language processes predominate. Learning to speak is based partly on imitation or, more properly, attempts to imitate, and partly on trial-and-error activity. Memorizing of verbal material is investigated scientifically by use of nonsense syllables, which, like mazes, are novel, starting the learner "from scratch." Poems, narratives, words, and other symbols are often used in studies of memorizing. These, however, are not as useful as nonsense materials, because the subjects, when they come to the laboratory, already have a certain amount of familiarity with the items involved. Another type of verbal material much used in learning experiments is the substitution task, where one symbol must be substituted for another, as in decoding messages.

Both motor and verbal skills have different levels of complexity. We are often required to learn relatively simple habits and then to combine them into habits of increasing complexity. Typing, telegraphy, and many other

activities of everyday life are habit hierarchies which are developed in this way. A noteworthy thing about habit hierarchies is that, as higher-order habits develop, the simpler habits tend to become more automatic, which means that we are decreasingly aware of their presence.

Learning curves give a graphic record of the progress of acquisition. They tend to approach a level of no further improvement with practice — a level known as the physiological limit. This limit is sometimes set by the nature of the problem and sometimes by the nature of the individual. Sometimes there is a flat place in the curve, indicating zero improvement as a function of practice. If improvement subsequently occurs, this place is known as a plateau — otherwise it suggests that the physiological limit has been reached. The improvement following a plateau may come from increased motivation, an integration of lower-order habits, or an overcoming of interference from conflicting habits or techniques.

Transfer may be positive or negative. Positive transfer from one activity to another — either motor or verbal — often occurs. When it does occur, however, such transfer is attributable to similarity of contents, techniques, or principles, the individual finding that what he has learned in one situation applies to this, that the technique formerly successful can be used here, or that a principle learned earlier applies to this new situation. Negative transfer, or habit interference, is frequently evident when we are called upon to make new responses to familiar situations.

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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

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Chapter 8

Foundations of Learning

WITH THE UNDERSTANDING of conditioned responses and skills which we have gained from the two preceding chapters, we are now ready to probe some underlying factors.

The fact that learning does not occur just because stimuli impinge upon an organism's receptors has already been mentioned. In this chapter we consider some of the conditions without which learning would fail to occur, or without which it would be inefficient. We will also give brief consideration to certain sensory and neural aspects of the learning process.

One of the important conditions of efficient learning, and perhaps of any learning at all, is *motivation*. It is almost axiomatic in research on learning that adequate motivation must be provided.

Even when motivation to learn is present, learning does not automatically occur. There are certain other conditions to be met. Some of these are often formulated as *principles of learning*. One, the *principle of effect*, is closely related to motivation.

There are certain conditions which, although not necessary to produce learning, may make it more economical. The most important of these are *distribution of effort* and *recitation*. Whether it is more economical in time or effort to learn something as a whole or to learn it piecemeal is the question of *whole versus part learning*.

Sensory and neural processes are essential in the learning process. The cerebral cortex is especially important, although as we shall see, the rôle played by the cortex as a whole,

and by different regions, is still a matter of controversy.

THE RÔLE OF MOTIVATION

Rewards

It is a well-known fact that rewards of one kind or another lead both animals and men to put increased effort into their activities. It is well known, too, that certain rewards are more effective than others. Animals are motivated to the greatest degree by food, water, and other incentives related to the satisfaction of basic physiological needs. Well-fed human beings, on the other hand, are greatly motivated by material rewards, such as money; and social rewards, such as recognition.

Rewards and learning in animals

Learning of hungry rats which found food at the end of the maze was compared, in one investigation, with the learning of rats which were hungry and found no food, and with the learning of rats which were not hungry and found food. As illustrated in Figure 69, the hungry rewarded group showed normal progress toward mastery of the maze habit, while the other groups exhibited little progress. The slight learning by hungry non-rewarded and non-hungry rewarded rats may be attributed to the incentive value of escape from the maze. Time scores for these groups actually increased during the course of the experiment, while those for the hungry rewarded group decreased in the normal manner.¹




Figure 69. The Effect of a Food Reward on Maze Learning in Rats

(From Tolman, E. C., and Honzik, C. H., "Degrees of Hunger, Reward and Non-Reward, and Maze Learning in Rats," University of California Publications in Psychology, 1930, vol. 4, p. 246)

If a reward is introduced after training has gone on for several trials without use of a reward, the learning curve drops suddenly, as shown in Figure 70. Observe that little progress was shown by the hungry non-rewarded group until, from the eleventh trial, food was found at the end of the maze. Introduction of a reward caused the learning curve to drop quickly to the level of the curve for animals normally motivated throughout the experiment.²

Withdrawal of a reward during the course of learning has just the opposite result. It is followed by an increase in errors and time.³

Rats are motivated more highly when rewarded with bran mash than when rewarded with sunflower seeds. It is not surprising, then, that substitution of sunflower seeds for bran mash in the middle of the learning process leads to a marked increase in error and time scores. The result is similar to that obtained when a reward is withdrawn.⁴

Rewards in human learning

Monetary rewards and praise are effective

in human learning. This can be illustrated by an experiment on the learning of an elevated finger maze by sixty boys. Three groups having equivalent chronological and mental age were used. Members of the first group received no reward other than that which might come from satisfaction in learning the maze; members of the second group received a material reward (a penny) at the end of each trial; and members of the third group received a verbal reward, such as "Good," "Very good," or "Let me see if you can make even fewer mistakes this time." The curves in Figure 71 show that the no-reward group learned slowly, the verbal-reward group somewhat faster, and the material-reward group fastest. The average number of errors in the last five trials was: no reward, 2.6; verbal reward, 2.3; and material reward, 1.7. Statistical analysis shows that, although these differences are small, the chances are almost 100 in 100 that they result from different motivation, and not from chance factors.

In a further experiment, utilizing the same maze but different boys, a quarter was given




Figure 70. The Effect of Introducing a Reward

(From Tolman, E. C., and Honzik, C. H., "Introduction and Removal of Reward and Maze Performance in Rats," University of California Publications in Psychology, 1930, vol. 4, p. 267.)




Figure 71. The Effect of Different Rewards on Human Maze Learning

(From Abel, L. B., "The Effects of Shift in Motivation upon the Learning of a Sensor-Motor Task," Archives of Psychology, 1936, No. 205.)

for every trial without error. Although not many perfect performances occurred, and few quarters were thus received, this condition led to the fastest learning of all.⁵

Punishment and reward

Numerous experiments on learning in rats

and human subjects have compared the effect of punishment and reward, the punishment usually being a mild electric shock. In most of these studies, involving a variety of learning situations, shock for errors has been more effective, in combination with reward, than reward alone.⁶ However, the effect of punish-

ment is not clearly indicated. If punishment is given for incorrect responses, it leads to more rapid elimination of these responses than occurs without it. However, under certain conditions, punishment for correct responses, which are also rewarded, leads to more rapid fixation than occurs without it.⁷

Punishment, or the "annoyance" produced by it, tends to make the learner more cautious and more sensitive to the stimuli associated with a response, whether correct or incorrect. It develops attitudes of anticipation like those already considered in the discussion of conditioning.

Annoyers do not act on learning in general by weakening whatever connection they follow. If they do anything in learning, they do it indirectly, by informing the learner that such and such a response in such and such a situation brings distress, or by making the learner feel fear of a certain object, or by making him jump back from a certain place, or by some other definite and specific change which they produce in him.⁸

Praise versus reproof

What is the relative effectiveness of praising good performances and reproving poor ones? One of the best studies on this question was done with 106 fourth- and sixth-grade girls. Four groups, matched in initial ability,

in age, and in sex, were used. The task was that of solving as many as possible of thirty arithmetic problems in a time limit of fifteen minutes. Five comparable groups of problems were used, one on each of five trials, given one day apart. The reprovved group, regardless of how well it did, was asked to come to the front after each day's work and face the class. It was then "bawled-out" for its mistakes, careless work, and failure to improve. This group actually had no knowledge of how many problems it had solved correctly in the time limit. The praised group, regardless of how well or how badly it performed, faced the class each day and was complimented on its fine performance. The ignored group, while it heard the praise or reproof administered to the other groups, was not referred to during these periods. A control group, working in a separate room, was neither praised nor reprovved. It did not observe the treatment of the other groups, nor was it given any suggestion concerning the status of its own performance.⁹

The results of this experiment are graphically presented in Figure 72. Here we see that the average score of all four groups was initially the same — about twelve problems solved correctly. On the second day, both the praised and reprovved group gave a comparable performance, solving an average of slightly over sixteen problems. From this point on,




Figure 72. Effect of Different Motivating Conditions on Solution of Arithmetic Problems

(Drawn from data in Hurluck, E. B., "The Evaluation of Certain Incentives Used in School Work," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1925, vol. 16, p. 149.)

however, the praised group improved and the reproved group grew worse. Neither the ignored nor the control group showed any consistent improvement.

Knowledge of results

Motor skills are not acquired unless the subject has some knowledge of results. This is neatly illustrated by an experiment in which the apparatus of Figure 73 was used. By proper manipulation of both handles at once, the subject could move the spot of light onto the bull's-eye. He was given a score based upon how close he came to the bull's-eye. After preliminary practice, two groups were trained, one with the light off so that no knowledge of accuracy would be possible, and the other with the light on so that accuracy in hitting the target would be known. Five subjects working without knowledge of results failed to show any improvement. They became exceedingly "bored" with the whole procedure.

The learning curve for a group of ten women students is shown in Figure 74, preceding the point *B*. At *B* and thereafter, the light was turned off so that there would be no further knowledge of results. The rapid drop in performance which followed this point may be attributed to the loss of motivation which came with withdrawal of knowledge of re-

sults, not from forgetting what had been learned up to this point. Similar results were obtained with another group of ten students. The investigators conclude that:

Knowledge of results leads to improvement in performance. (a) by causing a tendency to repeat actions which have been successful, (b) by what may be called a "directive effect," i.e., by causing a tendency to correct, in the appropriate direction, any unsuccessful action; and (c) by setting up a conscious attitude or mood which is conducive to accurate performance. Removal of knowledge of results produces, on the other hand, an attitude which is not conducive to accurate performance.¹⁰

The need for knowledge of results, if learning is to proceed normally, is shown also by several other experiments, some of which utilized verbal material.¹¹

Rivalry and recognition

Human beings are greatly stimulated to put forth effort when competing with others, and when they know that social recognition will come to those who achieve. This was demonstrated in a classroom research in which groups of children did addition problems in five consecutive daily sessions. Some groups did the problems under conditions where no rivalry and no recognition for achievement were involved. Comparable groups did the same problems, but under conditions involv-




Figure 73. Two-Hand Co-ordination Apparatus

The subject was instructed to move handles *K* and *L* in such a manner as to throw a spot of light from the torch *T* upon the bull's-eye of the target *J*, *J*. Too small a movement of *K* caused the spot to move too far up on the target, while too small a movement of *L* caused the spot to move too far to the left. The performance was registered on a sheet of paper at *C*. A score of 10 was given for a bull's-eye, 9 for the next ring-out, and so on. The outermost ring scored 1 and a miss scored 0. The subject was required to move both hands just once at each trial. In other words, he was not allowed to explore until he located the target. (From Ewell, J. L., and Grindley, G. C., "The Effect of Knowledge of Results on Learning and Performance," *British Journal of Psychology*, 1938, vol. 29, p. 41.)




Figure 74. Average Performance of Ten Women in the Two-Hand Co-ordination Test

There was knowledge of results up to the 200th trial. From this point on, the light was turned off so that subjects could not tell whether or not they had hit the target. (From Elwell, J. L., and Grindley, G. C., "The Effect of Knowledge of Results on Learning and Performance," *British Journal of Psychology*, 1938, vol. 29, p. 45.)

ing intergroup competition. After each day's session, the children of the winning group held up their hands so that other children could see them. Not only this, but their names were placed on the blackboard. The curves in Figure 75 show that the rivalry and no-rivalry groups started with approximately the same average number of additions. After the experimental conditions had been introduced, however, the rivalry group improved and remained above the other in performance. The same general result held for accuracy and number of problems solved.¹²

It should be recognized, of course, that intense rivalry may have disruptive effects on performance and interfere with learning.

Passive versus intentional learning

While a certain amount of unintentional learning (but not necessarily unmotivated learning) occurs, the learning of verbal skills, like recitation of poems, narratives, and lists of words, seems to require motivation in the

form of intention to learn. Psychological literature contains many examples of failure to learn because the intention to do so was absent.




Figure 75. The Effect of Group Rivalry and Social Recognition on the Learning Process in Grade IV (Drawn from data reported by Hurlock, E. B., "The Use of Group Rivalry as an Incentive," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1927, vol. 22, p. 285.)

I have read aloud for several years, three or four times a year, and five successive times on each occasion, the same list of twelve words which students in my class are required to memorize as I read them. Students usually reproduce the twelve words in a correct sequence after three or four readings. Nevertheless, I cannot at this time recall a single word in the list. Even after reading the list five times in succession under these conditions, I could not completely reproduce it. The reason students learn this list so readily is that they *intend* to do so. The reason that I do not learn it is that I have no intention of doing so. There is no reason why I should learn it.

How many times have you read a passage in a book, only to stop and realize that you are merely reading the words while thinking of something else, and that you are understanding absolutely nothing of what you read? All of us have had the same experience many times.

Failure to learn, when there is no intention to do so, is also illustrated in the case of skills that are not predominantly verbal.

About twelve times in the last six years, I have gone to a certain institution, riding in a student's car. Each time we have gone over the same route, yet I could not, no matter what the inducement, follow that route without help. The reason that I have not learned it is that, instead of finding it myself, or intending to learn it while traveling with someone else, I have taken a purely passive rôle.

Several experiments in which subjects were mechanically guided through performances instead of initiating their own responses, have shown that complete learning of a skill does not occur on this basis alone. Guidance sometimes aids in the acquisition of a skill, but sometimes fails to have any effect.¹³

It should be clearly apparent from the preceding discussions that learning is inefficient, if not absent, unless strong motivation to learn is provided. We cannot at the present time, however, say which kind of motivation or which incentives are most effective. Praise, for example, is better than blame, but is it better than a piece of candy, a certain amount of money, or physical punishment? This we

cannot say, for the wide variety of possible incentives has not been investigated under comparable conditions. Moreover, the results reported are averages for groups. When we consider human individuals, it is clear from general observation that some are motivated more by blame than by praise, and some are motivated more by money than by either. See the chapters on motivation in Part 4 for a further discussion of this.

SOME CONDITIONS OF LEARNING

What conditions must apply if learning is to occur? Investigations of learning in animals and man have shown that certain conditions are of the utmost importance — of such importance, in fact, that they are often referred to as *laws* of learning. Some of these conditions are more important for certain learning situations than for others. None of them is in itself sufficient to account for learning. In stating one condition, we are usually forced to say, "Other things being equal." The other things are other conditions, without whose simultaneous occurrence with the first condition, learning could not be produced.

The most important conditions of learning are *contiguity*, *exercise*, *effect*, *belonging*, *intensity*, *recency*, and *primacy*. Some of these imply the others, some are supplementary to others, and some are more relevant to certain learning situations than to others.

Contiguity

In our discussion of conditioning we found that, in order to be associated, the conditioned stimulus and the unconditioned response must occur close together in time. While the conditioned stimulus does not have to be presented simultaneously with the unconditioned stimulus (and unconditioned response), it must appear soon before or soon after the unconditioned stimulus is presented. This is contiguity in time, and also in space, for the events to be related are presented in the same place as well as at approximately the same time.

For the organism engaged in maze learning,

the stimuli which indicate which turn is to be made next are approximately contiguous with the turn in both space and time. Reception of the reward is also roughly contiguous in space and time with the acts which immediately precede it. Punishment, in the form of having to turn back out of a blind alley, or in the form of an electric shock for blind-alley entrances, is also contiguous with the acts which produce it. In problem and tool learning, the same thing is true. Both correct and incorrect acts are contiguous in space and time with the stimuli which, after learning occurs, indicate that a certain response is or is not to be made.

In verbal learning, too, the principle of contiguity is operative. The words, digits, or other symbols to be associated are presented in the same place and at approximately the same time. Whether we are recalling such lists or reciting a poem or narrative, each response brings the stimuli (neural, kinesthetic and auditory) for the response contiguous with it in the original learning situation.

All other conditions of learning imply, or take for granted, the presence of contiguity. They emphasize, however, not the mere presence of two or more events in space and time, but such factors as repetition of the contiguous events, the effects of these events, the appropriateness of the contiguous relationship, and so on.

Contiguity, although an essential condition of learning, does not, of course, necessarily produce learning. Events may be contiguous, for example, without our ever noticing the fact. Stimuli in various parts of the maze are present, whether the rat is hungry or not, or rewarded or not, yet only the hungry rewarded animal comes to utilize these as signals indicating correct or incorrect turns.

Exercise

In order for learning to occur, repetition of the learning situation is usually required. We say "usually" instead of "always," because learning sometimes occurs on the basis of incidental observation, on the basis of imitation,

and on the basis of a single emotional experience — as when a child burns its hand and thereafter avoids the pain-producing stimulus. Learning of skills on the basis of a single experience, however, is extremely rare. Perhaps the only example would be acquisition of relatively simple skills, after watching someone else perform them — that is, imitation, after a single observation.

The principle of exercise or frequency, first enunciated by Thorndike on the basis of animal learning experiments, points to the fact that the more we repeat a certain response to a situation, the likelihood is increased that the same response will occur to the same situation later.¹⁴ It also implies that, in order to increase proficiency, we must repeatedly respond to the learning situation. This does not mean that we necessarily make the same response every time, for if we did, no acquisition of motor skills would occur. Such acquisition requires that the total response shall change in repeated trials.¹⁵

Several investigations have shown that, while repetition is usually necessary to build up stimulus-response relations, and to increase the individual's proficiency in motor and verbal skills, it does not necessarily have these effects. We saw, for example, the inadequacy of repetition when motivation is lacking. Passive repetition of words, or passive threading of a maze pathway, does not lead to acquisition. Nor does repeating an act without knowledge of results lead to learning.

It happens, too, that the most frequent response to a situation is not always the response retained. In a puzzle-box situation, for example, inadequate responses may be repeated more frequently than adequate ones, yet the latter be retained. As a matter of fact, the adequate response occurs only once, but a particular incorrect response may be repeated several times in each trial before the correct one occurs.¹⁶ The less frequent responses may thus be fixated. The reason for this is that not every response is equivalent in terms of the end result. Responses differ in their consequences. This implies that the

effect of a response may be more important than the number of times we repeat it

The importance of exercise lies in the fact that it involves repetition of other conditions which facilitate learning.¹⁷ Exercise without involving these conditions is practically useless.

Effect

The *principle of effect* with which Thorndike supplemented his "law of exercise" may be formulated briefly as follows: "Of the responses made to a situation, those which satisfy the organism's needs tend to be retained, while those which fail to satisfy these needs tend to be eliminated."¹⁸ Another way of stating this principle is to say that "those situations which elicit positive reactions tend increasingly to produce continuance of positive reactions, while those situations which elicit negative, or avoidance reactions, tend increasingly to produce continuance of negative reactions."¹⁹

That effect is a necessary condition of learning is supported by a considerable amount of evidence, including all that we know about the rôle of motivation in learning. Even in conditioned-response situations, where the factor of motivation is not so obvious as in the case of situations where skills are acquired, the principle of effect is also operative. The conditioned stimulus is associated with food reactions, escape reactions, or comparable responses of some utility to the organism. These responses are, as earlier pointed out, the dominant ones — the ones most congruent with the organism's needs. Responses which are less congruent — like pricking up the ears as compared with salivation — are not the ones connected with a new stimulus.

In all situations involving learning of skills, the principle of effect is clearly exemplified. In maze learning, the responses fixated are those related to food, escape, or incentives. The responses eliminated, on the other hand, are those which hinder satisfaction of the motive operating at the time. One set of responses contributes to the satisfaction of a need, while the other set hinders satisfaction of the need.

The stimuli which precede these responses become, through conditioning, the signs or signals of what is to follow.²⁰

Belonging

Thorndike is also responsible for statement of the belonging principle.²¹ It was formulated on the basis of verbal learning. In an experiment which is typical of several carried out in this connection, Thorndike read the following paragraph ten times to large groups of subjects, who were instructed to listen to what was read, just as they would listen to a lecture:

Alfred Dukes and his sister worked sadly. Edward Davis and his brother argued rarely. Francis Bragg and his cousin played hard. Barney Croft and his father watched earnestly. Lincoln Blake and his uncle listened gladly. Jackson Craig and his son struggled often. Charlotte Dean and her friend studied easily. May Borah and her companion complained dully. Norman Foster and his mother bought much. Alice Hanson and her teacher came yesterday.

After the tenth reading, the subjects were required to answer questions like these: "What word came next after rarely?" "What word came next after Lincoln?" "What word came after Norman Foster and his mother?"

Association of rarely with Francis, the word which followed it, occurred infrequently. Association between the last word of one sentence and the first word of the next occurred in only a little over 2 per cent of the cases. These associations do not have belonging in their favor. There is, in other words, no good reason why one should associate the last word of one sentence with the first word of the next, even though the two are repeated several times in that order. Association of Lincoln with Blake, however, so that presentation of the first calls up the second, seems entirely reasonable. We are accustomed to associating first and last names. The two appear to belong together. It is interesting to observe, therefore, that mention of the first word in a name brought the second word in around 20 per cent of the cases. These pairs were repeated no more than those mentioned above,

but the score was 18 per cent better. In response to questions like "What word came next after Norman Foster and his mother?" the reply was correct in from 73 to 81 per cent of the cases. The word "bought" belongs with the other words so evidently that association is relatively easy. Here again, the frequency with which these words were presented contiguously was no greater than in the cases already cited.

The effect of repetitions is enhanced, then, if the things presented together seem to belong together. In the last analysis, belonging is much like effect. Belonging depends upon attitudes developed through past experience (such as expecting to have the first name followed by the second), or instructions (such as "associate the word and the number so that, given the first you can respond with the second"). Individuals would have associated the last word of one sentence with the first word of the second if instructed to do so. Effect is the relevance of stimuli or acts to needs, however generated. When a person "needs" to associate one thing with another because of past experience or instructions, failure to do so has annoying consequences and success has pleasing effects. Thus, the principles are not actually different. They both point up the inadequacy of sheer contiguity and sheer repetition.

Intensity

It is a well-known fact that the intensity of motivational or other conditions associated with learning has some influence upon the readiness of fixation. This is sometimes referred to as the "law of vividness."

We have . . . those instances in which habit is established with one repetition, a name recalled with one introduction, a terror founded on one incident. . . .

Under what circumstances does this super-learning occur? Why will one telling experience sometimes take the place of twenty practice periods? . . . All of these cases of phenomenal learning seem to take place under strong emotion. The behavior that is attended by strong emotion tends to undergo

fixation. What leads to excitement tends to become a strong interest. The acts we perform when depressed or relaxed leave less impression.²²

While strong emotion does, at times, lead to fixation of a response — like withdrawal from an injurious stimulus — it may also interfere with efficiency in learning complex skills. Subjects who learn a stylus maze under emotional stress, for example, make more errors and learn more slowly than those who learn it under normal circumstances.²³ It is nevertheless true, as suggested in the above quotation, that the excitement attending a situation may, at times, fixate a response as readily as many practice trials without such excitement. Think, for example, of the greater apparent excitement evidenced by rats than by human beings in learning mazes. Excitement in this instance is directly related to motivation. Much of the efficiency of strong motivation in learning comes from the excitement engendered. In situations involving rivalry, for instance, the child launches himself wholeheartedly into his task, getting great joy out of success and feeling sad after failure.

The principle of intensity has been illustrated in verbal as well as in motor learning. In later discussions of attending, we shall observe that one responds most vigorously to, and remembers best, those aspects of a situation which stand out vividly from others, especially those which are novel. In the classroom, a student learns well those facts which follow the words, "Get this now," or, "You will doubtless get a question on this in the exam." Students learn their professor's good jokes, yet often fail to learn what the jokes are supposed to illustrate. And they almost never forget anything relating to sex, hypnosis, mental telepathy, and other extremely interesting subjects which may come up incidentally in the classroom.

Recency

Recent experiences, other things being equal, are more vivid than earlier ones. Likewise, when an organism attacks some problem

and solves it, the final acts involved in solution have, other things being equal, a greater vividness, in terms of neural after effects, than those performed earlier. One of the other things that may not be equal, of course, is emotional reinforcement, as when certain acts bring a shock or some other exciting consequence. To take another example, last evening's "date" is not necessarily better remembered than certain earlier ones which may have been more exciting emotionally.

When an organism learning to open a puzzle box returns to its task for the next trial, the most recent relevant activities, being more vividly represented in the nervous system, are the ones most likely to recur. Why should final acts be more vividly represented? There are three possible reasons. They may be more vividly represented because, (1) the neural pathways involved were the last to be activated before adjustment occurred; (2) because they were the acts most contiguous to solution and satisfaction of the need, hence most favored by effect; and (3) because they were followed by relative inactivity, a factor which, as will be apparent in the next chapter, favors retention.²⁴

Primacy

Other things being equal, first experiences and first acts in a series tend to be favored. The first "date," the first day at school, the first day in combat, and other "firsts" are often more vividly recalled than those somewhat more recent, but perhaps not those most recent. In learning a maze, a list of nonsense syllables or a poem, it often happens that the first turn, the first syllable, and the first line of verse are most readily impressed. Thorndike has argued that this situation occurs, not merely because the experiences or acts come first, but because of other factors, including the novelty of first things, and thus their greater tendency to attract attention.²⁵

A final word on conditions of learning

Of the conditions discussed (contiguity, exercise, effect, belonging, intensity, recency,

and primacy), none is, by itself, adequate to produce learning. Several of these conditions are simultaneously present in situations which result in learning. Contiguity, exercise, recency, and primacy are merely conditions in which factors like effect, belonging, and intensity operate. Moreover, we have not attempted to explain learning, but only to call attention to conditions associated with learning, or to describe conditions under which learning occurs. The "explanation" of learning will be a description of what happens in our nervous system when such conditions are operative. We are, as suggested earlier, at present far from achieving a full neurological description.

THE RELATIVE ECONOMY OF DIFFERENT LEARNING PROCEDURES

Assuming that the subject is well motivated and that conditions such as we have just described are operative, what are the best procedures to be followed in developing proficiency? Is it better, for example, to concentrate practice periods, or to distribute them with a shorter or longer interval between? Within a given practice period, is it better to give just one trial, or to give a number of trials? What is the most economical interval to introduce between practice periods — one hour, six hours, or a day? In memorizing verbal or motor skills, is it better to go over the material again and again, without a recitation or rehearsal, or is it better to introduce recitation or rehearsal periods at intervals during the original learning? If so, what proportion of the learning time should be given to reading, and what proportion to recitation? In learning a poem, a maze, or any other serial habit which may be broken up into parts, is it better to learn it a part at a time, or is it better to go over the whole thing from beginning to end at each trial? These are the chief questions with which discussions of economical learning are concerned. A great amount of research, involving animals and men, children and adults, and motor and verbal materials, has been concentrated on such questions.

Research shows, in general, that some sort of distribution tends to be better than massed learning, but it does not enable us to say what sort of distribution is best in every learning situation. Its value for a particular learning situation, not actually investigated experimentally, is to suggest discovery, in this situation, of the most appropriate distribution of effort. What applies to one situation (laboratory, classroom, or factory), or to one type of material (learning poems, and learning to fly), might not apply to others.

Research shows, too, that recitation or rehearsal of what one is learning is desirable. But it again does not tell us what distribution of recitation and learning time is most economical for situations other than those investigated directly. We know the best distribution for learning certain nonsense materials and biographical passages, but we do not know what it would be, say, for learning French verbs.

Research shows, finally, that whole learning is sometimes more economical than learning

by parts, but that there are other situations in which learning by a combination of part and whole procedure is most effective.

With the limitations of such findings in mind, we are ready to consider some of the research on economy in learning.

Distribution of effort

In one of the earliest investigations on this problem, rats given 1 trial a day mastered a problem box in 17 trials; those given 3 successive trials a day required 25 trials; and those given 5 successive trials a day required 33 trials. Thus, the greater massing of trials, in terms of trials to learn, produced the least economical learning.²⁶

Groups of adults working on a letter-digit substitution problem for a total of 120 minutes, but with practice periods of either 10, 20, 40, or 120 minutes, achieved final average substitution scores of, respectively, 265, 255, 195, and 135.²⁷ The learning curves for these four groups are reproduced in Figure 76. In this investigation, as in that mentioned above,




Figure 76. The influence of Different Distributions of Practice on Learning Letter-Digit Substitution

The 10-minute group worked twice a day, the 20-minute group once a day, the 40-minute group every other day, and the 120-minute group at one session. (From Starch, D., "Periods of Work in Learning," *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1912, vol. 3, p. 212.)

distributed learning led to greater gains than massed learning. Experiments on memorizing various types of verbal material, on learning codes, throwing darts, archery, mirror drawing, and maze learning, have likewise yielded results in favor of distribution.

There are actually two problems involved in distribution versus massed effort. One concerns the optimal length for particular practice periods; the other the most economical interval between practice periods of a given length. This is illustrated in an experiment on maze learning in rats. The animals required fewer trials to learn a maze when only one trial per day was given than when they received three or five trials one right after the other. These results are, of course, consistent with the results already mentioned. When a single trial was given at intervals of six hours, twelve hours, one day, or three days, the average number of trials required for learning to achieve the criterion was, respectively, 45, 37, 46, and 72. It is obvious that, when one trial occurred at each practice period, the twelve-hour interval was most economical.

Error and time data are also consistent with this conclusion.²⁸

In a similar investigation, but with human subjects learning such skills as mirror drawing, mirror reading, and code substitution, the least economical learning occurred with no interval between trials, and the most economical with a one-day interval. As shown in Figure 77, however, the advantage gained from the one-day interval was not much greater than that gained from an interval of one minute between trials. Learning the other activities gave comparable results.²⁹

Sometimes a practical situation arises which, despite its poor economy in other respects, may make massed learning more desirable than distributed practice. Suppose, for example, that skilled workers could be turned out with fewer lessons if their lessons came a day apart, but that you need skilled workers in a hurry. Let us say that a certain skill is acquired in fifty lessons when lessons are given five times daily, and in only thirty when they are given a day apart. In the former instance, a worker acquires the




Figure 77. Mass and Distributed Practice in Mirror Drawing

(From Lorge, I., "Influence of Regularly Interpolated Time Intervals upon Subsequent Learning," *Teachers College Contributions to Education*, 1930, No. 438, p. 16.)

skill in ten days; in the latter instance in thirty days. Economy in time to get skilled workers, therefore, might dictate massed learning.

There is another practical consideration which might make a certain degree of massed learning better than distributed learning. Some individuals take a long time to "get down to business" in studying or other kinds of learning. These would waste a large proportion of each interval before accomplishing anything; hence, might accomplish more if they worked a longer period at a time.

Why should distributed learning be more economical in trials to learn, errors made, or in total learning time? There are several possible answers, each of which may be correct in part. Two principles which seem most important in the light of research are:

(1) The well-established principle, known as *Jost's law*, which states that, "given associations of equal strength but different age, further practice strengthens the older more than the younger." In other words, if you acquired a certain association a week ago and another yesterday, and both are equally well fixated right now, further practice would be more advantageous in strengthening the fixation of your week-old than of your day-old association. The relevance of this to distributed practice is obvious. If you practice some activity after an interval of one day, whatever associations you have formed are older than if you practice it without an interval. These day-old associations are favored more by additional practice than those of only a few seconds.³⁰

(2) Wrong associations are forgotten faster than correct ones. Since they receive little or no reinforcement from the motivating factor in a situation, they are not learned so well as the correct ones. Massed learning, by allowing little forgetting to occur between trials, does not greatly favor the correct over the incorrect associations. With an interval between trials, however, the incorrect associations are weakened more than the correct ones. They drop out faster, and the correct

associations are relatively stronger than incorrect ones when the next trial occurs.³¹

Other possible reasons for the advantage of distributed over massed learning in particular situations are: fatigue (especially important in long-continued practice periods), motivation (the individual may work more intensely if he knows that a rest is to come soon); perseverance (neural activities once started may continue for a time — just as tunes "run through our head" — and this may lead, during an interval, to setting or consolidation of the neural effects of previous activities), and a tendency of the organism to resist early repetition of an act (which is, of course, what occurs in closely massed learning).³²

Recitation

The value of recitation versus mere reading has been investigated for memorizing a variety of verbal materials. The best-known study is that in which large groups of children from several grades memorized nonsense syllables and brief biographies.³³

Some children put 100 per cent of their time into reading the material. A comparable group put 80 per cent of its time into reading, and 20 per cent into reciting what it had read. Another group, comparable with the others, put 60 per cent of its time into reading and 40 per cent into reciting, and so on, down to the group which put only 20 per cent of the time into reading and 80 per cent into reciting.

Typical results obtained in memorizing lists of nonsense syllables are given in Table 2.

TABLE 2 THE RELATIVE EFFICACY OF DIFFERENT PROPORTIONS OF READING AND RECITATION IN MEMORIZING NONSENSE SYLLABLES

(After Gates)

Percentage recitation.	0	20	40	60	80
Average score for immediate retention (8th grade) . .	17	24	26	27	35

It is apparent that the larger the percentage of recitation, up to the limit indicated, the

greater the efficiency of learning. In this instance the largest amount of recitation was 80 per cent.

When biographies were used, the maximum percentage of recitation was increased to 90 per cent. The results were, in general, very similar to those obtained with nonsense syllables. Results for grade 8 are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3. THE RELATIVE EFFICACY OF DIFFERENT PROPORTIONS OF READING AND RECITATION IN MEMORIZING BIOGRAPHIES

(After Gates)

Percentage recitation	0	20	40	60	80	90
Average score for immediate retention (8th grade)	21	22	25	25	25	24

Other grades gave similar results. The best scores were obtained with from 40 to 80 per cent of recitation. All percentages of recitation gave better results than mere reading of the material.

In a more recent investigation with fifth- and sixth-grade children memorizing nonsense syllables, arithmetical facts, a difficult English vocabulary, and spelling, almost all the various distributions of reading and recitation used were better than reading without any recitation. The results of both studies make it clear that recitation contributes to efficiency in memorizing.²⁴

Why recitation should be more efficient than mere reading is fairly clear. In the first place, reading with the knowledge that one must soon recite what he is reading is conducive to good motivation — to what some have called “the will to learn.” We have seen that intentional learning is much more efficient than incidental learning. In the second place, a recitation tells us how well we are progressing. It gives a better knowledge of results than could occur from passive reading. Every time we reproduce something read there is a reward element introduced, and every time we fail to reproduce an item there is an effect somewhat comparable with pun-

ishment for incorrect responses. In the third place, one must eventually recite the material — so the person who recites is practicing the sort of reproduction he aims to achieve.

Whole versus part learning

Perhaps the least generally applicable of the learning principles mentioned is that which refers to learning by parts as compared with learning by wholes. In part learning the individual concentrates on one portion of the material, or on one aspect of a skill, at a time. He masters the parts separately and then combines the separate habits so that the whole performance can be accomplished. The whole method, on the other hand, calls for concentration on the entire task at one time, without separate attention to subsidiary activities.

A vast amount of research in the laboratory, classroom, and industrial plant has been concentrated on determining the relative efficiency of part, whole, and combination part-whole methods. These studies have involved a variety of mazes and several different kinds of verbal material. The maze studies have been carried out with rats, children, and adults. In these investigations the maze has been divided into several parts, the end of each part leading into the entrance of the next. One group of subjects learned part one, then part two, then part three, and finally part four. It then received further training, this time running the maze from beginning to end, until a criterion of learning had been reached. A comparable group, on the other hand, was, from the beginning, trained on the whole maze. A comparison of the results for the two groups indicates the relative effectiveness of the two methods. When poems or other verbal materials are used, the procedure is similar. One group masters one verse at a time, and then combines the verses in further practice, while the comparable group goes from beginning to end of the poem at each trial. One of the combination part-whole methods is to have the subjects learn part one, then part two, then parts one and two; then

part three, then parts one, two, and three; and so on. Another combination method is to have the individual go through the whole activity once, then concentrate on parts

Research on part versus whole learning has had no outcome justifying the generalization that the whole method, the part method, or some combination of whole-part methods is most economical. Even with the same kind of material, the results have not all been in favor of one particular procedure. In one investigation with school-children, it was found that the relative effectiveness of the different procedures depended on the intelligence of the children. For both bright and normal groups, the whole method was superior to the part method, but it was significantly more efficient for the bright than for the normal children.³⁵ The most adequate statement of the general outcome of research in this field has been given by Woodworth:³⁶

The net result of all the studies of part and whole learning seems to be something like this: the parts are easier to learn than the whole, and the learner is often happier and better adjusted to the problem when beginning with the parts. He carries over some of the skill and knowledge gained in learning the parts into the subsequent learning of the whole performance. But he finds that putting together the parts is a serious problem requiring much further work. In the end, he may have saved time and energy by commencing with the parts — or he may not — depending on the size and difficulty of the total task, and on the learner's poise and technique. If he can adjust himself to the whole method and handle it properly, he can learn quite complex performances effectively by the whole method. In a practical situation it is probably best to start with the whole method, while feeling free to concentrate at any time on a part where something special is to be learned.

SENSORY CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEARNING

Learning is obviously dependent upon sensory processes, for it comes from responding to stimuli. But a problem of interest to many psychologists is the relative importance of our various senses in acquiring particular habits. Verbal learning, as everybody knows, is prac-

tically non-existent in people who are born blind and deaf. These people, however, do learn motor habits.

The blind learn to find their way around on the basis of touch and hearing, but vision would, of course, greatly facilitate their learning. They also learn to avoid obstacles which to us are presented visually, but to them only through hearing. We learn to avoid these obstacles when blindfolded, also in terms of hearing.³⁷ Likewise, the deaf person may learn to respond to cues which are auditory to us. He learns to respond to them through his visual sense (lip reading) and also his tactual sense (frequencies and intensities of vibration being sensed with the fingertips).³⁸

The most thorough investigations of sensory contributions to learning have been made on animals, for with these we may eliminate one sense after the other and observe how learning is affected.

Large groups of white rats learned an elevated maze possessing five blind alleys.³⁹ Some of the animals learned the maze with all of their senses intact; some after being blinded; some after being both blinded and deafened; some after being both blinded and made anosmic (receptors for smell removed); and some after being blinded, deafened, and made anosmic. Prior to the operations which produced these sensory deprivations, the groups of rats were, in all important respects, equivalent. Thus, differences in their learning ability are attributable to the sensory defects. Learning curves for these groups are reproduced in Figure 78.

It is quite evident that, to the degree that sensory stimulation is decreased, there is decreased progress in learning this simple maze. The blind, anosmic, and deaf rats (having only tactual and kinesthetic senses left to provide guidance) learned very little. Experiments have shown that touch is of little use in learning this maze. Kinesthesia, as we have already seen, is quite important in the control of habits once they are formed; but it is apparently of little help in acquiring new habits when vision and hearing are absent. These




Figure 78. Sensory Deprivation and Maze Learning
(From Honzik, C. H., "The Sensory Basis of Maze Learning in Rats," *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, 1936, vol. 13, No. 64, as arranged by Crafts, et al., "Recent Experiments in Psychology," New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938, p. 147.)

results, although carried out only on rats and although confined to maze learning, suggest the general importance of vision and hearing in the learning process.

LEARNING AND THE BRAIN

The first clear evidence of learning comes in animals with a nervous system. Moreover, the skills learned become more complex as the nervous system grows in complexity. Growth of learning ability during early years of childhood is related to increasing maturation of the nervous system, and especially the cerebral cortex. The decline of learning ability in old age, on the other hand, is probably due to deterioration of cortical tissues.

Experimental investigation of the importance, for learning, of the cerebral cortex as a whole, and of different parts of the cortex, has naturally had to be confined to animals. The most important investigations in this field have been done by Lashley, with white rats.⁴⁰ His studies have indicated two important things about learning and the cortex: the relation between (1) learning and the amount of

intact cortical tissue and (2) learning and the location of a specified amount of cortical tissue loss.

Amount of cortical tissue

The greater the amount of cortical tissue available to a rat, the more efficient its learning. This is illustrated in Figure 79. The graph is based upon learning of mazes by white rats deprived of different amounts of cortical tissue. Percentages of destruction are given at the bottom of the graph. Three mazes varying in difficulty were used, and the efficiency with which each was learned is indicated by the average number of errors.

Destruction of brain tissue up to 50 per cent did not greatly interfere with learning of the simplest maze. It interfered somewhat more with learning of the maze of slightly greater complexity. The same amount of destruction greatly interfered with learning of the complex maze.

The effect of increasing amounts of destruction became greater as the complexity of the maze increased. Observe, for instance, that destruction amounting to 41 to 50 per cent increased the number of errors from maze I to maze II only slightly, but that it increased the number of errors from maze II to maze III approximately tenfold.

Location of lost tissue

As far as maze learning is concerned — and probably other similar sensory-motor learning — the location of a given amount of destruction is of little or no consequence. In other words, if you remove the same amount of tissue from the frontal, occipital, temporal, or parietal lobe, the effects on maze learning are approximately equivalent. It is true, of course, that removing tissue in the occipital lobe may destroy vision, while removing tissue in the temporal lobe may destroy hearing. But, with hearing gone, the animal still has vision and the rest of its senses to contribute to its learning of the maze. With vision gone, it has hearing and its other senses.

Lashley claims that cortical destruction in a




Figure 79. The Relation Between the Extent of Cerebral Lesions and Learning

Separation of the three curves indicates the relative difficulty of the three problems for normal animals. The abscissa shows the per cent of the cerebral cortex destroyed. The number of errors made in learning the respective problems is represented by the height (ordinate) of the graph. Maze I was the least and Maze III the most complex. (From Lashley, K. S., "Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence." Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929, p. 74.)

sensory area does much more than eliminate the contribution of that sense. When the sense is eliminated peripherally (that is, without injuring the brain), the effects on learning are sometimes much smaller than when the corresponding sensory region of the brain is removed. Lashley attributes the greater loss from brain injury than from peripheral injury to a disturbance of the associative or integrative functions of the cerebral cortex. He believes that, so far as these associative functions are concerned, the different regions are about equally important. Others have taken issue with Lashley on this and related points, in answer to which he has obtained further results, in support of his view.⁴¹

One should remember, of course, that Lashley's conclusions are based upon learning by rats. The different regions of a man's cortex, being much more complex than those of rats, might have different associative significance than the corresponding parts of a rat's brain.

Some have criticized the generality of Lashley's conclusions on these grounds.

Research now under way on monkeys and apes, whose brains are more like our own than are the brains of rats, may suggest whether or not Lashley's findings are generally applicable. If his conclusions are verified with these animals, it is probable that they are also applicable to man.

In the case of specific sensory habits, as in discriminating between sounds or figures or odors, Lashley and others have shown specialized sensory areas of the brain to be peculiarly important. Visual pattern discrimination in the rat fails to appear if the visual areas of the cortex are removed. But acquisition of this habit is not affected (except in trials to learn, errors before mastery, or the like) if some non-visual part of the brain is destroyed. As far as specific sensory habits are concerned, then, different parts of the brain are not equally important. This applies quite clearly to men.

as well as rats. Likewise, as pointed out in our earlier discussion of cortical functions, the frontal area of the brain is of especial importance for learning which requires recall of past experience and reasoning.

SUMMARY

It is doubtful whether any learning occurs without motivation. The efficiency of learning (trials to learn, errors made, time consumed, and so on) in animals and human beings is related to the strength of motivation. Generally speaking, the stronger the motivation, the more efficient the learning. Although much research has been done with various kinds of rewards and punishments, praise and reproof, and social recognition and rivalry, one cannot say which of these is the best for any particular situation or individual. Rewards are probably better than punishments, but a combination of the two has yielded better results than either alone. Praise is generally more effective than reproof. Rivalry produces faster learning than no rivalry, but intense rivalry might have disrupting effects. Skills are not acquired unless there is some knowledge of results. Human beings fail to learn many things because the intention to learn is absent. Passive repetition is apparently useless.

Some of the important conditions of learning are: contiguity (close temporal and spatial occurrence of events), exercise or frequency (repetition of stimulus — response situations), belonging (the mutual relevance of certain contiguous events), intensity (vividness of events associated with learning), effect (the relevance of activities to the organism's needs), recency (or better retention of the most recent events in a series), and primacy (the tendency for early impressions to be retained better than those which come somewhat later). None of these conditions is, by itself, sufficient to bring about learning. Contiguity, exercise, recency, and primacy are merely conditions in which such factors as effect, intensity, and belonging operate. One condition present in every learning situation

is contiguity. There is perhaps good reason for adding to this the principle of effect, which is, of course, related to motivation.

Distributed learning is usually more efficient than massed learning. However, the most effective length of practice periods, or intervals between practice periods of a particular length, must be determined separately for each learning situation. How short a practice period may be, yet produce efficient learning, depends on the individual learner — especially his ability to concentrate quickly on the task before him. Some practical situations call for massed learning, despite the fact that distributed learning, from the standpoint of lessons required before mastery, would be more efficient. Distributed learning is probably more efficient than massed learning because (1) the older an association, the more further practice tends to strengthen it, and (2) errors tend to be forgotten faster than correct responses. Other contributing factors are better motivation, lessened fatigue, chances for perseveration to occur, and absence of early repetition of responses when practice is distributed.

Recitation usually leads to more efficient learning than passive reading. Some reasons are recitation provides intense motivation, a better knowledge of results, an introduction of rewarding and punishing factors, and a practice of what one must eventually do anyhow.

It is not possible to make any definite generalization concerning the relative effectiveness of whole versus part learning. Some activities are learned more efficiently when they are broken up into parts and one part is learned at a time than when tackled as a whole. Others are learned more efficiently by the whole method. Sometimes a combination of part-whole procedures is most economical. However, one person may learn a particular activity more efficiently by the whole method, another person by the part method, and another by a combination of methods. Intelligence and other personal factors may play a part in determining which method is most economical. Even if one favors the part

method, it is probably best, before concentrating on the parts, to make an over-all survey of the material or task to be learned.

In learning any kind of activity, we probably use all of the relevant senses that we have. Some activities, however, are especially dependent on vision, others on hearing. Rats deprived of their visual sense are handicapped in learning a simple elevated maze. They are still more handicapped when both vision and hearing are eliminated. Blind, deaf, and anosmic rats show little learning at all. The kinesthetic sense is important in controlling a habit once perfected, but it is apparently of little use in acquiring a habit unless supplemented by vision or hearing.

Maze experiments with rats have shown that a decrease in the amount of intact cortical tissue is associated with a decrease in learning ability, and that the effect is greater for more complex than for simpler habits. These experiments also suggest that, so far as the maze

habit in rats is concerned, the part of the cortex from which the given amount of tissue is removed is of little or no consequence — that only the amount removed matters.

One interpretation of this finding is that, when any sensory area is destroyed, the rat uses its remaining sensory areas, and, regardless of which area is destroyed, the others together have an equivalent rôle in learning. Lashley opposes this view and presents data which suggest that destruction of cortical tissue does more than destroy sensitivity. He claims that it interferes with associative activity, and that so far as such activity is concerned, the different regions of the cortex are equivalent in function.

This controversy does not concern certain habits of sensory discrimination, where a particular region, for example, the visual cortex, may be essential. Nor does it apply to recall and reasoning — for the frontal lobes are especially involved in these activities.

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Chapter 9

Remembering and Forgetting

IN THE BROADEST and most fundamental sense, remembering is retaining and forgetting is failing to retain. Without some retention of the effects of previous activities, there could, of course, be no learning. Each repetition of the situation would elicit exactly the same response. On each trial, the organism would "start from scratch." When effects of previous activities are retained, however, each new performance does not "start from scratch." Instead, an increment is present. The organism responds to a previously neutral stimulus, it makes fewer errors in running a maze or opening a problem box, or it retains more syllables or words in the list to be memorized.

Remembering and forgetting may vary in degree. We may retain conditioning or some skill completely or in part. Forgetting may, of course, also be complete or partial.

Suppose you learned a poem as a child. You may be able to recall it completely, reciting it word for word, just as you did as a child. Perhaps you cannot recall the poem, even partially, but you can recognize it as one learned in childhood. Among many other poems which you did not learn, it appears familiar. Perhaps you cannot even recognize the poem. But since you learned it as a child, the chances are that you will be able to relearn it with a saving in the repetitions required. That is to say, you memorize it now much more readily than you memorize poems of comparable difficulty which you never before learned.

Evidence of memory in animals and infants

comes from a variety of non-verbal criteria, all of which apply to adult memory, although verbal evidences are also available at this level. The animal or the human infant may reproduce some motor performance, it may relearn with a saving in time and effort some response which it cannot perfectly reproduce, it may respond in terms of absent stimuli, and it may select from a random assortment of objects some object shown to it previously. This is delayed matching in terms of a sample. Our discussion of memory begins with these non-verbal evidences of retention in both animals and human beings.

REPRODUCING A MOTOR PERFORMANCE

Suppose, for example, that a rat or a human being has learned a maze to the point where it can run through the pathway three trials in succession without error. The next day, or a week or a month later, we may wish to see whether the habit has been retained. If the subject can traverse the maze for three trials without error, we say that it remembers perfectly — that there has been no forgetting.

Some rats have retained simple problem-box habits perfectly for as long as a month. Still higher organisms may retain such habits for months or years. Man retains some habits for life. You may not have ridden a bicycle for many years, yet still be able to ride one perfectly well.

How long we retain a motor habit perfectly depends to a large degree on how much we have practiced it. Skills like eating with a knife and fork, buttoning and unbuttoning

clothes, and writing are practiced so frequently that, even if something should prevent us from practicing them for many years, they would be retained without noticeable loss.

The almost perfect retention of motor skills over long periods has led some to suppose that such skills are necessarily better retained than verbal skills. That this is not so has been demonstrated in experiments where predominantly verbal activities (memorizing nonsense syllables) and predominantly motor activities (learning mazes) have received equal repetition. Under these circumstances, retention of motor skills is no better than retention of verbal ones.¹

RELEARNING AS EVIDENCE OF MEMORY

Suppose that retention is not perfect. Some forgetting has occurred. But how much? The method of determining this is the *saving method*. It is used with animals and human beings.

In order to determine the degree of retention (or forgetting), we require that the task be relearned to the same criterion as that originally involved. Thus, if the maze was learned to the point where it could be traveled three times in succession without error, it is relearned to the same criterion. We then compare the original performance with the relearning performance.

Suppose, for example, that a rat required twenty trials to learn a maze and only five trials to relearn it some time later. The saving is fifteen trials, or 75 per cent of the trials originally required. From the standpoint of forgetting, the rat has forgotten 25 per cent. In one maze-learning experiment with rats, there was a saving in trials and time to relearn which averaged 90 per cent after two weeks, 88 per cent after four weeks, 85 per cent after six weeks, and 73 per cent after eight weeks.²

Subjects may learn verbal materials until they can be recited without error. Weeks, months, or years later, the material may be partially forgotten. In relearning it to the criterion of one perfect repetition, and in com-

paring the repetitions required with those originally involved, the amount or percentage of retention can be determined.

A saving in time and effort required for learning may occur even when the material was originally not learned to the point where it could be recalled, and even where there was no attempt to memorize it. This is illustrated by an experiment in which a psychologist read certain Greek passages to his child between the ages of fifteen and thirty-six months, and several years later required the child to memorize them. Some of the passages were learned at the age of eight and a half years, and others at the age of fourteen years. In each instance the repetitions required to memorize the material read to the child were fewer than those required to memorize new passages of equal difficulty. The average number of repetitions required at eight and a half years was 317 for learning the passages presented earlier and 435 repetitions for learning the new passages, a saving of 27 per cent. In other words, hearing the passages in childhood, although it did not produce learning from the standpoint of recall, led to a saving of 27 per cent when learning to the point of recall was later required. The materials learned at fourteen years yielded a saving of only 8 per cent. Thus, the effects of earlier experience with the Greek passages apparently grew weaker with time.³

THE DELAYED REACTION

In the original experiment on delayed reactions in animals, the apparatus represented in Figure 80 was used.⁴ The animal was first trained to associate a lighted compartment with food and an unlighted compartment with an electric shock. The lighted compartment varied in position in a random sequence from trial to trial so that the animal could not learn merely by going to the middle door, to the right-hand door, to the left-hand door, or to the three doors in any particular sequence. If it learned this part of the problem at all, the animal did so on the basis of response to the light.




Figure 80. Hunter's Delayed-Reaction Apparatus

This particular form of the apparatus was used with rats. The animal, in the glass release box R, could be stimulated by the lights L. It was required to associate a light, appearing in any one of the three doors in a chance order, with the presence of food. An electric shock (grids were in front of each door) was administered whenever the animal attempted to enter an unlighted chamber. Food was obtained at the front of the apparatus whenever the correct chamber had been entered. In the training series the release box R was raised while the light was still present. After the association between a lighted compartment and food had been thoroughly established, the light was turned off before release. The animal was now required to remember in which compartment the light had appeared. If it continued to go to the previously illuminated compartment, a longer delay between the turning-off of the light and the raising of the release cage was instituted. The time of delay was gradually increased until the animal could no longer remember which compartment had been illuminated. D, doors through which the animal made its exit from the light box; S, switch connected with grids, S', light switches. (From Hunter, W. S., "The Delayed Reaction in Animals and Children," Behavior Monographs, 1913, vol. 2, p. 24)

After the subject came to select the lighted compartment at every trial, the delayed-reaction tests were instituted. The light was turned on in a compartment, but turned off before the animal was released. In order to respond to the previously lighted compartment, it was now necessary to remember in which compartment the light had been. If the interval between turning off the light and release was one minute, and the animal consistently went to the previously lighted compartment in a series of trials, it was credited with remembering for one minute—or recalling after one minute. The delay could then be increased until a marked inaccuracy of performance occurred.

Rats and dogs did not respond correctly

after an interval of even a few seconds unless they kept their heads turned toward the correct compartment. This motor set—involving muscle tensions—enabled them to respond correctly. Raccoons and children, on the other hand, did not need to maintain a motor set. They moved around in the release box and, after it was raised, turned and proceeded toward the correct compartment.

In rats and dogs there was no evidence of response to an absent stimulus. Although the light was off, kinesthetic stimuli associated with the fixed position of the body were present to guide them. The raccoons and children, on the other hand, maintained no motor set—hence, they had neither the light nor kinesthetic stimuli to guide them. Controls showed that no other external stimuli were acting as cues. The investigator thus concluded that the raccoons and children were guided by some implicit process which represented the absent light. This he called a *symbolic process*. He defined the symbolic process as "any process which is a substitute, which can arouse a selective response, and which can be recalled if it ceases to be present."

In the case of raccoons and children, something inside of the organism—presumably a modification of the nervous system—substituted for the light. Its function was selective because it guided the animal to the previously lighted compartment—not to any or all compartments. The substitute was presumably not functioning while the raccoons and the children were turning in this direction and that, but it was recalled after an interval.

Rats and dogs, although they failed to exhibit the symbolic process in this situation, have given ample evidence of it in later research, with simplifications of the original technique.⁵

Recent research on delayed reaction in animals and children has utilized a more direct method than that described. It is more direct in that the subject does not first have to be trained to associate a particular isolated stimulus (like the light) with food. This is the

method briefly referred to in the discussion of frontal-lobe functions.

Delayed reaction in monkeys

The monkey sits a short distance from the experimenter. Two cups are placed before it, one to the right and one to the left, or one near and one more distant. While the animal watches, the experimenter slips a piece of lettuce under one of the cups. The animal is now removed from the situation, perhaps taken to another room. Some time later it is returned to the experimental situation and released. If it goes directly to the food cup, the monkey is allowed to eat the lettuce and is credited with a correct response. If the correct cup is selected trial after trial, despite the fact that both cups smell alike, that the food appears under one cup at one time and another at another time, and that no other external cues as to the correct cup are available, we are forced to conclude that the animal remembers under which cup it saw the food placed some minutes or hours before.⁶ Stimulation provided by the experimenter's placing of the food must have made some impression on the monkey's nervous system which later served as a substitute for the actual stimulation. The specific nature of the symbolic process is suggested by a further experiment.

Monkeys ate lettuce if they found lettuce after seeing it placed under a cup, but they preferred bananas to lettuce. "What would the monkeys do," the experimenter asked, "if

they saw a piece of banana placed and found lettuce when they returned to the situation later?" When they found the lettuce under these circumstances, the monkeys usually refused it. They left it where they found it and walked away. Sometimes they examined the vicinity as if looking for the missing banana. Temper tantrums were occasionally exhibited. Children behaved in a somewhat similar fashion when a non-preferred reward like a chocolate drop was substituted for a jelly bean. Sometimes, however, they asked about the exchange of rewards.⁷

Delayed reaction in infants

Memory in infants between the ages of three months and two years has been tested by presenting some stimulus, then, minutes later, observing whether the child shows any signs of missing the stimulus. The best tests of this nature involve the materials shown in Figure 81. An infant is presented with the ball containing the chicken. As he or the tester squeezes the ball, a chicken pops out of the hole. After the child has had plenty of opportunity to observe the chicken, the ball is taken away. Other activity is then aroused. The ball is finally returned, but this time without a chicken to pop out. Recall is assumed to be present if, upon squeezing the ball or observing the tester squeeze it, the child shows surprise, looks questioningly at the tester, looks into the hole, or pokes its finger in, as if looking for the chicken. Maximum intervals after which the chicken is re-




Figure 81. Materials for the Delayed-Reaction Test in Infants

(After Buehler, C., and Hetzer, H., "Testing Children's Development from Birth to School Age." New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1935, p. 142.)

called range from around three minutes at fifteen months to seventeen minutes at two years.⁸

Between two years and five, there is a very great increase in the duration of intervals after which recall occurs. In one experiment in this age range, three plates were used.⁹ The child saw a cooky being placed under one plate, which varied in position in different trials. After intervals ranging from one day to over a month, the child was returned to the situation and asked to locate the cooky hidden previously. Some five-year-old children were consistently accurate after intervals of a month or more. They were greatly helped by language, itself a symbolic process. A child might say to himself, for example, "The cooky is under the middle plate." During the interval of a month or so, he might not think of the situation any more. Upon being brought before the plates, however, he might say, "Oh, yes, I saw it placed under the middle plate." Recall in older children and adults often occurs after years. Language probably plays a large rôle in reinforcing whatever symbolic processes are present in animals and in infants before language is acquired.

Recognition tests

Subjects are presented with a sample (for instance, a form) and are later called upon to identify it among a variety of other forms. A monkey is first trained to lift an object in order to obtain food. Several objects are used in this way. Then the animal is taught to lift an object resembling whatever sample is shown. A triangle is shown and then removed. Several seconds or minutes later, the animal is confronted with a triangle and several other forms. In order to be scored correct, the subject must lift the triangle and not touch the circle, square, or other forms presented with it. A circle, let us say, is then shown. Later, it is presented with other forms. Now, the circle must be lifted and the triangle and other forms left untouched.¹⁰

When children are used in such experiments, they may be instructed to "find the

form like the one I showed you a few minutes ago." They must then point to the form, or other object, resembling the sample.¹¹

RECALLING

Tests of the delayed reaction are too simple for use with older children and adults. Recall at these levels is tested by using nonsense syllables, words, digits, forms, or more complicated verbal or symbolic materials.

Recall after a single presentation — memory span

The simplest type of recall test with verbal materials is found in memory span tests. The subject may be presented with a series of digits gradually increasing in length. Each list is given only one presentation. When the auditory memory span for digits is tested, the digits are read off by the tester. As soon as the end of the series is indicated, the subject tries to repeat the digits vocally or in writing. Thus if the experimenter reads, "0 4 1 6 2 8 5," the subject attempts to reproduce these numbers in correct order. The first series may have four digits, the next five, the next six, and so on, up to a series of a dozen or so. The subject's memory span for digits is the longest group of digits he can recall in correct order, regardless of the length of the series read to him. He may recall the entire series until he gets to six or seven; but he may get eight out of the list of a dozen. His span for that presentation is then eight. The span will differ somewhat from presentation to presentation, hence an average of several tests is often taken.

When the visual memory span for digits is measured, the subject is shown the digits, one at a time, perhaps by means of an apparatus like that illustrated earlier (p. 115). He then recalls them orally or in writing. The same general procedure is used in testing the visual memory span for words, syllables, forms, or other materials.

Memory span differs with age and with the type of material used. For example, the average span for auditory presentation and vocal recall of digits is four between four and five

years, five between six and eight years, six between nine and twelve years, and seven beyond twelve years.¹² When familiar objects are presented, one at a time, and named by the child as they appear, his memory span is about five at five years and eight at thirteen years.¹³

Recall of paired associates

Suppose that the following pairs of English words and transliterated Russian equivalents were shown, one pair at a time, and you were asked to learn the Russian associate of each English word:

SKULL	CHEREP
EYE	GLAZ
SKIN	KOZHA
BRAIN	MOZG
FOOT	NOGA
HEAD	GOLOVA
MOUTH	ROT
BONE	KOST
HAIR	VOLOS
BACK	ZAD

After one repetition of the list of associates, you might be given the first members of the pairs in a changed order and asked to recall their associates. You might recall a few of the Russian words after this single presentation, but you would not recall all of them. After each successive repetition of the pairs, however, you would probably recall more associates. Finally, you would be able to recall the Russian equivalent of every English word. The number of associates recalled on successive tests would, if plotted against the number of repetitions, yield a learning curve somewhat similar to that obtained with nonsense syllables (Figure 65, p 118).

Recalling narratives

Children and adults read or hear narratives which they later attempt to recall, either orally or in writing. Recall after a single reading is like a test of memory span, although connected rather than disconnected material is involved. When the narrative is read or heard repeatedly and a recall is required after

each repetition, we have something like the typical memory experiment in which increased retention occurs as a function of repetition. A learning curve may be plotted for such data. Sometimes, however, recall is required at intervals of minutes, hours, days or weeks, after a single presentation of the narrative. This is to see how forgetting proceeds, and whether or not distortions are introduced as a function of time and repeated recall. A still further variation of memory experiments with narratives is to have one individual read or hear the narrative, then tell it to another who, in turn, tells it to still another, and so on. In this way, changes introduced as the story passes from one to another, as when legends are handed down from generation to generation, may be investigated.

In one extensive investigation involving the above procedures, university students read stories, then attempted to reproduce them.¹⁴ For example, a student read the following story two times, then engaged in other activities for fifteen minutes. His reproduction after fifteen minutes follows the original story.

ORIGINAL STORY

The Son Who Tried to Outwit His Father

A son said to his father one day: "I will hide, and you will not be able to find me." The father replied: "Hide wherever you like," and he went into his house to rest.

The son saw a three-kernel peanut, and changed himself into one of the kernels, a fowl coming along picked up the peanut and swallowed it; and a wild bush-cat caught and ate the fowl, and a dog met and caught and ate the bush-cat. After a little time, the dog was swallowed by a python, that, having eaten its meal, went to the river and was snared in a fish trap.

The father searched for his son and, not seeing him, went to look at the fish-trap. On pulling it to the riverside, he found a large python in it. He opened it, and saw a dog inside, in which he found a bush-cat, and on opening that he discovered a fowl, from which he took the peanut, and breaking the shell, he then revealed his son. The son was so dumbfounded that he never again tried to outwit his father.

REPRODUCTION

The Son Who Tried to Outwit His Father

A son one day said to his father: "I will hide, and you will not be able to find me." His father replied: "Hide wherever you wish," and went into the house to rest.

The son saw a three-kernel peanut, and changed himself into one of the kernels. A fowl saw the peanut and ate it. Soon afterwards a bush-cat killed and ate the fowl, and then a dog chased and finally killed and ate the bush-cat. After a time a python caught the dog and swallowed it. Soon after its meal, the python went down to the river and was caught in a fish-trap.

The father looked for his son, and when he could not find him, he went to the river to see whether he had caught any fish. In his fish-trap he found a large python which he opened. In it he found a dog in which was a bush-cat. On opening the bush-cat, he found a fowl, in which he found a peanut. He opened the peanut, and revealed his son.

The son was so dumbfounded at being discovered that he never tried to outwit his father again.

Observe that the reproduction retains the theme of the story and the succession of events. However, certain words like the "wild" bush-cat, are omitted entirely; synonyms for others, such as "wish" in place of "like," are given; and some words — and ideas — are added which were not in the original. For example, the original does not say that the fowl was killed and eaten by the bush-cat "soon after" the fowl ate the peanut. All it says is that the bush-cat caught and ate the fowl. After successive repetitions of such materials, each recall gives more and more details and, in general, accurate reproduction is approximated. But when successive recalls by the same individual occur without any further presentation of the original, increasing distortion of details is introduced.

Some of the investigator's conclusions from his analysis of a mass of such data are: (1) "accuracy of reproduction, in a literal sense, is the rare exception"; (2) "the general form, or outline, is remarkably persistent, once the first version has been given"; (3) "style, rhythm, precise mode of construction . . . are

very rarely faithfully reproduced"; (4) "frequent reproduction, omission of detail, simplification of events and structure, and transformation of items into more familiar detail, may go on almost indefinitely"; and (5) "in long-distance remembering, elaboration becomes more common in some cases . . . and there may be increasing importation or invention . . . aided by the use of visual images."

When the individual reads or hears a narrative, then tells it to another, and that one tells it to still another, and so on, the theme may be retained, but there is usually a marked distortion of details. The following reproduction of "The Son Who Tried to Outwit His Father" illustrates the point. It was obtained from the twentieth person who had heard the story, so to speak, chain fashion:

A small boy, having got into some kind of mischief, wished to hide himself from his father. He happened to be standing under a tree, when an acorn fell to the ground, and he immediately determined to hide himself within it. He accordingly concealed himself within the kernel. Now a cat chanced to be passing along that way, and when she saw the acorn, she forthwith swallowed it. Not long afterwards a dog killed and ate this cat. Finally the dog himself was devoured by a python.

The father of the boy was out hunting one day when he met the python, and attacked and slew it. On cutting the beast open, he discovered the dog inside it, and inside the dog the cat, and inside the cat the acorn. Within the acorn he found his long-lost son. The son was overjoyed at seeing his father once more, and promised that he would never again conceal anything from him. He said that he would submit to the punishment he deserved, whatever his crime might be.

Reproduction of forms

The subject may be shown a form which he later attempts to reproduce. As in the case of narratives, he may reproduce it once after a single presentation; he may reproduce it after each of a series of presentations — perhaps continuing until he reproduces it perfectly; he may reproduce it at intervals after a single presentation; or he may give his reproduction to another, who reproduces it from memory,




Figure 82. Reproduction of Form

(From Bartlett, F. C., "Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology" Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1932, p. 178.)

and then passes it to another, who does the same thing.

In Figure 82 is reproduced the original used in an investigation with university students, and also the reproduction by one subject. Successive repetition usually brings out reproductions increasingly like the original. Successive reproduction after a single presentation, however, brings omissions, additions, and inaccuracies, reminiscent of those found when narratives were similarly recalled. The main outline or theme is usually retained. For example, the man is still a man, although a markedly different one from the original. One tendency which stands out in such reproductions is that the picture becomes increasingly conventional. This is also true, when, as in the case of narratives, the picture is passed on, chain fashion, to a number of subjects, each of whom reproduces it from memory and then shows his reproduction to another.

Testimony

Many studies have been made of the ability of children and adults to describe or otherwise report events witnessed just once. The situation is somewhat like that of testifying about accidents or other events while in a courtroom. Still or moving pictures may be used. Sometimes, however, a carefully rehearsed scene is enacted before the group, without any knowledge on their part that it is acted, and without any expectation, either,

that they will be called upon to testify concerning the event.

Descriptions of still pictures, movies, scenes enacted, or actual events are in most instances grossly inaccurate, and they become increasingly so with a lapse of time between the original experience and the reproduction.

You may test your own accuracy in the following way. Some time ago you looked at a picture showing Pinel casting chains from the insane. Before looking at the picture again, write a description of it. Better still, show the picture for one minute to someone who has not already seen it. Then have him recall it in writing. Comparison of what is recalled with what was actually witnessed will undoubtedly show much discrepancy.

Sometimes the subject is given a list of statements or questions concerning the scene witnessed. He then attempts to say whether the statements are true or false or to answer the questions. Recall in these terms also shows much inaccuracy. The degree of inaccuracy is often related to the way in which the question is framed.

Test yourself or your subject with the following statements about the Pinel picture. Each statement is to be labeled true or false.

1. There are stairs in the picture.
2. A woman is kissing Pinel's left hand.
3. Pinel has a walking cane.
4. One woman is being whipped by an attendant.
5. Some of the women are still chained.

6. Five trees are shown in the picture.
7. The attendant is removing a metal band from a woman's waist.
8. Several women are shrieking loudly.
9. A large heap of chains and shackles lies on the floor.
10. Pinel is accompanied by soldiers with guns.

Inaccuracy of recall, under circumstances like the above, has several possible bases. (1) Observation was perhaps incorrect in the first place, leading to omission of certain details and to the addition of others. (2) Interests, attitudes, and expectations of the observer may have influenced both observation and recall. An architect looking at the Pinel picture may be greatly impressed by the architecture and recall aspects of this rather accurately. On the other hand, his observation and recall of facial expressions and other aspects of the behavior may be much less accurate. A psychologist might observe facial expressions and remain unaware of architectural details, thus recalling the latter with relative inaccuracy. Anyone who knew that the inmates were whipped to "drive the devil out of them" might falsely "recall" that he saw one of the women being whipped. If the person knew about Pinel's reforms, however, he would be likely to say that any statement to this effect was false, not because he actually failed to see a woman being whipped, but because he knew that such a scene would be inconsistent with the presence of Pinel. The person who knew that Pinel cast chains and shackles from the insane might, whether he observed it or not, "recall" that a heap of chains and shackles was lying on the ground before Pinel. Previous knowledge and expectations in line with it thus distorts the testimony. (3) Unintentional elaboration or exaggeration may have occurred. Individuals may "recall," for example, that Pinel's hand was raised in a dramatic gesture befitting the importance of the event. (4) As time elapsed, forgetting may have occurred. The omission of details occurs because of forgetting. When details are forgotten, moreover, we may try to fill out the gaps in what

we remember. Anything which seems reasonable in the light of what we do remember is "recalled." (5) The individual may have been misled by suggestions, either occurring spontaneously or given by the questions asked. The question might be, "Was the heap of chains near the dungeons or was it under the trees?" Some subjects might "recall" that the chains were in front of the dungeons and others that they were under the trees. It is likely that most who were "caught napping" by this suggestive question would say that the chains were near the dungeons — for this spot seems more logical than the other.

The rôle of stimuli in recall

In our discussion of the delayed reaction, we pointed out that the subject recalls an absent stimulating situation. This does not mean, however, that recall is without stimulation. The point is that the part of the situation recalled is absent. Other stimuli are necessary for recall. Thus, in the experiment with raccoons, the light recalled was not present at the time, but the experimental situation with its three compartments, the hunger of the animal, and other extraneous yet associated stimulating factors were present. In an entirely different external situation, or in the same external situation when not hungry, the animal in all probability would not recall the light.

Stimuli for recall may be external or internal. You may see a redheaded girl, and the redness of her hair may make you recall a childhood sweetheart whose hair was red. You may smell the odor of some flower that once grew in your home garden, then recall the garden. These, and innumerable examples that one might give, illustrate recall elicited by an external stimulus.

But you may have a stomach-ache and recall the green apples you ate as a child. You may be nauseated for some reason and recall that trip across the Atlantic during which you were violently seasick. These instances illustrate recall elicited by internal stimuli.

Recall of one experience often serves as a

stimulus for recall of another. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as *free association*. When we indulge in free association, we may recall many early experiences which we have not recalled for years. Psychoanalysts (see p. 14) use this method to facilitate recall of past experiences. They have their patients "think out loud" and sometimes keep them at it during sésances spread out over months or years. Eventually many experiences are recalled which were previously beyond recall.

Reduced cues Any fraction of some previously recalled situation may, by itself, lead to recall of the whole experience. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as *redintegration*, *recall in terms of reduced cues*, or *response to minimal cues*. To use our previous illustration, red hair, the odor of perfume, the sound of footsteps, or any other single aspect of some friend, may lead to complete recall, not only of the friend, but of former experiences in which she played a prominent part.

RECOGNIZING

Recognizing is much easier than recalling. This is why examinations of the completion and multiple-choice variety are easier than essay examinations covering the same material. The student has all the material before him, he does not have to recall it. His task is merely to differentiate between the familiar and the unfamiliar, or what has been experienced before and what is new.

In the typical experiment on recognition memory, the subject is shown nonsense syllables, words, forms, or other simple materials. He is given one or more complete presentations, the items usually being presented one at a time as in experiments on recall. The items involved in these trials are then presented among new items, the new and the old being mixed up in a random order. Now the subject must indicate which of the items appeared originally.

You may try this test yourself. Examine each of the faces in Figure 83, allowing yourself one minute for the whole group. Then

turn to page 167, and record the number of every face that you recognize as having been in the first group.

So-called *false recognition* is another example of response to reduced cues. We may "recognize" a person as our friend because of some similarity to the friend, such as hair-color, walk, build, or dress. Some aspect of former stimulation involving our friend leads us to recall him, and at the same time to identify the present person with the one recalled. The feeling that one has been in a certain place before or that he has done or said something before, even though he knows that this is the first time, has a similar basis. Something in the present situation or present behavior may be identical with, or very much like, something that occurred previously. This present aspect of former stimulation or activity leads us to recall the original experience and we incorrectly identify it with the present one.

RETENTION AND ORIGINAL LEARNING

Any activity which produces a poor impression obviously yields poor retention. The poorly motivated subject learns little, and, when tested for retention, later, retains little. But even where motivation is good, the most economical method of learning usually yields the best retention.

Distributed versus massed learning

Thirty-two college students memorized lists of nonsense syllables to the point where they could recall the lists perfectly. They learned comparable groups of syllables by the distributed and by the massed method of practice. Some lists were recalled after an interval of ten minutes, and still others after an interval of twenty-four hours. The same lists were then relearned to the original criterion — namely, one perfect repetition. The results were quite clear-cut. After every interval, the average recall score for distributed practice was higher than the recall score for massed practice, despite the fact that learning with distributed practice involved fewer repe-




Figure 83. Recognition Memory

Look at these faces for about one minute, then turn to page 167 and see how many you recognize. (Photographs used through the courtesy of the Vanderbilt Commodore)

tutions. There was a suggestion, too, that the difference in favor of distributed practice became greater as the interval between original learning and recall increased. In terms of repetitions required to relearn, distributed practice was again better than massed practice. As in the case of recall, this was true after each interval between learning and relearning. Although the above discussion refers to group averages, most individuals also recalled more and relearned faster when practice was distributed.¹⁵

Recitation and retention

We have already described an experiment in which the most efficient learning (immediate retention) of nonsense material occurred with 80 per cent recitation; and the most efficient learning of biographical material with from 40 to 90 per cent recitation (pp. 140-141). It is interesting to observe, therefore, that retention after four hours was best for the percentages of recitation which had already proved most efficient in learning. This is shown in Table 4. Observe that the

TABLE 4. RETENTION AS A FUNCTION OF RECITATION

Percentage recitation	. 0	20	40	60	80	90
Av. Retention score						
Grade VIII (nonsense syllables)	. 7	13	14	18	23	—
Av. Retention score						
Grade VIII (biographical material)...	10	12	15	16	16	15

highest retention score for nonsense material came with 80 per cent recitation and the highest for biographical material came with from 40 to 90 per cent recitation.¹⁶

Speed of learning and retention

Do slow learners retain better than fast learners who, of course, have fewer repetitions of the material to be learned? Some methods of investigating this question favor the slow learner by giving him as much time as he wants, hence an opportunity to overlearn. Other methods favor the fast learner by giving him more to retain. In other words, when a given time is allotted for learning, the fast learner will acquire more than the slow one, hence have more to retain, with the likelihood of a better retention score. Overlearning, and the amount learned may, however, be held constant through the method known as *adjusted learning*. All of these methods, whether they favor the slow or the fast learner, and whether or not they involve adjusted learning, show fast learners to be better retainers than slow learners.

Twenty-five children were required to associate a different number with each of a series of pictures so that, given the picture, they could recall the appropriate number. As soon as the child associated a number with the picture, the picture was withdrawn from the series for that child, the aim being to prevent overlearning. Fast and slow learners were similarly treated. The experiment continued until each child had learned approximately ten associations. This guaranteed that slow and fast learners would acquire an equal amount, hence have an equal amount to retain, or forget. The slowest seven of the subjects required an average of

5.7 repetitions, the eleven in the middle required an average of 3.7 repetitions, and the fastest seven required an average of 2.9 repetitions to get the ten associations. Retention was tested after twenty-four hours by both the recall and relearning methods. The average number of associations recalled by the slowest group was 1.7; by the middle group, 3.1, and by the fastest group, 3.9. These differences between the recall scores for the fastest and slowest learners were shown by statistical analysis to be significant. The average number of repetitions required to relearn was 3.4 for slow, 2.5 for middle, and 2.1 for fast learners. There was a statistically reliable difference between the lowest and highest averages.¹⁷

FORGETTING

Forgetting is negative retention. A retention curve drops as a function of time. Such curves are customarily used to represent the course of forgetting. If forgetting were plotted directly, in terms of the amount forgotten as a function of time, the curve would rise rather than fall. A comparison of retention and forgetting curves is given in Figure 84.

In the classical experiment on forgetting, Ebbinghaus memorized many lists of nonsense syllables. He relearned certain lists twenty minutes after he had memorized them to the point of one perfect repetition. Other lists were relearned a day after, some two days after, and so on. The intervals used, and the savings in time to relearn after each interval, appear in Figure 84. About 47 per cent was forgotten in twenty minutes, 66 per cent in one day, 72 per cent in two days, 75 per cent in six days, and 79 per cent in thirty-one days. These results show that forgetting is at first rapid (47 per cent lost in twenty minutes) and then slow (only 32 per cent more lost in a month).¹⁸

Forgetting and the type of material learned

In Figure 85 are summarized the results of several experiments on forgetting of different kinds of material. It is apparent that retention of nonsense syllables is poorest and that it declines most rapidly. Prose comes next,




Figure 84. Retention and Forgetting Curves for Nonsense Material
(Data from Ebbinghaus.)




Figure 85. Retention Curves for Different Types of Material
(From Guilford, J. P., "General Psychology." New York: Van Nostrand, 1939, p. 409.)

and then poetry. With insight (or understanding), early forgetting is seldom present. For example, college students learned various puzzles (match tricks) either by memorizing the solutions or by memorizing the principles involved. The majority of those who memorized without understanding the principles exhibited marked and rapid forgetting within a month. On the other hand, most of those who learned the principles had almost perfect retention when tested later at intervals up to one month.¹⁹

Overlearning and forgetting

Suppose that twenty trials are required to memorize some material so that you can recall it correctly just once. What would be the advantage, if any, of having an extra ten trials — 50 per cent of overlearning? Would you retain 50 per cent better than without it? Ebbinghaus and several later investigators have found that there are decided advantages from overlearning.

The value of overlearning for retention is illustrated by an experiment in which adult




Figure 86. Retention as a Function of Overlearning
(From data in Krueger, W. C. F., "The Effect of Overlearning on Retention," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1929, vol. 12, p. 74)

subjects learned lists consisting of twelve monosyllabic nouns. They learned with different amounts of repetition beyond that required for the first perfect recall.²⁰ The criterion of learning was one perfect repetition of the list. Having one half as many repetitions again as were required to reach the criterion was designated 50 per cent overlearning. Having twice the number of repetitions required for learning was 100 per cent overlearning. Thus, if four repetitions allowed the subject to reach the criterion of learning, six repetitions would constitute 50 per cent overlearning, and eight repetitions 100 per cent overlearning.

Different groups learned comparable lists of nouns with 0, 50, or 100 per cent overlearning. Recall and relearning occurred (in different groups) at intervals of one, two, four, seven, fourteen, and twenty-eight days. Figure 86 shows the retention curves for recall when overlearning was 0, 50, and 100 per cent. Somewhat similar results were found in the case of repetitions saved during relearning.

It is quite clear from these data that larger amounts of overlearning bring larger degrees

of retention. If we consider recall scores after the interval of a day, we find that there was 26 per cent retention for 0 overlearning, 38 per cent for 50 per cent overlearning, and 49 per cent for 100 per cent overlearning. Taking the results as a whole, the increase from 50 to 100 per cent overlearning (a 33 per cent increase in the number of repetitions) brought less than a 33 per cent increase in retention. Thus diminishing returns were evident. This fact is apparent in the curves. Note that there is a wider space between the 0 and 50 per cent than between the 50 and 100 per cent curves.

A later investigation followed the same experimental design, but involved mazes instead of words.²¹ The results were in fairly close agreement with those already indicated. In this study, however, 200 per cent overlearning was also introduced. The results show quite clearly that diminishing returns occur as overlearning is increased. For example, an increase of 100 per cent overlearning (100 to 200) brought an increased retention which averaged less than 50 per cent.

Why do we forget?

The first answer to occur is that we forget because the neural traces of previous experience grow fainter with a lapse of time. It is by no means certain, however, that lapse of time, as such, causes forgetting. It is much more likely that other activities which occur within the interval weaken neural traces and make us forget. In other words, time may be an important factor in forgetting, merely because of the activities which occur in time. Numerous experiments have shown, in fact, that relative inactivity following acquisition decreases forgetting.

The effect of sleep

Two subjects memorized lists consisting of ten nonsense syllables before a period of (1) normal daily activity or (2) sleep. Retention was tested after one, two, four, and eight hours of either waking activity or sleep. Under each of these conditions different lists of

nonsense syllables were learned and recalled, but they were all of comparable difficulty. Each duration of sleep yielded better retention than a comparable duration of waking. After the successive intervals of sleep, the percentages of nonsense syllables recalled were: 70, 54, 55, and 56. There was, as we see, no further forgetting after the one-hour interval of sleep. The comparable percentages for waking were, 46, 31, 22, and 9. Forgetting was greater, the longer the interval of waking. These findings have been verified in later research. The investigators concluded that "forgetting is not so much a matter of the decay of old impressions and associations as it is a matter of the interference, inhibition, or obliteration of the old by the new" ²²

The fact that forgetting occurs during sleep, even though it occurs less rapidly than when we are awake, is, of course, no basis for discrediting the idea that interpolated activity rather than time itself causes forgetting. Although we are not engaged in learning new activities while asleep, our nervous system is active.

Retroactive inhibition

Experiments on retroactive inhibition provide further evidence for the view that forgetting is due to interpolated activity. In a typical experiment on retroactive inhibition, two equivalent groups memorize the same list of nonsense syllables (list A). One group (experimental) then learns another list of nonsense syllables (list B). While they are doing this, the control group rests, perhaps singing or telling stories, so as to prevent rehearsal of list A. After the experimental group has learned list B, both groups recall all they can of list A. Under these conditions, the recall score for the experimental group is much lower than that for the control group. This applies rather uniformly to individual scores as well as to group averages. Thus, learning list B appears to obliterate, to some extent, the neural traces produced in the learning of list A.

A recent extensive investigation shows that

retention is better when a rest period is interpolated immediately after learning.²³

One thousand school-children, separated into equated groups, studied twenty-five verbs and then recalled all they could after twenty-one minutes and after twenty-four hours. The experimental group studied a list of nouns for seven minutes of the interval. Some of the experimental group studied the nouns immediately after studying the verbs, others studied them following a rest of four minutes, and still others following a rest of eight minutes. Thus, the interpolated learning came at different intervals after learning. The control group sang familiar songs during the entire twenty-one-minute period.

Retention scores (ratios) were as follows: 121 for controls and between 50 and 69 for experimental groups. The lowest retention score within the experimental group was for interpolated study immediately after learning. The longer the rest period between learning and interpolated study, the higher the retention score. Retention after twenty-four hours showed little loss for the control group, but a large loss for the experimental group. Again, the longer the interval of rest between learning and interpolated study, the higher the retention score.

Various investigations have shown that there is also a relation between the degree of forgetting and the similarity of the interpolated activity to that involved in original learning. With a very high degree of dissimilarity (as between memorizing words and singing), there is relatively little retroactive inhibition. With a high degree of similarity (as between memorizing nonsense syllables and memorizing other nonsense syllables), there is usually a large degree of retroactive inhibition. Within these extremes the relationship between degree of similarity and degree of retroaction is a complicated one which we need not consider here.

Emotion and forgetting

The obliterating effect of emotion-provoking situations, presented immediately after learning, is suggested by the following experiment: College students, working one at a time in a small lighted darkroom, were given sev-

eral repetitions of a list of nonsense syllables, after which they recalled as many syllables as possible. Following this recall, they were sometimes given jokes to read, none of which was highly mirth-provoking. They were then asked to recall the syllables again. At other times, and quite unexpectedly, they were given a marked emotional upset after recalling a list of syllables just presented. The back of the chair collapsed, an electric shock was felt in the arms, scrap metal fell from the ceiling to the floor, a pistol shot rang out, and the lights went off, producing total darkness. All of this happened simultaneously. As soon as the commotion ceased, the subject was again asked to recall all of the syllables that he could remember. With the emotion-provoking situation interpolated between first and second recalls, retention was decreased more than under the control condition. In some individual cases there was a very large decrease. After experiencing the situation described, one subject forgot every syllable in the list.²⁴

MEMORY TRAINING

Almost everybody would like to improve his memory. Some want to remember names and faces better. Salesmen would like to remember "selling points" better. Public speakers would like to remember their speeches — or at least remember outlines — so that they could avoid reading them. Students would like to remember better the important points of a lecture or of an assignment. They would like to be able to read lists of French verbs, say, and remember them without a large amount of study. And they would like to have better success in recalling the foreign equivalents of English words, or vice versa. It is not surprising, therefore, that thousands of people buy courses whose authors promise improved memory.

One of the best-known "memory experts" has made his living for over twenty years teaching people how to "improve their memory." Various large firms have employed him to improve the memory of their salesmen or

other employees. Among these are the Coca-Cola Company, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, and the Fisher Body Corporation. If you read his book, which describes his copyrighted "system," you will see that the system is an application of the psychology of learning to specific situations which salesmen, public speakers, and students meet.²⁵ This "system," and others like it, facilitate remembering, not by developing some hypothetical entity called "memory," as a muscle might be developed by exercise, but by teaching people to utilize various devices which facilitate learning and recall. In the last analysis, whatever success is achieved by use of such devices is achieved because the efficiency of learning is increased.

If you follow principles like those involved in any memory system, you may improve your "memory," but, if such improvement does occur, your "memory" will return to its former efficiency (or should we say, inefficiency?) whenever you fail to use the principles. So-called memory training has value only to the extent that it induces efficient learning. Sheer memorizing of something, with the idea that it will improve memory as exercise improves a muscle, is a waste of time. This was amply demonstrated in an experiment on college students.²⁶ One group which memorized various materials "by heart" showed no improvement later in memorizing similar materials. On the other hand, a group which learned to apply efficient principles of learning while memorizing did show an improvement in later memorizing. The improvement came because principles learned while memorizing one set of material were applied to memorizing the other. This is an example of transfer resulting from application of principles. Some of the principles involved in this experiment and a few additional ones are summarized below.

(1) Have the intention to learn. Suppose, for example, that you are introduced to Mr. Flynn. The person introducing him says, "I would like you to meet Mr. Flynn." In all

probability you will say, "How do you do," "Pleased to meet you," or something similar. You may not even have listened to the name. You may have listened, but without hearing it correctly. But this does not disturb you. "After all," you ask, "why should I remember his name? Mr. Flynn is of no importance to me. I may not meet him again, anyhow." But if you do meet him, you will almost surely not remember his name. The reason is not that your memory is poor, but that you failed to learn the name in the first place. Whenever you hear, read, or observe anything only incidentally, the chances are that your memory of it will be poor. In this connection, think of what was said earlier about failure to remember lists of words when intention to learn was absent.

(2) If you have the intention to learn, you will probably pay close attention to what is before you. If it is important for you to remember Mr. Flynn's name, you will probably listen attentively as the name is spoken. Students often fail to remember what the lecturer is saying, or what they are reading, because their thoughts are elsewhere. Very frequently, too, they are so concentrated on the task of taking detailed notes that they miss the substance and meaning of what is presented. The best procedure here is to listen or read primarily, and to give only secondary attention to note-taking. Notes should be taken only at intervals — whenever something seems especially important. Some of the poorest students have the most detailed notes. Unless you are attending to what is presented, you do not know what is important and you mechanically jot down notes of which you may later have little, if any, understanding. Remember that there is relatively little forgetting when we understand, and that we cannot understand unless we attend closely to what is presented.

(3) Use imagery to the fullest possible extent. Try to get a photographic impression of Mr. Flynn which may be revived later. Notice his eyes, his hair, how he is dressed, and so on. If he has a particular accent, that

may help you to recall. Some systems advise picturing him doing something ridiculous, the more ridiculous the image the better — but more about this later. It is well for you to visualize as much as possible what you hear and read. If you hear or read, for example, that a child making a delayed reaction is responding to an absent stimulus, try to picture the situation, first with the stimulus present and then with it absent. You will then probably remember what we mean by a delayed reaction. The advantage of movies and other forms of visual education is that they facilitate acquisition of relevant visual imagery.

(4) Tie up what you are learning with other things. In other words, develop as many associations as possible. William James²⁷ once said:

In mental terms, the more other facts a fact is associated with in the mind, the better possession of it our memory retains. Each of its associates becomes a hook to which it hangs, a means to fish it up by when sunk beneath the surface. Together they form a network of attachments by which it is woven into the entire tissue of our thought. "The secret of a good memory" is thus the secret of forming diverse and multiple associations with every fact we care to retain. But this forming of associations with a fact, what is it but *thinking about* the fact as much as possible? Briefly, then, of two men with the same outward experiences and the same amount of mere native tenacity, the one who THINKS over his experiences most, and weaves them into systematic relations with each other, will be the one with the best memory.

Individuals sometimes marvel at how an expert in some field can read a new book in a couple of hours and retain what they could retain only after a course of intensive study. The reason for the expert's "better memory" is, of course, his background in the field. He has, as it were, many hooks on which to hang what he reads. The newcomer to the field must "start from scratch."

Most memory "systems" give major emphasis to association. Some of these advise one to memorize a list of logically related words. First this list is mastered thoroughly,

so that it can be said forward and backward, and the word in any position (sixth, forty-first, and so on) can be recalled without hesitation. Then each new thing to be remembered is, as it were, "hooked" onto one of these words or placed in the appropriate "file." If a list of "selling points" is to be memorized, for example, the first is associated with the first word in the list and the second with the second word, and so on. The first words, being so thoroughly retained, are recalled quite readily. In being recalled, they tend to bring the respective "selling point" with them.

In stressing association, most memory systems utilize the idea of getting vivid, even ridiculous associations in addition to those provided by the "filing system" or the series of "hooks."

Here is an example of associations as an aid to recall, but without any prearranged system of words or other symbols such as most systems contain.²⁸


Let us suppose that we have to remember the following French verbs. *venir*, *acheter*, *couper*, *appeler*, *munier*, *songer*, *porter*, *recevoir*, *courir*, and *manger* — ten of them. Rather a problem, but not so hard if we use our little trick. Let us choose a room in the chemistry laboratory, to start with. You enter and there is a big can of veneer on the table. Make the imagery plain. You carry that can to the other end of the room and empty it into the professor's ash tray (*acheter*). You then cross the hall into the next lecture-room and are surprised to find a huge chicken coop (*couper*) in the middle of the room, and, while you watch, in comes the chemistry assistant and feeds the chickens on green apples (*appeler*). You become disgusted at seeing a chemistry laboratory so abused and go outside. You are astonished to see that the moon (*munier*) is about three times its natural size, and, while you look at it, the man in the moon starts singing a song (*songer*), whereupon a hotel porter (*porter*) comes up and packs the moon into a big valise, takes it out back of the campus, and dumps the valise into a reservoir (*recevoir*). Now for *courir*. Not so easy. Let's see; you send a courier to the president for help and you go along with him. But, when you enter the president's house, you are astonished to find that you are in a manger (*man-*

ger). That is certainly an exercise in the imagination, but those words will stick. So will any similar list if worked out with reasonable care and reviewed once or twice; but be sure and visualize clearly.

Write down the list of French verbs in correct order. You will probably get several more than you would have retained without the associations given above. Here, however, someone else made up the associations for you. But what if you had to devise them yourself? It might have taken you more time to make up your story than to memorize the words in the first place by routine methods. That is the chief difficulty with "memory systems" — the associations are artificial, and, while learning the system or making up your peculiar associations, you might be learning more directly what you wish to remember. In any event, such systems are valuable only in memorizing lists or outlines, or associations like names and faces. They are of little or no use if you want to recall material which does not fall into obvious sequences.

(5) Rhythm is an aid to retention. This has been shown in several laboratory researches and it is exemplified in the theme songs of radio advertising, like "Dentyne chewing gum, Dentyne chewing gum. . ." The writer was taught the multiplication table in a sort of sing-song and this no doubt helped it stick. There are decided limits, however, to the application of rhythm in learning.

(6) Distribute your learning as much as possible. If you can avoid it, do not cram. You may "get by" the next day, but the chances are that you will not retain very much over longer periods. In the light of what we know about distributed learning as compared with massed learning, it is safe to say that, other things like intelligence being equal, the student who distributes his learning over days or weeks will do better on the examination and also retain better weeks, months, or years later than the student who crams the material the day before. Regardless of the basic factors which make distributed better than massed learning, there are also other advan-



Indicate, by number, which twelve of the above faces appeared on page 159. Then turn back to that page and check your accuracy. (Photographs used through the courtesy of the Vanderbilt Commodore.)

tages to distributing one's study. For one thing, the crammer does not have time to tie it in with past experience, nor does he have much chance to rehearse what he is learning.

(7) Wherever possible, rehearse or recite. We have already pointed out the advantages of recitation as compared with passive reading. Recitation not only facilitates learning, but it aids retention. In attempting to remember names and faces, recitation is especially advisable. You should not only intend to remember the name and attend closely so as to get it correctly, but you should also take every opportunity to recite it. You should certainly say, "How do you do, Mr. Flynn," rather than merely "How do you do." If you are engaged in conversation long enough, you may get in a good bit of repetition. You might at least say, "I have so much wanted to meet you, Mr. Flynn," "Good-bye, I hope I shall have the pleasure of meeting you again, Mr. Flynn." The more times you can say the name, the better your chances of recalling it later.

(8) Rest, or, better still, sleep after you have studied. From what we know about the obliterating effect of interpolated activities, it is poor practice to study one subject immediately after getting through with the study of another. There should at least be a pause in which anything like study is avoided. It is especially bad to load up a whole morning with classes, one hour after the other. As much as possible, each class should be followed by rest unless the following class is quite dissimilar to the one that preceded. There is no harm, for example, in following mathematics with physical education, art appreciation, or something of that nature. But if it can be avoided, one should not follow it with some other subject requiring intense application.

(9) When a long chapter is to be studied, look it over as a whole, before beginning intensive study of the parts. If it has a summary, read this before reading the chapter. You may find that you do better not to concentrate on parts, but to read the material

through from beginning to end each time. However, the findings on whole versus part learning do not warrant the categorical statement that it is better to learn by wholes than by parts. It depends on you, and on the kind of material you are learning.

SUMMARY

Remembering in the general sense is retaining. Where verbal learning is not involved, as in animals and infants, retention may be measured only through reproduction of motor skill, a saving in time and effort required to relearn, delayed reaction, or delayed matching in terms of a sample. Delayed reaction is recall memory, and delayed matching in terms of a sample is recognition memory. In older children and adults, we may study recall and recognition by using verbal materials like nonsense syllables, digits, and words. Poems, narratives, and actual or pictured events are also used in research on recall in children and adults.

Recalling is responding in terms of absent stimuli. It is made possible by some modification of the organism which represents past stimulation. Thus, the subject in a delayed-reaction situation may respond in terms of an absent stimulus (light, seeing food placed, and so on) because, while the stimulus was present, it modified him in some way. The modification, since it represents something other than itself, has been called a symbolic process. When the adult recalls digits, words, or other symbols that he has learned, he likewise responds in the absence of the stimuli which previously modified him. It is this modification which enables him to "play back," as it were, the original stimulating conditions.

Memory span increases with age, and with the meaningfulness of the material to be recalled. Recall of narratives presented once is usually inaccurate as to details, dropping some details and adding others, but the general theme is well retained. The same is true in recall of form. When narratives or forms are presented repeatedly, and each presentation is followed by recall, the reproduction

becomes increasingly accurate, and we may plot a learning curve. Successive recall following a single presentation, however, becomes increasingly inaccurate. This is more evident if the successive reproductions are by different persons who, as it were, have received the material second-hand. Here again, the general theme of the narrative or picture is usually retained.

Testimony concerning events witnessed just once is highly inaccurate. Some of the reasons for this inaccuracy are: incorrect observation, variations in interests and attitudes, unintentional elaboration in "recall," forgetting, and response to suggestions, such as are involved in questions designed to aid recall or, at times, to mislead the person making the recall.

Although we recall objects and situations in their absence, this does not mean that recall is without stimulation. Even when we recall some absent aspect of the situation, as in delayed-reaction experiments, other associated stimuli are present. It is noteworthy in this connection that any fraction of some former stimulating situation may be sufficient to elicit recall of the whole situation. This is response in terms of reduced cues.

In recognizing, we differentiate between the familiar (the old) and the unfamiliar (the new). This is much easier than recalling something in its absence. False recognition shows the influence of reduced cues. Some aspect of former stimulation sometimes makes us feel that we are familiar with a new person or situation.

Procedures which make for efficient learning also facilitate retention. This has been illustrated by reference to the superior retention which comes from distributed learning and the use of recitation in learning. Fast learners are better retainers than slow learners, even under conditions where overlearning

and the amount learned are controlled. Overlearning aids retention, but there are limits to the value of large amounts of overlearning. Increased amounts of overlearning sometimes bring diminishing returns from the standpoint of retention.

In the broadest sense, forgetting is failing to retain. You may say, "I have forgotten so and so," because you cannot recall it, but your nervous system may retain it to the degree that you can recognize it or, failing this, relearn it with a saving in time or effort.

Forgetting of nonsense materials is at first rapid, then relatively slow. The course of forgetting tends to be slower, the more meaningful the material learned. In the case of learning with insight or understanding, forgetting may be negligible. It is doubtful whether a lapse of time, as such, causes forgetting. Experiments on retention after sleep, rest, and interpolated learning of various materials suggest that forgetting is due to retroactive inhibition. This is the obliteration of earlier learning by new activities. The least amount of forgetting occurs after sleep, and the greatest amount after interpolation of activities similar to those learned, yet different from them as to detail. Emotional upset may also produce retroactive inhibition.

Memory training is successful to the degree that it makes for more efficient learning — it does not develop a "memory" faculty. Some principles of efficient learning which aid retention are: intending to learn, paying close attention, using imagery, associating the new with the old, using rhythm, distributing practice, reciting while learning, resting after something has been learned, and getting a survey of the whole before starting to learn by whole or part methods. Anybody who learns to use these principles will improve his "memory," but whenever he fails to apply them, his "memory" will be no better than it was before.

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Chapter 10

Thinking

WE THINK with symbols which we learn, and, as we get older, much of what we learn is learned through thinking — through manipulating the world implicitly, using symbols in place of objects, situations, and events. This is sometimes called “ideational” or “symbolic” learning.

A few examples of learning on a symbolic level have already appeared in some preceding discussions of the learning process. The delayed-reaction experiments indicate the presence of symbolic processes in animals ranging from rat to man, who have demonstrated their ability to recall or think of absent objects, situations, or events. This ability to think of things in their absence is the first essential of the more complex forms of thinking. Acquisition of insight in certain problem situations suggests the presence of thought processes. It implies some sort of implicit manipulation of the environment. Sometimes, as we have seen, insight is preceded by implicit trial and error. This is another name for reasoning.

We turn now to a more intimate study of thinking, and especially reasoning. Reasoning is differentiated from mere thinking of something, because it involves a sequence of symbolic activities (thoughts or ideas). It differs from the type of thinking known as *reverie*, or free association of ideas, because it is related to the solution of a problem. In reverie, the associations are random. In reasoning, however, the “associations begin in a problem, and end in its solution.”¹ We say, therefore, that reasoning is a form of con-

trolled association. The problem gives us a set which determines the nature of the symbols or associations in the series.

Reasoning may be differentiated from phantasy, or day-dreaming, in that it is more realistic. If you are unable to meet your financial obligations, for example, you may imagine yourself winning a thousand dollars at bank night, digging up buried treasure in your garden, or receiving a legacy from some rich uncle. This is phantasy. You may, on the other hand, lay definite plans to solve your problem. You may think of getting a job that pays a bigger salary, of selling some of your property, or of doing some extra work in spare hours. If these are realistic solutions — solutions capable of actual accomplishment — we classify the problem-solving process as reasoning rather than as phantasy.

Although Aristotle called man the “reasoning animal” and thereby suggested that animals below man do not reason, there is abundant evidence that reasoning begins far below the human level. The evidence indicates, as a matter of fact, that reasoning first appears in lower mammals like the rat, and that it becomes increasingly complex as the human level is reached. Reasoning at the human level begins in early childhood.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF REASONING

Three tests have been widely used to study reasoning in animals, and all three have been modified for use with human subjects. One of these confronts the organism with a problem that can be solved only by combining

previous experiences. Another requires the subject to make a temporally related series of turns, without any external or internal sensory cues to guide it. This is the *double-alternation problem*. Still another test requires that certain relations be discerned by the subject. In a sense, it is a test of generalizing ability. This is the *multiple-choice test*.

Combining past experiences

Looked at from one angle, reasoning is combining past experiences in order to solve a problem which cannot be solved by mere reproduction of earlier solutions. A situation used to test this process in rats is illustrated in Figure 87. The animal is first allowed to explore the entire room, the ringstand (*RS*) and the table (*A*), which is reached by climbing the ringstand. The partition around *F* prevents the rat from reaching this region. Preliminary exploration continues for a few days so that the animal may become familiar with every aspect of the situation. Table *C* is then added to the room and an elevated pathway is run from it to the blocked-off region (*F*) on table *A*. Three other pathways, each reached by a ringstand (*R* 1, *R* 2, and *R* 3), are connected with the new table, as




Figure 87. Maier's Reasoning Test for Rats
(After Maier, N. R. F., "Reasoning in White Rats," *Comparative Psychological Monographs*, 1929, vol. 6, p. 23.)

illustrated. Use of any one of these ringstands and the associated pathway makes it possible for the animal to reach *F*.

Learning to run from any part of the room, up *RS* and onto table *A*, is designated *Experience I*. It does not enable the rat to reach *F*, the place where food will appear in the actual reasoning test. After addition of table *C* and the new ringstands and paths connected with it and with *F*, the animal is trained to climb one of the three ringstands (*R* 1, *R* 2, or *R* 3), and traverse the path which runs from it to *C*, and from *C* to *F*. This is designated *Experience II*. The test of reasoning comes when the rat is placed at *A*. Its problem is to reach the food at *F*. The animal has learned to descend *RS* (part of *Experience I*), and it has learned to climb, let us say, *R* 2 and proceed from that point to *C*, then to *F* (*Experience II*). But the animal has never before descended *RS* and gone to *R* 2. Will it bridge this gap? If it does so without further training, one may say that it has combined the two separate experiences.

The typical reaction in this situation is somewhat as follows: (1) Random activity at the obstruction. (2) Running back and forth between the obstruction and the edge of the table. (3) Descending *RS*. (4) Running across the floor to *R* 2 (or whichever stand has been used for *Experience II*). (5) Climbing *R* 2 and following the path now available until *F* is reached. Control tests have shown that the animals do not reach the appropriate ringstand by chance, but as a result of previous training with it.²

A modification of this type of problem for use with children is shown in Figure 88. The child first explored the apparatus so as to become familiar with its various aspects. There were three parts to the test period. (1) The child was given another brief exploration, then removed via a predetermined booth, designated *Y*. This exploration, and those which preceded it, comprised *Experience I*. (2) The child was led from the exit, in this case at *Y*, around the outside of the apparatus by a devious route, and finally to another




Figure 88. Maier's Reasoning Test for Children

W, X, Y, and Z are booths at the end of pathways arranged in the shape of a swastika; E, entrances and exits, covered with cloth. Curtains also separate paths from booths. A is an adult chair; B is a child's chair. Position of lights is indicated. (From Maier, N. R. F., "Reasoning in Children," *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, 1936, vol. 21, p. 356)

booth, designated W. Here there was a toy windmill house. When the child dropped a penny into the chimney of the house, a tune began to play and the windmill began to turn. The experience in this booth was designated Experience II. The experimenter and child then went out, ostensibly to look for a penny with which the child could play the tune again. Finding the penny, the experimenter took the child to still another booth, designated X. The child was then told to go and find the windmill. It could not go directly to W from X, however, unless it combined Experience I (general knowledge of the layout of the apparatus) and Experience II (knowledge of the particular booth in which the windmill appeared). The route from W to X had not previously been learned, hence the ability of the child to "combine or integrate two isolated experiences" was tested. In different

tests, combinations like X-W, Y-Z, and W-Y were used.

The child's response indicated reasoning, so long as no incorrect alleys beyond the elbow turn were entered. If the child chose at random after emerging from the booth in which it was placed for the test, its accuracy would be only 33 per cent. It was assumed to have solved the problem if it attained an accuracy of 50 per cent in the last ten tests. Five children averaging four years of age had an average score of only 32 per cent. Only one of them attained a score of 50 per cent. Eleven children averaging five years of age had an average score of 44 per cent, and only three of them reached a score of 50 per cent. The average score of children about five years of age ranged from 59 to 83 per cent, the percentage of correct responses increasing with an increase in age. In this study the highest age level was around eight years.³

Multiple choice

In solving this type of problem, the subject must learn that the aspect of the situation associated with success always bears a certain relation to other aspects. Look at Figure 89, a diagram of a type of multiple-choice apparatus used with animals. There are nine doors confronting the animal, any number of which




Figure 89. A Yerkes Multiple-Choice Apparatus
(From Burr, H. E., "A Study of the Behavior of the White Rat by the Multiple-Choice Method," *Journal of Animal Behavior*, 1916, vol. 6, p. 224.)

may be open on a particular trial. Suppose, for example, that the relationship which we wish the animal to learn is that of middleness. We require it to learn, in other words, that the middle door of any of those open is the correct one — that this leads to the front of the apparatus and to food, while the others lead to punishment.

On the first trial, for example, the first three doors at the left are open. Door 2 is the correct one. If the animal enters it and proceeds to the front of the apparatus, food is received. If 1 or 3 is entered, the door closes and confines the animal. On the next trial, let us say, doors 2 to 8 are open. The animal may go to 2, especially if it went in at that door and was rewarded on the preceding trial. But 2 is now wrong. If the animal is to receive food and avoid punishment on this trial, it must go in at door 5. On the next trial, doors 7 to 9 may be open, the animal being required to go through door 8. This procedure is continued, each setting differing from the preceding one in the number of doors open and in their location. When the subject consistently enters the middle door, we regard the problem as solved.

Instead of using middleness, one may use such relations as the right-hand door, the door to the right of the middle door on one trial and to the left of the middle door on the next, or problems so complicated that even an intelligent human adult could not solve them.

Why do we call these *reasoning* problems? If the correct door were always in a fixed position, for instance, always door 3, the animal would merely have to associate this particular door with food. It might learn the association on a conditioned-response basis, the door serving as a sign for escape and food. In the multiple-choice test, however, the external situation changes from trial to trial. Learning to make a response to a particular door will not do. The subject must somehow combine what it learns in the different settings. It must, so to speak, "put two and two together." The different aspects of previous experience with the problem must be inter-

preted so that they make evident the general principle.

Birds, rats, pigs, monkeys, and chimpanzees have all solved certain multiple-choice problems. A problem solved by all these animals is that requiring selection of the end door, either right or left. It may be questioned, however, whether this simple problem requires reasoning. The middle-door problem has been solved by a bird, a monkey, and human subjects. Chimpanzees, who failed the middle-door problem, have solved the end-door problem, the problem requiring response to the right and left door alternately on successive trials, and the second door from the right. So few animals have been used in these investigations, however, that one could not justifiably conclude that birds are brighter than rats or monkeys brighter than chimpanzees. Another chimpanzee, for example, might have solved the middle-door problem, and another monkey might have failed it. The important point is that reasoning problems of this nature are sometimes solved by animals below man.⁴

A multiple-choice apparatus widely used with human subjects is illustrated in Figure 90. Here the subject sits on one side of the apparatus and the experimenter on the other, the two separated by a screen. The experimenter pushes a certain number of keys to-




Figure 90. Yerkes Multiple-Choice Apparatus for Use with Human Subjects

ward the subject (corresponding to the open doors confronting the animal) and the subject presses the key which he believes to be correct. If the key is correct, a buzzer sounds. Pressure on the incorrect key lights a bulb in a corresponding position behind the screen, thus telling the experimenter which key has been selected. The subject continues to press keys until the buzzer sounds. Then a new setting is presented. Settings are presented until the subject reacts without error to a predetermined series, or, as usually happens, states the principle involved. The end-key, next-to-the-end-key, and middle-key problems are very quickly solved by human adults, but a problem like that calling for an alternate response to keys on each side of the central alley sometimes requires dozens of trials.⁵

The double-alternation problem

This is another problem which, like that described above, can be used with both animal and human subjects. A stylus form of the apparatus is shown in Figure 91. An open-alley form has been used with animals as well as with human children and adults. The problem is essentially the same, whichever form is used. It is to learn the correct sequence of turns which must be made, fol-

lowing successive trips up the central alley. This sequence, for a series of four successive trips, may be either right, right, left, left (*rrll*) or the reverse. Each correct turn is followed by a reward. Incorrect turns lead to punishment. After making a wrong turn, the subject must retrace until the correct alley is reached. A trial consists of four trips from the entrance, up the central alley, and back again to the starting-point. After the fourth trip, the subject is given a rest.

Observe that the apparatus is bilaterally symmetrical, and that there are no external differential cues to guide the subject. If a red light flashed on whenever a right turn was to be made and a green light whenever a left turn was required, these lights would serve as differential cues. The correct turn would be made in terms of the color of the light at the end of the central alley.

Suppose that no lights were present, but that the right and left turns were made in different places within the apparatus. Then we would have the type of maze already considered. This is sometimes called a *spatial maze*, because the turns differ in space. Differing in space, they provide different visual, auditory, olfactory, tactual, and kinesthetic cues to which the respective turns may become conditioned. Making the correct turns in this type of maze, whatever their sequence, would provide no proof of reasoning. In the *temporal maze* used in reasoning tests, however, each turn occurs in the same place. Moreover, all external conditions are identical, regardless of whether the turn required at any moment is right or left.

But how about kinesthetic cues; those associated with muscle tensions? One might think that these would provide cues for the required turn. If the sequence were *rlrl* instead of *rrll*, this might be true. Having turned to the right in one trial might produce muscle tensions which would persist until the animal reached the same point again. These cues might become conditioned to a left turn. Likewise, muscle tensions persisting after the left turn might serve as conditioned stimuli for a right turn. But in the *rrll* sequence, no such guidance is possible. After having turned right the first time, the animal might have muscle tensions which would guide it to the right again. On the third trip, however, the same muscle tensions would have to guide the animal to the left. Muscle tensions from just having gone to the left would then have to guide to




Figure 91. A Stylus Form of Hunter's Double Alternation Temporal Maze

the left again. In a continuation of the sequence, the same tensions would have to guide the animal to the right. In other words, the same muscle tensions would at some stages have to guide the animal in one direction and at other stages in another direction. Such a dual guidance by the same stimuli in close temporal succession is impossible. The only satisfactory explanation of *rrll* responses in the temporal maze is that the animal somehow "figures out" the proper sequence.⁶

Human subjects usually formulate this problem verbally. They attack it in an overt trial-and-error fashion at first, but soon begin to test out this or that hypothesis. The correct hypothesis is sometimes hit upon rather suddenly. A subject may seem to be making no progress — then a correct sequence occurs. Following this he says something like "Oh, I get it. You go two times to the right and two times to the left." He often reports that he tried out and tested various other hypotheses before hitting upon the correct one.

White rats, the lowest animals tested with the temporal maze, have not learned the problem in its usual form, even in one thousand trials. But some have learned the solution by other means. They first learned the separate turns in different T-shaped boxes. Then the *rr* sequence was taught in one box and the *ll* sequence in another. Transferred to the temporal maze after such training, a few of the rats eventually learned the *rrll* sequence. When required to continue after the *rrll* series, they responded *llll*. . . . Rats thus failed to continue the sequence.⁷

Raccoons, on the other hand, have learned the sequence in the temporal maze directly — that is, without preliminary training in other mazes — and have continued the sequence for two additional turns; that is, they have responded *rrllrrrr*. This shows a much better grasp of the problem than occurs in rats. Monkeys have done better still. In a special form of the problem, they have learned an *rrllrrll* sequence, then extended the series to eight additional turns, their total series of responses being *rrllrrllrrllrrll*.⁸ Human subjects have learned the double-alternation

problem much more readily than animals, and they have extended the series until told to stop. When asked to continue, in other words, they have usually responded *rrllrrllrrllrrll*. . . , perhaps saying "right, right, left, left . . .," either overtly or implicitly, while doing so.

Young children do not do very well on the *rrll* problem. It has not been solved by children below the fourth year and, until the seventh year, there is failure of some children to extend the sequence; that is, to respond *rrllrrll*. Too few children have been used at the lower age levels, however, to draw any conclusion concerning the age at which ability to solve this problem first appears. Children between the ages of five and thirteen required from four to thirty-seven trials before learning the *rrll* sequence. In general, the older children required fewer trials. The average number of trials for a group of thirty-six children who learned the problem was 15.4. A group consisting of twenty-five college students learned the double-alternation habit (but with double the number of turns — that is, *rrllrrll*) in from one to sixteen trials. The average number of trials required was 6.2. All adults extended the series without difficulty. The average number of errors per subject was thirty for children and sixteen for adults.⁹

THE REASONING PROCESS

Reasoning, as we have seen, is a form of implicit activity. It involves manipulation of aspects of the world in terms of symbols. We have seen, too, that reasoning is initiated by a difficulty of some kind. It is quite possible that the rats and other animals used in our experiments on reasoning reasoned then for the first time in their lives. It is quite possible, too, that they never again reasoned after psychologists finished the experiment. In order to induce these organisms to reason, it was necessary to confront them with problems which could not be solved by mere reproduction of former solutions, by conditioning, or by overt trial-and-error.

In man, also, reasoning is only initiated by

situations which cannot be met in a routine manner. We may go for hours or even days without reasoning, especially if our work is so routine that habitual modes of response enable us to meet, in a more or less automatic manner, every situation that arises. As soon as habitual modes of response fail, however, reasoning is likely to begin. Some problems of everyday life which initiate reasoning are how to get certain things done, how to make something go that has stopped, how to get food, how to pay our bills, how to get where we want to go, and how to avoid distressing situations. Being human, we also express curiosity about aspects of the world. We want to know what certain things are for, and why certain events occur. An average child of three years is already puzzled by objects, situations, and events not directly related to its personal adjustments.

It is interesting to observe, moreover, that what is a problem for the scientist or scientifically minded child or adult may go unnoticed by the general run of human beings. John Dewey, the philosopher, tells, for example, of his concern over why bubbles form on the outside of inverted tumblers that have been washed in soapsuds, and then go inside the tumblers¹⁰

The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from within the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat or by decrease of pressure, or of both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out, holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from

the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside.

But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse.

Inferences

One important step in all human reasoning is that of forming *inferences* (hypotheses) about problems. Our inferences are often put in the form of questions. If your car suddenly stops running, you probably ask yourself, "Have I run out of gas?" The first inference to occur, let us assume, is, "I have run out of gas." You may check the truth of the inference explicitly by looking into the gas tank, or you may check it implicitly by recalling that you filled the tank yesterday, that you have traveled so many miles since then, and that it could or could not be empty unless the gas tank has sprung a leak or someone has siphoned off some gasoline. Failing to find the tank empty, you get another suggestion or make another inference. "Is the gas line choked?" You then check that possibility. So one inference after another occurs to you until, providing you do not run out of relevant inferences beforehand, one of them is found correct. If your knowledge of automobile motors is limited, you may run out of inferences very soon. You must then call in an expert, one who has many more symbolic representations of motors and things that might go wrong with them than you have.

Inferences involve recall of past experience. They are always limited by what one already knows about the situation involved. The more facts he can recall about the situation, the more inferences he is likely to make and the better these inferences are likely to be. The bubble problem mentioned above would not even occur to the average housemaid, but if it did, she could not begin to make relevant inferences.

Those who claim that education should

teach people to think rather than cram facts. Into their heads often overlook the dependence of thinking upon facts with which to think. We should be taught facts, especially those that are relevant to situations which we are likely to meet, and we should also be taught to think more efficiently.

Inferences are usually evaluated before being accepted or rejected. Dewey calls this the *rational elaboration of ideas*. We may accept the first inference that comes to us or we may bring relevant knowledge to bear upon it. Evaluating an inference in the light of other knowledge at our disposal sometimes leads to rejection, then to making a further inference. Thus, we realize that, in terms of how much gas we had in our tank yesterday and the number of miles we have traveled, our gas could not have been used up. Then we think of other possibilities.

Sometimes an objective test of our inferences is necessary. Our critical evaluation of an inference, like that of the empty gas tank, for example, may convince us of its correctness. In many instances, however, and especially in scientific reasoning, it is necessary to prove the correctness of an inference by objective or experimental means. Thus, Dewey could not be certain that his inferences about the bubbles were correct until he arranged an experiment which corroborated them. It often happens that inferences generally accepted as reasonable are found to be false when tested experimentally.

Direction

If you ask anybody to repeat every word that comes to mind after you give the signal to begin, he will probably give you a more or less random assortment of words. He may name objects in the room, objects seen out of the window, or anything which anyone of these objects suggests. Likewise, if a psychoanalyst should ask you to tell everything that comes to mind, you would recall many experiences which are related in various ways, but which do not necessarily follow any particular direction. These are examples of free or non-

directed association. Suppose, however, that I ask you to name all of the birds that come to mind. You do not begin to name objects at random. The set "think of birds" facilitates recall of the names of birds and inhibits recall of anything else. Likewise, if the psychoanalyst says, "Recall all of the experiences you can about your fishing trips with your father," this set determines that experiences of fishing trips with your father will be recalled, and not a motley assortment of experiences. These are examples of controlled or directed association. Here the instructions give one a set — that is, a determining tendency is injected into one's thinking.

Recall in reasoning is directed. Recall is directed by the nature of the problem. If our car has stopped running, we recall things about cars. If some natural phenomenon like the behavior of bubbles at the bottoms of up-turned washed glasses bothers us, our recall is of bubbles and things related to them. We are not likely to recall things that are completely irrelevant. The inferences that we make are related more or less closely to the problem as we conceive it.

It often happens, however, that our inferences, while generally bearing on the problem, follow an inadequate direction in other respects. There are many examples of this in everyday life. A man in his early forties, say, begins to have dizzy spells and jumps to the conclusion that his heart has gone bad. He begins to think of cleaning up his affairs in case he should drop dead. He limits his exercise and his eating. Finally, he convinces himself, or someone else convinces him, that he should have a physical examination. The doctor finds nothing wrong with his heart, but asks some questions about his eyes. Then the patient recalls for the first time that he finds it easier to read if he holds the paper at arm's length, that he experiences difficulty in reading small print on labels, and that his dizziness comes when he suddenly looks from a near to a more distant object, or vice versa. None of these things occurred to him before because the idea that there must be something wrong

with his heart sent his thinking in the wrong direction. A checkup with the oculist shows that the patient needs bifocals in place of his present glasses. He makes the substitution and his dizziness eventually disappears.

Delusions and direction. Certain delusions of the mentally ill are attributable to reasoning in wrong directions. In so-called "monomaniacs" for example, the direction of associative processes gives bizarre interpretations to the most innocent events.¹¹

Has she a tired look? — it is proof of adultery, a gay manner? — she comes from a rendezvous. A look, a movement of the eyebrows, lips, or fingers are so many telltale signs; the same with smiles or tears. Should she utter the name of the supposed lover, the sound of her voice leaves no doubt, should she repeat it often, it is to "accustom herself to hear it in public without blushing", if she ceases to mention him, the motive can be guessed. In the street, the jealous man thinks that the passers-by are laughing at him, ceaseless allusions are made to his misfortune; he is taken for a complaisant husband. His wife's footsteps on the parquet floor are so many signals to her lovers and compose a telegraphic alphabet that he can successfully interpret. . .

Mme. X . . studies minutely the letters that she receives. Punctuation marks or spelling mistakes give rise to numerous interpretations. Her father writes to her. "We desire your cure." She observes that the stop is of an unusual size; it must read. "We desire your cure to stop" (*Nous ne désirons point ta guérison.*) Another woman imagines that her husband is announcing the intention of leaving her by putting two five-centime stamps on a letter instead of a ten-centime one. A look, a smile, a gesture, the shouts and songs of children, the coughing or spitting of a neighbor, the whispers of passers-by, pieces of paper found in the street, a door opened or closed, a mere nothing, serves as a pretext.

Direction in problem solving. The disadvantage of getting the wrong direction and the advantage of getting the right direction in problem solving has been investigated in the laboratory. How the wrong direction or wrong set may interfere with solution is illustrated by the problem indicated in Figure 92.




Figure 92. The Nine-Dot Problem

One is required to connect the nine dots by drawing four straight lines without taking the pencil off the paper and without retracing

In attempting to solve this problem, you make one inference after another, and all are relevant in that they concern the nine dots and the instructions. Any inference which concerns the nine dots, but fails to conform with the instructions, is rejected almost as soon as suggested. You have a set, in other words, that is related to the dots and to the instructions. But you may also have a set not involved in the instructions — that is the set which makes you keep all lines within the limits of the area bordered by the dots. As long as your thinking follows this direction, you cannot solve the problem. Every inference will prove inadequate. But when you think of the possibility that lines may go outside of the area within the dots, you have the right direction. The solution may still be far off, but at least you will make inferences more in keeping with the requirements of solution. Eventually, you may hit upon the solution illustrated at the end of this chapter.

Following a certain line of thought to the exclusion of others, as in the above example, often seriously interferes with problem solution. The importance of shifting direction is illustrated by an experiment with college students.

One of the problems used in this study called for blowing out a lighted candle from a distance of eight feet with nothing but the materials illustrated in part A of Figure 93. A group consisting of 206 students worked without any suggestion from the experimenter that they should vary their mode of attack. Forty-eight per cent of this group solved the problem within the time allowed. Another group consisting of 178 students was given a




Figure 93 Maier's Candle-Blowing Problem
(From Crafts, et al., "Recent Experiments in Psychology"
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938, p. 354)

preliminary lecture covering twenty minutes in which the following advice was given and elaborated.

1. Locate a difficulty and try to overcome it. If you fail, get it completely out of your mind and seek an entirely different difficulty.
2. Do not be a creature of habit and stay in a rut. Keep your mind open for new meanings.
3. The solution-pattern appears suddenly. You cannot force it. Keep your mind open for new combinations and do not waste time on unsuccessful efforts.

The problem was solved within the time limit by 68 per cent of this group — 20 per cent more than in the group that received no instructions about changing direction.

In a check experiment, 169 subjects attacked two problems of equal difficulty, one before and one after receiving the above instructions. Here the effect of instructions about changing direction doubled the number of individuals achieving a solution.¹²

LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

The view has often been expressed that thinking is "restrained speaking," "subvocal talking," or "implicit language activity." Reasoning can, however, occur without lan-

guage. This is illustrated by experiments on animals.

Even where language does exist, a certain amount of thinking is probably non-linguistic. We may, for example, think about things for which we do not have names. In such instances we often have a visual or some other image of the thing thought about. Some psychologists have claimed that thinking can occur without involving either words or images.

After recognizing these limitations on the view that thinking is merely implicit language activity, we must admit that the symbols which represent most of the world are language symbols (verbal, gestural, or written), and that most of our thinking appears to be an internal manipulation of such symbols.

That thinking is closely tied up with inner speech is suggested by attempts to analyze thought processes. Try to analyze your everyday thinking and you will find that words are everywhere evident. It usually appears that, in thinking, you are talking to yourself. Children often do their thinking out loud for everyone to hear it — until they learn that it is customary, and often worthwhile, to keep one's thoughts to oneself. The deaf and dumb, who have previously learned the sign language, have been observed to move their fingers while thinking, much as they move them while talking, only to an abbreviated degree. Hand movements made in writing, and even eye movements made in reading, may accompany thought processes. Electric potentials picked up from the tongue and throat during silent counting and thinking show that abbreviated movements of these speech mechanisms are present.¹³

CONCEPTS

A concept is a process which represents the similarities in otherwise diverse objects, situations, or events. Concepts are products of reasoning and, once developed, play an important rôle in further thinking. A large proportion of the words in any complex language represent concepts. Words such as "tree,"

"dog," "liquid," "beauty," and thousands of others in our language, represent common aspects of things that are in many respects quite different one from the other.

In a sense, concepts are condensations of past experience. They bring together in a single idea, so to speak, what has been learned about properties of many different things. Take, for example, the concept *tree*. This concept is foreign to certain Australian tribes. The native speaks of particular objects, like the eucalyptus, the mulga, and the gum, but he has no word to represent what is common to them all. So he has no concept "tree" such as is represented by the word "tree" in our language. The child would be in a similar fix if it spoke of the chow, the spaniel, and the St. Bernard, but had not acquired the concept *dog*.

Development of concepts

The development of concepts requires two processes known respectively as *abstracting* and *generalizing*. Sometimes the two cannot be separated clearly, but each of them is at least implied whenever a concept is formed.

Abstracting is observing the similarity of otherwise different things. The individuals who first invented the concept *tree* must have observed that trees, regardless of how much they differ, still have something in common. Likewise, the child, in acquiring the concept *tree*, or understanding the word "tree," must make similar observations. The child's first experience with a tree may be with a magnolia, with which it hears the word "tree" associated. But later on, the child hears the same word attached to the pine, an object of quite different appearance. Later still, it hears the oak called a tree. After a series of such experiences with a variety of trees, the child may see, let us say, a willow which has never before been called a tree in its presence. If it designates this a tree, the child must have observed something of what the willow has in common with other trees. But it must also have put aspects of previous experiences together with the present experience and

reached the conclusion that this, being like the others in certain respects, is to be designated in the same manner. Deriving a principle from varied experiences in this way is generalizing. One might abstract but fail to generalize, but one could not achieve an adequate generalization, or concept, without first abstracting.

One should not gather the impression, from what we have just said, that the processes of abstracting and generalizing are necessarily deliberate, or even carried on consciously. In animals and human infants, our only evidence of abstraction and generalization comes from observation of similar reactions to different situations having a common characteristic. Looking at it from another angle, all we know is that different situations are equivalent from the standpoint of the reactions aroused and that this equivalence depends upon something which, despite their diversity, these situations have in common. We do not know whether the subjects deliberately analyze the situations, and whether they are conscious of similarities and relations.

Experiments on concept formation

Experiments dealing with development of concepts have been carried out with animals, children, and adults. One concept that has been extensively investigated is that of triangularity. Rats, cats, dogs, raccoons, monkeys, and human infants have developed this concept as a result of training in the laboratory¹⁴

Research with rats typifies the general procedure. The rat is confronted with two windows backed by cards [see Figure 110, p 253]. One card contains a white equilateral triangle with its apex up, and the other a circle of equal area and brightness. If the animal jumps at the card with the triangle, the card falls, and food is made accessible. If it jumps at the card with the circle, however, the animal falls several feet into a net. This constitutes its punishment for an incorrect response. The cards vary in right-left position in a chance order, and all other stimuli than those provided on the cards are carefully controlled.

The rat usually starts out by jumping about

50 per cent of the time to the triangle and 50 per cent to the circle. Gradually, however, the percentage of responses to the triangle increases. Finally, the animal selects the triangle in from 90 to 100 per cent of the trials.

But so far we have no evidence of response to triangularity. Perhaps the animal is responding negatively to the circle. To test this possibility, we substitute other forms — say, a square, rectangle, or cross — for the circle. If this fails to influence the accuracy of response, we conclude that the animal is reacting positively to the card with the triangle, and not just negatively to the circle. Perhaps the animal is reacting, not to the triangle as such, but to a certain distribution of light. The triangle has its apex up, hence the card has a larger area at the bottom than at the top. Perhaps this is the basis of discrimination. So we invert the triangle, placing it on its apex. At this point some subjects (cat, monkey, and infant) continue to discriminate as though nothing had happened. They are apparently reacting to triangularity, three-sidedness, three-corneredness, or the like, rather than to a particular distribution of light. The rat, however, fails to discriminate, following this change. It acts as if confronted by a new problem. The animal is apparently responding to the position of the triangle, to the particular distribution of light, rather than to triangularity. But we can train it to do the latter.

In one experiment, rats were from this stage given 1050 trials with the triangle varying in position (apex up, down, to the right, to the left, and so on). The only constant aspect of the positive situation was the triangle; all other concomitants varied. Some animals finally learned to discriminate the triangle, regardless of position, with an accuracy of 90 per cent or better. Substitution of other forms in varied positions for the circle again failed to influence the response, showing that it was indeed based upon stimulation from the triangle. Then other kinds of triangles (right-angled, equilateral, made of lines or dots, and the like) were substituted in varied positions for the triangle used in training. Accuracy was still 90 per cent or better. The animals now reacted to all of these different triangles and positions of triangles as equivalent. They had, according to the investigator, learned "abstraction of triangularity." Triangularity (three-corneredness, three-sidedness) was the only characteristic in which all of the triangles were equivalent.

The Chinese language offers an excellent pictorial illustration of concepts and how the process of abstraction is involved in understanding it. For this reason, it has been used in experiments on concept formation in adults. Take, for example, the Chinese characters reproduced in Figure 94. In the upper row the characters represent, respectively, *delicious to the extent of producing saliva*, *ice*, *lacquer*, and *harbor*. The characters in the lower row represent, respectively, *gruel*, *selling rice*, *a rice sieve*, and *a rice cake*. Do you observe anything common to the characters in the top row? There is a common property in all these varied things which is represented by the common symbol 𠂇. Any character including this symbol — and there are many — has this common property. It is liquidity. Saliva is liquid, ice is made from liquid, lacquer is liquid, and a harbor is liquid. The common property represented in each character of the lower line is obvious. Each has something to do with rice; any character that refers to rice has the symbol 米.

College students were shown Chinese characters like the above and, two and one half seconds after each character was presented, a sound representing the characteristic which it had in common with certain others in the series was also presented. Characters having the common element were presented mixed up with others having a different common element. Thus, the character 𣎵 was presented with sound oo, the character 冰 was presented with the sound yer, the character 漆 was presented with the sound fid, the character 港 was presented with the sound yer, and so on, there being six characters for each of six common characteristics, or sounds, which represented them.

The subjects were not told that this was an experiment on concept formation, abstracting, or




Figure 94. Abstracting Common Elements in Different Chinese Characters

generalizing. Until they learned otherwise as a result of their experiences, all thought that they were doing a memory experiment. They were merely asked to name the character (*oo*, *yer*, *fid*, and so on), before hearing the experimenter name it (that is, within two and one half seconds after exposure). When a subject could anticipate the term (*oo*, and the like) for each of six series of six characters each, he was tested with new characters having the same common element. This was to test whether, after having abstracted the common element, as indicated by correct naming of individual characters, the subject had generalized the principle involved — namely, that all those having the characteristic *✓* were *oo*, all those having the characteristic *✕* were *yer*, and so on.

Eventually it “dawned” on most of the subjects that the different *oo* experiences, for example, were linked by a common factor — the *✓* embedded in each of the Chinese characters. The investigator says that “individual concepts usually came into consciousness very gradually. Erroneous first impressions were either discarded or transmuted into the correct form by a continuous development. Trial and error plays, if not a dominating, at least a very great rôle in the process.”¹⁸

Methods of training in concept formation

A large part of the experiment described above was concerned with efficient methods of training in concept formation. There was no difference in the efficiency of starting with simple characters and going to complex ones, on the one hand, and starting with complex characters and going to simple ones on the other. Nor was there any advantage to teaching the concepts out of their context — that is, by presenting the naked common elements. In identification with new complete Chinese characters, the individuals who had the concepts given them in naked form had to learn to discriminate them from the whole character. In this test, which is the sort of thing required in everyday life, neither those who had the concepts given them nor those who evolved them through trial-and-error learning had an advantage. A combination method in which naked characteristics were given, mixed in with the series of complete characters, was better than any other mentioned above.

The most efficient method of all, as one might imagine, was to present the entire character, but with the common element redrawn in red so that it stood out or attracted attention.

Regardless of the precise method used, it is essential that the principle of dissociation by varying concomitants be followed if an adequate concept is to develop. This principle has been stated as follows: “What is associated now with one thing and now with another tends to become dissociated from either, and to grow into an object of abstract contemplation.”¹⁹

In other words, if the concept of triangularity is to develop, the triangularity must appear in different particular situations; if the concept *oo* is to develop, the character *✓* must appear now in one context and now in another; if the child is to develop an adequate concept *dog*, the word *dog* must be associated with white creatures, black ones, brown ones, large ones, small ones, smooth ones, rough ones, and so forth. The concept would never develop so long as only one dog, or one type of dog, was associated with the term *dog*.

Concept formation under conditions of greater complexity

Many situations encountered in everyday life do not involve such obvious common elements as those of the abovementioned experiments. Some other experiments on concept formation in adults have dealt with common properties, which are not so obvious.¹⁷ Take, for example, the drawings in Figure 95. The upper three are designated *zif* because of some common characteristic. The lower figures, lacking this characteristic, are not *zif*. What is this characteristic? In the experiment from which these figures are borrowed, all *dax* comprised a circle with two dots, one dot within and one outside the circle. There were several other sets of figures, each with some common property which was by no means obvious. The subject could not merely observe the common factor. He had to “figure out” what it was. When you have decided what makes all the upper figures fall into the




Figure 95. What Property Do the Upper Figures Have in Common Which Differentiates Them from the Lower Ones?
(After Smoke, K. L., "An Objective Study of Concept Formation," Psychological Monographs, 1932, vol. 42, No. 4.)

zif classification, verify your generalization by looking at page 193.

Human beings not only acquire concepts by observing common elements and figuring out relationships, but they learn them by asking questions about things which puzzle them and getting answers in return. The child hears his parents talking about having time to do a certain chore, about its being time to go to bed, about something happening in time, and so on. Puzzled, he asks what time is? His parents may have great difficulty in explaining time, but what they tell the child leads to formation of a concept of *time*, adequate or inadequate. Take the concept *life*, as a further example. This may have both an observational basis and a basis in interrogation of elders. The child observes dead and living animals, and he observes, perhaps, that the living ones move and the dead ones do not. But concepts of *life* and *death* on this basis alone are likely to be far from adequate. Upon helping to bury the dead animal, the child may ask, "When is he going to wake up?" "Does he like being down there?" or, "How is he going to get out?" You then realize how limited the child's concept really is. You per-

haps explain that animals once dead never wake up, and that they do not know anything, so can neither like nor dislike being buried. This process of observing, questioning, and getting answers goes on for years before the child has concepts of life and death which come close to those held by adults.

One method of finding out what concepts children already have is that of questioning them. Several investigators have used this method to discover how particular concepts develop with age and experience. The child is asked, for example, "Do you know what it is to be alive?" A reply to this question brings further questions.

Thus, a boy of eight years was asked, "Is the sun alive?" to which he answered, "Yes." Asked, "Why?" he replied: "It gives light. It is alive when it is giving light, but it isn't alive when it is not giving light." Asked, "Is a bicycle alive?" the child replied: "No, when it doesn't go, it isn't alive. When it goes, it is alive." To the question, "Is a mountain alive?" the child answered, "No." The query, "Why not?" brought the reply, "Because it doesn't do anything." It is obvious that for this child the concept *life* means abil-

ity to move or do something. By way of comparison, let us take the more mature concept of a twelve-year-old boy similarly questioned. The boy said that he knew what it meant to be alive. He was then asked, "Is a fly alive?" He said, "Yes," and, upon being asked, "Why?" replied, "If it wasn't alive, it couldn't fly." To the question, "Is a bicycle alive?" the boy replied, "No." "Why not?" brought the reply, "Because it is we who make it go." Further questioning verified the fact that this boy attributed life to anything that could move of its own volition.¹⁸

As children grow older, their concepts gradually come closer to those of the adults with whom they associate. Adult concepts are themselves inadequate, sometimes childish, as compared with those of other adults. Many an intelligent adult, even, would have difficulty in defining *life* in a manner which biologists would accept as adequate. But, inadequate as they may be, our concepts give us an advantage which would be lost were we compelled to speak and think about particulars only.

CREATIVE THINKING

Many of man's creative works develop gradually, as if by a process of trial-and-error. One of the first attempts at developing a locomotive, for example, was a boatlike structure with a sail and wheels which ran on tracks. Next, a horse running on a treadmill was used for motive power. Then, a horse pulled the carriages along tracks. The steam-driven vehicle which followed had many obvious defects — it was so uncertain in action, actually, that a horse-drawn "train" raced it. There were then gradual refinements of locomotives, leading up to our present streamliners. Despite the obvious trial-and-error progress here represented, there were many inspirations which made successive steps in the development of the locomotive possible. And so it is with all creative work. There is an evident need to produce something different, then the attempts to produce it, followed, quite often, by significant insights.

In recent years, several psychologists, political theorists, artists, inventors, and other creative thinkers have either analyzed their own thinking or had the products of their thought analyzed by others in an attempt to discover something of the creative process. It is rather generally agreed, as a result of these studies, that creative thinking has three, and often four, more or less definite stages. These are: (1) *preparation*, (2) *incubation*, (3) *inspiration* or *illumination*, and (4) *verification* or *revision*.¹⁹

Preparation

All education is, of course, a preparation for creative thinking, although we may not use its products creatively. Specialized education, like training in medicine, is preparation for creative thinking along special lines. The doctor's education gives him the information (symbolic processes) which prepares him for possible creative thinking in medicine. The inventor of electrical devices must have preparation along electrical lines. Einstein's concept of relativity would never have occurred to him had he not first learned the calculus.

In addition to this general preparation for possible creative thinking, one needs specific preparation for specific problems. Thus, a doctor confronted by some especially difficult medical problem may have to consult other authorities about various aspects of the general problem before being able to reach a conclusion concerning it. Even in preparing a term paper, which may at times be a creative activity, you must first acquaint yourself with relevant facts concerning the topic about which you are to write. A comparable "soaking-up" of facts is the required preparation for any creative work.

Preparation for creative thinking often includes attempts to relate facts in various ways. There is much trial and error. Perhaps there is pacing of the floor or biting of fingernails. You attempt to write your term paper; you may write something; tear up what you have written; and start over again, only to tear

that up in disgust. Edison remarked that much of his inspiration was actually perspiration, referring, perhaps, to this sort of preparational activity.

Incubation

This stage of creative thinking is characterized by absence of overt activity, or in many instances even of thinking about the problem. Sometimes, however, certain ideas concerning the problem recur. Poets and artists report the following details about their incubation periods:²⁰

The idea smoulders in my mind until completed.

I have an idea in the back of my mind for a long time, sometimes a week or two. I don't think constantly about it, but it keeps coming back.

I often carry an idea around for several weeks before I make a picture, though sometimes longer. I got ideas in Santa Fe last summer to do now. The ideas recur from time to time while I am occupied with other things.

This is a period of no obvious progress. Some creative thinkers intentionally put all thoughts of their problem in the background after preparing themselves. Some go for a stroll, read light literature, engage in a game of golf, or perhaps have a sleep.

The stage which follows incubation has led some to assume that, while the creative thinker turns his attention elsewhere, his problem is being solved unconsciously. This would be difficult, if not impossible, either to prove or disprove. It is likely that associational activities initiated by attempts to solve the problem continue to some degree. We see some evidences of this in connection with dreams. The individual may give up his problem and go to bed, only to have aspects of it appear in his sleep. There is no reason to believe otherwise than that the associational processes would continue in a similar manner were he to remain awake and engage in other activities. This continuance of associational activities, once started, has already been referred to as *perseveration*.

Inspiration

Most creative thinkers claim that their creative ideas, following the period of incubation, come to them suddenly. The significant ideas may occur at any time, sometimes even while the thinker is dreaming.

In writing your creative theme, you have doubtless been discouraged by an evident lack of progress, when suddenly the material seemed to organize itself, the relevant ideas came copiously and rapidly, and what had been obscure became clear. One will recognize that this process resembles the process of insight during other forms of learning activity. It is often, as in those instances, preceded by a certain amount of trial and error.

Trial-and-error activity, however, is usually considered part of the preparation rather than the incubation stage of creative thinking. Several creative thinkers have pointed out that their trial-and-error activity apparently led nowhere, and that it was only after they put the problem aside that inspiration came.

Verification or revision

Inspiration is sometimes the final stage in creative thinking. In most instances, however, it is necessary to evaluate, test out, and perhaps revise, the idea that comes to us. Is it logical? We can at times determine whether an idea is logical by casting it into syllogistic form and testing it by the laws of formal logic. Very often, however, it is necessary to carry out controlled observations which will prove whether or not an inspiration is correct, or workable, or needs revision.

This is the method followed by scientists. Likewise, the inventor must show that his ideas work in practice as well as in his blueprints. Indeed, the scientist, inventor, and artist frequently find that their inspirations need considerable modification before their creative work is satisfactory.

The inspiration, in other words, is only a prelude to further intensive work. It is one thing for the person to get the idea for a picture, a novel, a poem, an invention, or a the-

ory, and quite another to paint the picture, write the novel, write the poem, produce the invention, or formulate and verify the theory.

THINKING AND THE BRAIN

Do we think with our whole body, or can we think with our brains alone? According to one theory, we may think only with our brain. This is known as the *central* theory of thinking. It is represented graphically in Figure 96 A. Opposed to this is the so-called *peripheral* or *motor* theory, a theory which claims that we think with the whole body. This is diagrammed in Figure 96 B. It might better be called the *peripheral-central* theory, for it gives recognition to the fact that, even though we may not think with our brains alone, the brain plays a predominant rôle in all thinking.

This view stresses the fact that impulses aroused by stimulation go (1) to the cerebral cortex, where they initiate sensory, motor, and associational functions, and (2) to the effectors, where they initiate motor activities. Motor activities in turn arouse impulses (kinesthetic) which go (1) to the cerebral cortex and (2) to the same or other effectors. Likewise, cortical activities, through the motor pathways, also initiate activities in muscles, glands, and visceral structures. These activities cause further impulses to go (1) to the cerebral cortex, and (2) to the same or other effectors. There is thus a constant interplay of cortical and motor activities. The cortex, however, plays the dominant rôle because of its connector functions as well as because it

contains the records of past experiences, the symbolic processes with which we think.

As already suggested, thinking is often associated with activities in the muscles of tongue and throat. In one study, electrodes were placed on the subject's tongue or underlip. These were connected with a string galvanometer. When the subject imagined counting one-two-three, the galvanometer needle, which had been at rest, showed three marked series of excursions, indicating that action currents were coming from the tongue or lips. Such instructions as, "imagine telling your friend the date," "recall a poem or song," "multiply certain numbers," and "think of eternity," brought action currents very similar to those involved in actually saying the words.²¹

Subjects who had been trained to relax their muscles at a signal to do so were instructed, "at the first signal, imagine lifting a ten-pound weight in the right forearm, and at the second signal, relax." A record of action potentials picked up from the subject's right biceps muscle while he was imagining this activity is shown in A, Figure 97. B is a record taken from the corresponding muscle in the left forearm when the subject imagined lifting the weight in his right hand. It is evident from this, and many comparable observations, that thinking of or imagining an activity is associated with slight contractions of relevant muscle fibers.

Action currents are obtained from the hands of deaf mutes during thought.²² Some-




Figure 96: The Central (A) and Central-Peripheral (B) Views of Thinking

(Suggested by Dashiell, J. F., "Fundamentals of General Psychology." Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1937, p. 567.)




Figure 97. Action Currents (Electrical Potentials)
Obtained from the Right Biceps (A) and Left Biceps
(B), While the Subject Imagined Lifting a Weight with
His Right Arm

The white marks at the top of each record indicate (left) the onset of the instruction, "imagine lifting a ten-pound weight in the right forearm," and (right) the onset of the cue for resumption of relaxation. (From Jacobson, E., "Electrophysiology of Mental Activities," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1932, vol. 44, facing p. 683.)

times the activities of the hands are of sufficient magnitude to be detected with the naked eye. In one study, deaf mutes and normal subjects were asked to multiply mentally, divide mentally, and so on. Under these conditions, 80 per cent of the deaf mutes had action currents in the hands. Only 30 per cent of the hearing subjects showed such responses. The reason that hearing subjects exhibited electrical potentials in the hands at all may be attributed to the fact that even they often use, or have used, their hands in making calculations — with or without using a pencil or chalk. The average magnitude of the responses obtained from the hands was about four times larger for the deaf mute than for the hearing subjects.

Added to these investigations of vocal and other muscular activities are a number dealing with eye movements during the process of thinking or imagining. Eye movements during imagination of an object are often very similar to those made in original examination of it.²⁴ Eye movements made in recalling memorized verbal material are also often

similar to those made in the original reading of the material.²⁴

These facts show that we think, at least at times, with the whole body. They do not allow us to conclude that motor activities, either alone or in relation to cerebral activities, are thought. One could argue that they are caused by thought, assumed to be a central phenomenon, just as well as that they constitute thinking. The results do not, moreover, allow us to conclude that motor activities are essential to thought. It is conceivable that one could think on a purely central basis, without any action currents occurring in his tongue, eye, or other muscles. It would be impossible either to prove or disprove this central theory, for our only evidence of the process of thinking comes from peripheral activities, verbal or otherwise.

We have already indicated (pp. 52-54) that the frontal lobes play an important rôle in reasoning. When these lobes are completely removed in animals below man, evidence of reasoning no longer occurs. The rôle of the frontal lobes in human thinking is pictured by two brain surgeons who have specialized in the cutting or removing of tissues in the frontal lobes, with a view to alleviating mental illnesses of various kinds. This is the field of *psychosurgery*.²⁵

Aside from certain small areas that mediate voluntary control over muscular movements and the regulation of visceral functions, the rest of the frontal cortex is, according to our hypothesis, concerned with the projection of the whole individual into the future. With the intact brain the individual is able to foresee, to see before, to forecast the results of certain activities that he is to initiate in the future, and he can visualize what effect these actions will have upon himself and upon his environment. Case 38 expressed this concept almost directly. When he was questioned about his activities in slapping the nurses and pulling the fixtures from the wall in the hospital, he replied, "Now that I have done it, I can see that it was not the thing to do, but beforehand I couldn't say whether or not it would be all right."

The patient with normally functioning frontal lobes can presumably define the goal toward which

he is working and estimate more or less the nearness to which he approaches it. By projecting himself into the future in his mind's eye, he is calling upon his cortical mechanisms to synthesize past experience as his guide and upon his emotional mechanisms for the driving force in the search for satisfaction and the avoidance of distress. Once the goal is set, he is further calling upon his cortical mechanisms to assemble the various parts of the problem and to select a proper course from among the many alternatives that present themselves to him at the completion of each separate step. The total behavior is modified in response to every change of condition. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction depends upon the recognition of the nearness that actuality approaches the ideal that he has foreseen. . . .

If this hypothesis is accepted, it makes more easily understandable many of the observed facts concerning frontal lobe disease. Inertia and lack of ambition, reduction in consecutive thinking, loss of what is commonly called *self-consciousness*, indifference to the opinions of others, satisfaction with performance, even though this may be of inferior quality and quantity

SUMMARY

Thinking is manipulating the world internally, using modifications of the organism which represent the things that produced them. Modifications with this representative function are symbolic processes. Although the term thinking covers such activities as thinking of, or recalling, something; reverie, or free association; phantasy, or day-dreaming; and reasoning, or implicit problem solving, psychologists give their major attention to the latter process.

The existence of reasoning in animals ranging from rat to man is clearly indicated by results obtained with several learning problems. These are problems which could not conceivably be learned without the use of symbols.

One type of reasoning problem gives the animal two separate "experiences," and then confronts it with a problem which it can solve immediately only by combining these experiences. Rats and children have been the only subjects used in such experiments. Rats have

evidenced the ability to solve simple problems by "putting two and two together." Children have been given similar problems of greater complexity. The ability of children to solve these problems increases with age. Solution rarely occurs before the fifth year.

Certain multiple-choice problems have been solved by a number of animals ranging from birds to man, the complexity of solved problems increasing, in general, with the nearness of the animal to the human level. The problem calls for a response to relationship, such as to the middle door or key, of a constantly varying number of doors or keys presented in varying positions.

The double-alternation problem uses a temporal maze and requires the subject to make a temporally related series of turns, for example, *rrll*, without any differential sensory cues to guide it. The ability to solve this problem and to extend the sequence beyond that involved in training increases as we go up the scale from rat to man. In human children, ability to solve the double-alternation problem increases with age. Children below the age of four to five years have not solved it, but few children have been tested at these lower age levels. The problem is quite readily learned by adults, who extend the series without difficulty. It is usually verbalized by children and adults, the subject saying, "right, right, left, left," or something comparable, as he makes the turns.

When confronted by problems or difficulties which cannot be met in a routine manner, human beings make inferences concerning the cause of their difficulties or the solutions of their problems. This is the most important step in human reasoning. Inferences are made on the basis of past experience, and they are limited in scope and relevance by the limitations of experience. Before accepting or rejecting inferences we usually evaluate them, either by further implicit activity or by carrying out an actual check on their applicability.

Our associational processes in reasoning are directed by the nature of the problem, as we conceive it. The problem gives us a set, or

determining tendency, which facilitates recall of certain items and inhibits recall of others not relevant to the situation. Sometimes, despite this general directional tendency, we are hindered by limitations which we place on our own thinking. We accept the first inference that comes to mind, perhaps, and let our thoughts go in the direction suggested. Delusions often have such a basis. Think, too, of the limitation on such reasoning in the nine-dot problem when the individual assumes that he must keep within the limits of the dots. The value of constantly changing directions, getting new inferences when one that we already have will not work, has been shown in problem-solving experiments with college students. Instructions to change direction frequently, led to an increase in the number of subjects achieving solutions.


Much human thinking is doubtless subvocal talking, but imagery and possibly other processes also play an important rôle. Many of the terms used in thinking represent common properties of things that are diverse. These are conceptual terms, and the ideational processes which underlie them are called concepts. Getting the concept triangularity, dog, tree, or the like, requires that the individual discriminate the common properties of the different objects — that he discern similarity amid diversity. This is the process known as abstracting. In order to develop a concept, it is also necessary that the individual generalize — that he relate the similarities in such a manner as to derive a generalization like "all objects having these properties are trees."

Concepts, such as the concept of triangularity, have been developed by animals beginning with the rat. The general method followed is dissociation by varying concomitants, for the triangularity factor is embedded in varied patterns from which the subject must learn to dissociate it. Research on concept formation in adults, using Chinese characters, suggests that the most efficient method of teaching individuals to abstract and generalize is that of presenting total situations with

the common elements emphasized. The common properties of many situations which call for concept formation are by no means obvious, and the individual must "figure them out." Children also learn many of their concepts by asking questions. Children's concepts, at first very inadequate, approach those of their elders as they grow older.

Creative thinking is especially evident in the production of such people as scientists, inventors, artists, and poets. Much trial-and-error underlies most creative work. Inspirations, insights, or illuminations are its spectacular aspects. Analysis of creative thinking by the thinkers themselves, and by others, has led to the conclusion that four stages are more or less clearly evident. These are preparation, the gathering of relevant information and attempts to organize it; incubation, a period of relative inactivity, perhaps with recurrence of ideas about the problem, but no evident progress; inspiration, the sudden illumination, or "aha" experience; and verification or revision, the testing-out and evaluation of the idea, inference, or hypothesis, either by implicit processes or by actual experiment. The last stage is not always present, but it is required whenever anything is done about the inspiration. It is essential in scientific research and in certain inventive pursuits.

Although several studies have shown that thinking is associated with a variety of muscular activities, thus offering support for the peripheral-central or motor theory of thinking, the findings have not disproved the central theory, which claims that thinking can occur in the brain alone; that is, without motor processes being present. As we shall



Solution for Figure 92, page 180. Begin at the top.

observe again in the discussion of attending, it is difficult, if not impossible, to get crucial evidence for or against a central theory. The

reason is that our only index of what central activities are occurring is through some sort of motor process.

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Answer to problem on page 185. Each zif has three dots, the distance between the two uppermost dots being twice the distance between the two lowest ones. It happens in this example that each zif has obtuse angles as well.

Part 4

MOTIVATION OF BEHAVIOR

THE LITERAL MEANING of motivation is much broader than its psychological meaning. Literally, to motivate is to move — that is, to activate — and anything which activates is a motive. In this sense, every stimulus which arouses a response is a motive, and, since every response is preceded by internal or external stimulation of some kind, all behavior is motivated. In current psychological usage, however, the term *motivation* is used only when inner controls are involved. The term is not applied to tropistic behavior, where responses are controlled exclusively by external stimuli. We do not say that the water scorpion, which may be made to move in any desired direction merely by changing the direction of light, is motivated. Nor do we say that the reflex contraction of our pupils in response to light is motivated. So far as tropistic and reflex responses are concerned, organisms act much as puppets. They are lacking in autonomy. Their responses are governed solely by the structures with which they were endowed and by the external forces which happen to be operative at the moment of response.

As we ascend the scale from lower to higher organisms, puppet-like behavior becomes less evident. Rather than being ruled exclusively, or even predominantly, by the external stimuli present at any moment, the higher organisms are governed by changing physiological states, such as underlie hunger and thirst; and by the neural records produced by previous experience. Thus, one cannot predict that an animal will drink water placed before it unless one knows that the animal is thirsty. One cannot predict whether a child will approach or shrink from fire unless one knows what its previous experience with fire has been. The psychology of motivation is a study of the inner controls which have their roots in changing physiological conditions and in previous experience. It may be said to deal with the inner springs of conduct or with the mainsprings of behavior. Looked at from another angle,

the psychology of human motivation aims to discover *why* we behave like human beings.

As one may have gathered from the foregoing, motives are inferred or deduced from observable behavior. We do not observe them directly any more than the physicist observes the force of gravity directly. The physicist observes many different phenomena which involve a common principle — a tendency to move toward the center of the earth. He calls this tendency *gravity*.

Similarly, we observe many different kinds of behavior, all of which have in common the fact that they are controlled from within the organism primarily, and by external stimuli only secondarily. We use the term *motivation* to represent this inner control. Moreover, we name the various motives in terms of behavioral variations. If the organism's activity is directed toward food, we infer the motive of hunger; if it is directed toward water, we infer the motive of thirst.

It often happens that many different behavior patterns are similarly motivated. Thus, an individual motivated by a desire for recognition may express that desire by engaging in athletics, accumulating wealth, writing books, or doing any of a number of things. In such instances the motive is inferred from behavior. It may be named by the individual himself. He may say, "All of my activities are motivated by desire to receive recognition from my fellow men." He may, of course, not know his true motives (as we shall observe in a discussion of unconscious motivation), and he may not be telling us the truth. However, an excursion into his life history often indicates the accuracy of his and our own judgment.

It often happens, too, that different motives produce the same type of reaction. For instance, murder may be the outcome of anger, fear, greed, lust, or any of several other motives. Discovery of the real motive, or motives, comes from a study of other behavior preceding or following the crime, the individual's own statements, and his life history.

We are all acquainted with many motivational terms such as "aim," "drive," "wish," "purpose," "desire," "craving," "goal," "incentive," "attitude," "interest," "choice," "preference," and "will." Each of these terms suggests regulation of his own behavior by the individual. Several everyday motivational terms, as *desire* and *wish*, are practically synonyms. Others, as *drive* and *will*, have opposite meanings. Thus, we say that an individual is driven to an act or, on the contrary, that he acts of his own free will.

These everyday motivational terms are, at times, used as though they explained why an individual does what he does. We say that he does such and such because he "chooses" to do it, because it suits his "purposes," or because he is "driven by desire." Of course, these are explanations only in the most superficial sense, as is the statement that we sleep because we are sleepy. Strictly speaking, the terms are merely labels. The crucial problem is that of discovering why the individual chooses as he does, why it suits his purposes to do this rather than that, or why he has the desire to act in a certain way. Psychology seeks explanation at this more basic level. It seeks, as far as possible, to get below the surface — to discover underlying causes.

Some motives, of which hunger and thirst are good examples, have a purely physiological explanation. They are inborn, universal, and ineradicable. Life itself depends upon their satisfaction.

In the final analysis, most of our other motives are related directly or indirectly

to the physiological. Some have claimed that the energizing of all conduct is ultimately physiological; that if every physiological motive like hunger, thirst, and sex were removed, the organism would be as inert as an engine without fuel or a watch with its mainspring removed. This is doubtless true, but to say that all motivation stems ultimately from our inborn physiological makeup does not help us to understand the great range of human motives which have little, if any, direct or obvious relation to inborn physiology.

When we examine the origin of most human motives, we find their roots in the individual's life history, in what has happened to him. As already suggested, the effects of past experience are recorded in the nervous system. To the degree that these "records" differ, so also do motives.

A motive which depends upon an individual's life history may be universal in man because all men, in many respects at least, have the same life history. We are, for example, all dependent upon others during the first few years of life, and that history of dependence leaves us, even as adults, with a strong desire for the company of others. This is the so-called gregarious motive about which we shall have more to say later. It is a learned motive, but one which, because of common helplessness, itself of biological origin, is normally acquired by all.

Certain other motives which depend upon the individual's life history are not found in all men, but are prevalent within a particular cultural group. For example, many Japanese soldiers were moved to commit suicide rather than to surrender and "lose face." They were so motivated because they had been taught from childhood that to surrender, even in the face of overwhelming odds, was to disgrace themselves and their ancestors, whereas to die for the Emperor was to attain everlasting honor.

Many other motives which depend upon life history are purely personal. Among such motives are cravings for particular drugs, the drive to collect stamps or antiques, the desire to marry a particular individual, the urge to travel, the ambition to become a doctor, a lawyer, or an engineer, and the many different ideals which guide human conduct. An understanding of a specific personal motive may be obtained only by examining the life history of a particular individual; in other words, by making a case study.

Chapter 11

Physiological Drives

NEEDS

THE STUFF out of which we are made is dissipated and needs replenishment from time to time. Therefore, we must eat and drink. Waste products accumulate and must be eliminated. Because of this, we have excretory needs. In order to survive as intact organisms, we must withdraw from anything which seriously injures our tissues. Perpetuation of our kind — and perhaps optimal enjoyment of human adult life — depends upon sexual activity. Conditions of fatigue demand that we rest from time to time. Thus, we have a number of needs whose basis is purely physiological. Some of these arouse positive reactions, such as appetite and exploration, while others arouse negative reactions, such as aversion for and withdrawal from injurious or potentially injurious situations.

When physiological needs are not immediately satisfied, the physiological balance of the organism is disturbed. Activities are then aroused which continue until either the need is satisfied or the organism has become exhausted. When we say that certain substances, such as food or water, satisfy the need, we are saying that they restore the physiological balance which a condition of want or deprivation has disturbed.

One very interesting interpretation of this restoration of physiological balance is involved in the concept of *homeostasis*, which carries the implication that organisms, by their own activity, tend to maintain a constant state. As one physiologist so aptly put

it, "The living being is an agency of such sort that each disturbing influence induces by itself the calling forth of compensatory activity to neutralize or repair the disturbance" ¹ He had in mind such compensatory activities as the restoration of injured tissues by white blood cells and the maintenance of a constant body temperature through sweating.

Activities associated with several of our physiological needs, although not so automatic as the processes mentioned, are certainly compensatory in nature. The activity aroused by an unsatisfied need for food serves to bring food, which removes the hunger. The pressure of waste products arouses activities which eliminate the pressure. Accumulation of fatigue products leads to reduced activity and dissipation of the fatigued state. A similar interpretation may be placed on activities associated with many physiological needs.

It should not be assumed that all activities elicited when a need first arises are those activities, and only those, required in satisfying the need. In some instances — and the excretory needs provide a good example — it is true that the need automatically sets in motion those acts which satisfy or relieve it. In cases like hunger, on the other hand, the direction in which the need is to be satisfied must be learned. Thus, the animal motivated for the first time by a need for food does not know that food will restore the physiological balance. The animal sucks — which is itself an appropriate response — but it sucks anything which comes to its mouth, whether this

be hair, skin, straw, cloth, or nipple. However, it is only when the nipple is sucked that hunger is alleviated. Eventually, the animal comes to suck this alone.

DRIVES

Conditions associated with deprivation of needed substances (like food) or needed activities (like excretion) seem to drive the organism to activity. For this reason, the term "drive" is widely used in discussions of animal motivation. The inborn drives which stem from basic physiological needs are frequently distinguished from less fundamental drives — that is, those acquired during the individual's lifetime — by calling them "physiological" or "animal" drives.

Physiological drives

The term *physiological drive* customarily refers to the physiological condition which drives the animal to activity. This condition is a consequence of unsatisfied need, but some writers fail to distinguish between physiological drive and need.

Physiological drives have been given specific names in terms of (1) the kind of act in which general activity ends, (2) the sort of deprivation which produces the activity in question, and (3) the physiological conditions which are known to underlie activity. In some instances, we know nothing of the sort of deprivation which arouses a particular form of activity nor of the physiological basis. Thus, we speak of an "exploratory drive," solely on the basis that an animal from time to time engages in vigorous activity which appears to be exploratory. Some inner condition which drives the animal to explore is in this case inferred purely from behavior. The hunger drive, on the other hand, may be so designated in terms of the fact that the activity in question (1) culminates with eating, (2) is aroused by deprivation of food, and (3) is associated with physiological conditions, such as stomach contractions and lowered blood sugar, which, in human beings, are related to the experience of hunger.

Incentives and motives

Objects (like food), situations (like changed temperature conditions), or activities (like excretion) which provide a means of culminating motivated activities are referred to as *incentives*. Moreover, when incentive-directed behavior is involved, the term *motive* is often used in preference to *drive*. An animal activated by hunger eventually acquires a food-seeking motive. Activity aroused by drives, as such, may be blind, whereas activity aroused by motives has direction. In other words, drives provide only a "push from within," whereas motives involve a "push in some relevant direction."

It may be pointed out also that incentives appear to attract or "pull" the organism in certain directions. In the case of aversions, like the aversion for painful stimulation, which repels rather than attracts, we refer to the repelling object or situation as a *deterrent*.

HUNGER

In research on physiological drives, the usual procedure has been to record general activity and then, by operative or other means, to investigate the underlying physiological conditions.

When rats are deprived of food and placed in tambour-mounted cages, like that illustrated in Figure 98, they show periodic spurts of activity. Each spurt occurs after an interval averaging about two hours.

If two cages are placed side by side with a passageway going from one to the other, and one of these cages contains food, the rat enters the food cage at about the middle of each activity period. It rarely enters the food cage except at this time. This suggests that the periodic spurt of activity is motivated by hunger. After the animal has eaten and returned to the home cage, activity continues for a short period.²

We know nothing, of course, of the rat's experiences; hence, we use the term "hunger" in a purely physiological sense. Early research with human beings, however, showed that the aching or gnawing experiences known




Figure 98. Tambour-Mounted Cage Used to Study the Hunger Rhythm in Rats

The triangular cage rests on three tambours, one under each corner. Each of these tambours (small cups topped with a sheet of rubber) is connected by rubber tubes to a recording tambour. Movements of the rat cause changes in air pressure within the recording system, and a writing lever moves up and down on a specially prepared smoked paper rotating on a kymograph drum at a constant speed. Thus the rat's movements produce scratches on the smoked paper. The record shown here is a reproduction of one obtained in this way. It shows two activity periods separated by an interval of approximately two hours. (After Richter.)




Figure 99. The Relation Between Hunger Pangs and Stomach Contractions

(After Cannon in "The Handbook of General Experimental Psychology." Worcester: Clark University Press, 1934, p. 250.)

as *hunger pangs* are associated with muscular spasms of the stomach.³ Subjects were trained to swallow a small rubber balloon with rubber tube attached. The balloon was inflated in the stomach and the rubber tube was then attached to a kymograph recording mechanism, so that each spasm of the stomach muscles would cause a mark to be made on the smoked drum. In addition, each subject was told to press on a key whenever he felt a hunger pang. A mark was thereby made on the drum just below the record of stomach activity. The subject's abdominal breathing was also recorded, so that the investigator could determine whether the spasms represented in the record were due to stomach or to abdominal movements. The record shown in Figure 99 is typical of those obtained under these conditions. It shows that hunger pangs coincide with stomach contractions, but are unrelated to movements of the abdominal muscles.

Hunger and blood chemistry

Various lines of evidence suggest that hunger pangs, stomach contractions, and related body activity in general, depend upon blood chemistry. In the first place, the stomach may be removed, or nerves between it and the brain severed, without destroying the hunger drive.⁴ In the second place, if the blood sugar level is lowered by injections of insulin (the hormone given diabetics to control carbohydrate metabolism), stomach contractions and hunger pangs are induced. When glucose, which raises the blood sugar level, is given, these contractions and hunger pangs cease.⁵ In the third place, if blood from a starved dog is injected into a normal dog, the stomach of the injected animal shows the kind of contractions found in hunger. Injection of blood from a well-fed animal, on the other hand, stops the stomach contractions.⁶

Although some aspect of blood chemistry doubtless underlies the more obvious phenomena associated with hunger, its nature is at present unknown. Studies with insulin and glucose injections support the view that

blood sugar level is the basic factor. On the other hand, there is apparently no relation, under normal conditions, between the human blood sugar level and hunger. One study showed that the blood sugar level is normally about the same before, during, and after eating.⁷

The fact that injection of blood from a starving dog into a normal one elicits stomach contractions, even though the blood sugar level is not lowered by the injection, suggests that lowering of nutrient reserves releases specific chemical activators (hormones) into the blood stream and that these are responsible for stomach contractions, the experience of hunger, and general bodily activity associated with food deprivation.⁸

The view that something more subtle than stomach contractions underlies hunger is also favored by recent experiments showing that, instead of craving food as such, animals and men have a large number of specific hunger drives and associated appetites.

Hunger drives

Organisms need proteins, fats, and carbohydrates. They also need various minerals and vitamins. Lack of one of these substances often creates an appetite for it.

Cravings for special foods are well known under conditions of everyday life. Children whose diet is inadequate often develop a craving for salt, chalk, and other substances. The craving of the African pygmy for salt is well known. Certain Australian aborigines whose diet of worms, frogs, and other small animals is lacking in normal amounts of fat develop an intense craving for fat which sometimes drives them to cannibalism.⁹ Diabetics, in whom carbohydrates are not properly utilized, often develop a craving for sweets. Pregnant rats, given a free selection of food, eat about three times the usual amount of salt.¹⁰ Certain glandular disturbances produce intense appetite for such substances as calcium and salt.¹¹

When appetites for particular foodstuffs occur in animals, they have a purely physiological basis. As is well known, however,

human appetites are influenced by many factors other than, or in addition to, physiological needs.

Cafeteria feeding

Animals living in a state of nature select food in accordance with bodily needs. This has suggested that the organism does not need scientists to tell it what to eat. Several laboratory experiments with pigs, cows, rats, chickens, and human infants have supported this suggestion. Such experiments are often referred to as *cafeteria-feeding* experiments because, as in a cafeteria, the organism is confronted with a wide variety of foods from which it may select freely. In one such experiment with white rats, each animal's cage contained three food trays for solid substances and a battery of glass tubes for aqueous solutions of various minerals and vitamins. Twice daily, each container was emptied and the amount taken from it was carefully determined. Eight rats were studied under such conditions for a period of several months. All of them grew normally, reproduced normally, and were normally active.¹²

A somewhat comparable cafeteria experiment with fifteen human infants, who selected their own food over periods ranging from six months to four and a half years, yielded similar results.¹³

Each child was fed by the cafeteria method from the time of weaning, which varied between six and eleven months. The general procedure was to place a number of small dishes and glasses of food before the child and to make no comments concerning the food eaten or the manner of eating it. As soon as the child reached for a dish, a spoonful of the foodstuff was picked up. If he failed to open his mouth voluntarily, the food was replaced. He was allowed to eat with fingers or, at a later age, with implements. The important point is that he was given no suggestions of any kind concerning what to eat, when to eat, or how to eat. No comments were made concerning what he actually ate.

Some twelve to twenty foods were presented at each meal, three times daily at first and then four times daily. Selections were from a total of thirty-four different foods. Most of these were simple

foods, not mixtures; some were raw and others cooked. At first, the children sometimes spat out food after it was in the mouth, but they soon learned to make their selections without tasting the food. In other words, their immediate selections were eventually based on vision or smell. After a child had definitely finished eating (from twenty to thirty minutes), the food tray was removed, and the portions still remaining were weighed. Note was also taken of food spilled.

The results were quite conclusive. All children thrived on a diet of their own choosing. Their growth was in advance of standard growth curves. No bad effects of any kind were noted. The diet chosen was not widely different from that recommended by nutrition experts. As might be expected, preferences for particular foods varied from one child to another and in the same child from time to time.

Food preferences

Rats and other animals have definite food preferences. This is shown by their selection of certain foodstuffs much more often than others which are equally accessible. Several experiments have shown, moreover, that these preferences change with bodily need. Thus, rats which ordinarily prefer sugar to fat will select fat rather than sugar if they have been fat-starved. Likewise, rats deprived of vitamin B₁ soon exhibit a marked preference for foods rich in vitamin B₁.¹⁴

How do organisms come to select the proper diet? One possible basis of selection is trial and error. That is to say, the organism selects at random to begin with, but learns that certain substances (recognized by visual appearance, feel, taste, or smell) relieve tensions, or restore physiological balances, while others do not. It then "seeks" these substances when such tensions arise. Another possible basis is that a physiological need affects directly the senses of taste, and smell, or both, so that the organism is attracted to certain substances and repelled by others. According to this view, the need for protein would make meat smell or taste "good" and thus attract the organism.

The importance of taste in selecting an ade-

quate diet is suggested by an experiment in which the nerves in the rat's tongue were severed. Animals with their sense of taste destroyed in this way did not select an adequate diet when placed in a cafeteria-feeding situation.¹⁵

Both of these views are perhaps partially correct, but neither is adequate, by itself, to account for the satisfaction of all hungers. The chief difficulty with the trial-and-error view, when it is considered alone, is that the effects which follow eating are sometimes long delayed. To an animal deprived of carbohydrate, say, invert sugar would have an almost immediate effect and it is easy to see how sugar would eventually be sought out. In the case of many other substances, however, it may be an hour or so before eating restores the physiological balance. Here it is difficult to see how the association of a particular food with satisfaction of a particular hunger could occur. The chief difficulty with the second view, when considered in isolation, is that the initial selection in cafeteria situations is indiscriminate. If taste were in itself an adequate guide, selection should be perfect, or nearly so, from the beginning. Possibly changes in taste sensitivity aroused by a condition of need aid the trial-and-error learning which eventually guides the organism to the needed foodstuffs. From the experiment mentioned above, one must gather that trial-and-error, without cues from the sense of taste, is incapable of producing adequate selection.

Hunger in everyday life

In human beings especially, appetite may be stimulated by the sight, odor, and taste of food, even though physiological hunger is absent. It is stimulated by "appetizers" of various kinds. Seeing others eat also stimulates eating. This influences not only the time at which we eat, but also the amount and kind of food eaten.

The influence of social eating upon the amount eaten is observed even in animals. If a record is kept of the amount eaten when the animal is in isolation and when it is in the presence of other eaters, we find that more food is eaten in the social situation.¹⁶

Rhythms of eating are also present, irrespective of physiological rhythms. We eat

two or three times a day, or as many times as is customary, whether we are hungry or not. Habit obviously plays a big part in all such variations in the occasions for eating. Habit and social customs account, too, for most of our aversions for certain foods, such as horse meat.

SEX

When rats live in cages like the one illustrated in Figure 100, they spend part of their time running in the attached rotating drum. The drum contains a counter which records revolutions in either direction. From the number of revolutions one may calculate the distance run. Thus, it is calculated that female rats run from one to many miles per day. Male rats show much less activity than females. Moreover, their level of activity fluctuates in no regular manner from day to day. The female rat, on the other hand, usually runs a mile or so a day for from three to four days and then shows a marked spurt on the fourth or fifth day. At the peak of the




Figure 100. A Revolving Drum Used to Study Activity in Small Animals

(Courtesy of Wahmann Manufacturing Company, Baltimore, Maryland.)

cycle, a female often runs as far as fifteen miles in a day.

The observation that male rats living in cages like the one illustrated are much less active than females, and that they show no cycle such as that observed in females suggests, of course, that the high activity level and the cyclical variation in female rats are due to some motivating factor peculiar to females. Thus, a sexual basis appears probable.

During the period of heightened activity, when the female rat undergoes certain tissue changes in the sex organs and ovaries, it engages in and actively solicits mating. On the days of low activity, the animal refuses to mate. These facts suggest that the spurt in activity on the fourth or fifth day is motivated either by tissue changes in the sex organs, by secretions from the ovaries, or both. Removal of the sex organs does not affect the cycle, hence, it remains to determine what influence is exerted by the ovaries.

Evidence that the motivating factor is a secretion from the ovaries comes from various

sources. In the first place, the activity cycle makes its appearance at the time of puberty and ceases when the menopause is reached. In the second place, as illustrated in Figure 101, removing the ovaries reduces activity and abolishes the cycle. Replacement of ovaries by grafting restores the activity level and the cycle. In the third place, the cyclical behavior is restored by periodic injections of a secretion from the ovaries. The hormone especially involved appears to be *estrin*. Finally, male rats manifest a typical female activity level and cycle when their testes are removed and ovaries substituted.¹⁷

Experiments on male rats, guinea pigs, and other mammals castrated prior to puberty show that secretions from the testes are necessary for sexual behavior and also for maintenance of a normal activity level. Castration after puberty has been attained also reduces the activity level, but it does not always eliminate sexual behavior. Injection of *testosterone* (a hormone from the testes) increases the general activity level and at the same time revives the specific sexual reactions.




Figure 101

This graph shows how removal of ovaries influences activity in rats. (From Richter, C. P., "Animal Behavior and Internal Drives," *Quarterly Review of Biology*, 1927, 2, p. 326.)

of castrated rats. This hormone thus appears to play a key rôle in the sexual life of male animals.¹⁸

Although the general activity level of rats is greatly influenced by secretions from the gonads, it is also influenced by secretions from other glands. A secretion from the anterior lobe of the pituitary gland (at the base of the brain) and another from the cortex of the adrenal glands (above each kidney) are especially involved.

The glandular system is an interlocking one, with the pituitary gland playing a major rôle. Inadequate pituitary function disturbs the functioning of the gonads and other glands. We do not know the precise rôle played by each of the glands, either in motivating general activity or specific sex behavior. It has been clearly established, however, that removal of the gonads, the anterior pituitary, or the cortex of each adrenal gland reduces both general activity and sexual behavior to a low level. Removal of the thyroid gland also decreases activity, but not so much as removal of the other glands.¹⁹

The human sex drive

Although the human sex drive shows no periodicity as clear-cut as that found in female rats, it does have a comparable glandular origin. Removal of ovaries prior to puberty leads to absence of adult female characteristics, and produces what appears to be an individual of neutral sex. There is also complete absence of a sex drive. Human males are similarly affected by early castration. When removal of either male or female gonads occurs in mature individuals, there may be little influence upon sexual activity. Continuance of sexual motivation under these conditions probably results from retention of interests and habits which, while they originally developed under the influence of the gonads, are no longer dependent upon secretions from these glands. It is interesting to observe, in this connection, that men and women whose gonads have degenerated during middle or late life (the menopause in women) usually

continue to participate in sexual activities.²⁰

The human sex drive varies considerably both in its intensity from one individual to another and in the directions in which satisfaction may occur. Repressive influences (such as ideas that sex is evil, or dirty) sometimes lead to absence of sex interests and inability to engage in sexual activity, despite the fact that the individual is structurally normal. Frigidity (in women) and impotence (in men) represent this low tide in sexual drive. At the other extreme are nymphomania (in women) and satyriasis (in men). Individuals thus affected, because of excessive glandular secretions or excessive social stimulation involving sex, have an unusually strong sex drive.²¹ The intensity of the human sex drive varies between the extremes mentioned in the same manner as do most other biological and psychological traits (see Part 7).

Variations in the direction of the sex drive often begin to develop in childhood. Just as organisms driven by hunger continue to seek out that which satisfies their hunger, so do they seek a repetition of those acts which have in the past released their sexual tensions. It often happens that a child whose sex urge has already made its appearance stimulates itself sexually, is stimulated sexually by another member of the same sex, or receives sexual stimulation from some object or situation. The satisfaction obtained from such stimulation may lead the individual to seek a repetition of the stimulation. Continued into adulthood, unusual directions of sexual satisfaction may prevent the kinds of sexual release sanctioned by society. The individual is then regarded by the group (and often by himself) as abnormal or perverted. Similar "perversions" often occur in animals (and especially in the higher ones), but they are more frequent and more varied in man.²²

THIRST

White rats drink approximately six hundred cubic centimeters of water daily for every square meter of body surface.²³ Drinking, like eating, tends to be periodic. When the

animal is deprived of water over a period of hours, it becomes excessively active even though all other needs are satisfied. It is apparent, therefore, that something within the organism, present in times of water deficit, drives the animal to activity.²⁴

What provides the drive behind water consumption? According to a well-known theory, the drive comes from dryness of the mucous lining of the mouth and throat.²⁵ When the organism is deprived of water over a period of several hours, the mouth and throat become dry. This dryness, reflecting dehydration of body tissues in general, is assumed to underlie thirst experience, general activity associated with water deprivation, seeking of water once the organism has learned that this will alleviate its need, and drinking of an amount sufficient to satisfy bodily need.

When water is placed in the stomach directly, as in tube feeding, a period of several minutes must elapse before the thirst experience ceases. This suggests that the water must get into the tissues sufficiently to remove the dryness of mouth and throat before the thirst experience disappears. On the other hand, merely wetting the mouth temporarily removes the thirst experience.

Dogs subjected to different degrees of water deficit drink an amount of water directly proportional to the known deficit.²⁶ Such an accurate "estimation" by the dog of its need for water is hard to explain in terms of dryness of the mouth and throat. The first mouthful would wet the mouth and throat, removing the condition which might otherwise provide the dog with a guide to the amount needed. As in the case of hunger, some unknown chemical condition aroused by a state of deficit may be the regulator of thirst and water consumption.²⁷

OTHER PHYSIOLOGICAL DRIVES

No useful purpose would be served by an attempt to list all of the physiological needs and their associated drives and motives. As a matter of fact, there are perhaps many needs of which we are unaware, because they

are so thoroughly and automatically satisfied. Under ordinary circumstances, such needs would not motivate behavior.

Take oxygen want, for example. Until men ascended to the higher atmosphere in balloons, there was no recognized need for oxygen. At altitudes between 20,000 and 28,000 feet, however, the balloonists experienced physiological and psychological disturbances which were later found to result from insufficient oxygen. Some of them lost their lives as a result of this lack. Consequently, the need for oxygen is now recognized. However, unless we ascend to high altitudes or have marked interference with our respiration, we are unlikely to experience an oxygen drive or be motivated to seek oxygen.²⁸

Some needs, like the need for food, the need for water, the need for sexual activity, the need to excrete waste products, and the need to avoid tissue injury, are known to have a physiological basis. Others, like the need for rest and the need for activity, have no clearly discernable physiological origin.

Some needs are satisfied on a purely automatic basis, as is the need for oxygen, while others, like hunger, are satisfied only as a result of the individual's efforts to adjust himself to his environment. Sometimes, as in the case of our need to maintain a constant body temperature, a need is satisfied to some extent automatically and to some extent by individual effort. For instance, when the external temperature is higher than the normal body temperature — that is, 98.6° F. in man — sweating occurs; it becomes more profuse the higher the external temperature, although it is also affected by humidity. This process is carried out automatically by a thermostatic regulating device in the hypothalamus. We aid the process, however, by reducing the strenuousness of our activity, by drinking cold liquids, by seeking out a cooler spot, or even by the use of air-conditioning equipment. When the temperature of the body threatens to go below normal, on the other hand, we put on warmer clothing, light fires, and sometimes huddle together.

Before leaving the topic of needs and their associated drives, it should be pointed out that the life of all societies is organized around the problem of satisfying needs. All of our agricultural activities are in one way or another linked with the hunger drive. Many of the most rigid social customs in all societies have to do with regulation of sexual activity. There are definite customs for the control of excretory activities. Various measures to protect the individual from tissue injuries are instituted. Recreational activities center around the need for activity. The general tempo of life is related to temperature needs, and it has been claimed that the general drive or initiative of different races and cultural groups is largely determined by climatic conditions. In other words, it is claimed that individuals living in the tropics must slow down so much in order to maintain a normal temperature that they show little inclination for productive work. One must not, however, overlook the fact that there is usually an abundance of food in warm climates, so that the hunger drive is satisfied without arousing highly motivated activity. This, as well as temperature requirements, may underlie the lethargy which characterizes people who live in the tropics.

THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF PHYSIOLOGICAL DRIVES

Which is the most potent of the drives common to men and animals? This question has been approached from various angles. Some have appealed to history, which shows that most of the great human struggles have been motivated directly or indirectly by hunger.²⁹ Others, basing their conclusion on the fact that most people with psychological disturbances who go to psychiatrists are found to be maladjusted sexually, have stressed the potency of the sex drive.

If we wish to determine the relative strength of physiological drives as such, our best approach is through experiments with animals. The chief advantages gained from using animals are: (1) no cultural influences are inter-

woven with the physiological as they are in man; (2) we can control the life history of animals as we cannot control the life history of man; (3) we can subject the animals to experimental controls not possible with man, and (4) we can subject to controlled conditions as many animals as are required for reliable comparisons of the different drives.

Pitting one drive against another

We may study the relative strength of drives by pitting one against the other and observing which one dominates. This has been done with hunger and sex. Male rats were deprived of food and sexual activity for twenty-four hours and then offered a choice between food and a female in heat. Seventy-seven per cent of the responses were to food.³⁰ One difficulty with such an experiment is that hunger reduces the sex drive.³¹ Thus, by starving the animals for twenty-four hours, the experimenter was, as it were, stacking the cards in favor of food selection. However, the fact that hunger reduces the sex drive suggests that hunger may be the stronger drive.

The obstruction method

The most satisfactory method yet devised to measure the relative strength of drives in animals is that used by investigators at Columbia University.³² This is known as the *obstruction method* because it is based on the principle that the more persistent a form of response in the presence of obstruction, the stronger its motivation. The obstruction in the Columbia experiments was an electric grill to be crossed in approaching the incentive. Thus, as illustrated in Figure 102, the hungry rat was required to cross a charged grill to reach food at the other end of the apparatus. Since all factors other than the particular drive being investigated were held constant, it was possible to compare the relative strength of drives in terms of the average number of times the rats crossed the grill in order to reach certain incentives appropriate to these. The drives investigated were hunger, thirst, sex, maternal, and exploratory.

Comparison of the strength of drives in terms of the number of crossings of the grill was made possible because the following aspects of the experiment were carefully controlled (1) All rats were of the same age. (2) All animals were derived from the same genetic stock. (3) There were enough animals tested under each condition (at least twenty) so that reliable averages upon which to make the comparisons could be obtained (4) A special shocking apparatus was devised which, in spite of differences in the susceptibility of rats to electric shock, gave each rat a shock of approximately the same strength whenever he made appropriate contact with the grill (5) Each rat was tested for a particular motivating condition and then discarded, thus, there was no possibility that being tested for the strength of the hunger drive, say, would influence the tests for other drives. (6) Each animal, regardless of the drive being tested, was given exactly the same preliminary training. The rat was placed in the apparatus and allowed to cross the uncharged grill three times. Each time it touched the incentive (food, water, animal of the opposite sex, member of the litter, or exploration box) the rat was returned to the front of the apparatus ready for the next run. After the three preliminary runs designed to acquaint it with the

fact that an incentive was available, the animal was given another run with the electric grill charged. This was to make known the presence of shock. (7) After an animal had received this preliminary training, it was allowed to remain in the apparatus for a period of twenty minutes, during which time the number of approaches to the grill, the number of contacts and withdrawals, and the number of crossings were counted. (8) In all important respects, the apparatus and general conditions under which each rat was tested remained constant.

Before a rat was tested in the above way, it was given an abundance of food, water, sex activity, and so on, so that it might become satiated. Then it was deprived of water if the thirst drive was to be studied, or of food if the hunger drive was to be investigated, but allowed full satisfaction of other needs. Thus, one group of rats was deprived of water for zero hours and tested; another for twelve hours and then tested; another for twenty-four hours; and so on up to six days. The test at zero hours was for control purposes; to see, for example, how many times an animal




Figure 102. Rat Crossing the Obstruction Apparatus
(Courtesy of C. J. Warden.)

would cross when not thirsty. Controls were also carried out when the animal was thirsty and no water was present. Under such conditions, crossing was infrequent.

The results of these obstruction studies are summarized in Figure 103. Only crossings are shown. When no drive or a drive with no incentive was present, the average number of crossings was around three. The maternal drive produced the greatest average number of crossings (22.4), and is thus the strongest of those tested. Weakest of the drives involved in this research was the exploratory, with an average of only 6.0 crossings. The strongest drive shared by both sexes was thirst, with an average of 20.4 crossings. This, as illustrated in the graph, reached its peak after a deprivation of twenty-four hours. The decline in average number of crossings from that point on is doubtless due to the growing weakness of the rats. Hunger was apparently somewhat less motivating than thirst, with a peak average of 18.2 crossings. Moreover, hunger

reached its greatest strength three days later than thirst, a fact which also suggests that it is a weaker drive. The sex motive, with an average of 13.8 crossings for both sexes, was much weaker than the thirst and hunger motives. Its greatest intensity came after twenty-four hours of deprivation for males, and, as we have already mentioned, at the fourth or fifth day of the sexual cycle for females.*

The relative strength of the thirst, hunger, and sex drives suggested by the above data is about what one might expect in view of the fact that men live only a few days without

* It has been pointed out that a shorter or longer period of observation would change certain of the results shown in the graph below. The maternal drive would probably still be strongest, hunger or thirst next, sex next, and the exploratory drive weakest. There might also be some change in the intervals of deprivation at which the peaks for these drives occur. See Leuba, C. J., "Some Comments on the First Reports of the Columbia Study of Animal Drives," *J. Comp. Psychol.*, 1931, 11, pp. 275-279.




Figure 103. Graph Summarizing the Results of the Columbia Obstruction Studies

The base line of the graph represents the period of deprivation, and the vertical line the average number of crossings of the grill, in the standard period of twenty minutes. The dots at the side of the vertical line represent the drives for which variations in the period of deprivation were not used. Thus, the maternal drive was tested immediately after the litter had been removed to the incentive part of the obstruction apparatus. Likewise, the exploratory drive was tested without a period of delay between removal from the exploration box and the test itself. Only males were thus tested. The female sex drive is represented at the side of the graph because it was practically nonexistent, except at or near the peak day of the four-five-day cycle. Males and females did not differ in the strength of their hunger and thirst drives; hence results could be grouped. These motives, and the male sex motive, varied in strength with the length of the period of deprivation. The graph shows this variation. (After Warden.)

water, a few days longer still without food, and for an indefinite period without direct satisfaction of the sex drive.

Those who regard sex as the strongest human drive do so principally on the ground that much human maladjustment has a sexual basis. This association between sex and inability to make an adequate adjustment to the conditions of civilized life does not spring from the physiological urgency of sex alone. It comes primarily from the fact that sex, of all human drives, is most hedged around with moral restrictions. If the tables were turned, with restrictions on satisfactions of hunger as great as those now applied to sex, but with sex satisfied as readily as we now satisfy hunger, one might expect maladjustment to be rooted more in hunger than in sex.

PHYSIOLOGICAL DRIVES, REFLEXES, AND INSTINCTS

The physiological needs of many organisms are satisfied in ways which are characteristic of the species and which individuals do not have to learn. Thus, a male rat mates in approximately the same manner as any other male rat, but in a different manner from that of dogs, cats, or monkeys. Moreover, it mates in the same way — that is, in the same position and with the same sequence and pattern of movements — whether it has observed other rats mate or whether it has been reared entirely by itself. Such complicated unlearned responses are called *instincts*.

Most psychologists now use the term *instinct* in the sense of an *unlearned complex pattern of reflexes*. There has been much disagreement concerning the number of man's instincts. This is largely due to a failure rigidly to define the term "instinct." Different psychologists in the past used different criteria of instinct. They all agreed that instincts are unlearned or inborn, but from that point on, they differed widely. Instinct for some was any unlearned reaction, regardless of complexity. Thus, the relatively simple response of blinking and the complex response of walking would be included in a list of instincts. Some psychologists listed only the complex unlearned pat-

terns of reflexes. Others spoke of inborn physiological drives as instincts, regardless of the nature of the culminating responses. In place of "drive" some used such terms as "propensity" or "tendency." Thus the tendencies to construct, collect, fight, and appeal would be listed as instincts regardless of the objects or the behavior patterns involved. A few psychologists failed to differentiate between drives or tendencies and behavior patterns, hence their lists of "instincts" included drives, unlearned tendencies, and unlearned behavior patterns. Finally, a few regarded as instinctive any universal drive, tendency, or behavior pattern, the assumption being that, if it is universal, it must be unlearned.

Widespread controversy developed, and hundreds of articles were written on one aspect or another of the "instinct doctrine." Several psychologists even claimed that there are no instincts; that all complex behavior is learned. However, when a differentiation between inborn drives, reflexes, and instincts was finally made, the viewpoint represented by this chapter, namely, that while instincts clearly exist in animals, they are obscured or perhaps absent in man, became widespread. Even McDougall, perhaps the strongest proponent of instinct, eventually came around to the view that instincts are peculiar to lower animals. He said, "I recognize that, in the fullest and most universally accepted sense of the word, instinctive action is peculiar to the lower animals, and the extension of the term to the behavior of higher animals and of man has led to unfortunate confusion and controversy which have obscured, rather than elucidated, the true relations between lower and higher forms of action."²³

The term "instinct" sets off complex unlearned behavior patterns from habits. The terms "instinct" and "habit" do not explain behavior, but they do indicate where explanation may be found. For example, the bird does not fly because of instinct; flying is the instinct. When our observations show that any behavior is unlearned, we know that its explanation resides in the inborn organization of receptor, effector, and neural mechanisms rather than in what has happened to these, as a result of activity, during the organism's lifetime. This inborn organization is to be explained, of course, in terms of heredity

and the conditions of early development considered in Chapter 5.

The relation between drives, reflexes, and instincts

We speak of the energizing aspects of behavior as *physiological drives* rather than as instincts, although these drives, like instincts, are unlearned. Drives as such do not determine the pattern of response, for the same drive is associated with different patterns of behavior in different species. The chick that is motivated by hunger pecks, the young mammal that is motivated by hunger sucks, and the older mammal that is motivated by hunger gnaws or nibbles.

As we have seen, the young organism must learn the direction in which activity associated with some physiological needs or drives should be turned. The newborn mammal activated by hunger does not know that food will alleviate its condition. It learns by experimenting, as it were, with various objects, including a nipple. Many responses associated with the satisfaction of needs are relatively simple, unlearned acts like sucking, swallowing, grasping, and withdrawing. These are called *reflexes*. The term *instinct* is thus reserved for relatively complicated unlearned patterns of reflexes.

One cannot, of course, draw the line between reflex and instinct with any degree of precision. One psychologist often lists as instincts some of the responses which another has listed as reflexes. In general, however, an instinct differs from a reflex in being more complicated and in involving an adjustment of the whole organism rather than some very restricted part of it. Nobody would classify the pupillary response as an instinct, and nobody would classify walking as a reflex. Moreover, instinctive responses are more variable — more attuned to changing conditions — than reflexes.

From what has been said above, one should not assume that every instinct is motivated by a physiological drive. Flying in birds, building of webs by spiders, swimming by fish, and many other similarly complicated

unlearned responses may serve any or all of a number of drives. Flying may be motivated by an activity drive, by a hunger drive, by the sex drive, or by a combination of these. Flying may also be aroused when none of these drives is present. For example, the pull of gravity when the bird is launched into the air may automatically initiate the pattern of reflexes which propel it. We can see, therefore, that flying serves no single need. One could argue that it serves no need directly, or that it serves many of them.

It should thus be apparent that, while there is often a relationship between physiological needs, drives, and instincts, the relation is not a simple one in which each instinct serves a particular need or drive. We observe, too, that instincts are elicited under conditions in which no known physiological drive is present.

THE SEX DRIVE AND MATING

All of the higher animals have a sex drive. They also have many reflexes associated with sexual functions. But do they all have a mating instinct?

Lower mammals, like the rat, undoubtedly have such an instinct. Consider, for example, a male rat reared in isolation until the age of puberty (two months). It has had no opportunity to engage in exploratory sexual behavior with other rats, male or female, and it has had no opportunity to observe mating in other rats. Soon after it reaches the age of two months, this animal, even with all needs satisfied except the sex drive, becomes much more active than hitherto. This increase in activity, which accompanies the maturity of the testes, suggests that the animal now has a sex drive. But there is no means of satisfying the drive. However, when a female rat in heat is introduced, exploratory activities are soon turned to her. This exploration partly results, no doubt, from the strangeness, to the rat hitherto isolated, of another animal's presence. But it is also because of the stimulating nature of the female's movements and perhaps a typical odor.⁴⁴ Within a short pe-

riod, the male rat exhibits, for the first time in its life, a stereotyped pattern of sex behavior which is very much like that of every other male rat. The mating pattern is approximately the same, regardless of whether a rat has had previous sexual opportunities or has witnessed mating in others. In inexperienced pubescent rats, the behavior pattern is the same as that of older, more experienced rats. The mating pattern in female rats is likewise stereotyped, and it makes its appearance independently of the opportunity for learning it. There is no doubt that the rat, in addition to its sex drive and its sexual reflexes as such, which are obviously unlearned, has an unlearned pattern of behavior with which to satisfy the drive. It has, in other words, a mating instinct.³⁵

Mating in monkeys is less stereotyped than in the rat. When the level of the higher apes is reached, it is somewhat doubtful whether a mating instinct any longer exists. The chimpanzee, like the rat, has a strong sex drive, and it has several reflexes associated with sexual functions. But what of the total pattern of sexual behavior, including the copulatory position?

Studies carried out at Yale University with the chimpanzees shown in Figure 104, which were observed from an early age until adulthood, show that mating develops in an ex-

ploratory or trial-and-error manner out of play behavior. The pattern which finally develops, including the position used, differs markedly from one animal to another and in the same animal from time to time.³⁶

For obvious reasons, no observations of a similar nature have been carried out with human subjects. However, there is every reason to suppose that learning would be even more evident than in the chimpanzees. Such learning is derived from hearsay, observation and trial-and-error, as well as from direct instruction. The varieties of human sexual behavior are so extensive that sexologists have written volumes about them. Books are also written for the sexual education of newlyweds. If we possess a mating instinct, why should we have to be told the ways in which to mate?

We can conclude, therefore, that man has an unlearned sex drive and unlearned sexual responses of the reflex variety, but that it is questionable whether he has a mating instinct in any strict sense of the word.

MATERNAL BEHAVIOR

What we have said about the sex instinct applies equally well to maternal behavior. The white rat, when she gives birth to a litter, exhibits a clear-cut pattern of behavior even more complicated than the sexual pattern.



Figure 104. Chimpanzees Used to Study Sexual Development
(Courtesy of Dr. Robert M. Yarkas.)

She licks the newborn, bites off the umbilical cord, eats the placenta, builds a nest out of any débris available, retrieves the young, places them in the nest one by one, and then crouches over them.³⁷

Nest-building is especially interesting from the standpoint of motivation, for in rats not motivated by a maternal drive, the number of pieces of débris used in building nests is related to the external temperature. Thus, as the temperature increases, an animal builds fewer or smaller nests until, at high temperatures, it does not build at all. When motivated by the maternal drive, however, the rat builds nests with as much vigor when the temperature is high as when it is low. This is an instance of self-regulation *par excellence*.³⁸

The energizing of the maternal instinct, the drive behind it, is not so clearly established as in the case of sex. However, it has been found that the act of giving birth is not a motivating factor, for rats delivered by Caesarian section show the usual behavior. Recent evidence suggests that the hormone *prolactin*, secreted by the pituitary gland, plays an important rôle. This hormone stimulates even virgins to retrieve and care for young rats.³⁹

The sequence of responses, with the manner in which they are carried out, is similar from one mother to another. It is just as similar in mothers who have offspring for the first time as it is in experienced mothers. The pattern is essentially the same, whether or not the animal has had opportunities to observe it in others. These facts make it obvious that we are justified in speaking, not only of the rat's maternal drive, but also of its maternal instinct.

Maternal behavior in animals higher than the rat has not been described in any great detail, but it is evident that, as the primate level is approached, maternal behavior becomes increasingly variable. In human beings, neither the maternal drive nor maternal behavior itself is clearly inborn. Prolactin is secreted by the anterior pituitary gland as in the rat, and other physiological conditions associated with birth are quite similar to those found in the rat, but the results of these are unpredictable.

The problem of human maternal motivation and maternal behavior has various aspects which should be kept clearly in mind. There is a great difference between wanting to have children before they are born and wanting to keep them and care for them after they are born. Another aspect of the problem is how the child is cared for. In other words, is there an inborn behavior pattern, as in the rat?

The desire for children is by no means universal. Many women, even after they are pregnant, for various reasons wish that they were not. Prospective mothers were asked, "Are you glad that you are going to have a baby?" More than 75 per cent of the 87 quite frankly said that they were not pleased at the prospect.⁴⁰ In another group of 66 expectant mothers, 66 per cent admitted that they had not planned to have a child.⁴¹ Some who became pregnant voluntarily said that they did so only because their husbands wanted a family, because they wanted something to occupy their time, or because they thought it right to have children. These are only three of the many reasons, apart from mother love as such, which women give for having children.

Many women who say that they do not desire children show evident display of mother love after the child has once arrived. However, there are many possible motives other than, or in addition to, the physiological motives. Among them are pleasurable stimulation obtained from nursing and rearousal of the pleasant impulses originally associated with dolls.

What about the pattern of human maternal behavior? There is no universal pattern, unless it be that of feeding a child on the breast when such feeding is possible. Except for this, the pattern differs from one cultural group to another and from individual to individual within a group. There is so much to maternal care besides the nursing pattern, all of it apparently learned, that it is doubtful whether one is justified in speaking of a maternal instinct in human beings. The fact is

that human mothers, even with their observations of their own parents and others to help them, are often so ignorant of how a child should be cared for that they must receive special instruction through books or attendance at clinics.

MAN IS PRIMARILY A CREATURE OF HABIT

Insects possess relatively simple nervous systems in which definite functional patterns are laid down. When an insect is stimulated, a discharge of impulses over channels already determined is likely to occur; the result is a stereotyped pattern of response. Few, if any, détours, short cuts, or alternate routes are available. In amphibians, reptiles, and fishes, we find somewhat comparable stereotypy of behavior. Their behavior is stereotyped because the organism has predetermined nervous pathways and connections which shunt nerve impulses going from receptors to effectors over narrowly prescribed routes. Because they are endowed with predetermined behavior patterns with which to satisfy their needs, insects, amphibians, reptiles, and fishes are, from the moment of birth, able to adjust to their environment without help from others. They are not helpless "bundles of reflexes" as is the human infant. In birds, and in lower mammals like the rat, there is less evidence of stereotyped behavior. Nevertheless, innate predetermined behavior patterns are still in evidence. Birds, for example, do not have to learn to fly and, without any training, many build nests which are typical of their species. Rats, as we have seen, exhibit innately determined patterns of sexual and maternal behavior. However, there is less stereotypy in rats than in birds, probably because of the much greater complexity of the rat's cerebrum.⁴² Note, too, that rats are much more helpless, and for a much longer time, than chickens. The chicken feeds for itself within a few days; the rat only after a week or two. As our study shifts from rat to man, we find that the complexity of the central nervous system rapidly increases. There are fewer complex innate behavior pat-

terns, there is increased helplessness, and there is a longer period of infancy.

The human infant, with its billions of nerve fibers connecting receptors and effectors, is the culmination of this trend away from biological stereotypy. Since it has few predetermined behavior patterns, it is relatively helpless. Until the child develops appropriate behavior patterns, its needs must be attended to by others. Some of these behavior patterns, although absent at birth, are to a large degree determined by the innate structure of the organism. Man cannot fly like a bird, even though he may observe birds and attempt to emulate them. His inborn structures are fitted for crawling and walking, not for flying. There is good evidence, moreover, that man's assumption of the upright posture and the general pattern of his stepping movements are also determined largely by inborn structure. The human child, if properly supported, can exhibit stepping movements at birth. Although these movements are not beneficial to the child at an age of general neuromuscular immaturity, they nevertheless provide the pattern for later locomotion. In this connection, the reader will doubtless recall our discussion of maturation (pp. 81-86). There is no doubt that some neural patterns incompletely laid down at birth grow later and that their growth is independent of training.

The only behavior patterns involved in the abovementioned studies of maturation in human beings have been postural, locomotor, prehensile, and vocal.⁴³ Although all these are related in general to the satisfaction of physiological needs, none of them is specifically related to the satisfaction of any particular need, as, for example, eating is related to hunger or copulation to sex.

It is apparent that few of the behavior patterns which enable a human adult to satisfy his needs are determined by maturation. They are habits learned during the period of dependency. The primitive child is taught, for example, to spear fish, track and kill game, and fight anyone who endangers his existence.

We are taught "civilized" ways of accomplishing the same ends. During the long period of dependence upon his elders, the child customarily learns their way of satisfying physiological needs.

It has been claimed that the infant has many immature instincts, which, because he is not permitted to express them or because his behavior is channelized so early by his elders, never come to expression in pure form. Thus, newborn infants, when placed in a tank of water, make general movements with arms and legs which propel them through the water. This "swimming instinct" is said to be lost by disuse before we ever have any opportunity to swim.⁴⁴ Loss of instinct by disuse has been observed in animals. Chicks, for example, fail to peck at single grains after they have been fed and watered by hand in darkness for about two weeks.⁴⁵

Whether or not man has instincts which fail to appear because of disuse or early habit formation, the important fact is that satisfaction of most of his physiological needs depends upon habits acquired from others. We do not know what sort of human behavior would emerge under conditions of complete isolation from others, if such were possible. On the other hand, we know that human needs are satisfied in a variety of ways rather than in the universal stereotyped ways characteristic of lower animals.

SUMMARY

In common with other animals, man has a number of physiological needs upon the satisfaction of which life itself depends. The physiological conditions which are aroused when these needs are not immediately satisfied appear to drive the organism to activity. Activity associated with some physiological drives is initially "blind." For this reason we often refer to it merely as general activity. Under normal conditions, this activity is soon directed toward objects, situations, and the performance of specific acts which satisfy these needs. These incentives attract the

organism, whereas deterrents repel. The latter are associated with negative drives, such as the drive to avoid tissue injury. General activity becomes specific — that is, directed toward incentives and away from deterrents — through the ability of the organism to learn which aspects of the environment satisfy its needs. It learns that certain objects, situations, or acts restore the physiological balance disturbed by deprivation and other injurious conditions. The concept of homeostasis suggests that the organism, through these "restoring" activities, maintains, or attempts to maintain, a constant physiological state. Drive implies merely a "push" from within, whereas motive implies a "push" in some particular external direction as, for example, toward food, or away from injury.

Food deprivation is followed by an increase of general activity, by spasms of the stomach muscles, and (at least in man) by hunger pangs. Although stomach spasms are often stressed as the physiological basis of the experience of hunger, and of the general activity which follows food deprivation, there is much evidence pointing to a chemical control of activity, stomach contractions, and hunger experiences. The existence of specific hungers, such as for vitamins, minerals, and so on, suggests that the stomach contraction theory is too simple. Blood sugar level has been mentioned as a possible motivator of the other phenomena associated with food deprivation, but the evidence is conflicting.

The sex drive has been shown to depend upon secretions from the gonads (ovary and testis), although the drive is disturbed by injury to the anterior pituitary gland and the cortex of the adrenal glands. In females the most important secretion underlying the sex drive is estrin. In males, it is testosterone. Although the human sex drive has the same physiological motivation as that of other animals, it shows much wider variation both in intensity and in direction of satisfaction. Social influences, such as moral codes and childhood experiences, are important factors underlying such variation.

Water deprivation produces general bodily dehydration which is reflected in a dryness of the mucous lining of the throat and mouth. While this dryness has often been stressed, not only as the physiological basis of the thirst drive, but also as the factor which regulates water consumption, recent research suggests that there is some more subtle mechanism at work.

There are two methods of investigating the relative strength of drives, the method of pitting one drive against another and the obstruction method. Both methods show sex to be a weaker drive than hunger. Investigations with the obstruction method rank the drives investigated, from strongest to weakest, as follows: maternal, thirst, hunger, sex, and exploratory. The strength of the sex drive in male and female rats is approximately the same at its peak, but it is cyclical for females, the peak appearing only on the fourth or fifth day of the sexual cycle.

The expressions of the physiological drives of human beings are so modified by cultural influences that the sex drive, for example, often appears stronger than the hunger drive. It is only under carefully controlled experimental conditions, such as those of the obstruction experiments, that the actual potency of physiological drives can be discovered. Since human beings are creatures of culture as well as physiology, animals provide the only adequate information on the relative potency of physiological drives.

Instincts are complex unlearned patterns of reflexes. We see many instances where animals satisfy their physiological needs instinctively. The mating and maternal behavior of rats illustrates the relation between need and instinct. Flying in birds exemplifies an instinct which does not appear to depend upon any single drive for its motivation. The point was stressed that, while instincts are often related to particular drives, they are sometimes elicited by any one or more of a number of drives and sometimes, even, when no known drive is present.

As our study shifts from rat to man, we find decreasing evidence of instincts. While mating in the rat is clearly an instinct, developing in the same way even under conditions of isolation, the mating of chimpanzees is not clearly so. When the human level is reached, one observes even less evidence of an unlearned mating pattern. In the case of maternal behavior, it is even doubtful whether human beings have a physiologically determined maternal drive. The specific patterns of human maternal behavior, except possibly for suckling at the breast, are learned.

The decreasing evidence of instincts as we ascend the scale of evolution and the increasing importance of learned behavior may be attributed to the increasing complexity of the central nervous system. As the association neurons of the cerebral cortex increase in number, there are many more possible paths for the transmission of nerve impulses. This means that it becomes decreasingly possible for impulses to travel along narrowly prescribed routes from receptors to effectors. Absence of predetermined modes of adjustment renders the organism helpless. Its dependence upon others for satisfaction of its physiological needs leads to the acquisition of learned modes of satisfaction.

One cannot say what complex patterns of behavior would emerge if human beings could be reared in complete isolation from others until the time of maturity. If any complex behavior patterns were universally present in such isolated individuals, we would call them instincts. As the situation stands at present, we must conclude that man has the inborn physiological drives found in animals, that he has many reflexes, themselves also inborn, but that complex behavior patterns which serve to satisfy his physiological needs are largely, if not entirely, learned. How many instincts might appear if man's behavior were not so early restricted and so early channelized by social influences is of no practical consequence, since he actually lives by habit rather than by instinct.

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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

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Chapter 12

Common Social Motives

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL DRIVES are universal in man because they are a part of his animal heritage. Some social motives are also universal in man. Certain others, if not universal, are at least very widespread in certain cultures. We will consider data in this chapter which suggest that man's universal and common social motives have their origin not so much in his animal heritage as in his social heritage. There is no evidence that they are specifically represented in the germ plasm, but there is much evidence that they are acquired by each individual during his lifetime. In the last analysis, these motives are related to the satisfaction of physiological drives and to man's initial helplessness, but, as later discussions will show, the relationship is a general rather than a specific one. Some of the motives which we will consider are much more widespread than others. The term *coenotrope*, which means "common habit," has been coined to represent these "common modes of learned response that are the products of original nature and commonly shared environment."¹

Particular importance is attached to some of the common social motives because those who wish to maintain the *status quo* often claim that the motives are inborn and ineradicable. Should one advocate the abolition of war, he is informed that human nature has an ineradicable ingredient of pugnacity which makes human conflict inevitable. The seeker after a society in which the motif of individual gain is subordinated to the welfare of the group as a whole is informed that man is by nature acquisitive. At best, he is told, one can expect only enlightened self-interest. He is informed, further-

more, that human selfishness has strangled every embryonic utopia. In fact, the social reconstructionist is regarded as a fabricator of idle dreams, as a would-be alchemist flirting with the fond hope that the baser qualities of man may be converted into gold. The critic admits, usually, that the dreams are interesting to contemplate and the dreamt-of things desirable, but he regards them as beyond actual accomplishment because "you can't change human nature."² Even Aristotle claimed that slavery is a necessary institution because some are "born to be slaves."

Man's "instinct of workmanship" is said to underlie satisfaction in work. It is claimed that modern industrial methods, which prevent men from completing and taking personal pride in the products of their labor, thwart the "instinct of workmanship" and thus make for industrial unrest. Educators have often been deluded into thinking that their function is to draw out inborn motives, to modify them, and to direct them into socially desirable channels. If the motives in question are not inborn, but products of early education, then educators might better give their direct attention to the implantation of desired motives.

Thus, one can see that the controversy concerning whether particular motives are innate or learned is not an idle one. Scientists, of course, want to know the truth, regardless of the outcome, but the present issue is of both scientific and practical importance.

Psychologists fail to agree on the number of common social motives. Some list as few as four such motives, and others list a dozen or more.³ Some represent a particular motive by one term, while others represent it by another. Thus, one speaks of *self-assertion*, while the other speaks of the *mastery motive*.

Moreover, what one psychologist is satisfied to call *gregariousness*, another breaks down into such specific motives as *desire for the presence of friendly human beings*, *desire for concerted action*, as in a crowd, and *desire to witness the happy behavior of other human beings*.⁴ It is likely that, if one had the patience and thought it sufficiently worth while, he would be able to name dozens of common social motives. All these could doubtless be placed within the framework of one or more of the shorter classifications.

We shall make no attempt to provide a complete list of social motives, a few have been selected purely for illustrative purposes.* We wish to illustrate two things — namely: (1) the possible origins of such motives and (2) the nature of research bearing upon the question of how social motives originate. The motives selected for our purposes are: *gregariousness*, *acquisitiveness*, *self-assertion*, and *pugnacity*, or *aggression*.

GREGARIOUSNESS

Starting with birds, and going up the scale of evolution, there is a strong tendency for animals who are isolated to return to their group. In chickens, the effort to return is accompanied by loud peeping. Chimpanzees emit mournful cries under similar circumstances. Most of us who have been forced to live in isolation for a time know of the longing for human association. Gregariousness, the motive to return to our kind when isolated, is perhaps closer to universal than any except the physiological motives. For this reason, it has been claimed that gregariousness is inborn rather than acquired during an individual's lifetime.⁵

All gregarious animals spend the early part of their lives in the intimate presence of others. This is especially true in man, where life itself, because of the child's helplessness, depends upon the satisfaction of needs by others.

Through the process of conditioning, stim-

uli and activities associated with satisfaction of needs acquire increasing potency to arouse motivated behavior. To an infant the mother is at first merely a means of satisfying basic needs, but long before she has outlived her usefulness in this respect, the infant's mother becomes a cherished aspect of its surroundings. Likewise, any others who are closely associated with satisfying the child's needs develop an attractiveness in their own right; that is, apart from the rôle they play in satisfaction of needs. Most of our physiological needs are normally satisfied in association with other human beings. As one grows older, his group contacts broaden. For example, he learns to enjoy moving pictures in the company of others. Later on, if he has occasion to view a film alone, he may not enjoy it as much as when others are present.

Since we are dependent upon others for a long period of time, and most of our pleasures from the time of birth are experienced in the company of others, there seems no necessity for supposing that our strong desire for human associations is inborn. It seems much more reasonable to suppose that gregariousness is learned.

An experimental approach to the problem is hardly possible with human beings. One would have to isolate children from human contacts, yet keep them alive, from the time of birth on, then observe whether they also have a tendency to seek the companionship of others. If children reared under such circumstances did seek human contacts, we should be forced to accept the view that gregariousness is innate.

There has been an experimental attempt to discover the origin of gregariousness in chickens, but its results are suggestive rather than conclusive.⁶

Each of forty-two chicks was hatched and kept in isolation until the afternoon of the fourth day of life. Isolation included absence of the sound as well as the sight of other chicks. In the tests of gregariousness, carried out on the fourth day, each chick was placed at a point equidistant between two white mice on the one hand and two white

* An extensive list is given in Warren and Carmichael's *Elements of Human Psychology*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1930, pp. 396-397.

chicks on the other. The mice and chicks varied in right-left position on different tests so as to equate for the possibility of a right- or left-hand preference. Panes of glass separated the chick being tested from the incentive animals. The time spent before chicks and the time spent before mice was recorded for a period of thirty minutes for each chick. Tests were made on six successive days. The behavior of controls reared for the first four days of life within a group of chicks was compared with that of the isolated chicks.

Taking all of the results into consideration, the isolated chicks spent about the same percentage of their time before the mice as before the chicks (31.6 and 34.6 per cent, respectively). The non-isolated chicks, on the other hand, spent a much smaller percentage of their time before mice than before chicks (19.4 and 60.7 per cent, respectively). We may say, therefore, that chicks reared with other chicks for the first four days of life show a much stronger gregarious tendency (directed toward chicks) than do chicks reared in isolation. However, these are group tendencies. Not all chicks responded in these ways. Moreover, when the results are broken down in terms of daily records, there is an initial tendency of isolated chicks to respond more to chicks than to mice, a tendency which is then reversed so that the isolated animals respond predominantly to mice. In the case of chicks reared under social conditions, however, a gradually increasing tendency to respond to chicks is found throughout the six days of observation.

While the experiment described gave some support to the view that gregariousness is an acquired motive, it also showed that, for a time at least, even isolated chickens are gregarious. The investigator believed that the chicks exhibited an initial "innate gregariousness" which later waned. Chicks are, of course, far from helpless. More experiments of the same nature as the above, but with animals having an early period of helplessness, would show more conclusive results.

Because there are many opportunities for gregariousness to be learned, and every human being is subjected to these opportunities, there is no good reason for regarding gregariousness, despite its universality, as an inborn human motive.

ACQUISITIVENESS

Acquisitiveness may be defined as the motive, tendency, or propensity to "acquire, possess, and defend whatever is found useful or otherwise attractive." According to McDougall, whose definition of acquisitiveness we have quoted, this motive is found in only some animals, but is universal in man. It is, supposedly, the motive which underlies the institution of private property and dooms at the outset any utopian schemes based upon communal ownership.

One may question, first of all, the claim that this motive is universal. In certain Central Australian tribes, to use but one example, all food and water belong to the tribe. The natives live under conditions where water is so scarce that it is often squeezed from frogs dug out of the dried-up beds of streams. The only food, and it is scarce at that, consists of ants, grubs, lizards, snakes, and occasionally a skinny kangaroo. Members of the tribe go out in search of water and food, but do not drink or eat until everything they have gathered is brought in and divided among them. One does not keep what he has found and eat it himself. Each child is taught that he must share food and water with others. There is little else than food and water which is of sufficient value to hoard. Hence acquisitiveness is practically nonexistent.

The important point about the nonacquisitive Australians is that their ancestors learned the advantages, in that particular environment, of a communal form of life. Thus, they passed on a tradition of communal rather than acquisitive behavior.

Acquisitiveness is rare or absent also in societies having a plentiful supply of those things necessary for the satisfaction of physiological needs. Where acquisitiveness does occur in such societies, it applies to trinkets and other objects which, in some way or another, have come to be associated with social prestige.

It is a far cry from the various expressions of acquisitiveness in man to the hoarding of food pellets by rats, but certain experiments

on such hoarding are at least suggestive. Several of these investigations agree in showing that rats, unless they are subjected to conditions of food-deprivation or to frustration of the hunger drive, fail to hoard.⁷ Another research⁸ suggests that hoarding results from "accumulated deficit in the body and is independent of hunger except in so far as both are produced by deprivation." Still another investigation with white rats shows that earlier experiences of frustration may increase the tendency to hoard later in life.⁹ Rats were subjected to periodic frustration of the hunger drive for fifteen days beginning with the twenty-fourth day of life. These rats and a group of controls were then tested for hoarding, under conditions of frustration, after five months of plenty. The rats frustrated in early life hoarded an average of 37.7 pellets, while the control group hoarded an average of only fourteen pellets. Rats whose earlier frustration began at thirty-two days of life did not hoard more than their controls. This may mean that frustration must be early to have the effects noted or it may mean that not enough rats were used in either group to obtain reliable results. These studies suggest that rats do not have an inborn drive to hoard merely for the sake of hoarding. They hoard only when deprived of food or when they have learned to hoard under earlier conditions of deprivation.¹⁰

In discussing human acquisitiveness, one should not overlook the fact that man is molded by social influences from the time of early infancy. In most human societies, the child soon learns the advantages of having more than others. He learns, first of all, that certain things are his and that certain things belong to others. His parents induce him to do their will by offering rewards from their store of goods. Learning this lesson, the child induces others to give him things that he wants or to carry out desired acts. He does this by giving from his store of goods. As he grows older, he observes that those who have can get more, and that the more one has, the more he is respected and the more freedom he

enjoys. He learns, too, that many wants are satisfied only by anticipating and saving for them. With these and other influences of a similar nature playing an important rôle in the development of almost every child in our society, it is little wonder that acquisitiveness is a common motive.

Since acquisitiveness fails to appear in some societies and there are so many opportunities to learn it in those societies in which it does appear, there seems no good reason for supposing that the motive is inborn. If the institution of private property is ineradicable in civilized society, it is for other reasons than that man has an innate acquisitiveness.

SELF-ASSERTION

Here again we are dealing with a strong and extremely common human motive. It is expressed in domination, leadership, self-display, and the desire for recognition. Some writers have claimed that, no matter how insignificant men may be as judged by broad social standards, each seeks his own sphere of influence. Even the most lowly may have a dog which "respects his authority." McDougall, who regards self-assertion as an innate motive, pairs it with submission, the "innate tendency" to "defer, obey, to follow, or submit in the presence of others who display superior powers."¹¹ Alfred Adler¹² claims that all normal human beings in our society have "the will to power" and that this is stronger even than the sex motive. He popularized the terms "inferiority and superiority complex" which are regarded as outcomes of, respectively, unsuccessful and successful exploitation of the "will to power."

What is the origin of this motive? Is it innate, as several have supposed? Or is it, as in the cases of gregariousness and acquisitiveness, acquired in the course of having our basic needs satisfied? The only strong argument for its innateness is its apparent universality. As in the cases of acquisitiveness and gregariousness, however, there are universal opportunities for learning it. For example, if the mother tries to force down unwanted food,

the child vomits, perhaps reflexly at first. Then, unless the mother is wise, he is petted, allowed to go without his meal, and pampered in other ways. Pretty soon, much to her surprise, he vomits whenever his motives conflict with hers, whether or not the question of food is involved. This, for a time at least, brings the wanted results. Temper tantrums, wetting, soiling, and failing to sleep when parents desire it are other devices often used by children to get their own way, under conditions where others are trying, as it were, to mold them.

As the child grows older, he learns that his needs can be satisfied only by asserting himself, demanding his rights. When frustrating circumstances arise, either he has to assert himself or submit. More often than not, asserting himself means overcoming frustration. If one form of self-assertion fails consistently to overcome a particular frustration, the individual may try some other way of asserting himself, or he may give up, assuming the submissive attitude. However, the attitude of submission is sometimes itself a self-assertive technique, as every coquette knows. It often happens that those who now stoop conquer in the long run.

Another factor which one must not overlook in considering the genesis of self-assertion is the cultural one. There are some human societies in which self-assertion is so rare as to be regarded as abnormal. For example, consider the Arapesh of New Guinea.¹³

With work a matter of amiable co-operation, and the slight warfare so slenderly organized, the only other need that the community has for leadership is for carrying out large-scale ceremonial operations. Without any leadership whatsoever, with no rewards beyond the daily pleasure of eating a little food and singing a few songs with one's fellows, the society could get along very comfortably, but there would be no ceremonial occasions, and the problem of social engineering is conceived by the Arapesh, not as the need to limit aggression and curb acquisitiveness, but as the need to force a few of the more capable and gifted men into taking, against their will, enough responsibility and leadership so that occasionally, every three or four

years or at even rarer intervals, a really exciting ceremonial may be organized. No one, it is assumed, really wants to be a leader, a "big man." "Big men" have to plan, have to initiate exchanges, have to strut and swagger and talk in loud voices, have to boast of what they have done in the past and are going to do in the future. All of this the Arapesh regard as most uncongenial, difficult behavior, the kind of behavior in which no normal man would indulge if he could possibly avoid it. It is a rôle that the society forces upon a few men in certain recognized ways.

Thus, in a society where the norm for men is to be gentle, unacquisitive, and co-operative, where no man reckons up the debts that another owes him, and each man hunts that others may eat, there is a definite training for the special contrasting behavior that "big men" must display.

Among the Zuni Indians, also, marked self-assertiveness is rare. An individual who excels in competitions is prevented from entering further competitions. Zuni children, when asked to do problems at the blackboard and to indicate when they have finished, hold back until all have completed the problems before turning around. Each hesitates to show better performance than another.¹⁴

There are other societies, like our own, in which the male, especially, is expected to have a strong self-assertive tendency. Generally speaking, when the self-assertive individual fails to force us into too painful submission, we respect his self-assertiveness. Self-assertive men who do not thwart us — men like Thomas Edison — achieve social recognition, as well as an abundance of the world's goods, and they are held up to the growing child as examples of manhood at its best. On the other hand, self-assertive men who thwart our own interests — men like Hitler and Mussolini — are not presented as models for the young to copy.

With these and many other possible sources of self-assertion, there seems little if any reason for supposing that it is innate. No experiments on animals or human beings are available, but it seems reasonable to suppose that if individuals were held rigidly to a regimen in which asserting themselves failed to remove

frustration, and in which no models of self-assertion were provided for them to copy, they would be lacking in this motive.

In certain religions, the "will to power" is replaced by the "will to acquiesce." Thus, Nirvana, the Buddhist doctrine of absorption into the infinite by ceasing to struggle against the forces of nature, is a cultural influence exactly opposite to that to which most of us are subjected from the cradle to the grave. Brought up as Buddhists, we would show little evidence of a mastery motive. Have the Buddhists suppressed the motive to assert oneself, or is the motive itself a product of certain cultural influences not experienced by Buddhists? The latter seems the more reasonable answer in the light of the evidence as it now exists.

PUGNACITY

It has frequently been claimed that all men, in common with animals below man, have an inborn urge to fight, or, in general, to indulge in aggressive behavior. Inborn pugnacity is often given as the reason for war — it is alleged that man has an inborn and ineradicable pugnacity which makes war inevitable. The implication is that man experiences the need to fight for fighting's sake — not merely to accomplish specific ends. Very few psychologists any longer hold this view, but it is commonly expressed by the layman.¹⁶

We do not have any carefully worked-out experiments on the question of innate pugnacity, but there are many naturalistic observations which discredit the idea. These observations provide a good argument for the claim that pugnacity, wherever it exists, arises out of either or both of two conditions: (1) hindrance with the satisfaction of physiological needs and (2) an education conducive to pugnacity.

Pugnacity is perhaps universally expressed by animals and men toward those who endanger their lives or in any serious way hinder or frustrate the satisfaction of basic needs like hunger, thirst, and sex. One immediate and

probably inborn reaction to frustration is the emotion of anger. This might be said to motivate the pugnacity in question or to be one aspect of it. The fact of the matter is that, when frustrated, human beings get angry and, in most instances, fight the individual or situation concerned. As everybody knows, human beings sometimes anticipate frustration, rightly or wrongly, before it occurs. Thus, pugnacity is aroused either by actual or by anticipated frustration of physiological needs.¹⁶

Most of us have antipathies toward situations and individuals without ever having experienced direct frustration and perhaps without ever having anticipated it. In such instances, we have acquired our attitudes through social contacts. For example, each nation has its traditional enemies and each child acquires these antipathies through various channels of education — such as myths, legends, and history. In times of war, nations find it necessary to whip up pugnacity in their citizens who are not too directly threatened by citing incidents calculated to arouse anger against the enemy.

If the desire to fight were an inborn motive, it should be universal in mammals. However, when mammals fight, it is only because satisfaction of their hunger, sex, thirst, or other needs is prevented or threatened with frustration, or because they are subject to attack from others. Except for the removal or attempted removal of obstructing individuals or groups, they do not attack those who are obviously stronger than themselves. Weaker animals are attacked and killed, but only for satisfaction of hunger or because of their frustrating influence.¹⁷

Many human groups, like the Arapesh mentioned earlier, show little evidence of pugnacity. If the motive were inborn and ineradicable in man, it would be universal, or else held in check. There is no reason for supposing that peaceful human beings actually have an inborn urge to fight, but that they successfully inhibit any expression of it. Some writers, basing their conclusion on observations of peaceful primitives, have gone to the

opposite extreme and argued that man is by nature peaceful rather than pugnacious.¹⁸

The evidence is so definite and so abundant that it becomes a problem of psychological interest to discuss why men persist in denying the fact of man's innate peacefulness. Each of us knows from his own experience that his fellows are on the whole kindly and well-intentioned. Most of the friction and discords of our lives are obviously the result of such exasperations and conflicts as civilization itself creates. Envy, malice, and all uncharitableness usually have for the object of their expression some artificial aim, from the pursuit of which primitive man is exempt.

Some primitive societies, however, are characterized as much by pugnacity as others are characterized by peaceful behavior. The study of such peoples throws much light on the origins of pugnacity. Take the Mundugumor, a New Guinea cannibal tribe, for example.¹⁹ Pugnacity characterizes this group, but it is traceable to training of the young. In the first place, Mundugumor children are not wanted by their father, so they are born into a situation charged with hostility. In the second place, there is much conflict between husband and wife, all of which is obvious to the growing child. In the third place, the pattern set for the child by his culture is one in which "both men and women are expected to be violent, competitive, aggressively sexed, jealous, ready to see and avenge insult, delighting in display, in action, in fighting." In the fourth place, the care of the infant is conducive to the development of pugnacity.

Mundugumor women suckle their children standing up, supporting the child with one hand in a position that strains the mother's arm and pinions the arms of the child. There is none of the mother's dallying, sensuous pleasure in feeding her child that occurs among the Arapesh. Nor is the child permitted to prolong his meal by any playful fondling of his own or his mother's body. He is kept firmly to his major task of absorbing enough food so that he will stop crying and consent to be put back in his basket. The minute he stops suckling for a moment, he is returned to his prison.

Children, therefore, develop a very definite purposeful fighting attitude, holding on firmly to the nipple and suckling milk as rapidly and vigorously as possible. They frequently choke from swallowing too fast, the choking angers the mother and infuriates the child, thus further turning the suckling situation into one characterized by anger and struggle rather than by affection and reassurance.

In the fifth place, the child is taught by his mother that all men, including his father, are sexual rivals. Finally, his training is one calculated to fit him for survival in a hostile world — a training in which modes of fighting have a large place.

The conclusion forced upon us by a consideration of such information as we have presented is that man is by nature neither pugnacious nor peaceful. He has certain physiological needs which demand satisfaction. If he can satisfy these without hindrance from others, his behavior will be characterized by peacefulness. On the other hand, those who frustrate the satisfaction of these basic needs will arouse anger and pugnacious or aggressive attitudes and acts. However, each of us is born into a situation where certain culture patterns, including traditional antipathies, already exist. These may mold us into pugnacious or peaceful individuals, regardless of whether satisfaction of our needs is actually thwarted or threatened with frustration.

SOCIAL MOTIVES AND SOCIAL TECHNIQUE

Motives, as we have already pointed out, cannot be observed directly. We infer their existence from the varieties of human behavior which we regard as expressions of them. It should be apparent that the motives of gregariousness, acquisitiveness, self-assertion, and pugnacity are deduced from gregarious behavior, acquisitive behavior, self-assertive behavior, and pugnacious behavior. One may ask why we do not describe the behavior in question, point out its origins, and let it go at that, without recourse to the concept of motivation. One recent writer²⁰ says that he prefers to speak of *social techniques* rather than

social drives or motives because the term *technique*

emphasizes the essentially instrumental or ancillary character of the social responses. Living in groups as the gregarious species do, it is inevitable that they should have developed (partly through evolution and partly through individual experience) certain characteristic types of social behavior and that these should serve as techniques for insuring more food, drink, sex, less pain, and the like

The chief advantage to be gained by speaking of motives rather than, or in addition to, techniques is that a particular motive may find expression in many different ways, as illustrated in Figure 105. To describe all the different behavior patterns involved, and the history of each, is much more cumbersome, and perhaps much less meaningful, than to speak of the motive which underlies all of them. In other words, pugnaciousness takes literally hundreds of different forms — as many forms as there are ways of injuring other individuals. The most significant thread which runs through this wide variety of behavior patterns is their common motivation. Eliminate the motive, and you eliminate all of the behavior patterns

The point, however, is well taken that common social motives (and techniques), such as those discussed, have an instrumental value. They exist, not in their own right, but because they contribute to the satisfaction of basic physiological needs. Where these needs are satisfied directly, and where no cultural influences conducive to development of the par-

ticular social motives already exist, the motives in question will in all probability fail to appear. Because of inborn helplessness, gregariousness is almost inevitable. However, acquisitiveness, self-assertion, and pugnacity are by no means inevitable. As we have observed, there are several societies in which acquisitiveness, self-assertion, and pugnacity fail to exist

SUMMARY

Without attempting a complete classification of universal and common social motives, we have considered some of the influences which produce such motives. The motives of gregariousness, acquisitiveness, self-assertion, and pugnacity were used for illustrative purposes. While these and certain other social motives have been regarded by many as inborn, chiefly on the grounds that they are so widespread, the evidence from experimental studies and naturalistic observation suggests that they are learned. The term "coenotrope" has been coined to represent these social motives

Gregariousness is perhaps an inevitable outcome of the fact that our early helplessness makes us dependent upon others for satisfaction of our needs. Because of our conditioning, we continue to seek the company of others even when such an association is no longer necessary for our existence

The motives of acquisitiveness, self-assertion, and pugnacity are particularly related to (1) hindrance of the satisfaction of physiologi-




Figure 105. A Few of the Possible Ways of Fighting
(From Britt, S. H., "Social Psychology of Modern Life." Farrar and Rinehart, 1941, p. 78.)

cal needs and (2) early training. When individuals find that they can satisfy their needs better by hoarding, asserting themselves, or acting aggressively toward others, they develop the necessary motives and techniques. On the other hand many individuals become acquisitive, self-assertive, or pugnacious, not because they are actually frustrated in the satisfaction of their needs, or because they anticipate frustration, but because they have been taught these motives and techniques. In

other words, cultural influences play a large rôle in perpetuating common social motives.

To those who claim that man has inborn and ineradicable urges which demand such social institutions as war, we may answer that such motives, rather than being inborn, are themselves the products of those social institutions which frustrate satisfaction of basic needs and subject each individual to educational influences which instill particular social motives and techniques.

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Chapter 13

Personal Motives

EVERYONE FALLS HEIR to the physiological drives. From individual to individual, however, there are marked variations in the strength and in the expressions of these drives. They are weak in some and strong in others. Each individual satisfies the same drive in a somewhat different way. The same observations apply, also, to the common social motives. Everyone who is normal acquires the social motives which characterize his culture, but there are individual variations in the strength of each common social motive and in the ways in which the individual expresses it. Thus, individuals differ markedly in the degree to which they exhibit acquisitiveness and also in the directions in which acquisitiveness is manifested. Acquisitiveness may be expressed by accumulating money, by acquiring property, such as land or cattle, or merely by collecting stamps or antiques.

We may regard these varieties of behavior as personal or individual variations in the strength and expression of physiological and common social motives. The term *personal motive* will be used to refer to motives which, while allied with physiological and common social motives, are themselves not predominant in a particular culture.

Drug addictions, life goals, interests, and attitudes are personal in the sense that an individual may or may not crave a drug, may or may not wish to be a doctor, may or may not be interested in English literature, and may or may not have a particular attitude on some social issue. Such personal motives may ultimately be traced to physiological and common social motives. However, the path from personal motive back to physiological

and common social motive is a long and devious one. It often happens that two or more competent psychologists start from the same point and arrive at quite different conclusions concerning the basic motivation for particular addictions, ambitions, ideals, and the like.

Under ordinary circumstances a psychologist has little interest in tracing personal motives to their origins in more basic motives. He is interested more in basic motivation and in general principles involved in development of motives. However, clinical psychologists are often called upon to explain peculiar behavior and, if possible, to eliminate it. Why, for instance, does this patient have a compulsion to light fires, to steal objects which he does not need, or to attack women? If the psychologist knows how these motives developed — if he knows their roots — he is in a better position to change or eliminate them than if he is ignorant of their origins.

A "firebug" got a sexual thrill out of lighting fires. His compulsion was traceable to sexual stimulation earlier received under similar circumstances. He lit fires, not for the sake of lighting them, but to repeat the sexual thrill. A boy who stole eye and watch glasses had developed the erroneous notion that boys who possess glasses are brighter than others. He, a poor student, had noted that those who did best in his class wore glasses. Thus, stealing was not indulged in out of a desire to steal, but in the hope of increasing ability and gaining classroom recognition. Similarly, a college student who waylaid women and assaulted them was indirectly satisfying an urge to assert himself, something denied at home because his mother, of whom the women were symbolic, was

exceptionally domineering. He could not bring himself to attack his mother directly, but he gained satisfaction from attacking substitutes.

Thus, personal motives may be understood only by studying the individual cases. In making a case study, however, we often find that apparently different acts have a common motivation. This may come from a physiological drive, it may come from a common social motive, or it may be personal. In other words, many different acts may spring from the ambition to be a doctor. In many instances the basis is a more or less intricate combination of physiological, common social, and personal motives.

DRUG ADDICTION

The craving for certain drugs by one addicted to their use often becomes as potent as any inborn physiological drive. Sometimes the addict may even commit murder in an effort to obtain the drug.

Some individuals acquire the habit of taking drugs to relieve pain or to escape from sorrow or boredom. Certain drugs may be non-habit-forming in the sense that a craving for the drug as such does not develop, but the use of any drug to escape from reality may lead to dependence upon the drug for that purpose. Many habitual drunkards, for example, have come to depend upon alcohol as a means of escaping the unpleasant realities of everyday life. Certain other drugs are habit-forming in the sense that there develops a "need" for the drug as such. Those addicted to morphine, for example, actually become ill when denied it. Continued use of the drug produces physiological changes in the organism so as to create an artificial need. The "need" is not merely a desire to escape from reality, for animals may also become addicted and exhibit physiological and psychological reactions similar to those of human beings.

In one of several investigations of drug addiction in animals, chimpanzees were injected with morphine twice daily for periods ranging up to fifteen months.¹ From about six weeks on, the time differing for different

animals, failure to give an injection at the regular time produced physiological disturbances and also behavior suggesting that the animal sought an injection. Restlessness, depression, and other symptoms were apparent. Continued use of the drug intensified such symptoms. When released from its cage at or after the usual time for an injection, the animal took hold of the experimenter, pulled him toward the room where the injection was given, picked up the syringe, gave it to him, and bent over for its injection, which was given in the rump. Here, as in the case of human morphine addicts, there is doubtless an acquired physiological need for the drug. The cure of drug addicts is especially difficult to accomplish, partly because actual illness follows withdrawal of the drug.²

LIFE GOALS

When we consider motives like the desire to become a doctor, a sailor, a lawyer, a banker, a merchant, or a teacher, the roots spread in so many directions that it is all but impossible to follow them. Every individual's life goal, even when it is shared with others, has somewhat different origins. One may wish to be a doctor because he sees it as a good way to make a living, because his childhood curiosity about bodily functions was never satisfied; because, in his play activities as a boy, he obtained satisfaction out of doctoring other children with the aid of the toy doctor's kit which somebody gave him; because religious teachings have imbued him with the idea of serving his fellow men and he sees the doctor as a servant of mankind, because his pals are going to be doctors; or perhaps for any one of a hundred other reasons. Sometimes a combination of influences like those mentioned underlies one's selection of a life goal.

Many different activities may have a common motivation

It is often apparent, when we investigate a person's life history, that the individual's many different activities have a common theme — are similarly motivated. Sometimes

the motive is a desire for recognition, and sometimes it is a desire merely to become self-dependent. The so-called "will to power" is often suggested as the connecting thread.

While personal histories differ in details, most of them suggest that a predominant motive is established in childhood, largely through the influence of social contacts. As the individual gets older, one activity after another may be taken up while others, which no longer contribute to satisfaction of the predominant motive, or which contribute less than the new activity, are dropped.

It quite frequently happens that frustration early in childhood creates a strong desire for recognition, for mastery, or for self-assertion. The aggression of men like Hitler has been attributed to early frustration. Adler has claimed that the frustrations of childhood create in most of us a "will to power." At least it is clear that, if an individual has some predominant motive, like a desire for recognition, it is a "thread" which runs through many different activities

Predominant motives and specific acts

Many activities other than those related directly to life goals contribute to satisfaction of a single motive. Suppose, for example, that you are hungry and wish to eat. You perhaps open one door, go downstairs, open another door, walk across the campus, open still another door, walk to a counter, take up a tray, pass down the line, picking up one dish after another, pay the cashier, sit down, and begin to eat. If one asks, "Why did you open the door?" "Why did you cross the campus?" and the like, he gets his answer in terms of the fact that you wished to eat and these acts each contributed to that goal. Each act, meaningless by itself, was meaningful in terms of the motive which predominated at the time.³

LEVELS OF ASPIRATION

In choosing life goals and in undertaking everyday activities, individuals differ widely in their level of aspiration — that is to say, in their expectations of accomplishment or in the

demands which they make upon themselves. One individual, let us say, aspires to become a cab driver; another a doctor. Some expect to attain a salary of ten thousand dollars per year while others expect to attain only two thousand dollars. Likewise, if you ask individuals how accurately or how quickly they can perform a particular task, some will set for themselves a high level of accomplishment and others a much lower level.

General observation and laboratory investigations show that one's level of aspiration is usually modified from time to time in terms of his success or failure in attaining his goals. Students who aspire to be physicians, but find the premedical requirements beyond them, eventually lower their level of aspiration. Some then aspire to be dentists. One student, known to the writer, aspired successfully to becoming a physician, a dentist, and a mortician. The latter occupations are, of course, worth while and necessary, but for one who first aspires to become a physician, they represent a lowered level of aspiration. One value of aptitude testing, to be considered in Chapter 24, is that it facilitates the setting of a level of aspiration which is in keeping with possibilities of attainment. Some of the unhappiest people in the world are college students who, because of insufficient intelligence, consistently fail to meet the standards required, or have exceptional difficulty in meeting these standards. The same individuals would be far happier if their parents had ascertained earlier in their lives the things that they might be expected to accomplish successfully or without abnormal strain. Some of them would then have been encouraged to develop goals along these rather than along educational lines. Many an unhappy student might, under these circumstances, have been a happy mechanic or clerk instead.

Some individuals enter academic work with the goal of getting a B A and then entering a nonacademic field. Finding themselves successful beyond their original anticipation, however, they often go ahead to the Ph.D. and become teachers themselves. In other

words, while failure tends to lower the level of aspiration, success tends to raise it.

In many of the laboratory investigations on levels of aspiration, subjects have been asked to indicate what level of performance they will undertake to achieve on a familiar task such as solving puzzles, placing pegs in holes, tracing through mazes, or doing arithmetic problems. They then perform the task one or more times. After this, they are told their actual performance and asked to state their level of aspiration for a further performance of the task. This is continued for a number of trials. Sometimes an individual is not told his actual accomplishment, but is given a fictitious score which he believes to be his own. Sometimes he is told that others have accomplished a particular score on the task. This is to test the significance of social influences. Finally, the differences between levels of aspiration and levels of actual achievement are determined. The experimenter then calculates how success or failure in meeting the designated level influences the level of aspiration.

The results of these investigations are not easily summarized. In general, the level of aspiration stays pretty close to actual performance, but there is a tendency for it to remain above rather than below actual performance. There is a tendency, too, for the individual to raise his goal after success more than to lower it after failure. The influence of social factors is suggested by the observation that individuals tend to raise their level of aspiration when told that average performance, especially of a group regarded as inferior, is above their own.⁴

FORCE OF HABIT

Habits originally acquired under the influence of one or more motives may persist, probably in the service of other motives, even after the initial motives have ceased to exist. This is sometimes referred to as *functional autonomy* of habits.⁵

Habitual ways of satisfying the same motive also tend to persist. For example, if we

satisfy the hunger drive by eating foods prepared in a certain way, there is often resistance to eating foods prepared in some other way. Likewise, if an older person's need for rest and recreation is customarily satisfied by sitting quietly at home, perhaps reading, he may resist the suggestion that he go to a movie or to a bridge party. In other words, habit forces us "into a rut." This phenomenon is often referred to as the "force of habit," as though habits once formed act somewhat as drives, impelling us to continue the accustomed ways instead of taking up new ways of satisfying our motives. The social significance of this tendency for habits once formed to persist is indicated in the following quotation from William James.⁶

Habit is the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and the deck hand at sea through the winter, it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log cabin and his lonely farm through all the months of snow, it protects us from invasion by the natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again. It keeps different social strata from mixing. Already at the age of twenty-five, you see the professional mannerism settling down on the young commercial traveler, on the young doctor, on the young minister, on the young counselor-at-law. You see the little lines of cleavage running through the character, the tricks of thought, the prejudices, the ways of the "shop," in a word, from which the man can by and by no more escape than his coat-sleeve can suddenly fall into a new set of folds.

James may have exaggerated somewhat the permanency of habitual modes of behavior, for people often do change their prejudices and, during war or other emergencies, their ways of living. However, there is strong re-

sistance to change. Anyone who wishes to change the behavior of an adult must take into consideration his tendency to persist in his well-formed habits.

UNCONSCIOUS MOTIVATION

The fact that individuals are not always aware of the motives which underlie their acts is well recognized. Phobias, or abnormal fears of particular objects or situations, often exemplify unconscious motivation.

A Midwestern English professor had, as long as he could remember, an intense fear of going more than a few blocks from his home. This fear was so strong that he had always lived in the same house and within a narrowly circumscribed area. He did not know the basis for his fear. During the course of psychoanalysis he recalled that, as a child of three, he wandered from his mother over to the railroad tracks. A train coming into the station rushed by and he was scalded by the steam. Although he failed to remember the incident until adulthood, the fear aroused by it had motivated him to stay near his home. The professor's book, entitled *The Locomotive God*, gives an account of the effect of this incident on his subsequent conduct.⁷

A girl had a fear of running water which was so strong that it required the combined efforts of several members of her household to bathe her. Even when she went to school, the sound of a drinking fountain frightened her. While riding on the train, she lowered the curtain so that she would not see streams over which the train passed. The girl, even at the age of twenty, did not know why she acted in this way. However, when she was twenty an aunt whom she had not seen for thirteen years came to visit the girl. The aunt's first words on again meeting her were, "I have never told." This led the girl to recall an accident which she experienced at the age of seven years while walking in the woods with her aunt. The child had promised her mother, when she left, that she would be strictly obedient. However, she ran off from the aunt and, when found, was wedged among the rocks of a small stream into which she had fallen. A small waterfall was pouring down on her head and she was screaming with terror. Her aunt dried the child's clothes and promised that she would never tell the mother of her disobedience.⁸

Post-hypnotic suggestion

Post-hypnotic suggestion provides another good example of unconscious motivation. The subject is hypnotized (see also pp. 13-14) and told that when he wakes up he will remember nothing of what has happened. He is then told that, upon waking, he will perform a certain act. After he is awake, the subject then feels a compulsion to carry out the act suggested, but he does not know why.

A girl (S) in a psychology class was hypnotized in the following manner. She reclined in an easy-chair and fixated a bright object placed above her head in such a position that her eyes were strained upwards in order to keep it in view. While she was thus fixating the object, the hypnotist (H) said, "Your eyes are becoming tired. Your limbs are tired. You are falling into a deep sleep. You will sleep until I tell you to awake. You will do everything that you are told, but you will remember nothing of this experience . . ." This continued in a monotone until S's eyelids began to tremble and difficulty in keeping the eyes open was apparent. Then H said, "Your eyelids are trembling. Your eye muscles are tired. Your eyes are closing. They are closing tighter, tighter, tighter. Now you cannot open your eyes. Try, but you cannot open them." S tried to open her eyes, but without success. To make sure that she was not faking the performance, H told her that her right hand was getting numb and that she would soon have no feeling in it. After a few such suggestions, with occasional stroking of the hand, H squeezed up the loose skin on the hand and stuck a sterilized needle completely through it. The subject made no response at all. When H touched the other hand with the point of the needle, it was quickly withdrawn. The right hand was similarly withdrawn from a needle after the suggestion, "Feeling has now returned to your right hand."

Certain, now, that S was deeply hypnotized, H said, "After I have counted ten, you will wake up. You will then return to your seat and be wide awake. When I scratch my head during the course of the lecture, you will get up from your seat and go to my office, where you will find a laboratory coat hanging behind the door. You will bring the coat here, into the classroom, and put it on me. I may not want to put it on, but you must get it on me." H then said, "One-two-three — you are waking up — four-five — you are becoming wider awake —

six-seven-eight — you are getting wide awake — nine — you are almost awake — ten — you are awake.” S opened her eyes, looked a little embarrassed, and returned to her seat. When asked, she said that she remembered nothing that happened from the time she felt her eyes getting tired until she woke up. H continued with the lecture and, several minutes later, scratched his head. The subject sat still, but looked a little uneasy. However, the lecture was continued. A minute or so later, S, with a great deal of hesitation, left the room. Shortly she returned with the laboratory coat. She said to H, “You had better put this on.” H said that he didn’t need it. S insisted, saying, “It is rather cold in here and this will keep you warm.” H insisted that he did not need it, that the room wasn’t cold enough to put it on. S now became very insistent. She tried to get H’s arm in the sleeve, insisting, now, that chalk might get on his clothes if he didn’t put on his coat. After a few minutes, S began to plead with H to put on the coat. Thus he finally did. S then seemed greatly relieved and returned to her seat.

When asked why she had done what she did, S said that she didn’t know. She said that the idea occurred to her when the instructor scratched his head, but, realizing how silly it was, she decided not to do it. Finally, she could not resist. S said she knew she would feel better if the impulse were followed.

Under the influence of hypnosis, patients have been told that cigarettes will nauseate them, that they will dislike the taste of alcohol, or that they will concentrate better on their studies. The suggested effects are experienced, for varying lengths of time, but the patient usually does not know why he is nauseated by the cigarette, dislikes alcohol, or is so much better able to concentrate on his studies.⁹

Unconscious basis of attitudes

Our attitudes toward other people often have a basis of which we are not aware. The gentlemen who prefer blondes may have had pleasant experiences in childhood while playing with blondes or while being handled by blondes — or, these gentlemen may have been subjected to unpleasant experiences in their associations with brunettes — yet they do

not know why they are attracted to blondes more than to brunettes. To take another example of such unconscious motivation, a psychologist reports:

I met a man named Snyder, and for some peculiar reason felt constantly suspicious of him. . . . I could find no definite reason for disliking him, until one day it occurred to me that a number of years previously I had read a story in which a person named Snyder was a thoroughgoing villain. Having thought of this explanation, all my ill feeling departed and the real Mr. Snyder became a very good friend of mine.¹⁰

Slips of the tongue

Psychoanalysts, as mentioned in Chapter 1, give especial emphasis to unconscious motivation. Even slips of the tongue, forgetting of appointments, and other simple acts of everyday life are traced to motives of which the individual may not be aware at the moment. Thus, the bored hostess, after an insufferable evening, said, not what she intended (but what she meant): “Well, good-bye, I’m so sorry you came.” Likewise, the deb at a dance, much interested in a certain young gentleman, intended to ask him when he was going to dance with her, but instead asked, “When are you going to marry me?”¹¹ There is no good reason for supposing that all such lapses are unconsciously motivated — some may be purely accidental — but there is no doubt that many have such motivation.

INCENTIVES AND EFFORT

Incentives are the objects or goals toward which motivated behavior is directed. In a sense we may regard them as inducements to act. In experiments on animal learning, we offer the animal food, sex, water, a means of escape from punishment, a means of returning to familiar surroundings, or perhaps an opportunity to return to her young. Food, sex, water, and opportunities to return to a more desirable situation are inducements to effort — in other words, incentives. It is perhaps obvious that these are incentives only if the animal is hungry, sexually aroused, or placed

in an undesirable situation. To an animal whose stomach is full, food is no incentive at all

Incentives such as we have mentioned are also effective, under suitable physiological and external circumstances, in arousing human action. In the home, classroom, and industry, however, the incentives used are indirectly, if at all, related to basic physiological drives.

Monetary incentives

Money may satisfy the hunger drive by making possible the purchase of food. Its incentive value then rests upon satisfaction of hunger. On the other hand, people who are not hungry, and who do not need additional money in order to satisfy hunger, are still induced by money to put forth much effort in the performance of various tasks. In some instances they are motivated, not by hunger, but by a knowledge of the fact that money will buy clothes which enhance their attractiveness to the opposite sex. In other instances money has incentive value because it provides a means of gaining prestige, and thus satisfying social motives such as self-assertion and the desire for recognition. This by no means exhausts the motives, physiological, social, or personal, which money may tap. The following table offers an interesting example of the many motives which money may satisfy and, in terms of independent estimates by two groups, the per cent of expenditures allotted to each motive.¹²

TABLE 5. PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTALS OF 33 ITEMS OF EXPENDITURE AFTER ALLOTMENT (I) BY PSYCHOLOGISTS AND (II) BY ECONOMISTS, EXPERTS IN HOME ECONOMICS, ETC.

(Data from Thorndike)

	I	II
Hunger	11.2	11.3
Protection against cold, heat, wet	10.2	9.8
Exercise	.4	.7
Sleep, rest	2.6	2.0
Sex relief...	.8	.9
Reproduce species...	1.9	.8

	I	II
Protection against animals and diseases	4.4	4.1
Protection against bad people	2.5	1.5
Reduce or avoid pain	3.5	2.3
Pleasures of taste and smell	4.6	4.8
Pleasures of sight and sound	3.9	5.2
Sex entertainment	3.9	4.1
Security	10.5	11.2
Affection (to get it)	1.8	1.9
Companionship	2.3	2.3
Approval of others	7.2	7.2
Approval of one's self	4.0	3.8
Mastery over others	3.0	1.8
The welfare of others	7.2	8.6
Mental activity	1.9	2.3
Curiosity and exploration	1.8	2.3
Social entertainment	4.2	6.7
Physical entertainment	1.1	1.3
Comfort not in above	4.5	3.0

It is often said that "every man has his price" — that if you offer sufficient monetary incentive you can induce him to do anything that you wish, even commit murder. It is interesting, therefore, to examine the results of a study in which individuals were asked how much money would induce them to suffer specific mutilations (such as having all of their teeth pulled out) and to commit certain acts (as spitting on a crucifix), against which there is usually much resistance in civilized human beings.¹³

TABLE 6. VALUATIONS OF CERTAIN MUTILATIONS, DEPRIVATIONS, ETC.

(Data from Thorndike)

Item	Median amount demanded by students and teachers of psychology
Have all your teeth pulled out..	\$1,000,000
Have one ear cut off	No sum
Have a little finger of one hand cut off	75,000
Become unable to taste	1,000,000
Have to live all the rest of your life outside of U.S.A.	200,000
Have to live all the rest of your life in Japan	1,000,000
Have to live all the rest of your life shut up in an apartment in New York City. You can have friends come to see you there, but cannot go out of the apartment..	No sum

Eat a dead beetle one inch long . . .	5,000
Drink enough to become thoroughly intoxicated	100
Choke a stray cat to death	10,000
Let a harmless snake five feet long coil itself round your arms and head	500
Attend Sunday morning service in St. Patrick's Cathedral, and in the mid- dle of the service run down the aisle to the altar, yelling, "The time has come, the time has come," as loud as you can until you are dragged out	100,000
Take a sharp knife and cut a pig's throat	1,000
Spit on a crucifix	300
Go without sugar in all forms (includ- ing cake, etc.), tea, coffee, tobacco, and alcoholic drink, for a year	1,750

It should be recognized, of course, that there may be quite a difference between imagining what amount of money would induce you to perform an act, with a full knowledge that the money never will be offered, and actually having the money placed before you. Many a student who said he would require one hundred dollars to swallow a goldfish might, especially if he were "hard up" at the time, perform the act for ten dollars cash in hand.

Incentives in industry

The fact that piece work and bonuses induce workers to put forth increased effort is well known. Introducing such wage incentives often increases the output even of highly skilled workers¹⁴ However, interests and attitudes aroused in workers toward their jobs, toward the management, and toward each other are often as significant as material incentives.

An experiment carried out at the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company over a number of years seemed to show that increased pay, shorter hours of work, improved lighting and ventilation, rest pauses, and refreshment periods were inducing girls to increase their output of electric relays. Each time a new incentive was introduced, production went up. However, when the girls were returned to the original working conditions, their output not only failed to drop to former

levels, but it continued to improve. The conclusion finally forced upon the investigators was that the girls were motivated not so much by external incentives as by increased morale related to the fact that they were selected for the experiment and that the company was apparently interested in them as individuals rather than as mere cogs in the industrial machine. Moreover, common interests and attitudes relating to their experiment gave the girls an *esprit de corps* which went beyond that usually found in industrial situations.

Capitalizing on the findings of this experiment, the company introduced an interview system whereby each employee could air his criticisms to, and talk about personal problems with, a person who would listen and report to the management, but without divulging names. Better morale was thereby introduced because the workers felt that the management was interested in them as persons.¹⁵

INTERESTS AND ATTITUDES

Interests and attitudes are learned predispositions to react in certain ways to aspects of our environment. A hungry animal is more receptive to food than to other aspects of its environment. Similarly, the student interested in science may be more receptive to physics than he is to English literature, the person who has a negative attitude toward the Democratic Party is thereby more likely to see the platform of this party in an unfavorable light and the platform of the Republican Party in a favorable light. Interests and attitudes thus provide further illustration of the fact that, instead of responding indiscriminately to every stimulus which impinges upon our nervous system, we react selectively — we exhibit personal autonomy or self-regulation.

Interests

Both interests and attitudes predispose the organism to react in certain ways, both are learned, and both may be tinged with feeling and emotion. Interests, however, are always positively directed. We are interested in a

person, an occupation, a hobby, or a book. The individual usually likes the things in which he is interested. We would not say that he was interested in something for which he had an aversion. Moreover, interests are usually active rather than passive. We seek to do the things which interest us.¹⁶

An interest is accompanied by pleasant feeling and by a dynamic tendency to seek the object or do something with it . . . interest in the movies means that one enjoys attending them and does so. . . . A measurement of one's interests is also a measurement of what one will do, other things being equal. . . . As one does not long continue to like what one cannot do, it is also to be expected that a measurement of one's interests is approximately a measurement of what one can do.

Interests may be acquired in early childhood or later. Some change a great deal with age and some are maintained throughout life. They are usually developed in relation to, and remain allied to, more basic motives. In satisfying his need for activity, or perhaps his curiosity, or both, a child may, for example, play with toy trains, go to the railroad station to watch the trains coming and going, read about trains, and so on. This interest in trains, perhaps begun with a train trip, receipt of a toy train, or the like, may be retained through the years until, in adulthood, the individual finds his career in some aspect of railroading. On the other hand, through fortuitous circumstances, such as receiving a gift of something more enticing than toy trains, moving to a new locality, and being preoccupied with school, the boy's interest in trains may become secondary, or even disappear. He may turn his attention elsewhere.

As suggested in the preceding quotation, an inventory of an individual's interests may point to the vocations in which he is most likely to succeed. This aspect of the problem is considered in Chapter 24.

Attitudes

Whereas interests are always positive in direction, attitudes may be positively or negatively directed. Our attitude toward a politi-

cal party, a person, a race, a nation, a book, or a movie may, if we have any attitude at all, be favorable or unfavorable. Interests are directed toward specific objects and persons, while attitudes tend to be broader in scope, being directed among other things, toward races, nations, institutions, groups, and general ideas and issues. Moreover, attitudes are more passive than interests. We are more likely to have attitudes and do nothing about them than we are to have interests and do nothing about them. Nevertheless, when we are called upon to make decisions, to act, and to express opinions, our attitudes determine the outcome just as strongly as do our interests. As a matter of fact, attitudes are usually defined as *determining tendencies*.

Attitudes toward races, nations, ideas, institutions, and the like, are sometimes referred to as *prejudices*, because such attitudes lead us to prejudge an issue. Thus, if we are prejudiced against a person who is accused of a crime, we are likely to regard him as guilty, regardless of the evidence; or, if we examine the evidence, we do so with partiality, giving more weight to the damaging than to the exonerating evidence. We can also be prejudiced in favor of some individual or thing. Thus, our country can do no wrong, our children are the most beautiful and best-behaved, and our school is beyond criticism, at least from an outsider. When the word "prejudice" is used without qualification, however, it customarily refers to a negative attitude.

Psychologists have devised scales by means of which an individual's attitudes, and their direction, may be gauged. We have scales for measuring attitudes toward radicalism, the church, evolution, communism, birth control, and races other than our own, to mention only a few. The best-known and most widely used attitude scales are those developed along the lines laid down by Thurstone.¹⁷ Some excerpts from one of these scales, that on *Attitude Toward War*,¹⁸ follow:

Compulsory military training in all countries should be reduced but not eliminated.

The benefits of war outweigh its attendant evils.

He who refuses to fight is a true hero.

An organization of all nations is imperative to establish peace.

War in the modern world is as needless as it is suicidal.

The individual who fills out this attitude blank, containing twenty-two statements like the above, is asked to put a check mark against each statement with which he agrees, a cross against each statement with which he disagrees, and a question mark against those statements about which he is unable to decide. After the individual has filled out the blank, the statements checked are noted and their scale values recorded.

Scale values are determined, while the scale is being developed, by requiring a large group of judges to assign each statement a value from 1 (extremely militaristic) to 11 (extremely pacifistic). Judges are not called upon to say whether or not they agree with the statement, but merely to say, for example, whether the statement, "War in the modern world is as needless as it is suicidal," represents an attitude in favor of or against war, and to assign it a value between the two extreme values of 1 and 11. Each judge assigns a value to each statement selected tentatively for inclusion in the scale. Then, by a statistical method which we need not consider here, the midpoint of the series of values assigned to each statement is determined. Those statements concerning the value of which the judges are in close agreement are selected for the final scale.

The scale values of the statements listed above in order from top to bottom are 5.4, 2.7, 10.6, 7.0, and 9.5. One can see that the first statement, according to the judges, represents a neutral attitude (halfway between 1 and 11). The statement most in favor of war is the second, with a value of 2.7. On the other hand, the third statement, with a value of 10.6, represents a pacifistic attitude.

An individual's score is the middlemost value of the series of values of the endorsed statements. The other statements are ignored. Thus, an individual who endorsed

such diverse statements as those used here for illustrative purposes would have the score 7.0, which indicates "strong pacifism." When the number of statements endorsed is even, the two middle ones in the series are averaged.

Attitude scales have many practical and scientific uses. Suppose you represent an organization interested in spreading pacifistic teachings. If you know beforehand which individuals or groups are already pacifistic, you can save your propaganda for the neutrals and the militaristically inclined. Much research has been reported on changes in attitudes resulting from such influences as a college education, change of residence from one part of the country to another (say North to South), various types of propaganda (emotional versus rational appeals), persuasion through the radio or the printed page, seeing moving pictures, or listening to female rather than male speakers. Such changes in attitude are often measured by using comparable forms of an attitude scale, one form given before and the other after the experimental variable has been introduced.¹⁹

SUMMARY

In this chapter we have indicated certain complexities of personal motivation. Personal motives may acquire the urgency which characterizes physiological drives. All personal motives with the possible exception of drug addictions have a social origin — that is, they are acquired through social contacts.

Life goals often have their origins in early experiences. Many different activities have a common motivation. Even the sequential acts associated with short-term goals, like satisfaction of hunger at noontime, derive meaning from their common motive or goal.

Aspirations, while sometimes set for us by our elders without any recognition of our ability to achieve, are usually determined by actual success or failure in relevant activities. Success tends to raise and failure to lower the level of aspiration related to specific tasks, such as those studied in the psychological laboratory.

Habitual ways of satisfying motives often persist despite inducements to substitute new activities. This persistence is often known as force of habit. It has great significance for society.

Unconscious motivation is illustrated by phobias whose origin is unknown to the person who has them, response to post-hypnotic suggestions, attitudes of obscure origin, and slips of the tongue. The point of our discussion is that many of the motives which markedly influence behavior, as well as the origins of the motives, are unrecognized by the individual whose behavior they influence.

The use of appropriate incentives arouses increased effort in human beings. Monetary incentives are especially important in our so-

ciety. Knowledge that an employer is interested in one as an individual is another important motivating factor in industry.

Interests and attitudes, although differing in certain respects, are considered together because both predispose individuals to react in different ways to the same external situations. Interests are positively directed, are directed toward specific goals, and are active or dynamic. Attitudes, on the other hand, may be positive or negative in direction, are usually directed toward general situations or issues, and are often more passive than interests. Interests and attitudes may be measured. We have suggested some of the practical and scientific values of interest inventories and attitude scales.

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Chapter 14

Conflict

WHEN THE SATISFACTION of drives or motives is prevented or delayed, the individual is thrown into a state generally known as *conflict*. Several incidental references to conflict have been made in preceding chapters, although frustration or thwarting, rather than the conflict which they produce, were specifically mentioned. We pointed out, for example, that drives may appear stronger when satisfaction is prevented, or made difficult, than when it is easily attained. Thus, the human sex drive seems stronger in our society than the hunger drive. We indicated, moreover, that frustration of basic physiological motives is a potent factor in development of such common social motives as acquisitiveness, self-assertion, and pugnacity. Our discussion of life goals illustrated the fact that early frustration may produce feelings of inferiority and an abnormally strong desire to achieve recognition.

Conflict is so inevitable an aspect of everyday life and so significant a basis of psychological abnormalities that it warrants a more detailed discussion than we have so far given it. The following discussion deals with the chief sources of conflict; the representation of conflict situations in terms of the attracting and repelling properties of objects, situations, and various alternative actions; some normal and abnormal psychological reactions to conflict; and the rôle of conflicting motives in voluntary behavior.

SOURCES OF CONFLICT

The chief sources of conflict are: (1) environmental obstructions to the satisfaction

of motives, (2) personal deficiencies which directly or indirectly (through the responses of others) interfere with satisfaction of motives, and (3) conflicting motives.

Environmental obstructions may be social or nonsocial. For example, other persons (parents, friends, representatives of the law and so on) may stand in the way of satisfaction, or we may be thwarted by drought, famine, accidents, or other aspects of the physical environment.

Personal defects, such as low intelligence, poor aptitude for a selected vocation, or poor memory, may prevent us from making good grades, succeeding in our chosen field, or, in general, reaching aspired levels of achievement. Deformities may prevent us from engaging in athletics, from succeeding in certain occupations, or even from marrying. Inability to get along with others (or defective social intelligence) may prevent us from getting into a fraternity or sorority or from having the friends and social prestige which we desire.

Conflicting motives force upon us the making of difficult decisions. They put us "between the devil and the deep blue sea." This type of conflict is undoubtedly much more prevalent and much more devastating, from the standpoint of mental health, than the others mentioned above. Confronted by alternatives which cannot easily be resolved, animals and human beings often have "nervous breakdowns" or "go to pieces" emotionally. None of us, however sheltered from environmental frustration and however free of personal defects, can escape such conflict.

Shall we study or go to the movies? Shall we

take a trip or save our money? Shall we buy this or that dress? Shall we take this position or that? Shall we marry Janet or Mary? Shall we be brave and stand our ground or run away and save our lives? Shall we bear our disappointment or get drunk and forget it for a time? Shall we be honest at all costs or take a little graft when it comes our way? Shall we marry and have a home of our own, or obey the wishes of our widowed mother that we devote our life solely to her?

In many situations we are pulled in this direction and that, attracted by certain alternatives and repelled by others (Figure 106)

Sometimes, like the well-known ass situated at an equal distance from two equally enticing bales of hay, we are called upon to choose between alternatives which are equally attrac-

tive or equally repelling. The ass, according to legend, starved in the midst of plenty because he could not make up his mind which bale to eat. Many of us live in a state of unhappiness and anxiety because we are unable to resolve conflicts. Some of us run away. Some attempt to lessen the unhappiness by various forms of subterfuge, several of which will be considered later. Those of us who are wise face our conflicts realistically and, either alone or with the help of others, force a resolution of them. It is an interesting thing that, when one alternative has been chosen, the others often appear less attractive. The man who tosses a coin to see whether he will propose to Jane or Mary might go about reaching a decision more intelligently, but he may find



Figure 106 To Spank or Not to Spank

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that, after Jane accepts him, Mary loses much of her attraction for him.

TOPOLOGICAL REPRESENTATION OF CONFLICT SITUATIONS

An interesting and illuminating method of representing and analyzing conflict situations is that of Lewin¹ and his followers. It utilizes the geometric concept of topology to represent the person in his world and it considers the attracting aspects (incentives) and the repelling aspects (deterrents) of this world as having, respectively, positive and negative *valences*. The intensities and directions of the forces playing upon the individual are known as *vectors*. A situation involving a choice between alternatives, one more attractive than the other, is represented as in Figure 107.

Conflict situations are those in which the attracting or repelling forces are equally, or almost equally, balanced. Figure 108 illustrates three typical conflict situations as envisaged by topological psychology. In *A* the satisfaction of a motive is blocked by a physical barrier. However, the barrier could be either a parental admonition not to get the toy or inability to reach it because of a physical defect. A woman's ideal of chastity serving as a barrier to marriage might similarly be represented. In *B* the child wants to climb a tree, from which he expects that he may fall,




Figure 107. Topological Representation of a Simple Choice Situation Involving Only Two Alternatives

Plus signs indicate that the valences are positive—that is, that the alternatives are both attractive to the individual concerned. The larger + indicates that this is the stronger of the two positive valences. Arrows represent the direction in which the person (*P*) is pulled or repelled. The longer arrow represents the stronger pull. We see, therefore, that *P* is represented as being more strongly attracted to alternative *X* (decision, *D*) than to alternative *Y*. (After Wright, H., in Barker, Kounin, and Wright's "Child Behavior and Development." New York: McGraw-Hill, 1943, p. 380.)




Figure 108. Topological Representation of Conflict Situations

(*A*) *G*, the goal object (say, a toy) is beyond reach because of the physical barrier *B*, which has acquired a negative valence because of its frustrating and, perhaps, painful effects.

(*B*) *Tr* represents a tree which the child *C* wishes to climb, but from which he is afraid he will fall. The desire to climb and the fear of anticipated injury have + and - valences, respectively. If they balance, as here suggested, the child does not climb.

(*C*) Performance of a distasteful task, *T*, and the threat of punishment for not performing it, *P*, both have negative valences. If they are equally distasteful, as suggested in the illustration by the valences of equal size and by equivalent vectors (arrows in the same direction and of equal length), the child may move out of the field of conflict either directly (by running away) or indirectly (by imagining that it does not exist).

and he also wants to escape the anticipated injury. If the positive and negative valences balance, the child does not climb the tree. He may move away under the influence of other attractions. He may, however, provide himself with some safeguard, thus reducing the negative valence and resolving the conflict. In *C* we have a child confronted by the demand that he perform a certain act or be punished. If the valences balance, running away, day-dreaming, or some other manner of leaving the field, may result.²

When confronted by conflicting alternatives in everyday life, we usually find that one or another alternative, upon reflection, is more attractive or more repellent than the other. When decisions are difficult to reach, we may find Benjamin Franklin's method of great value. In a letter to Joseph Priestley, he said:

In the affair of so much importance to you, wherein you ask my advice, I cannot, for want of sufficient premises, advise you what to determine, but, if you please, I will tell you how. When those difficult cases occur, they are difficult, chiefly because, while we have them under consideration, all the reasons pro and con are not present to the mind at the same time, but sometimes one set present themselves, and at other times another, the first being out of sight. Hence the various purposes or inclinations that alternately prevail, and the uncertainty that perplexes us.

To get over this, my way is, to divide half a sheet of paper by a line into two columns, writing over the one *Pro* and over the other *Con*. Then during three or four days' consideration, I put down under the different heads short hints of the different motives, that at different times occur to me, for or against the measure. When I have thus got them altogether in one view, I endeavor to estimate their respective weights, and where I find two, one on each side, that seem equal, I strike them both out. If I judge some two reasons con equal to some three reasons pro, I strike out five, and thus proceeding, I find where the balance lies, and if after a day or two of further consideration, nothing new that is of importance occurs on either side, I come to a determination accordingly. And tho' the weight of reasons cannot be taken with precision of algebraic quantities, yet, when each is thus considered separately and comparatively, and the whole lies before me, I think I can judge better, and am less liable to make a rash step, and in fact I have found great advantage from this kind of equation, in what may be called moral or prudential algebra.

Sometimes events themselves solve a problem for us by changing the situation — for instance, the problem of whether to marry Mary or Jane, is resolved when somebody else marries Jane.

Wise parents control the behavior of their children, at least to some extent, by offering alternatives which are obviously more attractive (or more repellent) than others.

A child came home from school with plans to attend an amusement park with several of her friends. Her parents felt that the park was not a fit place for young children to go unaccompanied. However, the children had made their plans. The next day, a school holiday, they were going early in the morning and were to stay all day. Many a mother would say, "You can't go!" — perhaps giving the reasons for her objections — and arouse antagonism. The mother in question solved the problem without eliciting the display of emotion which such parental frustration might arouse. She agreed to let the child go, then dropped the matter for a time. At the supper table, however, she said, "Mary, since you are going to — park tomorrow and will be out all day, I think I'll go into town in the morning, do some shopping I've been wanting to do for some time, eat my lunch downtown, and go to see a movie. I'll be home in plenty of time to get your supper." The mother knew well enough the attractiveness of the respective alternatives. After a moment or two of hesitation, the child said, "Mother, do you suppose that I could go with you if I don't go to — park?" The mother said, "Why, if you'd rather do that, we can go downtown together."

A child of three insisted that he was going to take his teddy bear to Nursery School. His father said, "All right, you may take it." Then, after a few minutes, the father said, "People are going to say, 'Look at that baby carrying a teddy bear to school.'" The child replied, "I'm not a baby. I'm a big boy!" Then he said, "I think I'll leave Teddy home, he might get a cold." His father knew that the desire to be thought a big boy was more potent than the desire to take the teddy bear.

SOME REACTIONS TO CONFLICT

Trial and error

The most common reaction to frustrating external conditions is to remove or get around them. This often involves trying the various procedures which may occur to us until one of them succeeds or until we are forced to give in. The general trial-and-error process is already familiar to us.

Frustration resulting from personal defects may also be dealt with by trial and error, especially where the defects are susceptible to remedy. One could not change his intelligence or repair the ravages of infantile paralysis by trial and error, but he might, if he knew it to be the source of his difficulty, change some aspect of his appearance or behavior. Many girls make themselves more attractive to the opposite sex by experimenting with this and that cosmetic, this and that coiffure, or this and that type of dress. There are even "charm schools" where girls whose desire for affection is thwarted by lack of attractiveness are "remodeled" in various ways. Even plastic surgery has its place in this connection. Almost any girl can produce marked changes in looks and demeanor if she gives the problem her attention.

The chief difficulty is that many individuals, thwarted by personal defects, do not realize the source of their trouble and quite often their friends hesitate to make any suggestions. As we shall point out in more detail shortly, those with personal defects are often ready to attribute their difficulties to almost anything else than to the defects in themselves.

When conflict comes from incompatible motives, trial and error may also be helpful. If one does not know whether he should go into selling or teaching, or major in sociology or psychology, he can at least gain as much relevant information as possible about each and perhaps also try his hand in each field.

Then, too, he may list the pros and cons for each alternative and see where these seem to lead.

Trial-and-error reactions to conflict may be external or internal. We may try one thing or another actually or implicitly — that is, in imagination.

Unresolved conflict may produce a variety of reactions short of mental breakdown. In some instances conflict cannot, at least in any direct way, be resolved. The person with handicaps which cannot be remedied is doomed to conflict of one sort or another.

Likewise, the person who does not face his problems realistically — who fails to seek the source and remove it — is doomed to continued conflict.

Some of the reactions resulting from unresolved conflict are compensatory in nature. Indeed, certain psychologists have taken over the term *homeostasis* (see p. 199) to designate such compensatory changes.³ They point out that, much as the physiological structures react to compensate for any threat to the constant state of the organism, so a person reacts to compensate for a threat to his self-respect, or to his ego, which he attempts to maintain at all costs. Both forms of homeostasis are compensatory, both may be more or less automatic or unconscious. But the analogy probably ends there. One psychologist has very aptly used the term *autocorrectivism* to designate psychological compensation.⁴

Compensatory reactions

The term *compensation* is most often used in psychology to refer: (1) to emphasis of a different motive when expression of one is blocked or (2) the substitution of one means of expressing a motive when another more direct means of expression is not possible. In both instances we have substitution — either of another motive or of a new form of expression of the same motive.

As an example of the first type of compensation we may take the man who, because his sex motive is thwarted, emphasizes strenuous athletics, or the unattractive girl who emphasizes scholarship.

Examples of the second form of compensation are the woman who desires children, but is unable to have any of her own, hence enters kindergarten work; the business man who, after having a morning scrap with his wife in which he couldn't answer back, takes it out on his employees; the individual whose desire for new experience is thwarted except when he reads a novel, or, better still, goes to the movies — where he can, vicariously at least, crawl on his belly through the jungles of Bataan, man a machine gun on the deck of a plunging

battleship undergoing air attack, or carry on a flirtation with Dorothy Lamour; the parent who, unable to have a college education himself, makes sacrifices so that his son can go, and then experiences vicariously all of his son's failures and successes; the man who, in a gabby world, finds joy in belonging to a secret society, or, in a humdrum world, can join a lodge and be a Thrice Exalted Knight of the Enchanted Realm; or the man who in his day-dreams finds riches which compensate for actual poverty. All of these are examples where one expression of a motive is blocked, but another serves, in some respect, the same purpose.

Two processes which we have suggested but not mentioned by name often play an important rôle in such compensation. One of these is *identification*, the other *phantasy*.

Identification

The man who gets satisfaction of his desire for new experience by following the hero of a novel or movie, and the parent who experiences the successes and failures of his child as though they were his own, are identifying. We say that the individual identifies himself with the characters in question. Some readers may remember the incident where a member of a Midwest football crowd ran into the field and tackled a player about to make a touchdown. He was identifying himself with the situation in general and perhaps specifically with the tackler who couldn't quite "make it." His identification was so intense that it led into "appropriate" action. Individuals often have palpitation of the heart, weep, grimace, and even cry out while identifying themselves with characters in the movies or on the stage.

Phantasy

This, as one will recall from the discussion of thinking, is the process involved in dreaming (day or night) where we go through certain acts in imagination. A good illustration of phantasy or day-dreaming occurred in Charlie Chaplin's film, *The Circus*. The situa-

tion was somewhat as follows: Charlie was in love with the girl on the flying trapeze, whose partner — a very big and hefty fellow — was his rival for her affections. Charlie is sitting in the tent watching the performance. Suddenly we see a ghostlike Charlie emerge from the real one, go up to the rival, knock him out, and walk off with the girl. But the man actually begins to descend from his trapeze. As he does so, the shadowy Charlie recedes into the real one, who slinks away despondent.

Phantasies become dangerous, from the standpoint of mental health, when they lose contact with reality by dealing with desires impossible of fulfillment; when they involve impractical solutions; and when they are continually substituted for the real thing, thus preventing an actual adjustment. Mental hospitals contain thousands of individuals whose dreams "have come true" to them. They have, as we say, "escaped from" or "lost contact" with reality. Among these are to be found "great inventors," and such characters as "Jesus Christ," "Joan of Arc," and "Queen Victoria." The writer has even seen a "Clark Gable."

Two other kinds of compensatory activity are associated with attempts to maintain self-respect in the face of failure. One of these is *belittling others*, and the other is *blaming others*.

Belittling others

The person whose ego is badly deflated often inflates it, so to speak, by thinking of or pointing out the faults of those who have succeeded where he has failed. Thus, the girl who fails to get into a sorority may point out that those who do so are a lot of handshakers, that they think more of politics than of scholarship, or that they are too cliquey a bunch anyhow. This makes her feel a little more happy with her lot. It may go to such an extreme that she is "glad" she didn't get in with such a bunch.

Blaming others

Students who fail courses, for example, often say that they had a "punk" teacher, that

the text was beyond comprehension, or that their class came at a bad hour. Sometimes they are right. In the majority of instances, however, such students are attempting to maintain self-respect at a high level by refusing to recognize their own faults. A student once said that the writer's chief weakness was an inability to make up exams that students like her could pass.

Blaming others is a dangerous reaction. Like excessive unrealistic day-dreaming, it may lead to insanity. Mental hospitals contain many people who place responsibility for their troubles upon others. They accuse others of putting ground glass in their food, of poisoning them, of throwing radio waves on them, and of perpetrating other criminal acts. It is apparently easier for them to do this than to admit their own shortcomings.

Overcompensation

Several forms of compensatory reaction have been indicated, but there remains another important reaction usually called *overcompensation*. Like other compensatory phenomena, this is associated with efforts to overcome threatened inferiority or threatened loss of self-respect. It is associated especially with conflict due to personal defects. As the name implies, overcompensation is a tendency to do more than remove the defect. The former weakling who does not stop when he has developed a normal body, but strives to become the "World's Strongest Man," is overcompensating for his original defect. Theodore Roosevelt and Helen Keller exemplify people who more than overcame their physical defects. Many "ugly ducklings" have become great actresses, and many people of small stature (Franco, Mussolini, Napoleon — to mention but a few) have become dictators or great military leaders. Many of the radicals in politics are obviously overcompensating for feelings of inferiority. A book dealing with psychology in politics traces the radical tendencies of several such individuals to childhood frustrations.

A form of overcompensation, but in re-

verse, is *self-repudiation*. The individual says, "Oh, I'm terribly dumb," "You know, I'm awfully homely," or, "I'm just not good for anything." The answer they desire is, "Of course you're not dumb," "I think you're beautiful," or, "You may not be able to cook, but you're a sweet little woman just the same." In many such instances the individual does not really feel inferior, but is merely "fishing" for compliments. He is rudely disappointed if the other person says, "That's right, you are dumb."

Self-repudiation sometimes develops to an extreme degree. In mental hospitals we find people who accuse themselves of sins, which they may or may not have committed, and who spend much of their time weeping and wailing. The writer knows one old lady who says sin has caused her to "lose her soul." She repeats over and over, "Lost my soul, lost my soul, lost my soul." She regards any effort to keep alive as a sin, so she will not eat or drink. Only forced feeding by means of a tube keeps her emaciated body alive. Such individuals stoutly maintain their sinfulness in the face of all attempts to show that, after all, they are no more sinful than most people. Some seem to enjoy the unique distinction of being "the greatest sinner of them all." Such individuals get more attention and recognition than they would enjoy if they were normal. This is undoubtedly the motivation in many cases of self-repudiation.

Projecting

Somewhat like certain of the compensatory reactions is that known as *projecting*. An individual "projects" himself when he attributes his thoughts or his desires to others. Projection is very often an indirect wish-fulfillment. Thus, the girl whose desire for response from men is frustrated may imagine that men have designs upon her. A college girl once known to the writer accused men of chasing her while she went home through a park. Upon investigation, however, it became apparent that she had not been chased. As the psychiatrist put it, "She wished that

men would chase her, the wish was father to the thought, and her imagination got the better of her."

Projection sometimes comes from feelings of guilt. If one has done something of which he is ashamed, he may imagine that people have found it out, and he may see relevant significance in their actions. A person who "felt like spitting on himself" got the idea that men whom he passed on the street wanted to spit on him.

Sometimes a person who feels guilty lessens this feeling by imagining that others are guilty too. For example, the married woman who carries on a flirtation may accuse her husband of unfaithfulness, and the college student who cheats may say that all students cheat when they get a chance to do so.

Like some other reactions to conflict that we have already mentioned, projecting may lead to mental illness if carried to extremes. Many inmates of mental hospitals are there because they attribute their desires, their thoughts, and even their acts to others. One man said that his every act (even crime) was "the will of God." Another had shot at a girl whose impending marriage was just announced in the paper because, for the year or so that they had been passengers on the same streetcar, she "had deceitfully led him on by her actions." The girl hardly knew of the man's existence and had never given him any reason for his accusations, but her every act had been interpreted as having amorous reference to himself. One will doubtless recall, in this connection, our discussion of direction in thinking and how getting the wrong direction may lead to delusions.

Rationalizing

This is the attempt to justify one's decisions, after they have already been made, by finding "good" reasons for them. A student knows that he should study, but wants to go to the movies. He tells himself that too much study will ruin his eyes, that he needs a rest anyhow, or that he'll be able to study even better the next day. Likewise, a married man

who carries on affairs with other women than his wife justifies his conduct on the grounds that "man is by nature polygamous" or that his wife doesn't really appreciate him anyway. Why doesn't he tell his wife about his unfaithfulness? If he did so, "she would feel unhappy" and "what she doesn't know won't hurt her." The individual responding in terms of post-hypnotic suggestion (p. 236) finds many excuses for carrying out the suggested act, the real motive for which is not known to him.

Rationalization is thus a form of "kidding oneself" as to the real motives for one's conduct.

The girl who says, "Oh, I didn't want that man anyway — he'd perhaps have turned out no good," or, "Who'd want to join that sorority?" is belittling others, but she is also rationalizing. This form of rationalization is sometimes very appropriately designated a "sour-grapes" reaction. It is obviously a compensatory phenomenon, easing the sting of defeat.

Rationalizing often begins at an early age. A three-year-old who did not want a neighborhood child of five to visit him because this child monopolized his "fire engine" was told that he must invite the other child to come over and have a ride. He said that the other boy might be having his nap. When told that the other boy was up, he said the sky looked as if it might rain. When he was told that it would not rain, he said that the boy's mother might not want him to come. He made one excuse after another, and never did get around to giving the child an invitation. A child confronted by the alternatives of taking his teddy bear to school and being thought a "big boy" did not take the bear, but his excuse was that the bear might get a cold. It is probable that children acquire this tendency to rationalize by copying patterns of rationalization set by adults. The "sour-grapes" pattern is obviously copied, for parents frequently tell a child, when they do not wish him to have something, that it is "no good," that it will "make him sick," or that boys who play with

such things are "sissies." It seems only natural that, when frustrated under similar circumstances, he should tell himself things like these his parents have told him.

Rationalization is so prevalent a reaction to situations involving conflict that it cannot be regarded as abnormal. It is sometimes excused on the ground that it reduces the qualms of conscience or misgivings which all of us suffer from time to time. Some assert that "if we did not rationalize, we'd go crazy." There is at least a grain of truth in such assertions, but they are themselves largely rationalizations. There is no good substitute for facing life squarely and meeting difficulties realistically.

Regression

Whenever an individual confronted by difficulties "gives up" and reverts to such inadequate reactions as weeping, kicking objects around, stamping his feet, and even "cussing," he is regressing to an earlier, less adequate mode of reaction. These reactions perhaps release tension — help us "let off steam" — but they seldom resolve a conflict. We say "seldom" rather than "never" because many a child learns that temper tantrums, sulking, and the like get him the things he desires. He may, in fact, continue to use these long after adequate modes of adjustment are possible. Men and women often revert to these earlier responses when frustrated. Wives sometimes dominate their husbands, and husbands their wives, by fits of sulking, weeping, and threats that they will "do away with themselves" or "go home to mother" if they do not get their own way.

Psychologists have carried out several experimental investigations of regression in animal and human subjects. Emotion-provoking stimuli like electric shock, a cold shower, and a sudden loud noise presented just before the moment of response lead many subjects to revert to earlier, less adequate forms of adjustment. In one study, eighteen rats were trained to turn to the left after emerging from the central alley of a T-shaped box and to

avoid a right turn. After this habit had been learned, the animals were trained to turn to the right and avoid the left-hand alley — in other words, to reverse their former response. This, of course, made the earlier left-turning habit inadequate. When they were now given a strong shock just before reaching the choice point, eleven of the eighteen animals reverted to the earlier habit which, in subsequent trials, persisted.⁵ Several other studies with rats, using different kinds of problems, have confirmed the finding that rats subjected to frustration and other emotion-provoking situations, may regress.⁶

In a recent investigation, the play activity of thirty preschool children was studied before and after a frustrating situation had been introduced.⁷ The children were observed individually. Free play was observed, frustration was introduced, and play was again observed for a period comparable in length with the first. The situation is illustrated in Figure 109. During the free-play period, the child did not know of the farther room, since it was hidden by an opaque partition. After the free-play period, the partition was removed, disclosing the rest of the room. The child then spent fifteen minutes playing with the very enticing objects now displayed for the first time. These included a doll's house with accessories of all kinds, a truck and trailer, a picnic table with accessories, and several other toys. After the child had played with these, it was returned to the other side of the room, with the less interesting toys, and the screen illustrated was lowered. Now the child could see the desirable objects, but the screen and a large padlock made them inaccessible. Two observers, one inside the room and one outside, but viewing it through a one-way vision screen, recorded the play activities. These were later scored in terms of constructiveness. Under free-play conditions before frustration, the average constructiveness score was 4.99. During frustration it dropped to 3.94, a change of 1.05 points which statistical analysis indicates is not due to chance. Of the thirty children, twenty-two




Figure 109 A Frustrating Situation Which Elicited Regressive Play Behavior in Preschool Children

(From Barker, R. G., Dembo, T., and Lewin, K., "Frustration and Regression: An Experiment with Young Children," *University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare*, 1941, vol. 18, p. 57)

regressed to the less constructive level, three did not change, and five increased their constructiveness.

Repressing

Some people react to conflict situations by refusing to admit the existence of difficulties, of defects, or of particular motives. These people are said to be repressing. A jealous child who refuses to admit the existence of his baby sister is repressing. So also is the person who has conveniently forgotten some unpleasant obligation.

Repressing is often contrasted with inhibiting. A clear case of inhibiting occurs when you decide to study instead of going to a movie. We may say that you inhibit movie-going activity, but it would not be correct to say that you have repressed such activity. Repressing would clearly be present, however, if you refused to admit the existence of the movie or of your desire to see it. In repressing, therefore, you close your eyes to reality.

Attempting to solve serious personal con-

flicts by repressing may have dire consequences. Many symptoms of neurotic behavior (p. 13) are attributed to repression. Among these are sleep-walking, amnesia (loss of memory — usually for unpleasant realities), multiple personality (coexistence of two or more personalities as in Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde — where one aspect of the total person dominates and the other is repressed), and so-called functional paralyses and anesthetics (loss of ability to control certain muscles, and loss of ability to see, hear, or smell, although the structures concerned are structurally normal). These are all examples of neurotic behavior, discussed more fully in Chapter 25.

Abnormal reactions aroused by experimentally produced conflict

If a dog is trained to respond to a circle and not to an ellipse, and the ellipse is then gradually made more and more like the circle, a point is eventually reached where the animal does not know whether or not to respond. In other words, it is unable to differentiate the

two stimuli. When this point is reached, many of the animals suffer a "nervous breakdown." They may whine, struggle when restrained, refuse to eat, and show, in general, what might be characterized as "nervousness." Pavlov, in whose laboratory this type of reaction was first studied experimentally, thought that the breakdown resulted from a conflict between the tendency to make and the tendency not to make a response to the situation.⁸ Many later writers have stressed the "conflict" basis of neurotic behavior in human beings.

Behavior disturbances resulting from conflict have since been observed in several animals under a wide variety of experimental conditions. In one study, pigs were subjected to two different environments on alternate days.⁹ A 600-cycle tone was sounded one day and a 750-cycle tone on the alternate day. On the day when the 600-cycle tone was presented, cessation of the tone for ten seconds served as a sign that an apple had dropped into the food box. The animal lifted the lid with his snout and got the apple. On the day when the 750-cycle tone was presented, cessation of the tone for ten seconds served as a sign that an electric shock to the foot was about to occur. This training continued for months. Finally, the animal's performance was well stabilized. Whenever the 600-cycle tone stopped, it lifted the lid. Whenever the 750-cycle tone stopped, it lifted its foot and avoided the shock. Then a new condition was introduced. Random lifting of the lid during presentation of the tone on food days and at any time during shock days brought an electric shock. The animal then refused to lift the lid until the apple had dropped. The experimenter, on the other hand, refused to drop the apple until the pig lifted the lid. This was apparently too much for the pig. It showed a marked tendency, first of all, to lift the lid and its foot at the same time, as if "torn apart." Finally, the animal showed "sulky" behavior, went into a sleeplike trance, and manifested many other abnormal reactions.

In still another of the many experiments on "experimental neuroses" in animals, rats were trained to jump to a card with a black circle on a white background, and to avoid jumping to a card containing a white circle on a black background¹⁰ (Figure 110). The pattern associated with food appeared to the right or the left of the animal, for the right-left sequence was determined by chance. If the rat jumped to this card, it fell, and the animal ran ahead to get a bit of food. Whenever it jumped to the other card, however, the rat fell several feet into a net, which comprised its punishment for making an incorrect response. After the rat had learned to jump always to the correct card, changes calculated to produce conflict were introduced. In some instances the experiment was continued with neither card consistently correct. A jump to the white circle might produce food




Figure 110. Discrimination Apparatus Used to Study Conflict in Rats
(After Lashley.)

or it might produce punishment. In other instances a rat was presented with only one of the cards, but required to jump whether it was the correct or the incorrect one of previous training. If the animal refused to jump, an air blast in some instances, and a shock in others, forced it to do so.

Many of the animals exhibited extremely abnormal behavior. Some jumped from the platform to the floor, ran around in circles so fast that they could hardly be followed by a movie camera, lay on their side and acted as though in convulsions of epilepsy, hopped along like a rabbit, showed jerky movements of limbs (tics), and finally could be rolled into a ball or molded in various ways almost as if they were pieces of clay. They sometimes remained as long as eight minutes in the position in which they had been placed (Figure 111). Each such spell was of short duration, but it could again be aroused by putting the rat into the conflict situation.

The type of abnormal behavior aroused in rats under conditions of conflict is duplicated under a number of different conditions, including subjection to high-pitched noises. The tendency to exhibit such behavior appears to be inherited.¹¹ Recent research has also shown that rats fed an adequate amount

of vitamin B₁ are not so likely to manifest the response as rats fed an insufficient amount.¹² Studies like these may eventually lead to a much better understanding than we now have of the bases of neurotic behavior in human beings.

CONFLICT, "WILL POWER," AND INITIATION OF ACTION

While they have wide popular usage, the terms "will" and "will power" are seldom used by psychologists, because they really explain nothing. To say that one "wills" to do something, or that he exerts "will power," tells us that he decides or intends to do what he does — that he is not doing it automatically or unthinkingly — but it does not tell us how his decisions are reached or how they are carried over into action. These are the crucial problems. We know much more about the basis of making decisions than we do about the carrying over of decisions into action.

Consider, first of all, the phenomena from which the concept of "will power" is deduced. You are, let us say, confronted by a very difficult decision and, after much deliberation, you assert, "I will do so and so!" Or you are confronted by a very difficult task which will take years to complete. There are many temptations to quit or to put it aside, but you persist until the task has been completed. Or, to take one more of many possible examples, you are listening to an uninteresting lecture, but with great effort keep your attention on what the lecturer is saying. In each of these instances you have, it is claimed, used "will power." Will power is inferred, in other words, when decisions are difficult to make, or when you persist in your endeavors, despite distracting influences. It is never inferred when decisions are easily made or when behavior is lacking in persistence. Nor is it assumed to exist in animals below man. The mother rat may persist in gathering her young, despite the electric grid that she must cross in doing so, but we would not infer that she was using will power. Rather obviously, her behavior persists because the motive to get




Figure 111. Rat Rolled into Ball After Being Subjected to Conflict

(From Maier, N. R. F., "Studies of Abnormal Behavior in the Rat." New York: Harper, 1939, Fig. 12.)

to her young is stronger than the motive to escape an electric shock

Psychologists have come to regard the varieties of behavior attributed to "will power" as expressions of the relative strength of motives. If we think in terms of topology, the decision stems from the incentives having the strongest positive valence. In other words, those alternatives which, in terms of innate drives and past experience, promise the greatest ultimate satisfaction of motives, determine the direction of choice. To say that "will power" swings the balance is to say no more than that the decision was difficult, but that the motivation to perform one act was stronger than the motivation to perform the other. The Japanese soldier confronted by the imminence of capture has two alternatives between which he must choose. One of these is to save his life by surrendering. But this, in terms of his training from childhood, means that he will lose self-respect and also the respect of his ancestors and associates. The other alternative is to kill himself. This, in terms of his training from childhood, means that he will have everlasting glory and honor in the supernatural life that has been promised him. So the soldier kills himself. Because our training does not put life and death in the same light, it seems to us either that he is "barbaric" or that he has exceptional "will power." Yet, almost anyone, if subjected to the same training, would find the alternative of killing himself much more desirable than that of living a life of disgrace.

A similar interplay of motives is involved whenever behavior persists in the midst of temptations to give it up. If you persist in your efforts to get a college education and put aside temptations to get married and quit, take a job which offers immediate financial rewards, or enjoy yourself at the expense of studying, it is probably because, as you think of the various alternatives, getting a college education exerts more "pull." You may be motivated by the desire to gain prestige, to prepare for further professional training, to please or not disappoint your parents, to fin-

ish what you have started, or by a combination of these or other motives. Some individuals find that persistence is made easier if they publicly state what they intend to do. Then, whenever associates ask, "How is that project going?" it acts as a spur to continued effort. By following this procedure, the individual "puts himself on the spot." Most of us hesitate to admit that something we have started has to be given up because of our own lack of persistence. If we do give up under such circumstances, we usually find "good" excuses for it — like ill health or interference of other work.

The person who does not persist in his endeavors, who seems to have little "will power," may be one who does not weigh the pros and cons, who does not have any long-range goals, or for whom such goals have only a weak attraction.

Conscience

It is perhaps well to inject here a few words about "conscience," which is supposed to indicate "right" and "wrong," thus aiding us in reaching decisions concerning our conduct. Our conscience is also alleged to bother us after we have made "wrong" decisions. Actually, there is nothing mysterious about "conscience." In a sense, it is the voice of our parents speaking through us. Take, for example, the following observation.^{1a}

A three-year-old, awakening full of pep at six A.M., starts tuning up for the day. His weary and irate father from the next bedroom tells him in no uncertain terms to get back into bed, and adds, "Don't you dare get up until seven o'clock."

The boy obeys, but within a few moments mutterings from his room again disturb the father.

Getting out of bed, and going to the door of the boy's room, this is what the father hears.

"Get back in there," says the boy, addressing his leg that is half protruding from the bed.

"Not till seven o'clock," to his arm as he jerks it back from the edge of the bed.

And, as his body squirms half out of bed, he throws himself back vigorously, saying, "You heard what I told you."

From the time of birth there is a more or less constant conflict between what we want to do and what our parents and others around us want us to do. When we suck our fingers, the parent says, "musn't," "dirty," "only babies do that." There is much "hush, hush" concerning sex. We must forego the pleasure of playing with our sex organs, which are said to be "dirty." We must not ask questions about sex or look at the sex organs of other little boys and girls. We must not scratch. We must not say certain words. There are literally thousands of "must nots" drummed into the child's ears. Whenever he refuses to obey these parental inhibitions, he is punished, perhaps by a harsh word, perhaps by being made to feel ashamed of his babyishness, perhaps by seeing the displeasure of his parents, perhaps by having various pleasures withdrawn, or perhaps by application of a switch or strap. In any case, like the child of the above illustration, he eventually comes to control his own behavior as the parents would control it; often repeating, as if they were his own, the parental words of admonition. The parent said, "You are filthy," and he now says, "I am filthy"; the parent said, "You should be ashamed of yourself," and he now says, "I ought to be ashamed of myself," or "I am ashamed of myself." There is good reason for supposing that language plays an important part in this "interiorization" or "internalization" of parental prohibitions and reproofs. Since these are framed in verbal terms, their acquisition in such terms is to be expected. We know, too, that much of the thinking engaged in by young children is thinking in terms of words, for they "think out loud." Our discussion of thinking showed us that words also play an important rôle in adult thinking, but on an implicit level.

Initiation of action

Under such conditions as extreme fatigue, alcoholism, low oxygen tension, low blood sugar, hypnosis, and brain injury, we may make decisions, yet be unable to carry them out.

An individual had several drinks and then felt that he should go home. He arrived there all right, but sat down in a chair and read for a while. He then said to himself, "I guess I'll go to bed now." But he did not go to bed. Two hours later he was still sitting and saying to himself, "I guess I'll go to bed now."

Investigators of high altitude flight have found that insufficient oxygen often produces a state like the above. Individuals who wait too long to take oxygen are unable to do so, although they are conscious and know what to do.

An inspector sat in a mine writing a dying letter to his wife while he slowly approached asphyxiation from monoxide gas.¹⁴ His letter did not make sense. It was incoherent and repetitive. But the important point for our purposes is that he knew perfectly well that, by walking twenty yards, he could avoid death. He had lost the power to initiate appropriate movements.

Related to the problem of "will power," therefore, is the problem of how, once we have chosen a course of action, we initiate the appropriate responses.

Reactions are customarily classified as *voluntary* (literally under the control of will) and *involuntary* (literally not under the control of will). Opening and closing my hand are called voluntary acts because I can control them myself. The contraction of my pupil, however, is involuntary. I have no control over it. It must be aroused by a stimulus which I myself cannot provide by thinking of, imagining, or intending its contraction.

The nervous pathways most directly involved in voluntary activity begin in the motor area of the cerebral cortex and terminate in the striped muscles of the body (see pp. 50-51). It is therefore apparent that the stimuli which initiate voluntary movement must be applied at the cerebral end of these fibers. It should also be apparent (from our discussion of activities in the association neurons of the cortex) that these activities provide stimulation of the voluntary motor fibers. But what kind of associational activity necessarily precedes voluntary movement? This we do not know in any detail.

Introspective reports indicate that thinking or having an "idea" of a movement precedes voluntary arousal of the movement. We know that thinking of a movement, such as clenching the fist, automatically elicits slight movements of the muscles involved and also action currents which may be measured by means of a galvanometer.¹⁶ The activities of association neurons which underlie thinking of the movement apparently serve to activate the cortical end of the motor pathways. Introspection also reveals that merely thinking of the movement does not produce it—all that occurs is a very slight, or an incipient, movement. If I want actually to clench my fist, I must *intend* to clench it. Here again, although we do not know the details, whatever cortical activities underlie intention apparently stimulate the motor paths which end in the appropriate muscles, and stimulate them in a somewhat different manner from that involved when we merely think of the movement.

We have already pointed out the important rôle which language, especially in the form of implicitly talking to ourselves, plays in motivational activities. Some investigators believe that language is especially important in the voluntary control of behavior. Their belief is supported by general observations and experiments on the development of voluntary control. Individuals have learned to move their ears.¹⁶ They have learned to move in isolation muscles of the body which are usually not subject to isolated control.¹⁷ They have learned to make the hairs on the body rise "at will."¹⁸ They have learned to contract the small blood vessels in the arm by thinking of a visual pattern or saying a word repeatedly associated (by the conditioned-response technique, Chapter 6) with placing of the hand in icewater and thus, automatic constriction of blood vessels.¹⁹ And they have learned to contract or dilate the pupils by saying or merely thinking the words "contract" or "relax," respectively.²⁰ Not all the above obviously involved language responses, but they all involved either thinking or language

responses. Thinking in man, as we have seen (see pp. 188-189), is partly a subvocal or implicit talking to himself.²¹

The particular stimuli most significantly involved in the control of voluntary movement are those generated by the behavior of the organism itself. The kinesthetic, tactual, and auditory stimuli involved in language are the most important self-induced stimuli in man. By the aid of such receptor processes the organism becomes relatively independent of its external environment and can regulate its own behavior to an extent impossible in infra-human animals. Behavior controlled by the organism's own language responses is voluntary in the highest degree.

SUMMARY

Conflict is the lot of everybody. Two frustrating conditions which produce conflict are environmental barriers and personal defects. Another important source of conflict is incompatibility of motives.

We may regard the individual as surrounded by a field of forces. The intensity and direction of these forces are vectors. Some of these vectors, the ones with positive valences, attract; others, those with negative valences, repel. Representation of conflict situations in terms of vectors and their valences is known as psychological topology.

Some of the common reactions to conflict situations are trial and error (overt and implicit), compensation, projection, rationalization, regression, repression, inhibition, and neuroticism.

Trial-and-error reactions, since they involve a realistic attack on the situation producing conflict, are highly desirable from the standpoint of mental health.

The desire to maintain self-respect or to bolster the "ego" at all costs underlies compensatory reactions. Compensation is exhibited when one motive substitutes for another whose expression is blocked, and where one means of expressing a given motive substitutes for another (usually more direct) means of satisfaction. In addition to or related to such substitutions are several other compen-

satory reactions. Among these are: identifying, certain forms of phantasy (day-dreaming), belittling others, blaming others, and overcompensation

Projection is a reaction to feelings of guilt or feelings of inadequacy. In essence, it is the imputing to others of one's own thoughts and desires. Rationalization is the attempt to justify one's motives or actions by finding "good" reasons for them. Some forms of rationalization, like the "sour-grapes" attitude, although they are not usually considered with compensatory phenomena, are nevertheless compensatory in nature.

Regression is the reversion to childish or less adequate modes of reaction than those called for by the situation. Animals and human subjects show regressive reactions when confronted by frustrating circumstances, especially those arousing intense emotion.

Repression is "putting out of mind" or attempting to ignore or forget motives or situations. Extreme repression is sometimes the basis of amnesia, sleep-walking, multiple personality, and functional sensory and motor disorders. The reason for this is that repressed motives often find indirect expression if direct expressions are checked. Inhibition differs from repression in that motives and situations are admitted to exist, and the checking of relevant behavior is carried out with full knowledge of the fact.

Experiments with animals have shown that conflict may produce many behavior disorders also found in human beings under the conflict conditions of everyday life. These are the neuroses or "nervous breakdowns." Experi-

mental investigations of neuroses in animals may eventually indicate ways of preventing or alleviating neuroses in man.

"Will" and "will power" are inferred from reactions to conflict situations, especially from the making of difficult decisions and persistence of behavior in the presence of obstructions to, or of temptations to give up, endeavors upon which the individual has launched himself. There is no reason to suppose that "will power" corresponds to any force which the individual focuses upon his own behavior. Decisions are made in terms of the relative strength of conflicting motives. When decisions are difficult to make, the pros and cons tend to be closely balanced and the effort involved in making the decision is in weighing the alternatives. Persistence has a similar explanation. The individual who persists in pursuing long-range goals is one for whom these goals, because of his past experience, have a greater attraction than more immediate goals. Conscience comes into this picture because it represents the motive to conform to parental inhibitions or prohibitions. It is, as it were, the parent speaking through the child. Language processes probably play an important rôle in the internalizing of parental prohibitions. They also play an important part in the initiating of action, once decisions to act have been reached. Subvocal language responses underlie much of our thinking, and the associated activities of the cortex probably provide the impulses which, running from the motor cortex to the muscles, produce voluntary movement.

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Part 5

FEELING AND EMOTION

WE REFER to feeling and emotion in general as *affective processes*. These are processes whose experiential aspect is feeling. The term *feeling* is here used with a meaning different from the one implied when we say, for example, that we “feel” something rough or smooth. In the present context the term refers to such aspects of experience as pleasantness, unpleasantness, excitement, or tension. In its affective sense, feeling thus refers to how the individual feels.

From the standpoint of experience, any emotion has both sensory and affective aspects. Feeling goose-pimples, warmth, dryness of the mouth, and many other experiences associated with one or another emotional upset are obviously sensory in origin. Other experiences, such as pleasantness, unpleasantness, and excitement, are not obviously sensory in origin and are thus classified as affective rather than sensory. In the last analysis, all or some of these affective experiences may be reducible to complex sensory experiences — but that question involves a controversy into which we need not enter here.

The first of these two chapters (Chapter 15) deals with feeling as an aspect of emotional processes, while the second chapter (Chapter 16) considers certain manifestations of feeling and emotion in everyday life.

Chapter 15

Emotion

ANYBODY who has observed his own emotional reactions and those of others already knows a great deal about the general characteristics of emotion. He knows that individuals not only experience emotion, but also act emotionally. He knows that when he is aroused by emotion-provoking stimuli he is emotional all over. He knows that emotion is usually characterized by disturbance, although he may not know that the Latin word *emovere*, from which we get our word "emotion," means to stir up, agitate, or disrupt. He knows that similar situations often produce markedly different reactions, depending upon the individual concerned -- that one may swear while another weeps, that one may cover up outward signs of emotion while the other "lets himself go," that one may do something about the situation while another remains helpless. He knows that emotion is provoked by external and internal stimuli -- for example, that the emotion-provoking situation may be a gun pointed at one's body, a pain in the region of the appendix, or the thought that one has left home without switching off the electric iron. He knows that emotion moves people to act -- to seek out or avoid objects and situations, and to weaken or intensify goal-directed activities. Finally, he knows a dozen or so emotional terms which serve to differentiate varieties of emotional experience and behavior.

Perhaps as satisfactory a definition as can be given at the present time describes emotion as "an acute disturbance of the individual as a whole, psychological in origin, involving behavior, conscious experience, and visceral

functioning."¹ However, this definition needs some elaboration. We say acute because emotion comes over us suddenly and, after a time, weakens and disappears. In other words, we do not have fear, or rage, or joy all the time. We say disturbance because all but the mildest emotions disturb or upset whatever activities are in progress at the time of arousal. We say of the individual as a whole because when an individual is emotionally disturbed, he is disturbed all over. We say psychological in origin because some disturbances (from injection of adrenin, brain tumors, drugs) cannot be considered emotional. A psychological situation is one in which experience and behavior are aroused by an external or internal stimulus through the usual sensory channels. It is, in short, a stimulus-response situation. We say involving behavior, conscious experience, and visceral functioning because emotion can be considered from the standpoint of behavior, from the standpoint of conscious experience, and from the standpoint of visceral (gastric, intestinal, and so on) processes.

DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIONAL BEHAVIOR

Emotion in the human newborn

How many different emotions are exhibited by newborn infants? One of the earliest investigations suggested that there are three, namely, *fear*, *rage*, and *love*.² But later investigations have failed to verify this conclusion. They have shown that

Any form of sudden stimulation such as dropping,

loud noises, restraint, pain, or a rush of air on the face, produces in the young infant aimless activity of most of the musculature, accompanied by crying. The stimuli must be sufficiently strong, however, to produce a reaction. When an infant below four or five days of age is dropped one or two feet, it frequently shows no perceptible response, except for vague movements of the arms and legs. The younger the infant the stronger must be the stimulus. This is also true for so-called "pleasurable" stimuli, such as stroking or petting, to which many newborn infants show no reaction.³

One investigator found only "mass activity."⁴ Another found that any of four stimulating conditions produced "any and all responses."⁵ Still another found only "excitement."⁶

The original investigators were apparently labeling the behavior fear, rage, and love in terms of how they would react if stimulated as the babies were stimulated. In other words, knowing that sudden loss of support would produce fear in themselves, they designated as fear the behavior elicited by loss of support. Moreover, they failed to observe or take into consideration such differences in reaction as were apparent to later observers.

Psychologists must always be on guard against "reading into" behavior something that is not there. In an experiment to determine how much graduate students in psychology, nurses, and medical students agree concerning emotional reactions of newborn infants, it was found that significant agreement was present only when the stimulating circumstances were known to the observers, and they were thus able to "read" their own reactions into the situation.

The emotional reactions elicited by hunger, dropping, a loud noise, pin-prick, and several other stimuli were presented in some instances on a moving-picture screen and in other instances directly, by having the judges look at the baby after a screen had been removed. In the first series of observations, stimulating circumstances were not known to the observers. Here there was little or no agreement concerning the emotion exhibited. For example, forty-two medical students who observed the reactions to dropping directly, but without knowing that the baby had been dropped, gave

the following designations to the behavior: hunger (6), pain (3), fear (2), anger (7), colic (11), awakened from sleep (11), bandage tight (1), and organic brain emotion (1). Thirty-two graduate students in psychology who saw films of reactions aroused by dropping, but did not know that dropping had occurred, gave the following designations: hunger (6), anger (14), fear (5), pain (3), grief (1), rage (1), consternation (1), and nausea (1). There was similar lack of agreement concerning behavior aroused by other stimuli. It is apparent that an individual is not likely to label the behavior as others label it when he does not know the stimulus which caused it. When the same graduate and medical students saw the stimulus as well as the behavior, they showed much closer agreement than when they witnessed the behavior alone. For example, 27 out of 41 said that dropping produced fear and 24 out of 39 that restraint produced rage.⁷

It is apparent, therefore, that the emotional behavior of the newborn fails to show clear-cut patterns to which definite emotional labels such as fear, rage, and love can be attached.

Growth of emotional behavior in children

Although the newborn child shows only general excitement when stimulated by situations which arouse emotion in older children and adults, other emotional reactions are soon apparent. Psychologists do not agree on the labels to be attached to manifestations of emotion at particular age levels, but they agree that, as the child grows older, an increasing number of emotions becomes apparent.

The diagram shown in Figure 112 illustrates one of the several classifications of emotional behavior in early childhood. It is based upon observations of a large number of babies in a foundling home, who ranged in age from newborn to two years.⁸ In newborn infants, the investigator could discern only general excitement. But in the three-month-old child distress and delight, as well as general excitement, could be distinguished. Within the next three months, distress was differentiated so that fear, disgust, and anger were also apparent. At about twelve months, delight had differentiated so that elation and affection were added to the repertoire of emotions.

Jealousy and affection for adults, distinguished from affection for children, appeared between the twelfth and eighteenth months. Between the eighteenth and twenty-fourth months, delight was differentiated so that joy was also evident.

One should not, of course, accept as gospel the particular labels and age levels indicated in the diagram. We should look upon it rather as one psychologist's attempt to represent emotional development in children. The above discussion of early investigations of infant emotion should warn us that even an experienced psychologist may "read into" the behavior of infants more than is actually present, and that different observers may assign different labels to the same reactions. The classification is presented here merely to illustrate the fact that one who perceives only general excitement in the newborn discerns an increasing variety of emotions as the child grows

Maturation and learning in emotional development

Both maturation and learning play important rôles in emotional development. In some instances it is possible to recognize their respective influences, but in others they are inextricably related.

Maturation. The influence of maturation is

clearly shown when, without any opportunities to acquire them, the infant exhibits such emotional responses as crying, weeping (crying with tears), smiling, and laughing. These emotional reactions appear at about the same age in all children, regardless of variations in stimulation provided by adults. They also occur where all opportunities to witness them in others have been removed.⁹

Further evidence that maturation plays a large rôle in emotional development comes from observations of individuals born blind and deaf. Such persons would have very little, if any, opportunity to acquire emotional behavior by imitating others. They certainly could not hear the sound of laughter and observe how it is produced, they could not see individuals clench their fists in rage, and they could not see the various facial expressions of emotion. The only way in which such expressions could be known to them would be through touch. But even when they have been given no tactual training, they exhibit emotional reactions which have much in common with those of normal people. Take, for example, the following observations of emotional behavior in a ten-year-old girl who was blind and deaf from birth, who had not been able to learn to speak or to care for herself, and who had received no training in emotional expression.




Figure 112. Approximate Ages of Differentiation of Emotions in Early Childhood
(From Bridges, K. M. B., "Emotional Development in Early Infancy," *Child Development*, 1932, vol. 3, p. 340)

A small doll was dropped down the child's dress, whereupon neck and shoulders tensed and the mouth half-opened. The sightless eyes opened to the fullest extent and the eyebrows were raised. The left hand at once began to grope for the toy. Both the posture and the facial expression were suggestive of what we should ordinarily interpret as startled attention. After several minutes of unsuccessful efforts to get the doll, which caught in the folds of her dress, she did not cry, but made slight whimpering sounds. . . . Suddenly, as if struck by a new idea, she renewed the attack, this time from a different angle. Her behavior took on the appearance of a struggle, determined in part by exasperation and mild rage. Her body writhed and twisted, the right hand impatiently beat the arm of the chair. . . . At the instant of success in extricating the doll, she threw herself back into the chair with feet drawn up under her. Both the hand containing the doll and the empty hand were raised in an attitude of delight, which was further attested by peals of laughter. . . . The exultant laughter faded to a smile of pleased satisfaction.¹⁰

Learning The rôle of learning in emotional development is clearly evident when we consider the stereotyped gestural and facial expressions which are not common to all men, but which characterize a particular culture. An interesting comparison is provided by our own and Chinese expressions of the same emotions, or what are presumed to be the same emotions. Some emotional expressions are similar in us and in the Chinese, but others are very different. Surprise in us is made evident by raising the eyebrows and opening the eyes wide, but the Chinese usually express surprise by sticking out their tongues. Scratching ears and cheeks is a sign of embarrassment in us, but to the Chinese it means happiness. Clapping the hands is a sign of happiness in us, but of worry or disappointment in the Chinese.¹¹ These emotional expressions are superimposed upon inborn expressions like those of the deaf-blind child. They are acquired from observing similar expressions in others.

The rôle of learning is also evident when we consider how particular emotions are aroused by different objects and situations as

we get older. Thus, infants, like the infant of Figure 113, are usually not afraid of snakes. Fear of snakes usually begins to develop at about two or three years of age.¹² Maturation, in the sense of giving the older child a keener perception of the peculiarity of the snake's movements, may be involved. But fear of snakes as particular objects comes from hearing stories about snakes, observing how older children and adults react to snakes, and perhaps by transfer to snakes of a fear of the strange or the unusual, acquired in other circumstances. Some older children and adults never develop a fear of snakes.

Studies of children's fears and those of their parents have shown that there is a close relation between the two.¹³ In other words, if the parent is afraid of the dark, of lightning, of snakes, or of particular individuals, the child will very likely have the same fears.

A classical experimental study of the acquisition of fear in a child is the case of Albert.

Albert, a normal child of nine months, exhibited fear reactions to a loud noise unexpectedly presented, but had no fear of white rats. Fear of rats was acquired under the following circumstances: When the rat was first placed before him, Albert reached for it, showing no signs of fear. Just then a loud noise was made behind his head by striking an iron bar. Albert started and fell forward on his face. . . . The rat and noise were again presented, the noise just after the rat. This time Albert responded as before except that a whimper was added. After five further presentations of the rat and noise, separated from the other two trials by a week, Albert was afraid of the rat alone. Not only this, but he was now afraid of objects closely resembling the rat in certain respects. For example, the same fear reaction was aroused by a rabbit, a dog, a sealskin coat, and a mass of absorbent cotton. Wooden blocks and other objects bearing no similarity to the rat did not produce the response. The fear reaction to rat, rabbit, dog, coat, and cotton was evident a month later, but it had decreased in intensity.¹⁴

It is evident that, by associating some stimulus which produces emotion with a stimulus which does not produce it, we may give emo-



Figure 113. Fear of Snakes Is an Acquired Fear

Annette Avers has had snakes as pets ever since her sixth month. In the first picture she is fourteen months old, and in the second picture she is six years old. At twelve years, she is still fond of snakes and has a seven-foot Indigo Bull snake as a pet. (Courtesy of Mr. Franklin H. Avers.)

tion-provoking potency to the previously neutral stimulus and to stimuli similar to it. The technique here is, of course, that of conditioning.

When a newborn infant is emotionally aroused, about all he can do is cry and thrash his limbs about. As he grows older, however, his emotional behavior shows a much wider range, some of it attributable to maturation and some to learning. Thus, the emotionally aroused one-year-old can stiffen his body, hold out his arms, throw things, call out, and cling to an object or person, as well as cry and thrash his limbs. As he gets older, language responses play an increasing rôle in his emotional behavior. He makes demands, scolds, pleads, swears, talks about others, and makes his feelings felt in many other ways.¹⁵ Most of these acquisitions are not emotional in themselves. They are merely utilized in emotional situations as well as non-emotional ones.

Other acquisitions give the child a greater control over his environment, thus reducing frustration and other emotion-provoking situations. He learns to help himself by getting out of bed alone, to satisfy his hunger by going to the pantry shelf, and to protect himself by fighting the neighborhood bully.

EMOTION AS CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE

Introspective reports on emotion are usually, if not always, retrospective reports. In other words, they are made, not while the emotion is in progress, but later. One reason for this is that it is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to experience an emotion, especially an intense one, and describe the experience at the same time. Those who attempt to analyze emotions while experiencing them usually report that emotional experience tends to diminish under such analysis. Thus, practically all that we know about emotional experience is based upon what individuals

remember, or think they remember, concerning previous emotional experiences.

Reporting emotional experiences is also hindered by the fact that we usually have great difficulty in putting our experiences into words. Individuals often say, "I had fear," "the experience was fearful," or, "I trembled all over," none of which tells us anything about fear as an experience. When one provides a check list of experiential terms, however, there is much agreement in checking off the terms which apply to particular emotions either experienced immediately before or a long time before making the report.¹⁶

Take, for example, the following terms. "pleasant," "dull," "strain," "spread," "unpleasant," "excitement," "warmth," "relaxation," "depression," "dense," "cold," "tension," "ease," and "bright." Think of some recent experience of anger and check off the terms which, as you recall, apply to your experience. Then refer to the note at the center of page 282 to see how much your response agrees with that of a group of 224 beginners in psychology.

When they were asked to report on experiences of anger, fear, joy, and sorrow, the 224 students agreed rather closely concerning applicable experiential terms. The results for fear, joy, and sorrow are shown in Table 7.

TABLE 7. PERCENTAGES OF 224 BEGINNERS IN PSYCHOLOGY USING THE COMMON DESCRIPTIVE TERMS TO CHARACTERIZE FEAR, JOY, AND SORROW

(From Hunt)

Emotion	Common Descriptive Terms												
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Bright	Dull	Excitement	Depression	Tension	Relaxation	Warmth	Cold	Ease	Strain	Dense
Fear	1	77	5	6	55	14	95	0	8	45	0	82	4
Joy	96	1	77	0	81	1	9	34	73	0	46	5	19
Sorrow	2	86	0	64	0	94	21	8	2	33	3	45	10

These results were verified in studies with other groups.

The table shows quite clearly that fear is characterized by large percentages of the subjects as unpleasant, excitement, tension, cold, and strain; joy as pleasant, bright, excitement, warmth, and ease; and sorrow as unpleasant, dull, depression, and strain. Note, especially, the agreement concerning the pleasantness of joy and the unpleasantness of fear and sorrow. Also note that, whereas fear and joy are characterized as exciting, sorrow is characterized as depressing.

While this type of analysis provides an interesting approach to the study of conscious experience in emotion, it is subject to the criticism that individuals may check the list in terms of what they have learned about emotional experience, through cultural stereotypes, rather than what they have actually experienced. In this way, we speak of the warmth of joy, the depression of sorrow, and the tension of fear, just as we speak of the wide-open eyes of surprise and the dropped jaw of disappointment. The stereotypes themselves are doubtless based upon observation of experience, but they may lead to greater agreement in such studies as the above, and imply a more stereotyped pattern of emotional experience, than would actually exist in an individual experiencing a given emotion.

We are often aware of bodily processes in emotion. One may feel his heart palpitating, the dryness of his mouth, the "lump" in his throat, the "sinking feeling" in the pit of his stomach, or the griping of his intestines. Figure 114 shows the percentage of three hundred veteran soldiers who reported each of sixteen bodily symptoms of fear experienced under battle conditions. Several of these symptoms are affective in nature.

We do not find that a particular emotion, such as fear, has a unique pattern of bodily feelings — a pattern which sets it off from another emotion, such as anger. There is much overlapping of the bodily feelings for different emotions. When physiological processes




Figure 114. Percentage of 300 Veterans Who Said that They Experienced the Indicated Symptoms of Fear in Battle

The veterans were members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, which fought with the Loyalists in the Spanish Civil War. The percentages total more than 100 because the informants usually checked several symptoms. (From "Fear in Battle," by John Dollard and Donald Horton. Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1944. Reprinted by permission.)

which underlie such feelings are considered, we shall find that they do not themselves fall into distinct patterns, one for each emotion, but that they show considerable overlapping from one emotion to another.

Emotion as awareness of visceral and postural activities is considered further in our discussion of the theories of emotion. The James-Lange theory contends that emotional experience is an awareness of bodily processes

EMOTION FROM THE STANDPOINT OF BEHAVIOR

Contemporary psychologists would hesitate to give a detailed stereotyped description of the behavior in any particular "emotion" because the variations in expression are more obvious than stereotyped expressions. Emotional behavior differs so much from one individual to another under the same external conditions, and even in different manifestations of what is said to be the same emotion, that the picture for any given emotion is far from clear-cut.

Facial expression

Most of the research on facial expressions of emotion has dealt with ability of individuals to judge what emotions are being expressed, not with the more fundamental problem of what expressions (innate or acquired, or both) characterize specific emotions. We shall consider the problem of judging emotional expressions in the following chapter. If all individuals judged a particular expression as surprise, it might mean merely that they all recognized the conventional stereotyped expression found in their culture.

One careful attempt has been made to discern whether well-defined patterns actually exist in facial expressions elicited by various emotion-provoking situations.¹⁷ College students were stimulated by a variety of emotion-provoking situations such as having to decapitate a live rat, looking at realistic pictures of horrible diseases, and sniffing foul odors. While the subjects were reacting to such situations, both still and motion pictures were taken. The subjects knew that they

were being photographed, but presumably attempted to act naturally. Each subject was called upon to name the emotion aroused. The photographs made data available for correlating particular expressions with (1) the situation which provoked them and (2) the emotion present, as reported by the subject. The upshot of this whole investigation, involving a very careful analysis of the facial musculature and of movement patterns, is that neither a particular situation nor a particular emotion, as reported, brings out a uniform pattern of facial expression.

Postural reactions in emotion

Certain emotions tend to arouse different general postures, although there are great differences in reaction from one individual to another, as in the case of facial expression. Fear often involves either flight or being "rooted to the spot." Violent anger often involves, not flight, but aggressive movements, either abusive or involving actual attack. Love usually involves movement in the direction of the loved one and, where tactual stimulation is involved, movements conducive to continuation of the stimulus. Sorrow is often associated with a general slumping posture, whereas joy often involves the opposite posture, with the head held high and the chest out.

Such postural reactions as we have mentioned are given especial emphasis in the James-Lange theory of emotion which we will discuss shortly. According to this theory, stimulation produced by assumption of postures contributes to the feeling aspect of emotion.

PHYSIOLOGICAL CONCOMITANTS OF EMOTION

Much of the research on emotion has been focused upon physiological concomitants, some of which are changes in respiration, blood pressure, pulse rate, limb volume, sweat-gland activity, gastrointestinal functions, metabolic rate, and chemical changes in

the blood. This research may be said to have two aims: to discover (1) how various physiological processes change during emotion, and (2) whether there are different patterns of physiological change underlying specified emotions, such as fear, rage, and disgust.

Investigating physiological changes in emotion

Most studies of the physiological concomitants of emotion record several physiological changes simultaneously. A typical setup in research and laboratory demonstrations is shown in Figure 115. Here we have devices for measuring respiratory and circulatory changes. A record of such changes is illustrated in Figure 116.

Activity of the heart in emotion is often studied by examining the shape of the curve obtained with an electrocardiograph. This instrument makes records of the electrical activity of all aspects of the heartbeat. In research on emotion, the analysis of electrocardiograms indicates changes in heart action and the duration of such changes.

Another instrument widely used in studying physiological changes in emotion is the so-called *psychogalvanometer*. This apparatus measures changes in electrical resistance in the skin — electrodermal changes — which changes are now known to result from activity of the sweat glands. At one time psychologists thought the *galvanic skin response* or *GSR* was specific to emotion — that is, present only when emotion was aroused. It has been clearly established, however, that the response also occurs in manual and mental work. However, the *GSR* is clearly present in emotional upset, and may even provide a rough measure of the degree of upset.¹⁸

Many psychogalvanometers involve the principle of the Wheatstone bridge, illustrated in Figure 117. The subject is placed in one circuit, the potential of which may be balanced with that of a fixed circuit. The two circuits are connected through a galvanometer. When they balance, the galvanometer reading is zero. If the subject's skin resistance changes, however, the potentials are




Figure 115. Measurement of Some Physiological Concomitants of Emotion

The subject has a pneumograph (for measurement of respiration) around his chest, the sleeve of a sphygmomanometer (for measurement of changes in blood pressure and pulse rate) around his right arm, and a plethysmograph (for measurement of limb volume) over his left hand and forearm. Each of these instruments is connected, through a rubber tube, with a recording tambour. A metronome connected electrically with a signal magnet provides a time line. Pressure on a stimulus key, also connected with a signal magnet, gives a record of when the stimulus (gunshot, electric shock, snake, foul odor, or the like) is presented.

As the subject breathes in, the rubber tube (pneumograph) around his chest expands, the air pressure in the system including the tambour decreases, and the pointer resting on the rubber diaphragm of the tambour moves downward, producing a downward movement of the line on the record. As the subject breathes out, the rubber tube around his chest contracts, increasing the air pressure in the system and raising the pointer attached to the tambour. The sphygmomanometer, the device used by doctors to measure blood pressure, may be used directly to determine blood pressure just before and just after onset of the stimulus. As in the case of the pneumograph, however, changes in air pressure associated with changes in blood pressure may be recorded on the smoked drum. Because the pressure involved is very great and would blow up the delicate rubber diaphragm of the tambour, a reducing capsule must be used. In this, the pressure from the sphygmomanometer is borne by a lower chamber capped with a thick sheet of rubber. Changes in this sheet of rubber from alterations in air pressure below are conveyed to an upper chamber connected directly with the tambour. The plethysmograph is connected with a tambour, and changes in air pressure produced by an increase or decrease in the volume of the arm (due to changes in blood supply) provide a record of such changes in volume.

thrown out of balance and a deflection of the galvanometer results.

Changes in the galvanometer following emotional stimulation are due to a lowering of electrical resistance between the two electrodes on the skin. This lowering of electrical resistance is itself due to the fact that beads of sweat oozing out of the skin facilitate conduction of the current. A record obtained with a mirror galvanometer, which throws a spot of light on a constantly moving photographic film, is shown in Figure 118. The G.S.R. may be studied in terms of its latency

(how long a period elapses before the change occurs), its amplitude (degree of change from zero), its duration (the time which elapses between onset of the response and the return to normal), or some derivative of such indices.

Gastrointestinal functions

These functions are often measured by means of balloons inserted into stomach or intestines. The reader will recall our discussion of the use of such balloons in the study of stomach contractions related to hunger. Gastric functions in emotion have also been stud-




Figure 116. Some Respiratory and Circulatory Changes in Emotion

Read from left to right. The subject was given a strong electric shock on the hand. Almost immediately after, as indicated in the record, his inspiration (lowering of the upper curve) became deeper. The respiration curve increased in amplitude. The blood pressure showed a slight rise, and the pulse increased in amplitude and to a slight degree in rapidity. This should not be taken as a typical reaction to shock, for curves made under these circumstances differ greatly from subject to subject and in the same subject from time to time. All that this curve illustrates is the general nature of respiratory and blood-pressure curves and the most obvious ways in which changes in them may be analyzed.

ied by fluoroscopic devices similar in principle to those used in shoe stores to observe whether a good fit has been obtained. When a fluoroscope is used, the subject takes bismuth with the preceding meal so that the contents and activities of his stomach and intestines will be visible.

Another method of studying gastric functions involves observation of the stomach directly. A recent study of this nature had as subject a man whose esophagus had been closed off in childhood by drinking scalding clam chowder, and who fed himself through a gastric fistula.¹⁹ This man put his food in his mouth, chewed it, and then expectorated it into a kitchen funnel inserted, through the fistula, into his stomach. Part of the gastric mucosa was turned outward in producing the fistula, so that circulatory changes in the stomach wall could be observed directly. The contents of the stomach could also be withdrawn at intervals for study. Conveniently, the subject was employed in the medical

laboratory where the studies were carried out.

The patient suddenly experienced fear one morning in the midst of a phase of accelerated gastric function. An irate doctor entered the room muttering imprecations about an important protocol which had been lost. The patient had mislaid it and feared that he had lost the record and his job. He lay motionless on the table and his face became pale. Prompt and decided pallor occurred also in his gastric mucosa, and associated with it there occurred a fall in the rate of acid production. A minute later, the doctor found his paper and left the room. Forthwith the face and gastric mucosa of the patient regained their former color.

A different reaction occurred at another time, when a doctor who complained of the patient's work told him he need not report for work any more. The subject accepted the




Figure 117. A Simple Psychogalvanometer

In this adaptation of a Wheatstone bridge, the subject's hand and an adjustable resistance (rheostat) are connected with two arms of the bridge, while fixed resistances of respectively 50 and 500 ohms are connected with the other arms. The potential in point B of the bridge corresponds to the ratio 50:500 or 1:10. When the resistances of the subject and the rheostat are also in the ratio of 1:10, the potentials at A and B balance and there is no deflection of the galvanometer. The rheostat is adjusted so that this is the case. Now the subject is the only variable. Any change in the electrical resistance of his skin will lead to a change in potential between A and B. The needle of the galvanometer will then swing out of balance.




Figure 118. Galvanic Skin Response to a Scream

The record was obtained by photographing the successive positions of a spot of light reflected from the mirror of a galvanometer placed in the electrical circuit of the psychogalvanometer. (From Lund, F. H., "Emotion." New York: Ronald, 1939, p. 185.)

rebuff politely. However, "his stomach became red and engorged and soon the folds were thick and turgid. Acid production accelerated sharply and vigorous contractions began." This subject showed such reactions whenever he became anxious, resentful, or hostile.

Other physiological aspects of emotional behavior — aspects like basal metabolism, blood count, blood sugar, hormones in the blood, skin temperature, urine sugar, and the like — are measured with the various devices used in clinical medicine. Many of the changes thus measured are directly or indirectly related to the concentration of adrenin in the blood. Adrenin (or adrenaline) is a hormone secreted by the adrenal glands located one above each kidney.

Adrenal discharge in emotion

Adrenin in excess amounts produces such effects as an increase in blood sugar, due to release of glycogen from the liver; sugar in the urine, as in mild diabetes; speeding up of heart action; constriction of small blood vessels in the skin; increased blood pressure; and more rapid clotting of the blood. Cannon, who has done a large volume of research in this field, points out that the increased energy made available through higher blood sugar, together with some of the other physiological

effects of excess adrenin, has an emergency function. Excess adrenin and related effects are presumably responsible for the almost superhuman feats of speed and strength which individuals sometimes put forth in emergencies, and which may enable them to escape dangers. Increased coagulability of the blood has obvious value in situations involving injury to the organism.²⁰

Although adrenin produces changes such as we have mentioned, injection of the hormone under non-emotional circumstances does not necessarily arouse emotional experience or behavior. Among twenty-two normal subjects injected with adrenin, three reported unpleasant experience, one pleasant experience, ten no emotional experience at all, and the remainder a variety of emotions. Subjects injected with adrenin often report that they feel as if they were going to have an emotional experience, but the expectation is not usually realized.²¹ This probably means that, in addition to the physiological changes produced by adrenin, an emotion-provoking situation and related postural activities are usually necessary for the arousal of emotional experiences.

Differentiating emotional from non-emotional states

We have seen that emotion has varied physiological concomitants, many of which

are objectively measurable. Is it possible, by studying such changes, to tell whether or not the individual has been emotionally aroused? Can we tell anything about the intensity of emotional arousal?

The so-called lie-detector discussed in the following chapter exemplifies the fact that physiological changes sometimes indicate whether or not, and, if so, to what degree, an emotional reaction has been elicited.

Perhaps the best-known laboratory diagnosis of emotional response is that in which eighteen college students volunteered to serve as subjects in an experiment allegedly concerned only with studying their heart action. One at a time, they sat in a dark room with an electrocardiograph, a pneumograph, and a psychogalvanometer attached to them. The experimenter remained in an adjoining room. Three records were taken without anything unusual happening. At the fourth session, however, the experimenter threw a switch, and the chair unexpectedly fell backwards through an arc of sixty degrees, after which its fall was gradually absorbed by a door check. The subjects let out a yell, called for help, or tried to escape from the situation. All reported experiencing fear and said that the collapse was entirely unexpected. The same subjects and three others were later subjected to the falling-chair situation, but with the knowledge that the fall would occur. They had no warning, however, as to just when it would come. None of the subjects reported fear under these circumstances.

A comparison of the records obtained when fear was present and when it was absent shows that, although all of the physiological reactions which were recorded had changed, the change was in some instances greater when the fall was unexpected and fear was experienced than when it was expected and no fear was present. For example, initial acceleration of the heart was 16 per cent under the first circumstances and 10 per cent under the second, and the duration of the change in rate of breathing was three minutes under the first circumstances and one minute under the sec-

ond. The psychogalvanic reaction was about the same under both circumstances. Several of the respiratory and circulatory indices were not significantly different in a fall with fear from a fall without fear.²²

It is necessary to add a note of caution at this point. In studies of physiological expressions, the investigator knows that an emotion-provoking stimulus has been presented, hence he can correlate physiological changes with such stimulation, and with emotion as reported by the subject. Under such circumstances someone else who knows that the subject has been emotionally aroused may, from the physiological record alone, be able to tell at what point the subject became emotionally aroused. However, physical and mental work often produce physiological changes like those associated with emotion. Thus, if one saw a record of respiratory, circulatory, and electrodermal changes without knowing whether work or emotion was involved, the chances are that he would be unable to predict which had produced the changes — work or emotion.

General observation and evidence from the laboratory suggest strongly that, whatever emotion is aroused, a more intense arousal (in terms of intensity of stimulation and reports of the individuals concerned) brings more marked physiological changes than a less intense arousal. In this connection there is some evidence that the intensity of affective arousal is correlated with the magnitude of the G S R. For example, those stimuli which the individual rates as pleasant or unpleasant tend to arouse a more marked galvanic reaction than those rated as neutral in affective value.²³ A high intensity of emotion (as reported by the subject) is also associated with a more marked galvanometer deflection than is a weak intensity of emotion.²⁴

Does each emotion have its own distinct physiological characteristics?

There are really two problems here. The first is to discover whether the direction and degree of change in a particular physiological

process, or aspect of a physiological process, is different for different emotions. In other words, does respiration differ in, let us say, fear and anxiety? The second question poses a more difficult problem — that of discovering whether the great variety of physiological changes associated with a particular emotion fall into a given pattern which may be differentiated from the pattern of some other emotion. If the physiological patterns associated with fear and love were distinct, and similarly distinct from physiological patterns in other emotions, we should be able to predict that fear or love was present merely from a study of the recorded physiological changes.

The answer to the first question is that little success has been achieved in differentiating emotions in terms of changes in a particular physiological variable. Most of the results are negative. Sexual passion or lust, the emotion intimately associated with the heights of sexual activity, of course presents a unique case, since physiological reactions in the sex organs are especially involved.²⁵

The answer to the second question is that a large amount of research on this problem has disclosed no distinct pattern of physiological changes which would enable us to differentiate one emotion from another. However,

attention should be called to the distinction between emotions as physiological states and emotions as enumerated and described in our descriptive terminology. As determined by the latter, our emotions are quite numerous. Consider, for instance . . . fear, horror, disgust, repulsion, aversion, dislike, annoyance, anger, sadness, sorrow, despair, hopelessness, pity, sympathy, hunger, interest, curiosity, pleasure, delight, fascination, admiration, amusement, humor, affection, love, tenderness, and passion.

It should be apparent that these terms are not descriptive of so many internal or organic states. They are descriptive, in most cases, of objective situations and of accepted modes of handling and dealing with these. Despair and annoyance could not be recognized, except in terms of certain behavior forms or certain external conditions. Even where the impelling features of an emotion are internal rather than external, our descriptive termi-

nology has reference to the overt rather than the visceral component. This is true of fear and anger. These emotions are distinguishable, not in terms of their visceral component, but in terms of their overt features, fear being a tendency to withdraw or flee, anger being a tendency to strike or attack.²⁶

NEURAL MECHANISMS IN EMOTION

As indicated elsewhere, emotion is a function of the whole organism — when we are emotionally aroused, we are aroused all over. Nevertheless, certain parts of the organism are more intimately involved, and involved to a greater degree, than others. What applies to the organism in general also applies, of course, to the nervous system in general. Our peripheral and central nervous systems are involved. Afferent and efferent fibers connecting the spinal cord and brain stem with the skeletal muscles and the autonomic nervous system are involved, as well as all the structures of the brain stem and the cerebral cortex. Nevertheless, the neural structures most intimately involved in emotional behavior and experience are the *autonomic nervous system*, the *hypothalamus*, and the *cerebral cortex*.

The autonomic nervous system

This system is schematically represented in Figure 119. It has three main divisions. The uppermost division (cranial) and the lowest division (sacral) together make up what is known as the *parasympathetic* nervous system. The intermediate division is the *sympathetic* system. Both the cranial and sacral divisions work in opposition to the central division of the autonomic system. Observe that many of the visceral and other structures indicated in the diagram have dual connections, one with the parasympathetic and the other with the sympathetic system. The antagonism of the two functional systems is illustrated by the following facts: When the sympathetic system is dominant, salivary secretion is inhibited, heart action is accelerated, the adrenal glands are accelerated, and the small blood vessels are constricted (vasoconstrict-




Figure 119. Schematic Representation of the Autonomic Nervous System

From Warren, H. C., and Carmichael, L., "Fundamentals of Human Psychology." Boston Houghton Mifflin, 1930, p. 33

tion). When the parasympathetic is dominant, on the other hand, salivary secretion is accelerated, heart action is retarded, adrenal functions are retarded, and the small blood vessels are dilated (vasodilation)

Connection of the sympathetic nervous system with the spinal cord and brain is illustrated in Figure 120, which represents only the paths traversed by nerve impulses which produce vasoconstriction. Motor connections are alone indicated. This is because the autonomic system is named in terms of its motor functions — not its structures. However, there are also sensory fibers running from the various visceral and other structures back into the central nervous system. Impulses received over such fibers underlie whatever awareness we may have of what is taking place in the viscera.

Stimulation of any part of the sympathetic system tends to bring about a widespread effect, inhibiting or accelerating the functions of most of the related structures. Part of this diffuse effect is due to the involvement of the adrenal gland. In other words, the sympathetic system activates the adrenal gland which, through its discharge of excess adrenin into the blood stream, produces reverberations throughout the whole body.

There is no doubt that most of the visceral components of emotion are dominated by the




Figure 120. The Neural Control of Vasoconstriction in Emotion

Nerve impulses from the brain pass down the pyramidal tracts to the thoracic region of the spinal cord and cross synapses to reach the pre-ganglionic fiber which carries them to the chain of sympathetic ganglia. Other (post-ganglionic) fibers then carry them to the arteries, or other structures innervated through the sympathetic ganglia. (From Crafts, et al., "Recent Experiments in Psychology." New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938, p. 266.)

sympathetic division of the autonomic system. Until recently, the parasympathetic system was thought to be completely "silent" during emotion. However, recent investigations on animals have shown that some structures are dominated by the parasympathetic, even when the organism is emotionally aroused. The conclusion thus forced upon us is that "emotion is characterized by autonomic function rather than by sympathetic function alone."²⁷

It has long been known that accidental or experimentally produced injuries to the thalamus may produce marked changes in emotional behavior. Sometimes the effect is to make the individual apathetic; at others it is to heighten emotionality. Apathy occurs when the *hypothalamus* (Figure 18) is seriously impaired; heightened excitability occurs when this region is intact, but connections between it and the cerebral cortex, through the thalamus proper, have been cut. The latter is presumably brought about by removal of the inhibitory effect of the cortex.

The recent emphasis by physiologists on the hypothalamus as a center for control of emotional behavior grows out of experiments on animals. Stimulating the hypothalamus with a needle electrode causes a cat to "retract its ears, crouch, growl, raise its back and lash its tail, and show a crescendo of . . . typical sympathetic and motor reactions."²⁸ Removal of the hypothalamus abolishes all expressions of emotion in cats and dogs, whereas removal of no other part of the brain has this effect.²⁹ Drugs, such as sodium amytal and metrazol, which act specifically upon the hypothalamus, produce marked changes in the emotional behavior of animal and human subjects.³⁰

Such observations as these make it evident that the hypothalamus plays an important rôle in emotional behavior, but do not justify the conclusion that it is the only important neural mechanism for control of emotion. In the first place, the seemingly emotional reactions produced by stimulation of the hypothalamus differ markedly from naturally aroused emotional behavior.

. . . much as these reactions resemble those of rage and fear, they differ from the latter in certain significant respects. For instance, the ostensibly aggressive activity during hypothalamic stimulation is not directed toward specific objects in the animal's environment, even when these are manipulated so as directly to irritate the animal. Again, the responses induced by hypothalamic stimulation are not adapted to the surroundings; *e.g.*, the cat will dash itself repeatedly against the sides of the cage and neglect a readily available avenue of escape. Moreover, all of the pseudo-affective reactions cease abruptly at the end of the stimulus, without leaving any of the residue (mewing, trembling, hiding, and the like) ordinarily observed after true emotional states. In effect, the activity induced by hypothalamic stimulation is mechanical, diffuse, stereotyped, stimulus-bound, and seems to carry no greater emotional connotation than would the contraction of a skeletal muscle induced by the stimulation of an efferent nerve. On these phenomenological grounds alone, then, pseudo-affective reactions differ significantly from those in motivationally determined emotional states.³¹

Although it is clear that the hypothalamus plays a rôle in the motor expressions of emotion, its rôle in relation to feeling aspects is widely disputed.³²

The cerebral cortex

In considering the rôle of the cerebral cortex in emotion, four facts stand out: (1) Most emotion-provoking situations cannot be perceived without the cortex. (2) The cortex plays a major rôle in adjustment to emotion-provoking situations. The cat or dog, with its cerebral cortex removed or seriously impaired, shows a decreased ability to avoid injury, escape from danger, or vent its rage appropriately. (3) Another contribution of the cortex is the sustaining of emotional behavior after the emotion-provoking stimulus has gone. The organism devoid of a cortex ceases its emotional reaction as soon as the stimulus is removed, but the normal animal continues to react emotionally. (4) Removing the cerebral cortex increases the intensity of emotional expression. This widely verified observation is consistent with the well-known fact that the cerebrum exerts an inhibiting

influence over other neural mechanisms, including the hypothalamus.²³

THEORIES OF EMOTION

There are several theories of emotion, some concerning one aspect and some another. The most prominent theories, however, concern the relation between behavioral and conscious aspects of emotion. There are really three such theories. One, designated the *common-sense theory*, needs little discussion. It assumes that we perceive an emotion-provoking situation, have an emotional experience, and then behave emotionally — as if the emotional experience aroused or stimulated the visceral and skeletal reactions. To the man in the street this is obviously what happens. The psychologist, however, does not accept so naïve a view. The other theories, known as the *James-Lange theory* and the *thalamic theory*, require a more detailed discussion.

The James-Lange theory

The basic principle of this theory was independently conceived by William James and a Danish physiologist named Lange. James²⁴ says:

My theory . . . is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep, we meet a bear, are frightened and run, we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be. Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we would not actually feel afraid or angry.

In support of this theory, James mentions such alleged facts as the following: Unless one assumes the postures typical to an emotion he fails to have the emotional experiences. In other words, it is claimed that if a situation calls for grief, and instead of slumping you hold your head high and stick out your chest, no experience of grief will come. On the other hand, it is argued that if you assume the postures typical in a certain emotion you will tend to have that emotion. James was told by actors that when they went through the postures of emotion and played their part well, they had corresponding emotional experiences. He also asks us to imagine an emotion without the heart palpitation, the goose pimples, and various visceral changes, and suggests that we will have little or no success in doing this. None of these lines of evidence is very convincing, and many papers have been written in refutation of them. Nevertheless, the James-Lange theory has had wide acceptance.

It is true that while the evidence in favor of the theory is not very convincing, the evidence against it is also not very convincing. The chief criticisms, and the evidence on which they are based, may be summarized briefly:

- (1) When the spinal cord is cut at the level of the neck, thus preventing nerve impulses originating in the sympathetic nervous system from reaching the cortex, emotional behavior and experience are apparently unchanged. Most of the work here has been done with animals and is thus not crucial. The theory claims that emotional experience is dependent upon contributions from the viscera and the skeletal muscles, but we do not know whether or not the animals had conscious experiences either before or after the operation. Moreover, such an operation does not remove the parasympathetic contributions. The vagus nerve, which carries the cranial fibers of the parasympathetic, is intact. There have been several reports of human beings with the spinal cord accidentally cut in the neck region, and whose skeletal muscles were paralyzed from the neck down. These people continued to have emotional experiences. Here again, since the parasympathetic fibers (vagus nerve) are intact,

the autonomic, hence visceral, contributions are not completely removed. If the reports of these patients were reliable and if all visceral connections were cut off, we might have crucial evidence against the James-Lange theory. As it is, these findings neither support nor refute the theory.

(2) Injection of adrenin, which produces widespread visceral changes, does not necessarily arouse emotional experience. However, there are visceral and skeletal aspects of emotion which adrenin does not produce and which, according to proponents of the theory, might be essential aspects of the total picture. Then, too, there is no stimulus appropriate to emotional arousal, and James claimed that the contribution of visceral and skeletal impulses is an addition to the perception of an exciting situation.

(3) As we have seen, the physiological patterns in different emotional situations, and associated with different emotional experiences, are apparently quite similar. This would argue against the view that nerve impulses traveling from viscera to brain could, each pattern in turn, contribute a specific form of emotional experience. On the other hand, the theory stresses the related contribution of impulses from the skeletal musculature — the contribution of movements as to escape, to fight, etc. To the degree that these fall into distinct patterns for each emotion, the theory might be supported, regardless of what happens as far as the viscera are concerned. That they do, except in a few instances, fall into such patterns is somewhat questionable in the light of evidence available.

(4) There is evidence that the viscera are not only relatively insensitive, but that they are also slow to react. Emotional experience may occur in less than a second after the stimulus is presented, yet the viscera respond only after a matter of seconds. It seems, therefore, that emotional experiences, instead of following the visceral changes, actually precede them. This does not mean, of course, that the experiences cause the visceral changes, as the common-sense theory supposes.³⁵

The thalamic theory

This theory takes cognizance of the above-mentioned criticisms. It also lays particular emphasis upon the hypothalamus as a center for the arousal of emotional behavior and experience. The theory in its present form has been worked out by two physiologists, Can-

non and Bard.³⁶ Its main features are apparent in Figure 121, where it is compared with the James-Lange theory.

The thalamic theory differs from the James-Lange theory chiefly in its emphasis upon the independence of emotional experience and emotional behavior. Whereas the James-Lange theory supposes that emotional experience is an awareness of bodily changes, the thalamic theory supposes that emotional experience and emotional behavior are almost simultaneously aroused by a discharge of impulses from the hypothalamus.

One can see quite readily that the thalamic theory overcomes several difficulties inherent in the James-Lange theory. The severing of the spinal cord in the neck region would not interfere with the discharge of the hypothalamus to the cortex, and hence with emotional experience. The injection of adrenin would arouse visceral reactions, but not necessarily cause the hypothalamus to discharge. That visceral and skeletal reactions do not fall into discrete patterns, one for each emotion, would offer no difficulty for the theory. It supposes that emotional experience is due to hypothalamic discharge and not to visceral or skeletal activities. The fact that the viscera are relatively insensitive and slow to react would be of no account as far as the theory is concerned, for emotional experience is independently aroused.

The thalamic theory runs into serious difficulty, however, when attention is turned to the facts mentioned above in connection with hypothalamic functions. In the first place, emotional behavior aroused by stimulation of the hypothalamus is less oriented toward a situation, more restricted, more stereotyped, less adaptive, and shorter-lived than naturally aroused emotional behavior. This suggests that parts of the nervous system in addition to the thalamus are significantly related to emotional behavior. From the standpoint of adaptation to emotion-provoking situations, the cerebral cortex is especially important. In the second place, as reported above, there is little or no reliable evidence that

EMOTION




Figure 121. The James-Lange and Thalmic Theories Compared

According to the James-Lange theory, an emotion-provoking situation arouses impulses which go to the viscera and skeletal musculature as indicated by the arrows. These impulses set up visceral and skeletal activities. Sensory fibers in the aroused structures are activated, and the visceral and skeletal structures then make their contribution, as the impulses from them pass back to the cortex. Here they add the feeling aspect to what was previously non-emotional perception.

According to the thalamic theory, an emotion-provoking situation arouses impulses which go to cortex, viscera, and skeletal musculature simultaneously. The emotional experience, according to this theory, is almost immediate and does not depend upon visceral and skeletal contributions. Because the cortex is close to the thalamus, emotional experience actually precedes the bodily changes. It is claimed, more specifically, that the hypothalamus is a center which discharges reflexly to arouse both the emotional experience and the bodily changes.

Both theories admit that the cortex can stimulate and inhibit emotional activities. The thalamic theory does not deny some skeletal and visceral contribution to experience. Lines representing the chief contrasting features of the two theories are alone included. (Modified from Morgan, C. T., "Physiological Psychology." New York. McGraw-Hill, 1943, p. 356.)

hypothalamic functions contribute to emotional experience in ways suggested by the theory.

We must conclude, therefore, that neither the James-Lange theory nor the thalamic theory is completely satisfactory as an explanation of the relation between emotional experience and emotional behavior. That we are often aware of bodily changes in emotion, whether or not these are necessary aspects as demanded by the James-Lange theory, shows that visceral and skeletal components play their part. We therefore cannot throw out the James-Lange theory altogether. Nor can the thalamic theory be ignored, for the thala-

mus, whether or not it is the center for emotion, contributes a great deal to emotional behavior. A theory in keeping with all of the known facts would not only have to combine certain features of both theories, but have to add a great deal besides.

SUMMARY

Emotion has been defined as "an acute disturbance of the individual as a whole, psychological in origin, involving behavior, conscious experience, and visceral functioning."

The human newborn probably has only one emotional response; namely, general excitement. As the infant grows, he gradually in-

creases his repertoire of emotions and specific emotional reactions. During the first two years of life, it is possible to discern the gradual emergence of several emotions. Moreover, the child who could only cry and thrash his limbs at birth comes to reach for objects, throw them, plead, complain, and manifest many other reactions when he is emotionally provoked.

The occasions for emotional upset tend to decrease as the child learns to master his environment. Nevertheless, objects which previously aroused no emotional reactions often come to do so. Thus, he may develop fear of snakes, of the dark, and of particular persons.

The facial and postural aspects of emotion soon conform, more or less closely, to the expressions which characterize members of the child's own group. The American child opens his eyes and mouth when surprised, but the Chinese child learns to stick out his tongue.

Some aspects of emotional development are undoubtedly due to maturation. This is especially true of crying, weeping, laughing, and certain other relatively simple reactions. Such responses appear even when, as in the congenitally deaf and blind, there are no opportunities to learn them.

Among the learned emotional reactions we find those which, while not common to mankind, characterize a particular culture. Reactions such as throwing, pleading, and complaining are also learned. Many of them are not specifically emotional, but are used by the individual in his adaptations to both emotional and non-emotional situations. The potency of particular objects and situations to arouse emotion is also developed through learning.

Retrospective reports of emotional experience indicate that some emotions are characteristically pleasant and others characteristically unpleasant. Moreover, individuals show close agreement in differentiating certain emotions with respect to experiences labeled as exciting, depressing, bright, or dull. Consciousness of certain bodily activities, like heart palpitation, are also reported.

It is doubtful whether each emotion has a unique behavioral pattern which differentiates it from others. The difficulty of discovering a "rage pattern," a "fear pattern," and specific patterns for each of the other emotions may mean that there is no universal inborn pattern, or it may mean that, whatever inborn patterns really exist are covered up by learned patterns, cultural and personal in origin. The problem is similar to that of instinct which we discussed in an earlier chapter.

The physiological concomitants of emotion are studied by use of such instruments as the pneumograph (respiration), sphygmomanometer (blood pressure and pulse), plethysmograph (limb volume), electrocardiograph (heart-muscle activity), and the psychogalvanometer (electrical resistance of skin, or sweat-gland activity). Records obtained in emotion-provoking situations show that a variety of physiological changes accompany emotion. Similar changes also accompany many non-emotional states. If one knows that emotion-provoking stimulation has been applied, he can often discern, from the record of physiological changes, when the emotional response occurred. So far, however, little success in discovering distinct physiological characteristics for each emotion has been achieved. Similarity of physiological reactions in different emotions is much more evident than a difference in such reactions for different emotions. There is evidence, however, that stronger emotional upsets, as they are experienced and as they are manifested in overt behavior, have more marked physiological concomitants than weaker ones.

Emotion involves the whole nervous system. However, there are three parts which are more intimately involved than others. These are the autonomic nervous system (both sympathetic and parasympathetic), the hypothalamus, and the cerebral cortex. Recent research has shown that, while the sympathetic nervous system tends to dominate in emotion, certain reactions remain under dominance of the parasympathetic. Research

has also disclosed that the hypothalamus, once thought to be the center for emotion, has a limited control over emotional expression. Expressions aroused by stimulating the hypothalamus are different in several important respects from those aroused under emotion-provoking circumstances. The cerebral cortex contributes to the perception of emotion-provoking situations, to adjustment in emotional reactions after the external stimulus has gone, and to the inhibiting of emotional reactions.

The common-sense theory of emotion is too naïve for scientific acceptance. However,

neither the James-Lange theory nor the thalamic theory is completely in accordance with available evidence. The James-Lange theory says that emotional experience is perception of bodily changes, both visceral and skeletal, whereas the thalamic theory says that emotional experiences and bodily changes are independent of each other, but both dependent upon discharges from the hypothalamus. A completely adequate theory would undoubtedly include certain aspects of the James-Lange and thalamic theories, but it would add a great deal more than is involved in either theory.

CHECK LIST FOR OBSERVATIONS ON EMOTION AS CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE

Anger was characterized as unpleasant by 73 per cent of Hunt's subjects; as excitement by 59 per cent; as strain by 59 per cent, and

as warmth by 44 per cent. Percentages for the other ten terms of the list given on page 268 ranged from 2 to 21.

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Chapter 16

Feeling and Emotion in Everyday Life

IN THE PRECEDING CHAPTER our concern was primarily with the nature of emotion. We gave attention to its everyday manifestations only when these contributed more or less directly to an understanding of emotional development, emotional experience, expressions of emotion, and physiological concomitants.

Certain aspects of feeling and emotion in everyday life have been subjected to extensive psychological investigation. Feeling is an aspect of all emotional experience. However, certain objects, individuals, and situations which do not provoke emotional upset may nevertheless arouse in us pleasant experiences, unpleasant experiences, or even, as the saying goes, "leave us cold." A knowledge of the things which please or annoy us is of great practical value for those who wish to control human behavior. Some of the research in this general field of investigation has concerned the colors, tones, odors, tastes, and combinations of these which, by arousing pleasant experiences, influence our preferences.

Common annoyances have also been studied. The psychology of feeling in everyday life includes what is sometimes called *experimental aesthetics*. This is the scientific investigation of the effect of various artistic creations on human beings and their resultant feelings and preferences. Why, for example, do people prefer certain paintings, novels, or musical compositions to others? The first section of the present chapter provides a brief introduction to this general field of research.

Postural and facial expressions of emotion were discussed briefly in the preceding chap-

ter. Our interest there was primarily in exploring the possibility that each emotion has a unique pattern — one which differentiates it from other emotions. In the present chapter, we will focus our attention on the agreement shown by members of our own society in judging what emotions are being expressed by those around them.

Although we have already mentioned the so-called lie-detector, we have said little about the apparatus involved, how it is applied, what records are obtained, and how these records are analyzed and interpreted. In our discussion of the lie-detector in this chapter we shall try to answer such questions.

An increasing number of medical men are accepting the view that many diseases have a psychological rather than a purely physical origin. Some of these disorders are apparently caused by the physiological concomitants of fear, anxiety, and worry. A brief introduction to this field of *psychosomatic medicine* is also given in this chapter.

An important problem of everyday life is the control of emotion. How, for example, can anger be controlled? How can we eliminate unnecessary fears? How can situations involving danger best be met? At the conclusion of our discussion, we will consider some of these questions.

FEELING IN EVERYDAY LIFE

By and large, the colors, odors, and tastes which we prefer are those which arouse pleasant feelings. Our aversions, on the other hand, are for objects and situations which

arouse unpleasant feelings. Thus, any investigation of preferences and aversions is, in large measure, also an indirect study of feeling.

A knowledge of the colors preferred by the greatest number of people is of great practical value not only in advertising, but in every field of business and industry involving color. But how can one discover the preferred colors or color combinations?

One method is to take the possible colors or combinations and ask a large representative group of people to place them in rank order, the most pleasant or most preferred at the top, the least pleasant or least preferred at the bottom, and the others at appropriate places between these extremes.

A second method is to have individuals rate the color on a rating scale, which may be a line with 10 (pleasant) at one end and 1 (unpleasant) at the other end and numbers from 2 to 9 distributed at equal intervals between. By this method the individual first looks at the color, and then checks an appropriate point on the line.

A third method is to pair every color with every other color an equal number of times and ask the subjects to choose one in every pair. However, an individual may have a right- or left-hand preference, tending, for example, to like what is on his right more than what is on his left. To counterbalance this tendency, each color is paired with every other color at least twice, once on its right and once on its left. This general method is known as that of *paired comparison*. Its advantage over the rank order and rating methods is that it insures a comparison of every color with every other color under comparable conditions.

When the paired-comparison method is used, some colors are chosen more often than others, and we rank them accordingly. Suppose, for example, that six colors were to be compared with each other in all possible combinations. The number of combinations would be determined by the formula $n(n-1)/2$ which gives us $6(6-1)/2$, or fifteen combina-

tions. When we consider that each color must be presented as many times on the right as on the left, it becomes apparent that there are thirty possible combinations. The number of times that each color is chosen in all combinations is determined, and a corresponding rank assigned to the color. The highest rank is given to the color chosen most often. Each of the other colors may be ranked on a similar basis, with that chosen the fewest times given the lowest rank.

The rank assigned each color by different individuals differs a great deal, regardless of the method used to determine preferences. However, when the ranks, ratings, or preference scores assigned to each color by many individuals are combined, there is evident a high percentage of agreement as to the most preferred and least preferred colors. There is usually less agreement, however, concerning the rank of colors between these extremes.

When the brightness and saturation of colors is held constant, most native-born North Americans (both Negro and white) prefer blue to all other colors. Yellow is the least preferred color. These preferences are not present at birth, but develop with age. Moreover, they differ from one culture to another. Thus, color preferences are acquired through cultural contacts. The Mexican, in whose culture red plays a large rôle, comes to prefer red above all other colors just as we come to prefer blue.¹

In the business world it is necessary to determine which color or pattern of cloth, what color combination in an automobile, and so on, is most preferred. Since many things are involved, apart from color as such — for example, color combinations and color and form — the results from the psychological laboratory, although they may be suggestive, cannot be applied directly. On the other hand, the special methods devised in research on color preferences are used in solving such practical problems.

The methods used to determine color preferences are also used in determining preferences for other aspects of sensory experience.

In one study of the affective value of common odors, it was found that peppermint was the most pleasant and carbon bisulphide the least pleasant.² Manufacturers of perfumes often use the procedures mentioned to select from many possible combinations those which the consumers will be most likely to prefer.

Much of the work on taste preferences has dealt with intensity aspects. Thus, it has been found that sweet, the most preferred taste, is consistently rated pleasant, whether low or high concentrations are used. Salt, on the other hand, is rated slightly unpleasant in low concentrations, and the unpleasantness increases as the concentration increases.³ One will recall, in this connection, our earlier discussion of taste, as related to the hunger drive. Certain substances needed by the organism, and of which it has been deprived, acquire a high preference value.

Investigations in the field of sound have shown that simple tones are usually rated pleasant, although certain ones, depending upon the individual, may be rated more pleasant than others. The average pleasantness rating for tones ranging from low to high pitch declines as the tones get higher. For a given pitch, the pleasantness rating declines as the tone goes from medium to loud intensity.⁴ In our culture, tonal combinations that are consonant usually get a high preferential rating and those that are dissonant usually get a low rating. It is, of course, true that one may become accustomed to dissonance, as in "jazz," and that its pleasantness may thus increase.

Aesthetic preferences

A large amount of research has been done to determine which pieces of music, geometrical forms, paintings, prose passages, poems, and color combinations individuals most prefer. One of the most interesting aspects of this research, however, has been the effort to discover why individuals exhibit preferences for one artistic creation as against another. In some instances, as in the field of music, there are doubtless certain aptitudes for appreciation. Aptitudes are considered in a

later chapter, but it may be said at this point that, unless an individual has fairly good ability to differentiate pitch and intensity differences, his appreciation of music will be limited accordingly. Likewise, a color-blind individual could hardly appreciate some colorful painting as much as an individual with full color sensitivity. In addition to perceptual ability such as that indicated, appreciation of artistic creations is greatly dependent upon training. Many a college student with little interest in or appreciation of music has, for example, acquired an interest and appreciation through his college course in musical appreciation where the works of such composers as Mozart, Bach, Beethoven, Tschaiakowsky, and Rimski-Korsakow were played and discussed. Perhaps not too unexpectedly, our aesthetic preferences and appreciations are also greatly influenced by what we know, or think we know, about the individuals who have created the music, the painting, the narrative, or the poem. In the case of music, the prestige of the performer is often an important factor underlying appreciation.

Psychologists have shown that the prestige of an artist greatly influences judgments concerning the artistic merit of his creation.

Ten pictures were obtained. Care was taken to employ pictures by unknown painters and to insure a considerable range of preference. A suitable title for each picture and a name for the artist were sought. Two paragraphs were devised for each picture and were attached to the mats. One set of paragraphs (designated as +) attempted to augment the rating, the other (indicated with a -) to decrease the rating. . . . The + and - paragraphs were chosen in a random order to make up two sets, each containing five +'s and five -'s. While each rater viewed all ten pictures, he could read only one set of paragraphs.

Directions given to sixty-four college students who acted as judges were as follows: "You will see a number of photographic reproductions on this table. Each one bears a number. You are to give your judgment in the following manner: on a sheet of paper put down the numerals 1 to 10, indicating the reproductions of corresponding number; then use the following symbols for your judgment:

- 1 — very beautiful
- 2 — pleasing
- 3 — indifferent
- 4 — displeasing
- 5 — very unattractive

You are to judge the painting, not whether the reproduction is good or bad."

A sample of the two kinds of title follows

Chinese Girl by Estha Hunt

"The painting that made Miss Hunt rise from obscurity to *Who's Who*, a work of beautiful design and brilliant richness of color." (From the sales catalogue of Messrs. Bryan, Bryan, and Bryan, London; they sold it to Mrs. Paul Dermoth, New York, for \$80,000.)

"An interesting painting by a little American High School girl in Shanghai. It was awarded second prize at the annual exhibition of the Kai-Hungpau High School."

The picture mentioned above received an average rating of 1.5 (between very beautiful and pleasing) when the high-sounding title was attached and 2.0 (pleasing) when the other was associated with it, indicating that the group given the positive suggestion rated it more beautiful than did the group given the negative suggestion. Similar results were obtained for every other picture in the group of ten. Some of the subjects failed to read the titles. If all had done so, the group differences would doubtless have been larger.⁵

One investigation utilized prose passages attributed to different authors, but actually written by Robert Louis Stevenson. The results demonstrated that appreciation of what one reads, his estimation of its merit, is greatly influenced by a knowledge of who wrote it. If the passage was attributed to a writer who had great prestige in the eyes of the judge, it was rated better than if a passage of comparable merit was attributed to a writer of relatively low prestige.⁶

Annoyances

Various aspects of our environment, including other individuals and what they do, are often sources of annoyance. One psychologist made an intensive investigation of com-

mon annoyances, aversions, or irritations.⁷ His initial procedure was to have 659 subjects of both sexes, and ranging in age from ten to ninety, make a list of the things which annoy them. These individuals listed a total of 17,800 annoyances. When duplications were eliminated, there were still 2581 annoyances. These were then classified as in the following table, which also shows the approximate percentage of all subjects listing annoyances under each class.

TABLE 8. CLASSIFICATION AND FREQUENCY OF COMMON ANNOYANCES
(After Cason)

Class	Number and per cent of different annoyances	
Human behavior	1523	59.0
Non-human things and activities (exclusive of clothes) . . .	486	18.8
Clothes and manner of dress	320	12.4
Alterable physical characteristics of people . . .	138	5.3
Persisting physical characteristics of people. . .	114	4.4
Total . . .	2581	100

It is quite evident from the data in Table 8 that the things which annoy most are activities of other individuals. In one way or another, practically every annoyance is connected with the behavior or characteristics of others, including their clothes and manner of dress.

When 507 of the most common annoyances were selected for further study and individuals were then asked to rate them in terms of their annoyingness, the most annoying items were found to be things such as the following:

- See a person blow nose without a handkerchief
- A person coughing in one's face
- A person cheating in a game
- To see a woman spit in public
- Odor of dirty feet
- See a child being harshly treated by adult

Since this investigation of common annoyances, others have applied similar procedures to a study of the habits of college professors


which prove most annoying to students.⁸ We may expect similar studies of the annoying habits of ministers, husbands, wives, children, and others.

The practical value of such studies for those who wish to "make friends and influence people" is obvious. If ministers, teachers, wives, and others do not know what aspects of their behavior annoy their parishioners, students, or husbands, there is little that they can do to reduce their annoyingness.


JUDGING EMOTIONAL EXPRESSIONS

Look at the expressions of emotion represented in Figure 122 and label each in terms of the emotion being expressed. Then look at the center of page 301 to see how closely your judgment agrees with that of a large number


of subjects who made a comparable judgment. In each of these instances we have only the face to aid us in making a judgment, and a stationary face at that. It is quite possible that the task of judging emotion would be easier if we could see the face in action. In many instances, moreover, we would be aided by a view of general body posture, including the position of the hands. We could tell whether the individual was trying to ward off some assailant, about to attack someone, or about to run away. In many instances, too, a knowledge of the situation, and especially what led up to it, would help us. In watching a movie, for example, we not only see the actor's facial and other expressions and hear what he is saying, but we also see the situation that he is involved in and what preceded it.




1



2



3



4

Figure 122. What Emotions Are Here Represented?

The value of knowing what has gone before in judging facial expression becomes apparent when one enters a movie in the middle.

Psychologists have done a large amount of research on judgments of emotional expression, facial, gestural, and vocal. One method has been to have an actress or actor pose in such a manner as to simulate various emotions. Two of the facial expressions in Figure 122 were posed and two were aroused spontaneously under conditions of everyday life. Can you tell which two were posed? The chances are that you can. Check your judgment with the statement given in the note at the bottom of page 302

Posed facial expressions of emotion are not judged with a high amount of agreement between judges. In the first place, the judges often disagree with the person who did the posing as to the emotion expressed. Thus, in determining whether or not an individual has judged "correctly," one usually goes by the majority opinion, not by what the actor intended. In other words, if you judge an expression to be rage and more of those who made the original judgments said it was rage than said it was something else, your judgment is said to be correct. In the second place, one can judge "correctly" only a small percentage of posed expressions. For example, very few individuals can correctly judge as many as ten out of the group of thirty-two posed expressions from which expression 1 of Figure 122 was taken — that is to say, judge them in agreement with majority opinion.⁹

When spontaneously aroused expressions are used, there is sometimes very close agreement among judges as to the emotion expressed. In a study involving spontaneously aroused facial expressions,¹⁰ three expressions produced from 86 to 97 per cent of agreement as to the emotions involved. We do not know actually what emotions are represented, for the pictures were taken from *Life* and the subjects were not contacted by the investigator, but the judges said that two of the expressions represented joy or happiness (which may be regarded as synonymous terms) and that the

other represented terror, fear, or horror (which may also be regarded as synonymous, or approximately so). Such a high percentage of agreement among judges is rare. There is almost universal agreement, however, as to whether an expression represents pleasant or unpleasant feeling.

Why, when 90 per cent say that an emotional expression represents fear, are we not justified in jumping to the conclusion that the emotion is fear? If the one whose spontaneous (not posed) expression was being observed said that he experienced fear, we should have to accept his report as correct, and those who said that the expression represented fear would have made a correct judgment, even if there had been only one such judgment. We might conclude, of course, that the expression was not representative of fear — that is to say, not a common expression of fear. That we cannot accept majority opinion as correct may be illustrated by an actual experimental finding. Over 70 per cent of ninety judges said that a certain spontaneously aroused facial expression represented sorrow. However, when they saw the facial expression, posture, and situation involved, all but 2 per cent changed their judgment from "sorrow" to such judgments as "strain," "determination," and "fear." Which judgments were correct? We do not know, because the person involved did not report the nature of her emotion.

Facial expressions of emotion have also been investigated through use of articulated models such as those shown in Figure 123. Such models enable us to simulate various emotional expressions by manipulating various parts of the face. One aim of research with the models is to discover which parts of the face most influence judgments of emotional expression. Generally speaking, the judgments are influenced most by changes in the mouth. In other words, one may set the model to give an expression presumably simulating rage. A certain percentage of the subjects perhaps says that the expression is "rage." We now change the eyes and there




Figure 123. Facial Expressions Made with Two Articulated Models of the Face
(After Guilford and Boring, with permission of the C. H. Stoelting Company.)

is little or no change in the percentage of agreement. We then leave the eyes and other parts of the face as they were, but change the mouth. Now a large proportion of the subjects says that some emotion other than "rage" is expressed.

The problem of eyes versus mouth in judgments of emotional expression may also be approached by taking photographs of facial expression such as those shown in Figure 124. Judgments concerning the emotion expressed are obtained and, as in the illustration, the pictures are cut in half through the bridge of the nose. Upper and lower halves are then interchanged. This study demonstrated quite clearly that individuals change their judgments when the lower halves are interchanged much more frequently than when the

upper halves are interchanged. This would suggest that judges are influenced more by expressions of the mouth than by expressions of the upper half of the face.¹¹ In a more elaborate study of a somewhat similar nature, agreement of judges was observed to be about the same for (1) the face as a whole and (2) the eyes separately in some instances (namely, "sulkiness" and "contempt") and for (1) the face as a whole and (2) the mouth separately in others (namely, "fear," "anxiety," and "doubt").¹² This suggests that the eyes play a major rôle in judgment of some posed emotional expressions, whereas the mouth plays a major rôle in the judgment of others. It is probable, however, that each set of posed expressions would give somewhat different results. Even "conventional" expressions dif-




Figure 124. The Eyes versus the Mouth in Judgments of Emotion
(From the frontispiece of Dunlap, K., "Elements of Psychology." St. Louis: C. V. Mosby Co., 1936.)

fer a great deal from one actor to another. One may use his forehead predominantly, another his eyes, and still another his mouth.

In Figure 125 are some postural expressions of emotion. Do you think that the postures contribute to recognition of the emotion expressed? The reactions of judges are represented in the note on page 301. How does your judgment compare with theirs? In one

investigation along these lines, judgments based upon the face alone were compared with judgments based upon the face and posture combined. There was somewhat greater agreement when postures were included than when the face alone was observed. Another investigation used posed expressions of the hands and forearms alone. Highly conventional expressions (as in worship)




Figure 125. Can You Name These Emotions?

were judged with a very high amount of agreement, while others that are not so conventional brought widely scattered judgment. Slightly greater agreement was obtained for moving than for still expressions¹³

If expressions of rage, of fear, or of any other emotion had a unique pattern, innate, or cultural, or both in origin, there should be a high level of agreement among judges as to the emotion expressed. Emotional expressions are actually a mixture of innate, culturally acquired, and individual or personal elements. The blending of these differs so much from one individual to another, from one situation to another, and even in the same situation from time to time, that judges often have no stereotype to aid them in discerning the emotion expressed.

The rôle of the voice in emotional expression is well known. Screams, weeping, laughter, and groans are all vocal expressions. Think, too, of the various ways in which one may say "no," "yes," and various other words, each time expressing different feelings or emotions. Singers often inject much emotional expression into their singing. Observe, for example, the record illustrated in Figure 126. Here is a graphic picture of how Lawrence Tibbett, in singing the fifth phrase for "Drink to me only with thine eyes," injects the emotional element. Note, especially, the periodic variations in loudness and pitch (vibrato) and how long "from" is held, as compared with "the." "Fast tempo, high register, and major mode tend to suggest joy, and their opposite to suggest sorrow. Staccato notes indicate gaiety




Figure 126. A Strobophotographic Record of Emotion Expressed in Singing
(Courtesy of Harold Seashore.)

or agitation." However, college students, when asked to characterize unfamiliar musical selections in terms of the emotion intended by the composers, often fail to agree with the composers. To use a slang expression, "they fail to get it."¹⁴

LIE-DETECTION

The so-called "lie-detector" is an apparatus for detecting physiological changes while the subject answers certain questions concerning a crime. In some instances he is called upon to say the first word which comes to mind upon presentation of certain "key" words. Actually, there are several "lie-detectors" in use today. One of the best-known and most widely used is illustrated in Figure 127. It is a compact modification of pneumographic and sphygmographic devices like those mentioned in our discussion of physiological reactions in emotion (p 271). The latest form of this "lie-detector" includes a device for measuring and recording electrodermal changes, the galvanic skin reflex.

All records are made simultaneously on a moving tape by means of ink-recording pens. Marks placed on the moving tape as the interrogation proceeds enable the investigators to associate the questions and answers with physiological changes.

In Figure 128 is shown the record of a thief who later admitted having stolen nine hundred dollars. Note that key questions were interspersed with irrelevant ones, and that only the former led to changes in respiration, blood pressure, and pulse rate. When the

galvanic skin reflex is also recorded, significant changes are represented by a drop in the tracing, which indicates a decrease in electrical resistance (sweating) in the hand on which the electrodes are placed.

There are three common misconceptions about the lie-detector, namely: (1) that it is infallible, (2) that it really detects lies as such, and (3) that innocent people would react emotionally in the same way as the guilty.

Known criminals sometimes show no significant responses to key words. They may respond to key words in terms of one variable, but not in terms of others. For example, they may respond to key words in terms of blood pressure but not pulse rate, respiration but not blood pressure, and blood pressure and respiration but not galvanic skin reflex. Individuals sometimes succeed in "beating" the lie-detector. However, their obvious efforts to "beat" it are often in themselves a "give-away."

The lie-detector does not really detect lies. It detects emotional reactions in response to questions. Presumably the innocent person would respond no more emotionally to key questions than to irrelevant ones. This would probably be true if he did not know anything about significant aspects of the crime. If he had read about them in the newspapers, for example, he might also react more markedly to key questions than to control ones. Whether the individual answers "yes" or "no" — whether or not he lies — is irrelevant, except for the fact that affirmative answers make the lie-detector superfluous.




Figure 127. The Keeler Polygraph as Used in Lie-Detection
 (From Inbau, F. E., "Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation," Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1942, p. 7.)




Figure 128. Record Obtained on a Thief Who Later Confessed Stealing \$900

The upper line is a record of respiration and the lower line of blood pressure and pulse rate. Questions 1, 2, and 5 were irrelevant ("Is your name —?"; "Do you live in Chicago?"; "Were you born in Illinois?"). At 3 the subject was asked, "Do you know who took the missing money?", and at 4, "Did you take it?" At 3 and 4 when the subject replied "No," observe the increase in blood pressure and the suppression in respiration. Moreover, the pulse beat, for about ten or fifteen seconds after the subject replied to 3 and 4, is somewhat slower than at 1, 2, and 5. The deviations at 3 and 4 from the subject's "norm," as established at 1, 2, and 5, are termed "specific responses." Numbers identify the questions and the plus or minus signs represent, respectively, "yes" or "no" answers. (From Inbau, F. E., "Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation." Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1942, p. 14.)

Actually, the stimulus which provokes the emotional reaction is the question itself — not the truth or falsity of the answer.

It is often claimed that anybody knowing that he was suspected of a crime would react emotionally to the lie-detector. The answer to this claim has already been suggested. It is given in the comparison of responses to key and control questions. For example, suppose we admit that a person is emotionally upset when being subjected to lie-detection tests. His blood pressure, respiratory, and galvanic response records show this emotional reaction by their general level. The significant thing, however, is not the general level of physiological reactions, but the change in this level for key as compared with control questions. If the record shows significant changes for the former and not for the latter, guilt is at least strongly suggested.

Lie-detector records are not readily admitted as legal evidence either of guilt or innocence. Efforts to have them admitted have, in general, so far failed. Nevertheless, the lie-detector is a useful instrument from several angles. If the individual subjected to the test really believes that it can detect his lies, he sometimes confesses without undergoing the test. An individual confronted with a lie-detector record often feels that the "game is up" and confesses. Moreover, the results of the test are often useful to detectives in narrowing the number of suspects. If the lie-detector test obviously shows one suspect to be the culprit, efforts to obtain evidence may be concentrated upon him, his associates, and his previous activities.¹⁵

Somewhat akin to the lie-detector test in its outcomes is the free association test. This is sometimes used by psychiatrists to detect *emotional complexes*.¹⁶ The individual may be asked to respond with the first word which comes to mind as each of a group of key and control words is given. The words selected may be taken from lists prepared by psychiatrists, or they may be made up in terms of information about the subject's past, his associates, and so forth. Evidence that a word

has really "hit the mark" — that it has probed a complex — comes from such aspects of response as the following: slow response to key words compared with the response to irrelevant words, repeating the stimulus word, giving the same response to several stimulus words, inability to make a response, giving peculiar responses, and associated emotional reactions, such as blushing. These are often referred to as *complex indicators*. Sometimes the free association technique is combined with measures of physiological changes.

Certain words, as "death," "kiss," "home," and "love," frequently arouse emotional reactions — so frequently, indeed, that psychiatrists have arranged standard lists. There are certain other words which, while they might not have emotional meaning for others, would have such for the individual with whose past experience they have been especially associated. For example, a psychology student who did not for a long time respond to the word "dance," and who showed other overt signs of emotion, later confided that he had undergone a very embarrassing experience while dancing. None of the other subjects responded emotionally to the word "dance."

EMOTION AS A FACTOR IN DISEASE

There is increasing evidence that many common gastrointestinal disorders (such as stomach ulcers and chronic constipation) are precipitated by chronic emotional states, especially anxiety. A relatively new field of investigation known as *psychosomatic medicine* has focused particular attention upon emotion as a causative factor, not only in gastrointestinal disorders, but in many others as well.¹⁷

Much of the supporting evidence comes from case studies. For example, one study showed that, of seventy-five individuals suffering from critical stages of ulcer, sixty-three had been subjected to unusual emotional strain for some days earlier. Financial difficulties, family conflicts, and worry over illness played a prominent part in the background of these individuals.¹⁸

The most direct evidence of psychological

factors in the origin of peptic ulcer is that obtained in an experiment on a patient whose stomach contents and lining could be observed.¹⁹ This patient was mentioned in the preceding chapter (p. 272). During two weeks of sustained anxiety, the redness of the patient's stomach and his acid secretion both showed a marked increase. There were correlated complaints of heartburn and abdominal pain. Bleeding points appeared spontaneously and mucosal erosions and hemorrhages were produced on the exposed lining of the stomach, merely by tapping it with a glass rod or rubbing it with dry gauze. Under normal conditions, such bleeding points are quickly repaired by mucus. On the exposed surface, however, as in the duodenal cap under normal circumstances, there was little if any mucus to repair damage. To test the idea that continued acid irritation of erosions might produce ulcers, the investigators made a small erosion on the exposed stomach lining and bathed it continually for four days with the patient's own gastric juice.

Within twenty-four hours the denuded surface had increased in size. The base of the lesion became deeper, and it bled intermittently. At the end of four days it measured four millimeters in diameter and presented the punched-out appearance of a chronic peptic ulcer, with well-defined edges and a granulating base. Traction or pressure applied to the lesion caused pain. While this lesion was present the whole mucus remained relatively engorged, and acid production was maintained at a high level.

On the basis of this and other evidence, the investigators say:

It appears likely . . . that the chain of events which begins with anxiety and conflict and associated overactivity of the stomach and ends with hemorrhage or perforation is that which is involved in the natural history of peptic ulcer in human beings.

Gastroduodenal disorders were reported to have played a large part in producing British casualties during early years of the recent war. Inadequate screening of recruits with a

history of such disorders and army food admittedly played a rôle, but emphasis is given to "a markedly neurotic personality structure" and "prolonged tension of men mobilized for war and exposed to hostile action, but with little opportunity in combatant activity."²⁰

CONTROLLING EMOTION

Many people who come to psychologists for help in solving their personal problems are much concerned about irrational fears, inability to avoid outbursts of temper, inability to control fits of jealousy, and worry over real or imagined deficiencies. Quite often, they expect the psychologist to listen to their story and offer forthwith some cut-and-dried formula for the solution of their problems.

A person's early history often holds the key to his problems of emotional control. How we act in emotion-provoking situations — how often we are provoked even — depends to a great extent upon childhood experience. The psychologist cannot undo in an hour or so, or sometimes even in weeks or months, the damage wrought by fears implanted and nurtured by parents, parental indulgence in the child's every whim, and other forms of unhealthy emotional conditioning. It should be obvious, therefore, that the most effective emotional control starts in childhood. Recognition of this fact does not help a great deal in controlling ourselves, but it may help in the emotional education of our children. Actually, there is no formula for the control of emotional behavior in adults. Each case, because of its peculiar history, requires a somewhat different treatment. In any case, re-education is required. It seldom happens that an individual is converted suddenly from a person lacking in emotional control to one possessing control. The process is long and slow, often requiring continued guidance from a psychological counselor.

Anger

Forty-five mothers, enrolled in child-study courses, made systematic observations upon

anger in their children. Among other things, they recorded the situations which precipitated anger, the frequency of anger outbursts, the degree to which such outbursts were blind or retaliative, how long the outbursts lasted, how they were terminated, and the nature of after effects such as sulking, sobbing, and resentment.²¹ They also reported the age of the children, their health, and the methods used in an effort to control temper tantrums. As one might expect, frustration was usually the precipitating factor. Also to be expected is the fact that retaliation played an increasing rôle as the child grew older. The most interesting outcome from our standpoint, however, concerns methods of control and their effectiveness.

The parents involved in the present investigation reported spanking and many other methods of control, some used alone and some in association with others. When the data were analyzed in an effort to discover the most effective method, the outcome was far from conclusive. The chief difficulty was in setting up a criterion of effectiveness.

Is the most effective procedure that which most quickly terminates the tantrum? If so, bribery, granting the child's desire, diverting attention to something else, providing a substitute, ignoring the outburst, and isolation are quite effective in many instances.

Is the most effective procedure that which reduces the number of outbursts? If so, several of the above methods are far from desirable. For example, bribery quickly concluded the outburst, but mothers who reported using this method reported a greater frequency of outbursts than did mothers who failed to use it. On the other hand, mothers who used spanking, a method which does not terminate outbursts as rapidly as bribery, reported relatively few outbursts.

Is the most effective method that which has fewest undesirable after effects, such as resentment and sulkiness? If so, spanking is much less effective than some other methods, for it is often followed by resentment and ideas of "getting even" with the parent.

It should be clear, therefore, that the investigation warrants no rule-of-thumb advice to parents on how to control anger outbursts in their children. As the investigator is careful to point out, there are many different ways in which the "same" method, such as spanking, may be applied. One spanking procedure may yield better results than another. It is pointed out, too, that much depends upon preventive methods. Serenity and tolerance in the parent may avert or soften many frustrations. Averting the issue, as in the cases mentioned earlier (p. 246), is often a good procedure. This does not mean, however, that the child should be shielded from all frustration.

If we wish to train children to be even-tempered on most occasions and to reserve their anger for circumstances under which anger seems to be justified, we shall be most successful if we direct our attention to the impulses and attitudes from which behavior springs. Anger comes when a strong impulse or desire is thwarted. In a world made up of many people, the child who does not early learn the necessity for reasonable conformity to the rights and wishes of others, but must have his own way at all costs, is likely to meet with many difficulties that the more co-operative child will escape.²²

Fear

Some fears, like fear of snakes and of being disliked by others, are very common in human adults. Other fears, such as the fear of being buried alive, fear of enclosed spaces, and fear of women, are seldom encountered. The former fears are usually regarded, because of their frequency, as more or less normal. The latter, known more specifically as phobias, are classified as abnormal and given special names. The three examples are, in order, *taphophobia*, *claustrophobia*, and *gynophobia*. We have already (pp. 235, 266) considered how these normal and abnormal fears originate. Here we are more interested in how to eliminate them.

There are several ways to eliminate fear, some of which are much more successful than others. Among these are: (1) teaching skills

which enable the individual to meet the situation effectively whenever it arises; (2) providing opportunities to become more familiar with the feared object or situation; (3) having the person witness others who show no fear in the feared situation; and (4) direct conditioning. Some of these methods are more effective in certain types of situation than in others.

Skills. Where the individual fears a bully, for example, the most effective method is perhaps to teach him boxing, wrestling, jujitsu, or other skills which will enable him to take care of himself when mistreated. This method applies to many situations, even including battle. When troops are taught to master situations met in battle, their fear tends to decrease. Preparation of American troops during the recent war involved large-scale maneuvers carried out under conditions which as closely as possible simulated actual warfare. Soldiers who went through such situations many times, and learned how to meet all sorts of emergencies, doubtless went into actual conflict with greatly reduced fear. When one knows what to do, and has confidence in his ability to do it, he is not likely to be terror-stricken.²³

Familiarity. A child who was afraid of rabbits lost his fear after a rabbit had for some time been in the vicinity. He had been given the opportunity to observe that it would do him no harm. Another child was afraid of frogs. When he wanted to play with a crayon, it was placed near a frog. The child ran over and picked up the crayon, apparently being for the moment unaware of the frog's presence. Later he said, "I ran over there and got it (the crayon). He (the frog) didn't bite me. Tomorrow I'll put it in a box and take it home."²⁴ We see in everyday life many examples of the effectiveness of familiarity with feared situations in reducing fear. Take, for example, the medical student who starts to dissect his first cadaver. Quite frequently, he approaches the task with thumping heart, trembling fingers, sweating palms, and marked gastrointestinal upset.

After a week or two, it is not uncommon to see him eating a sandwich while prodding away quite nonchalantly at the corpse. Moving pictures often portray similar loss of fear in telephone linemen, paratroopers, pilots, and others, as they become more familiar with their jobs. Part of the adaptation in these instances is doubtless due to increased skill in meeting the situations involved.

The example of others. Children often lose their fear of particular objects, as a dog or rabbit, when they see that other children are not afraid. It sometimes happens, however, that the children to be imitated acquire fear from the one who is supposed to imitate them. For example, it was arranged to have a child who had no fear of rabbits play with them in the presence of a child who was afraid, the idea being, of course, to have the second child lose his fear. What happened, however, was that when the second child cried, the first one became afraid.

Direct conditioning. The method of direct conditioning is fundamentally like that used in conditioning fears (pp. 266-267). Just as one may attach fear to a previously neutral object by presenting it with a fear-provoking one, the fear may be detached by presenting the fear-provoking object with one which characteristically elicits favorable reactions — an object, in other words, which has a strong positive valence. Thus, a child who feared rabbits lost his fear when a rabbit was associated with feeding. The rabbit was first presented at a distance. Then, in successive feeding periods, it was gradually moved closer to the child. This method must, of course, be used with great care. The feeding behavior, for example, might itself be disturbed were the child suddenly confronted with a rabbit.

Worry

Most of us recognize the undesirability of worry, even if we have not heard about its alleged rôle in the natural history of gastric disorder, but we continue to worry. Practically all that the psychologist can say about elimination of worry is in the nature of com-

mon sense, unsupported by experimental investigations.

It is, of course, obvious that worry over things beyond our control or over mistakes which cannot be corrected is completely useless. It neither does the worrier nor anyone else any good. Nevertheless, most of us continue to worry about such things. Worry about tasks and problems that are put off from day to day is also useless. The obvious suggestion is to face problems realistically, solve them to the best of our ability, and then forget them. In other words, the best way to cease worrying about that assignment is to do it. The best way to cease worrying about the difficult decision is to make it as soon as possible — perhaps utilizing Benjamin Franklin's method (p. 246) of balancing the pros and cons on one of the alternatives. The best thing to do about those fears of disease is to get a good physical examination — which many worriers about health avoid for fear of what they might find out.

A university professor in his forties had poor health habits, as a result of which he often had severe attacks of indigestion. Instead of correcting his living conditions and seeing a doctor to find out what was really wrong with him, he began to think of the possibility that his disorder was really stomach cancer. The more he thought about it, the more he was convinced that his diagnosis was correct. He finally had a physical exam, but the assurance of the physician that he did not have cancer was interpreted as the doctor's hesitation to tell him the worst. He finally shot himself, convinced that he would eventually die of cancer anyhow. A physical examination years earlier would have put his fears at rest before they had assumed such convincing proportions.

Worries of college students often concern sexual problems. A "hush-hush" attitude about sexual functions is partially responsible. Students are often worried about autoerotic practices. Such worry is intensified by the mistaken notion that their problems are peculiar. Actually, they are almost universal. Many persons are relieved immediately when they find out that they are not nearly so pe-

culiar as imagined. Parents, by being frank with their children about sexual functions and by seeing that sources of needed information are available, could remove much of the worry related to sexual adjustment.²⁵

Some reactions to danger

It is obvious that the best thing to do when confronted with a dangerous situation is to tackle it as one would tackle any other problem of adjustment — namely, by thinking of or actually trying this and that possible solution or means of escape. Some individuals are incapable of action in such situations. Others, because of training that has equipped them to handle such emergencies, react appropriately and with little emotion. The hunter who is sure of his gun and his aim does not fear the approaching lion. It is interesting to note, however, that many individuals who are neither transfixed in a dangerous situation nor ready with the appropriate response go through an extremely rapid implicit trial-and-error process. An aviator whose rudder stuck during a tailspin, and who fell four thousand feet before he regained control, reports the rapid review of possible solutions which occurred to him before he was successful in freeing the rudder.²⁶ Similar experiences are reported by an individual suddenly confronted with the task of saving a small child from death in a fireside accident.²⁷

Individuals frequently meet a dangerous situation with little or no emotional upset, and then afterward "go to pieces." So long as one can handle a situation effectively, there is no cause to become emotionally upset. Moreover, preoccupation with the task in hand turns attention away from its dangerous aspects. The emotional response which often follows escape may result from thoughts of how dangerous the situation really was and what might have happened. Sometimes, too, the situation has arisen and gone before one has time to do anything but react reflexly. For example, you may be walking across the street when you hear screeching brakes. You jump, just in time, out of the path of an auto-

mobile. You then realize what has happened and perhaps think of how you would look in a box covered with flowers. The situation now, for the first time, becomes emotion-provoking.

A rapid survey of previous experience sometimes occurs when a person is threatened with impending death.²⁸ Individuals rescued from drowning often report such experiences. They have been reported by persons suddenly saved from a firing squad or from the electric chair. The flyer mentioned above reported that he relived more events of his life than he can well enumerate while falling from fifty-five hundred to fifteen hundred feet with his rudder stuck. He recalled events starting with the learning of his ABC's and covering various episodes up to the time, a year earlier, when he joined the services. A similarly rapid association of ideas sometimes occurs in the delirium which may follow rescue from dangerous situations, especially those involving prolonged exposure to the elements. Why this rapid mental survey occurs is not known.

SUMMARY

Feelings aroused by aspects of the environment are often indicated through preferences. Psychologists have used three procedures to study preferences. These are: (1) arranging items in rank order; (2) rating items on an arbitrary scale; and (3) paired comparison of items. Color, tonal, and other preferences are to a large degree determined by previous experience, both cultural and individual. However, physiological needs play a rôle in determining certain preferences. Intensity is also a factor, especially in the fields of taste and smell. When aesthetic appreciation is involved, the prestige of the artist, composer, writer, or performer tends to influence evaluation.

The study of annoyances has shown that human beings are annoyed by many things, most of which relate to other people and the things they do. Knowing the common forms of annoyance gives us improved opportunities for reducing human friction.

Generally speaking, our ability to judge

what emotion is being expressed in terms of its facial, gestural, and vocal expressions alone is not accurate. Certain spontaneously aroused expressions have been judged with a high degree of agreement, but such agreement is rare. Even when it does occur, we cannot be sure that the judgments are correct unless the subject reports what emotion was actually experienced. It sometimes happens that many judge a certain emotion to be present, in terms of the face alone, and make a quite different judgment when the posture and general situation are observed. This fact, in itself, shows that agreement does not necessarily indicate a correct judgment.

Vocal activities, including song, often convey emotional meaning. Instrumental music, designed for the purpose, may arouse emotional feeling. However, the emotion intended by the composer is often lost upon an untrained audience.

The "lie-detector" does not detect lying, except indirectly. It measures emotional reactions elicited by questions relating to a crime. When the blood pressure, or breathing, or electrical resistance of the accused changes in response to the questions relating to the crime, but no change occurs for irrelevant questions, then he is assumed to be the culprit. The innocent person who knew nothing of the crime would be expected to have no different reaction to key questions from his reaction to control questions. It is the question, and what significance the subject gets from it, that determines whether or not an emotional reaction will occur. Whether he answers "yes" or "no" — lies or tells the truth — is irrelevant, except that an affirmative answer makes application of the "lie-detector" superfluous. Verbal and physiological reactions to words are also used to detect emotional complexes, especially in the fields of clinical psychology and psychiatry.

There is growing recognition of the fact that prolonged emotional upsets may contribute to, or even produce, organic disease. Case studies, and experiments on a man whose stomach was exposed for direct observation,

suggest strongly that prolonged worry or anxiety can produce peptic ulcers. The rôle of psychological, and especially emotional, processes in disease is now so well recognized that a special field known as psychosomatic medicine has arisen.

The most effective means of insuring control of emotional behavior is education of children in such control. Adults who lack emotional control may acquire it, but prolonged re-education is usually required. There is no rule-of-thumb method for the most effective control of anger in children. However, methods commonly in use have their strong and weak points. There are several ways in which fear may be eliminated in children. Which one will be most effective depends upon the individual concerned and the situations involved. Many adult fears go back to inadequate sex education in childhood. Frankness about sexual functions and about the effects of common sex habits would do much to remove worry based upon fear of physical and mental disease. The best way to meet situations which worry us is to make a realistic frontal attack — discover for certain whether our expectations and fears are warranted;

force a decision when we are worried by conflicting alternatives; do the tasks which we are obligated to do, so that we need no longer worry about them; and refuse to dwell upon unpleasant things beyond our control.

Quite frequently, the dangerous situation passes before an emotional upset occurs. This is, at times, because one's thinking of what might have happened — rather than what was happening at the time — provides the emotion-provoking stimulation. Dangerous situations often provoke an extremely rapid trial-and-error reaction which may be implicit, explicit, or both. When one's own life is imminently threatened, there is often a rapid survey of past experience.

Answers for Figure 122: Expression 1. Terror or fear. Expression 2. Grief or sorrow. Expression 3. Surprise. Expression 4. Hate. (Expression 1, Ruckmick; 2, *Sydney Morning Herald*; 3, *Life Magazine*, 4, Feleky. Nos. 1 and 4 courtesy of C. H. Stoelting Co.)

Answers for Figure 125: Expression 1. Terror, fear, or horror. Expression 2. Disgust. Expression 3. Horror. (No. 1, *Life Magazine*; No. 2, Leonard Carmichael; No. 3, C. H. Stoelting Co.)

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Expressions 1 and 4 of Figure 122 are posed.

Part 6

KNOWING OUR WORLD

WE ARE AWARE of the twittering birds, the blue sky, the warmth of our clothes, the coldness of the wind, the weight of our load, the odor of flowers, the taste of coffee, the passage of time, and the movement, shape, and size of objects around us. Thousands upon thousands of such experiences are crowded into the waking hours of every day. We also perceive events within ourselves. There is the emptiness of our stomach, the dryness of our throat, the ache of our muscles, and the pain in our head. Many of our own actions are perceived by us. Thus, we see our limbs move, hear our voice, and know the position of our limbs from one moment to the next, even though we cannot see them. When swimming under water with our eyes closed, we are aware of whether or not our body is upright and of the directions in which it turns. This wealth of experience is made possible by our receptors and associated neural mechanisms. As we have already observed, an organism's world expands and takes on increasing complexity as its receptors and neural mechanisms evolve.

It can truly be said that our receptors are the "gateways to knowledge." The blind and deaf live in a world represented only by such experiences as result from felt vibrations, contacts on the skin, temperature changes, odors and smells. A person blind from birth has no visual images. He has no imagery such as characterizes most of our dreams. Likewise, the congenitally deaf have no auditory imagery. There are, of course, several ways in which aspects of the world of light can be conveyed to the blind and aspects of the world of sound to the deaf, but the representations provided are neither visual nor auditory, and they are poor substitutes for the real thing. Imagine "seeing" a face by running your fingers over it or "hearing" a symphony by placing your fingers on the loud-speaker of your radio.

The following chapters focus attention upon our experience of ourselves and the

world about us. Certain common aspects of experience are considered from the standpoint of their dependence upon stimulating conditions and receptor and neural functions. The process of *attending* is given prior consideration (Chapter 17) because, unless we attend to them, many aspects of our world go unnoticed. *Perceiving* (Chapter 18) is discussed before receptor processes because, while it involves these processes, it involves much that is independent of a specific receptor process. In other words, visual perceiving, auditory perceiving, and other specific varieties have much in common. Chapters 19, 20, and 21, dealing, respectively, with *vision*, *hearing*, and the *simpler senses*, emphasize the contribution of receptors and related neural processes to perceptual experience. They include discussions of visual, auditory, and tactual *space perception*.

Chapter 17

Attending

IN EVERYDAY LANGUAGE we speak of giving this or that situation our attention, of concentrating attention on something, and of shifting attention from one thing to another. This manner of speaking often leads to the naive assumption that attention is a faculty or power which we can turn on or off at will, or something which we lend to this or that situation. All of us use the term *attention*, and use it often. There is no good reason why we should cease. It should be realized, however, that we are referring to an act, a process, a function — not to a power or faculty. Thus, it is more correct to speak of attending than of attention, although this usage may at times be more roundabout.

Attending is a form of set. We are already familiar with set as a determining or directing factor in association and thought. Here we use it in much the same sense, but with particular reference to receptor, muscular, or neural adjustments which contribute to, or interfere with, perceptual or motor responses. We say that the person with his eyes focused upon something is set to see it. This is an example of receptor set. It is also a muscular set, for eye muscles turn the eyes toward and focus them upon the object. We say, too, that the doctor who hears the telephone during the night, but fails to hear the baby cry, is set to hear the telephone. His wife perhaps fails to hear the telephone, but hears the baby. We say that she is set to hear the baby. This is an example of so-called mental set. The batter with his bat in position to hit the ball has a receptor set, a postural set, and probably a mental set as well.

Some sets not only fail to contribute to, but actually interfere with, perception. You may be so preoccupied with what you are writing that you fail to hear what is being said on a near-by radio. You are set for writing, but not for hearing the radio. Your set for writing is synonymous with attending to writing, but its significance is broader than this, for it actually interferes with hearing the radio. Likewise, the ventriloquist, through the antics which he makes his doll perform, gets us set to notice the doll and its mouth movements. Thus attentive set is so disarming that we not only seem to hear words issuing from the doll's mouth, but also fail to notice the ventriloquist's lip movements, which, while quite abbreviated, are observable if we attend to them. Postural sets likewise facilitate some responses and interfere with others. When the boxer feints, his opponent assumes what appears to be an appropriate posture to ward off the blow, but the blow comes from a direction for which he is not prepared, hence his set in response to the feint puts him at a disadvantage. He would have been better off to parry the blow from a neutral position than from the one assumed in response to the feint.

It should be apparent, therefore, that sets may aid or hinder perception and other forms of response. Attending is set looked at from the standpoint of its contribution to the process of perceiving or acting. In other words, we may be said to attend to some situation when our set prepares us for perception of, or makes us more ready to react to, that situation.

From the standpoint of perception, attend-

ing has aptly been called a "preperceptive attitude" — a "reaction of expectancy and exploration,"¹ or "an anticipatory perceptual adjustment."² This readiness to be stimulated, or to perceive, is the aspect of attending which interests us most in the present chapter

Attending, from whatever angle we consider it, is in the last analysis a motivational process. You do not respond indiscriminately to every aspect of your environment, and you do not make every response that could be made in a situation. You react selectively. You respond in terms of your interests and attitudes. Sometimes, moreover, you attend "voluntarily" and sometimes "involuntarily." Interests, attitudes, and voluntary action are topics considered within the framework of motivation. Thus, attending could be considered from the standpoint of motivation. One introductory text deals with the process primarily from this standpoint.³

SOME ASPECTS OF ATTENDING

The act of attending may be considered

from at least five different standpoints. First, it involves *receptor adjustment*. Second, it involves general *postural adjustment*. Third, it is characterized by *muscle tensions* and related feelings of effort. Fourth, it involves some sort of *adjustment in the central nervous system*, perhaps even apart from, or in addition to, neural adjustments incident to the receptor and motor processes. Finally, it is characterized by an *increased clearness*, a bringing-out of detail, in whatever is attended to. Some of these aspects of attending are readily observable, either in ourselves or in others.

Look at the puzzle picture in Figure 129 and search for the hidden motor-cycle policeman. Note, before you start, that no such person is clearly, or perhaps in any way, apparent. While carrying on the search, which is obviously a process of attending, you adjust your head and eyes, there is a change in general body posture, muscle tensions are involved, and various changes take place within your nervous system. You are perhaps not aware of many such changes. When you finally discover the policeman, you will observe




Figure 129. A Puzzle Picture

From Franz, S. I., and Gordon, K., "Psychology." New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933, p. 405.

that he stands out from everything else. He will probably stand out so obviously that you cannot fail to see him.

Many of the adjustments involved in attending can best be observed in someone else. Ask somebody who has not already seen Figure 129 to search for the policeman. Note the eyes scanning the picture, note the generally alert posture, note changes in posture, or in the position of the book, so that the picture may be observed from various angles. Observe whether the muscles of the face are more tightly drawn as unsuccessful exploration continues. Quite frequently there are emotional reactions during such a search. The subject may be frustrated by inability to discover what he is looking for, and may become exasperated. On the other hand, he may become generally relaxed after discovery.

Similar receptor, postural, and emotional reactions are often observed in students when the teacher is trying to "put across" some idea not easy to grasp.

Receptor adjustments

As already suggested, gross receptor adjustments in visual attending are readily observable. The head and eyes turn toward the object to be observed, and there is either a continued fixation or a scanning process. Rapidly changing adjustments of head and eyes may be seen in the observers of a tennis match as the ball goes from one player to another.

Devices for photographing eye movements and the duration of fixations are often used to determine the "attention value" of different parts of a page and of different aspects of an




Figure 130. A Bidimensional Eye-Movement Camera

This camera, invented and developed by Dr. Herman F. Brandt, of the Visual Research Laboratories of Drake University, photographs the duration, location, and sequence of every eye fixation, as well as the distance and direction of every eye movement. By means of this instrument the relative attention value of such physical variables as color, size, isolation, and position may be ascertained. For further information see Brandt, H. F., "The Psychology of Seeing," Philosophical Library, 1945. (Used by permission of Doctor Brandt and Look Magazine.)

advertisement. Such a device is illustrated in Figure 130. It is assumed that those portions which attract the eyes most often and for the longest continued fixation periods have the highest attention value. Eye movements and successive fixations involved in a woman's scanning of a man and the per cent of time involved in surveying different male features are illustrated in Figure 131. These results were obtained with the camera shown in Figure 130. Other ocular adjustments are the convergence of the human eyes and the ac-

commodation of the iris muscle and lens (pp. 342, 350).

When the dog "pricks its ears," we have just as obvious a receptor adjustment as that of turning the head and eyes. Some animals not only erect their ears, but also turn them in directions conducive to better reception of sound waves. The hard of hearing in former days moved their ear trumpets in a somewhat similar fashion, and for the same purpose. We cannot move our ears, but we do move our heads to facilitate reception. This is espe-



Figure 131. Eye Movements of a Woman in Looking at a Man

The dots and lines on the man show successive fixations of one woman in visually attending to a man. She looked first at his chest; then her eyes swept up to his face, moved to his left eye, then down to his collar, etc. The percentages indicate time spent by 100 women in fixating each of the indicated parts of a man and his clothing. (Courtesy of the copyright owners, Marshall Field & Company, and Look Magazine. The research was done by Doctor Herman F. Brandt of Drake University.)

cially evident in the person who has only one good ear. He turns his head to bring it in the direction of the sound waves; he may even cup his hand behind it. A finer receptor adjustment associated with hearing involves a muscle of the middle ear (the *tensor tympani*). This muscle produces a change in the tension of the eardrum to adjust it for sounds with different intensities. The adjustment apparently protects the ear from being injured by low tones of great intensity.⁴

Changing the position of the nose and sniffing are obvious receptor adjustments. Touching a substance with the tip of the tongue and moving it around in the mouth so that it falls near the tip, back, or side are likewise receptor adjustments.

Postural adjustment

This form of adjustment is especially evident when one stoops, as in looking at something on the ground, when one crouches on the starting line, and when one strains forward in his seat. Attentive postures may be continued for long periods without tiring the person, so long as what he is attending to is inherently interesting. The dog pointing and the cat with its paw in position to catch a mouse about to emerge from a hole are good examples of attentive posture. Consider, too, as a human example, the soldier standing at attention.

Muscle tension

This is involved in any postural adjustment, but it is at times more subtle than general observation would indicate. For example, when efforts are made to distract subjects working at (attending to) a task, the expected decrease in efficiency often fails to appear. But there is often clear evidence of increased attention to compensate for the distraction. Associated with this compensatory process is increased energy expenditure, some of which is attributable to heightened muscle tension.

Six subjects were given a task in which they were required to press appropriate keys as each of a se-

ries of letters was exposed. There were ten keys, somewhat comparable to the keys of a typewriter. These were numbered from 1 to 10. The letters exposed were L M N P S T V X Y Z. They were exposed upon red, yellow, or green backgrounds. As a letter appeared, the subject was required to look at it, note the color of the background, look at a code just below, translate the letter (in accordance with the code) to one of the first ten letters of the alphabet, then press the key whose number corresponded to the number of the letter of the alphabet. Pressure brought automatic exposure of a new letter. Unknown to the subjects, there was attached to each key a device through which the amount of pressure exerted could be determined. The aim of the experiment was to see whether the amount of pressure would change when attempts were made to distract the subject by introducing noise. The average pressure exerted under conditions of quiet was tested, both before and after noise had been introduced. This pressure under conditions of quiet was compared with the average pressure during noise. All six subjects exerted more pressure under noise conditions than under conditions of quiet. The average pressure exerted just before noise was introduced was 305 grams. Under noise conditions it rose to 438 grams. In a period of quiet which followed noise, the average pressure was 292 grams. The amount of work accomplished did not differ significantly under conditions of noise and quiet. Heightened attention to the task, with which the muscular exertion was associated, apparently compensated for the distracting influence of noise.⁵

Another example of muscular tension during the act of attending comes from an experiment in which the thickening of each of four muscle groups was measured while (1) the subjects were listening for a click known to be barely audible, and (2) they were listening for a click known to be quite obviously audible.⁶ Subjects were required to press a key as soon as the sound was heard. They attended more closely while expecting the weaker than while expecting the louder sound. Concomitant with this additional effort was a greater thickening of the muscles whose tension was recorded. Typical records are shown in Figure 132.

Muscle tensions are involved in the act of




Figure 132. Thickening of Muscles in Listening for a Weak Stimulus as Compared with Listening for an Intense Stimulus

The record at the left was taken while the subject expected a loud click, and that on the right while he expected a weak one. At the top of each figure is a record of the subject's finger reaction as he heard the signal. Note that only two muscle groups, and these only weakly, thickened while the subject anticipated a strong stimulus. While he was anticipating the weak stimulus, however, all four muscle groups thickened, and one which thickened under the other condition now thickened to a greater extent. (After Freeman, G. L., "The Spread of Neuro-Muscular Activity During Mental Work," *Journal of General Psychology*, 1931, vol. 5, p. 486.)

attending in yet another way. When one has been asked to attend to something, and especially when he has been asked to attend to a variety of specified details, he is likely to repeat the instructions, either aloud or silently. Even when he repeats them silently, his tongue, throat muscles, and perhaps other muscles of his body are thrown into action. Action currents generated in this way were discussed in the chapter on thinking.

Central nervous adjustments

The adjustments so far considered are largely peripheral or surface phenomena. However, these adjustments necessarily involve the central neural mechanisms.

Every psychologist would admit that central mechanisms are involved in the act of attending. There is much controversy, however, concerning the possibility of a central adjustment independent of receptor and postural adjustments. There are two contrasting views on this issue. According to one of these, attending is merely a receptor and postural adjustment, the central nervous system exerting no independent control. According to the other view, the central nervous system, especially the cerebral cortex, sometimes plays an independent rôle in attending.

It would be easy to settle this issue if we could find some way of measuring specific

central neural adjustments without at the same time involving receptor and postural changes. The problem is similar to that already confronted in the discussion of central and peripheral-central theories of thinking.

Hypnotic phenomena sometimes suggest centrally maintained sets either to attend or not to attend to stimulation. Thus, a hypnotized subject may be made apparently inattentive to painful stimulation, such as a burn, an electric shock, or a pin-prick. The subject is told that his skin is insensitive, whereupon presentation of the normally painful stimulus elicits no reaction. This suggests central inhibition. On the other hand, the suggestion that any stimulus, even a light touch, will be painful brings out a reaction simulating the reaction to painful stimulation. This suggests central facilitation.

Research on attending suggests, but fails to prove, the existence of a central control independent of peripheral adjustments.

Human subjects, seated with one finger on a simple key, were instructed to lift the finger whenever a light or a sound appeared. If a light appeared, they were to lift the finger as quickly as possible. If a sound appeared, they were to make exactly the same response. Thus, the stimulus was either light or sound. Moreover, the same response was to be made to light or sound.

Subjects were sometimes told to expect a light,

sometimes to expect a sound, but to react, whichever stimulus actually appeared. When light was expected, the reaction to light was faster than when sound was expected. Likewise, the reaction to sound was faster when sound was expected than when light was expected. Since exactly the same posture and response were required in each case, it was assumed that different expectations produced the differences in time of reaction. These expectations were assumed to be purely central in origin, involving some adjustment of the central nervous system.⁷

However, if one expects a sound, his head may be held in a different position from that held if he expects light. Even if his head remains stationary, his *tensor tympani* may adjust the eardrum for sound reception. Likewise, his eyes may be set for the reception of light (but his ears not involved) when light rather than sound is expected. These receptor and related muscular and neural processes may account for a faster reaction when what is expected actually appears. There is thus no clear evidence that a purely central neural process was involved in the above experiment.⁸

In an attempt to answer such criticisms, several additional experiments were undertaken. Some of these support the central theory and others, while they do not support it, do not provide conclusive arguments against it.

In one of the experiments offering some support for the central theory, subjects responded to either an auditory or a tactile stimulus, the latter provided by a vibrator attached to the skin. At times during the experiment, there was an unexpected shift from auditory to tactual or from tactual to auditory stimulation. On such occasions, as in the first experiment mentioned above, the subjects reacted more slowly when they expected one form of stimulation and the other appeared. The crux of this situation is that the skin receptors have no known adjustment which prepares them for stimulation, hence it is claimed that (if a central factor were not involved) they should have been just as well prepared to mediate the response when a sound was expected as to mediate it when a vibration on the skin was expected.⁹

We cannot yet regard the issue of a purely central adjustment as settled. The last of the abovementioned experiments suggests that receptor adjustment is not essential in an act of attending, but it does not prove this point

conclusively. One could argue that the subject's ear was set for sound and that immediately upon failure of the sound to appear, its relaxation retarded the motor response through interference of related neural activities with those involved in making the finger reaction. Such an interpretation may be far-fetched, especially since the difference in reaction times under the two conditions was sometimes as small as one twentieth of a second. Nevertheless, such possibilities cannot be completely ignored.

Thus, while central neural adjustments are intimately involved in attending, there is as yet no conclusive evidence that they can play a rôle independent of receptor and postural adjustments.

Attending and clearness of perception

As we have already pointed out, attending to some aspect of the environment or to some bodily process is followed by a clearer perception than previously existed. Part of this increased clearness, this bringing-out of details, is due to receptor adjustment. While reading these words, you are only vaguely, if at all, aware of your surroundings. But suppose you now attend to a piece of furniture in front of or to the side of you. Its image may have been falling upon your eye while you were reading, but it either elicited no conscious reaction or, at best, only a vague perception. Now, if you fixate upon it, the lens of your eye adjusts so as to bring it into better focus on your retina. This makes it clear and its details distinct.

Although receptor adjustment plays a part in clarifying perception, it is not solely responsible. One may have a perfectly clear retinal image, yet — especially if he is preoccupied with his thoughts — fail to have a corresponding visual perception.

Postural adjustments and muscle tensions also fail to tell the whole story. The student in a classroom may be in a posture of rapt attention, but, when called upon by the teacher to recite on what has just been said, he may reveal that his thoughts have been far away from the classroom.

Do such facts indicate that there is really some sort of central nervous adjustment independent of, or in addition to, the central neural adjustments incidental to receptor and postural changes? They strongly suggest, but do not prove, that such an adjustment exists. It is conceivable that there are more subtle receptor and postural aspects than we are able to observe under such circumstances. Although the student has his ear cocked and is straining forward in his seat as if listening intently to the teacher, this may be a pure affectation. We might find, if we were able to observe him closely enough, that this attitude actually differs from his attitude when really listening. Moreover, thought processes involve widespread activity of the central nervous system and, as mentioned earlier, muscle tensions in various parts of the body. These activities may account for lack of attention (or preoccupation), despite appropriate receptor and postural adjustments. In other words, they may inhibit neural processes which would ordinarily accompany attentive adjustments.

FLUCTUATIONS OF ATTENTION

If you have somebody hold a watch at such a distance from your ear that you can barely hear it, you will notice that perception of its ticking appears and disappears. Likewise, if you fixate upon a small, almost invisible point, or upon a very dim star on a clear night, it will appear and disappear. Is this because you are in some way changing your receptor or postural adjustment? Or is it because your brain is undergoing some sort of fluctuation with which the fluctuation of attention (perception) corresponds?

In very general terms, these fluctuations are explained by supposing that the whole receptive apparatus, from sense organ to brain, must be functioning perfectly in order to perceive a very weak stimulus. Any momentary lapse in efficiency interrupts the sensation. Of the different parts of the receptive apparatus, the sensory nerve is least likely to fluctuate in efficiency. The locus of the

fluctuations may be the sense organ or the brain, or both. One possible factor has been exploited by one investigator, and another by another.¹⁰

Research has disclosed quite convincingly that certain receptor aspects are not involved. For example, absence of the eardrum does not prevent auditory fluctuations, and absence of the lens does not prevent visual fluctuations. Eye movements influence the frequency of visual fluctuations, but fluctuations continue to appear during fixation.

Other receptor and postural adjustments could be involved. Changes in retinal adaptation, in the occipital cortex, and even in respiratory and circulatory activities, have been found to affect the frequency of visual fluctuations, and they may be responsible for the fluctuation phenomenon.¹¹ There is the possibility, too, that slight changes in posture and in muscle tensions throughout the body enter into the total picture. Thus, there is no evidence that this phenomenon is due exclusively to central adjustments.

A somewhat related phenomenon to those just discussed is fluctuation of figure and ground in reversible configurations, like those illustrated in Figure 133. If you fixate the center, or any other part of either figure, you will note that now one aspect stands out, now the other. At one moment, for example, you see the black figure as though on a white background; the next moment you see the white figure as though on a black background. The frequency of such fluctuations can be influenced by trying to hold one as long as possible. The figure will change, despite your effort to hold it, but it will very likely change less often. Frequency of fluctuation in figures like the circular one is markedly influenced by the size, area, brightness, and color of the respective systems.¹²

There are several possible explanations of fluctuating figure-ground relations. Some psychologists stress the importance of receptor, postural, circulatory, and respiratory factors; others stress the independent contribution of central neural functions. The latter




Figure 133. Reversible Configurations

often attribute the fluctuations to what they call "brain dynamics."¹⁸

VARIETIES OF ATTENDING

If the dividing line is not too distinctly drawn, it is possible to classify three types or varieties of attending — namely, *involuntary*, *voluntary*, and *habitual* attending

When stimuli or situations force themselves upon us, as it were, whether or not we are set for their reception, attending is said to be *involuntary*. Thus a pistol shot, an intense electric shock, a sudden intense flash of light, a blow, and painful stimulation of any kind are

perceived involuntarily; one might say "reflexly."

Whenever we intentionally look or listen, attending is referred to as *voluntary*. Someone may say, "Look at this," or, "Do you hear that?" and you may respond accordingly. You may strive to attend to an uninteresting lecture, knowing that if you fail to attend, your grade may suffer. You may go into town with the intention of buying a camera and, as you walk along the street, pay particular attention to camera displays in the store windows. These are all examples of voluntary attending

When attending is difficult, as in listening to a lengthy and colorless discourse by a friend, it is often said that continued attention demands "will power." There is no doubt that the feeling that one should listen, and the temptation to do, or think of, something more interesting, produce a conflict situation. Attempts to resolve the conflict bring about a feeling that great effort is being expended. This problem, it will be recalled, was considered more fully in discussions of will power and initiation of action (pp. 254-257).

Each of us is more or less permanently set for reception of certain stimuli. Think, for example, of the doctor set to hear the telephone and his wife set to hear the baby. Think of the male's readiness to notice a beautiful girl and the female's readiness to notice a handsome male. Think of our periodically occurring interest in food and drink. Think of our readiness to perceive good in the actions of our friend and evil in the actions of our enemy. Think of the naturalist's observation of plants and bugs which we fail to notice. Think of the attitude of alertness which characterizes a class as soon as such topics as sex, hypnotism, or mental telepathy are mentioned by the instructor. These are examples of so-called *habitual* attending or of habitual sets. Most of our acts of attending are continuing rather than abruptly assumed sets, and they are sets of which we are frequently unaware. These continuing sets stem from our motives. They are related to drives,

interests, attitudes, prejudices, and aspirations (pp. 238-240).

DETERMINERS OF ATTENTION

The preceding discussion has suggested that attending is related to external stimuli and to conditions within the individual. These are often called the determiners of attention.

There has been a large volume of research on the attention-getting value of different aspects of external stimulation. The findings, as one can well guess, have proved extremely valuable in the field of advertising. An advertiser's problem is to sell his product, but before he can induce you to buy it, he must call your attention to it and also to the reasons for preferring it to other products. As you turn the pages of a magazine, scan the newspaper, or listen to your radio, there are many things more interesting than observing what an advertiser has to say about his wares. Hence, he must literally force you to attend. Any advertisement which produced involuntary attention, and then caused you to hold your attentive set, would be most effective. Successful advertisers use external stimuli which will "catch your eye" or "get your ear," and at the same time stimuli which will, as it were, tap your motives.¹⁴

External determiners

Among the important external determiners of attention are the nature, location, intensity, size, color, movement, repetition, and novelty of the stimulating conditions.

By the nature of stimulating conditions we refer to such things as whether a picture is that of a woman, an animal, or a product to be sold. By the nature of auditory stimulation we refer to such things as a narration, singing, or orchestral music. It has been shown, among other things, that pictures attract attention more readily than words; that a picture with human beings in it tends to attract attention more than a picture of inanimate objects alone; and that some rhyming auditory passage attracts attention better

than the same passage presented as a narrative.

The best location of a visual stimulus from the standpoint of attention-getting is directly in front of the eyes. Where this is not possible, there are still certain positions better than others. Research in advertising has determined the attention value of various positions, not only within a magazine, but also on a given page. This research has utilized eye-cameras like those already mentioned.

Intensity is exemplified by a brilliantly lighted sign or the blaring of a loud-speaker. As you read this sentence, you can hardly escape noticing the word printed in black type. You probably noticed it as soon as you turned to this page. Here we have not only intensity, but contrast. The black letters, because of their relative intensity, stand out from the surroundings. Intense odors, tastes, pressures, and pains, especially when they represent a sudden change from previous stimulation, also elicit attention.

The size of a stimulus is of obvious importance, but again contrast is an important aspect. If all of the LETTERS on this page were printed in capitals, the capitalized word in this sentence would have no greater attention-getting value than any other word; if all were printed in small type, the word with small type would have no advantage. Generally speaking, a large advertisement will get more attention than a small one, especially when the latter is surrounded by other material. But an extremely small advertisement in the center of a page that is otherwise blank is a strong determiner of attention.

We have already observed (p. 285) that certain colors and color combinations are more agreeable than others, and that advertisers have made use of this fact. Reds and blues play a large part in color displays because of their agreeableness. But here again, contrast is important. If one of these words were printed in any color but black, you would notice it as soon as you turned to this page. It would not matter what the color happened

to be. Color advertising derives some of its attention-getting value not so much from the colors or color combinations used as from the fact that, being colored, it stands out from the black and white which characterizes most of the other material in the magazine

Other things being equal, a moving object is more attention-demanding than a stationary one. This is true for animals. Many an animal is safe from others so long as it keeps still, but as soon as it moves, it is pounced upon. The large neon signs typical of Broadway illustrate the value of moving stimuli. These utilize a phenomenon to be considered in the next chapter

Repetition is a factor of great importance in drawing attention to some aspect of our environment. When a stimulus is repeated several times, we may eventually notice it, although we failed to do so at first. Despite the value of repetition in calling attention to a stimulus, continued repetition beyond a certain point may bring diminishing returns. We may eventually become so accustomed to the situation that it ceases to be noticed. Advertisers get around this by introducing change, and especially novelty

Most of us attend to anything that is novel. Sounds, smells, and tastes to which we are accustomed may go unnoticed, where a strange sound, smell, or taste is immediately noticed. We see examples of this principle in the futuristic rocket ships, planes, trains, and busses used to illustrate much present-day advertising. Strange animals and unusual dresses or furnishings attract attention because of their novelty. Use of novelty to attract attention is but another example of contrast. Anything that is novel derives this property through its contrast with what is customary.

Internal determiners

External factors are potent to the degree that they tap, as it were, our continuing sets, the internal determiners, which were elsewhere referred to in the discussion of habits of attention. These determiners, as we have already suggested, stem from motives. If

the individual is motivated by hunger, he is much more likely to notice the smell of cooking food or to see the picture of steak on a magazine page than if he has just had a good meal. The sexually deprived male is much more likely to notice females than is the sexually satiated one. Any advertisement involving a "leg show" is almost sure to get male attention. The man who is forced to play a submissive rôle, but would like to assume a dominant one, is prone to notice the physical-culture advertising. The person deprived of desired recognition notices the advertising headed, "They listened in amazement when I began to play." The movie fan is more likely to attend to an advertisement with the picture of a movie star than one with a picture of some other person. A student is especially attentive to any statement prefaced by such remarks as, "Don't fail to get this!" or, more pointedly, "I shall expect you to know this in the examination." Instructions such as "Find the hidden man" likewise produce a continuing set which, when it has once been engendered, is an internal determiner of attention.

ATTENDING AND PERCEIVING

Attending and perceiving are in some respects indistinguishable. What one psychologist discusses as fluctuation of attention, another discusses as fluctuation of perception. One psychologist asks, "How many things can we attend to at once?" while another asks, "How many things can we perceive at once?" Likewise, it would make little difference whether we referred to "involuntary attention" or to "involuntary perception." In all such cases the end product is the same, whether considered from the aspect of attending or that of perceiving. Similarly, the determiners of attention described above might have been discussed as determiners of perception.

In certain other instances, the two processes are clearly distinguishable. In the first place, with the possible exception of so-called involuntary attention, attending clearly precedes

perception. This is why attending has been referred to as a *preperceptive* or anticipatory attitude. In the second place, attending does not guarantee that perception will follow. One may listen for the expected call that fails to come. He may look, but fail to see. In the third place, attending does not in itself determine the organization or meaning of conscious experience. The same situation may be perceived differently by all who attend to it. It may be meaningful for one and devoid of meaning for another, or it may be meaningful for all, but have a somewhat different meaning for each.

Different anticipatory adjustments (especially what we call *mental sets*) not only prepare us for perception, but also play a selective rôle. Their influence upon what we perceive will be considered in the following chapter. It is clear, however, that having an anticipatory set and perceiving something relevant to it are to some degree different processes. The perception itself depends, not only upon the mental set, but also upon the forms of stimulation, the receptor functions, and the neural functions which follow assumption of this set.

SUMMARY

Attention is not a power — it is an act, process, or function. Thus, it is more correct, although often more cumbersome, to speak of attending than of attention. Attending has many ramifications, being related to motor activity as well as perception and also to learning, the thought processes, and motivation. In the present chapter we have focused especially upon the rôle of attending in perception. From this angle it may be defined as an anticipatory perceptual adjustment or as a readiness to perceive.

The act of attending is characterized by receptor adjustment, postural adjustment, muscle tension, and central neural adjustments. From the standpoint of perception, these adjustments bring an increased clarity of detail.

There has been much interest in the rôle of

the central nervous system in attending. It is generally recognized that central neural processes are a necessary part of receptor and postural adjustments, but controversy has hinged upon the question of a central control independent of, or in addition to, such peripheral adjustments. Some recent research suggests the possibility of an independent central control, but it does not provide conclusive evidence of such control.

When stimulation is weak (as in the case of a barely audible sound) or ambiguous (as in the case of reversible configurations), the phenomena known as fluctuations of attention occur. There is evidence that such fluctuations, while influenced by receptor adjustments, and respiratory and circulatory changes, stem partially from some independent central neural adjustment. Again the evidence suggests, but does not prove, existence of an independent central control.

Three varieties of attending may be distinguished. These are involuntary attending (such as is produced by an unexpected shot), voluntary attending (as in attending at somebody's request or from a sense of duty), and habitual attending (exemplified by continuing sets or attitudes like the mother's readiness to hear her baby's cry). Voluntary and habitual attending are motivational activities, being related to needs, interests, and attitudes.

Determiners of attention may be differentiated into two broad but somewhat related groups — namely, external and internal determiners. Typical of external determiners are the nature, location, intensity, size, color, movement, repetition, and novelty of stimulating conditions. A factor which runs through many of these is that of contrast. In other words, to the degree that they contrast with their surroundings or with what is customary, stimulating circumstances gain in attention-getting value. Internal determiners are those related to motivation. In short, we are most likely to attend to aspects of our environment which offer satisfaction of our needs, desires, and interests. Determiners of attention are of special interest to advertisers,

one of whose chief problems is that of attracting attention to their products.

Attending and perceiving, although at times indistinguishable, must be regarded as separate processes. This conclusion is based

upon the observation that attending usually precedes perception, that it sometimes occurs without being followed by perception, and that it does not necessarily determine the meaning of what is perceived.

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Chapter 18

Perceiving

PERCEIVING is a process comparable with discriminating, differentiating, and observing. The term is customarily used to refer to relatively complex receptor and neural processes which underlie our awareness of ourselves and our world. This awareness, or consciousness, is referred to as perception.

Although the term *perception* is usually restricted to conscious experience, it has certain behavioral implications. Perception of objects, situations, and relationships is often correlated with particular overt reactions. If we are aware of a difference in the color of apples, we will very likely select the red ones for eating. If we see the *détour* leading off to the right, we will very likely take it. If we do not see it, we are likely to continue and be forced to turn back later. Perceiving that a package is especially heavy, we use both hands to lift it; otherwise we use one hand. In general, when we perceive a difference between objects, we behave differently toward each of them, and when we do not perceive a difference, we fail to exhibit differential behavior.

Much of our information about perceptual processes is obtained without direct reference to their conscious aspects. Some of this information comes from experimental investigations of animal and infant behavior. Animals and infants can tell us nothing about their conscious experiences, but they do respond differently to certain aspects of their environment. We can train them to approach one color and avoid another, to make one response to a triangle and a different response to a circle, and to differentiate various stimulating

conditions. We can then reduce the difference between stimuli and observe the point at which discrimination no longer occurs. Differential responses tell us much about the stimulating properties of an organism's environment. This information may help us to understand receptor and neural development.

ANALYSIS OF PERCEIVING

Whether we look at perceiving from the standpoint of behavior, from the standpoint of experience, or from the standpoint of the response mechanisms involved, it is an extremely complex process. Regardless of the standpoint from which we approach the analysis of perceiving, we find that *receptor functions* play a predominant rôle, but that other functions may also be involved. These other functions have a variety of titles, but we shall group them under the two headings, *symbolic* and *affective*.

Receptor processes

Perceiving is often referred to in terms of the receptor process predominantly involved. We speak of visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, kinesthetic, tactual, static, or organic perception. Under most conditions of everyday life, several receptor processes are simultaneously activated. We not only see objects, but we hear, and perhaps even smell them at the same time.

When perceiving is narrowed to a particular receptor process, such as vision, there is much more to it than reception. The reception which is involved sets off in turn a compli-

cated pattern of neural events which represents former stimulation. For example, the picture of a skunk (visual stimulation) may remind us (symbolic process) of how skunks smell, or give us an image (symbolic process) of the odor. That is to say, we may have more or less vivid experience of the odor, even though it is not present at the moment.

Symbolic processes

Symbolic processes are known by a variety of names. We have just suggested that being reminded of something and having an image of something are symbolic processes. What we commonly call ideas are symbolic processes.¹

Our earlier discussions of remembering and thinking have pointed out that neural activities aroused by stimulation leave their "trace" or "record" in the nervous system. This trace may then represent, or act as a substitute for, the original situation, activity, and experience. To take a very simple illustration, think of your mother's face. I might have said, "Get an image of your mother's face," "Imagine your mother's face," or, "Recall your mother's face"—it would amount to about the same thing. The image that you get, if you get one at all, may be faint or it may be clear. Unless you are congenitally blind, it is most likely visual. It is somewhat as if you saw the face. The important point, however, is that such an image is dependent on former stimulation when your mother (or a picture of her) was actually present. This stimulation modified your nervous system in some way, leaving a residue or trace. Activation of this trace by certain stimuli may lead you to recall your mother's face. The stimulus may be a whiff of the perfume used by her, a voice like hers, sitting down to a meal such as she prepared, or the instruction, "Get an image of your mother's face." In short, anything associated in the past with your mother's face may activate the symbolic process.

Why do we refer to such processes as symbolic? Think, for a moment, of what we

ordinarily mean by a symbol. It is something which represents something else. Words are symbols because they represent objects, situations, or events. They are symbols for us if we know what they represent.

Any present stimulus, in addition to arousing receptor functions, also serves to activate symbolic processes.

Affective processes

It is generally recognized that each perceptual experience may have its affective aspects. We not only see an object and perhaps have images of former sensory stimulation, but the object impresses us as pleasant, unpleasant, or perhaps as neither. Certain forms of stimulation, like a strong electric shock or a needle prick, arouse feelings of unpleasantness, whether or not we have had former contacts with them. Sweet substances probably arouse pleasant experiences from the start. However, the pleasantness or unpleasantness aroused by the sight of a tree, the sound of a voice, or the odor of garlic depends upon our past experience. The odor of garlic, for example, might be pleasant to those reared on it and unpleasant to many others.

Analysis of perceiving summarized

We can best summarize the above discussion, and elaborate certain aspects, by referring to a particular perceptual experience. Let us take, for example, the perception of a meal cooking. At least three receptor processes (vision, smell, and hearing) may be involved. Light waves stimulate receptors in our eyes, odorous particles from the food stimulate receptors in our nostrils, and explosions in the fat set up sound waves which stimulate receptors in our ears. Related neural processes are aroused, and we have visual, olfactory, and auditory experiences. We are usually not aware of these experiences as separate. They are aroused simultaneously and are so interrelated (both from the standpoint of the stimulation provided and the central neural processes involved) that the experience is usually a unitary one. It is, in

other words, one experience. It is not analogous to a wall with its separate bricks. Rather, it is more closely analogous to water, with its hydrogen and oxygen not immediately evident.

In addition to receptor functions, symbolic processes are involved. The sight, sound, or odor of food may remind us of former occasions when we have eaten this food. Gustatory (taste) images are perhaps aroused. Although the tongue is not being stimulated at the moment, we vaguely "taste" the food. This is partly because what we call "taste" is to a large extent smell (see p 382), but also because previous situations like the one to which we are now subjected have been followed shortly by actual gustatory stimulation.

There are also the affective and related processes. If we are hungry, the situation is pleasant. If we are seasick, on the other hand, it may be highly unpleasant. Its pleasantness or unpleasantness may be related to such organic processes as salivation, gastric secretions, and stomach activities.

Aesthetic experience may also be involved in our perception of a situation. We may perceive it as beautiful, ugly, or indifferent. These evaluations depend upon affective processes and also upon recall of past experience. In this way, they overlap the affective and symbolic functions.

WHY WE PERCEIVE WHAT WE PERCEIVE

Preceding discussions have indicated that what we perceive depends upon the arousal of receptor, symbolic, and affective processes. But this does not tell the whole story. We have not pointed out, for example, that some forms of stimulation arouse the same experiences in all of us. These experiences appear to be independent of previous relevant experience. It would be difficult and perhaps impossible to prove that they are inborn, yet there is every indication that they are. We shall refer to them as primitive organizations of experience. Animals, children, and savages behave as if the stimulating properties of

some of these situations were the same for them as for us.

What we perceive is also dependent upon the context or general setting of the object, situation, or event. Some of the influences attributable to context are quite primitive, perhaps innate. Others are obviously due to past experience.

The factor of past experience, often referred to as the habit factor, accounts for the different ways in which different individuals perceive certain identical external situations. Moreover, the same individual may perceive a particular situation differently at different times. This brings us back again to the influence of sets or attentive attitudes. Such sets are also dependent upon past experience.

We will now consider some examples of *primitive organization* (certain simple groupings, illusions, relational discrimination). These will be followed by examples of the influence of *context*, *past experience*, and *set*.

SOME EXAMPLES OF PRIMITIVE ORGANIZATION

Look at the dots in Figure 134. Although you may never have seen this particular pattern of dots before, it has a certain degree of organization or meaning for you. You see the dots, not as so many dots, but as four groups of dots. You probably noticed the grouping before you observed the number of dots. Moreover, the same general configuration (gestalt) would remain if these were white dots on black; if they were small squares instead of circles, if they were red, or yellow, or blue; and, in fact, if they were any visual objects that one might imagine. In other words, the grouping is independent of the particular parts (the dots, etc.) which serve to represent it.

Even outside of vision, the same grouping would remain. Thus, eight taps with a pencil, eight blasts on a trumpet, or almost any eight auditory stimulations imaginable,



Figure 134. A Simple Gestalt (after Wertheimer).

would produce the same perceptual configuration if presented in pairs with a perceptible time interval between each pair. Likewise, the essential aspect of the configuration would be retained if one were to arrange points of stimulation on the skin with a large enough distance between each of the paired points (and the pairs of points) to make them discriminable. You would experience four groups of paired points.²

The dot example is but one of many used to illustrate primitive groupings. Illusions exemplify primitive organizations somewhat more complicated than the groupings illustrated.

Illusions

Illusions are "false" perceptions. When we experience an illusion, we experience certain things which fail to correspond with the situation as objectively measured. Illusions should not be confused with hallucinations. The latter (see pp 326-327) may also be thought of as inaccurate perceptions, or, as some prefer to say, dreamlike images which are mistaken for objectively measurable external phenomena. They differ from illusions in certain important respects. In the first place, while all of us experience illusions, few of us ever have hallucinations. While normal people sometimes experience them, hallucinations are usually confined to the mentally ill and those under the influence of drugs. In the second place, illusions always have a clearly apparent external stimulus. Hallucinations sometimes occur when there is no apparent objective stimulus. In the third place, the same situation arouses the same illusion in all subjected to it. That is why we class it with primitive organizations. On the other hand, everybody who has an hallucination under particular circumstances has a different hallucination. When one person sees red devils, another may see snakes, or dragons, or executioners.

The Muller-Lyer illusion. This illusion is illustrated in Figure 135. You, in common with all other normal adults, will say that the




Figure 135

vertical line in A looks shorter than that in B. Children old enough to indicate the nature of their experience give a comparable report. Some animals react as though they also see what we see. This digest of an experiment with chickens illustrates the procedure and outcome of such an experiment.

Two lines of obviously different length to the experimenter and, as it turned out, of obviously different length to the chickens, were presented in a discrimination apparatus. The shorter line appeared on the right side of the discrimination chamber in some trials, and on the left side in others, the side being alternated in a chance order. The longer line always appeared on the opposite side to the shorter one. The chickens were trained to discriminate between them by approaching the shorter line and avoiding the longer. Whenever they approached the shorter line, they received food. Approaching the longer line brought punishment in the form of an electric shock. After several hundred trials (the number differing from one chicken to the other), discrimination reached an accuracy of from 80 to 90 per cent. The difference in length of the lines was then gradually reduced. Moreover, changes in the figures were made so that the chickens would not be disturbed later by introduction of arrows. It is important to note that the changes introduced could by no means be considered training for perception of the illusion, for they

introduced no illusory effects. Finally, two lines of equal length, but bounded by arrows as in the above illustration, were introduced. Most animals continued to discriminate (as accurately as they had discriminated the shorter line) the line that to us appears shorter. It was, of course, possible that they were reacting to the over-all length of the figure (including ends of arrows) rather than to the horizontal lines as such. That this was not the case was shown by control experiments. When the over-all length of the figures was made the same, by decreasing the length of the line whose arrows flanged outward (the negative figure), there was a marked tendency to choose this, the figure previously avoided. Since the central line of this figure was now actually shorter than that of the other, although the over-all length of the figure was the same, it suggests that the chicks had really been responding to the central line all along.³

At least four other illusory effects commonly experienced by man have been demonstrated in the behavior of birds. These are illustrated in drawings *a* to *d* of Figure 136, which also contains two illusions not yet demonstrated in animals. Birds have been used in such experiments primarily because their vision is exceptionally good, not because it is thought that they are the only animals susceptible to illusory effects.

The Muller-Lyer and several others of the illusions mentioned may be experienced tactually when made up in the form of rubber stamps and impressed upon the skin.

Illusions of apparent motion We all experience the illusion of movement when we witness a moving picture. In the regular commercial motion picture a sequence of events




Figure 136. Some Other Visual Illusions

a. Interrupted extent illusion. The distance from end to end is the same in the line with the gap and the line without it. *b.* Vertical-horizontal illusion. The vertical and horizontal lines are equal in length. *c.* Breadth of rectangles illusion. The breadth is identical in both rectangles. *d.* Wundt's illusion. The figures are identical. *e.* Zollner illusion. The long lines are parallel. *f.* Hering's illusion. Place a straight edge along the horizontal lines to prove that they are actually straight.



Figure 137 Successive Frames from a Motion Picture

somewhat as follows takes place: a shutter cuts out all projected light, and a new frame with a slightly different picture on it (Figure 137) moves into place. The shutter then opens, and the picture is projected on the screen. A shutter cuts across this still picture while it remains in position, thus increasing the frequency of flickering interruptions and producing less perceptible flicker. The shutter once again cuts across the field, and a new still frame moves up. The whole sequence is

then repeated for that picture. Thus, there is never any objective movement on the screen itself, which would be seen only as a blur, but rather one sees in a moving picture the most beautiful example possible of synthetic movement.

Thus, a succession of still pictures, projected one after the other at a suitable rate, gives us the illusion that movement occurs. This illusion is known as the *phi-phenomenon*. We see it, not only in the movies, but in many electrical advertising signs. The red arrow which appears to move from one position to another does not really move. Two arrows in different positions are flashed on one after the other. Likewise, the greyhound on the bus signs does not really move. We see it running because different positions of the body involved in running are successively lighted at appropriate intervals.

The phi-phenomenon is often studied experimentally by using an apparatus which allows presentation of two or more lights, one after the other.⁴ Such an arrangement of lights is illustrated in Figure 138. Experimental research has shown that, in order to get the illusion, one must present the lights at an appropriate brightness, size, distance apart, and temporal interval. If the size, brightness, and distance between the lights are held constant, and you view the situation from a fixed distance, the timing factor may be clearly demonstrated. If there is too long an interval between flashes, you see one light go on and then the other. There is no apparent movement. If the interval between flashes is too short, you see two lights flashing at approximately the same time. However, if one flash follows the other at an appropriate interval (the interval depending upon the space between the lights, their size and brightness), you see a light move from *a* to *b*. In



Figure 138 Arrangement of Lights to Illustrate the Phi-Phenomenon

other words, you see, not two lights, but one. It appears to move across the space where no light actually exists.

This illusion is not confined to human adults. Children and animals behave as though influenced by it. The experiments with cats and guinea pigs are especially interesting

The animal is clamped into a holder, but with its head free to move. Its eyes face the inside surface of a rotating cylinder covered with alternate vertical black and white stripes. As these stripes move by in a clockwise (or counter-clockwise) direction, the animals exhibit typical right-left head movements (head nystagmus). Thus, their eyes follow a stripe momentarily and then return to the original position. Under normal conditions the nystagmic movements are elicited only when stripes are present and when these are actually moving. Human beings react in a similar manner to such stimulation.⁵

So far we have described the reaction to actual movement of the striped pattern. However, the same movements occur when the stripes do not actually move, but are flashed on in rapid succession. This successive presentation of the stripes is produced by use of stroboscopic illumination. The whole inside of the apparatus is dark, except at intervals when the light flashes on. The cylinder moves all the time, but the stripes can stimulate the eye only during a flash determined by the stroboscope. The flashes are synchronized with the moving drum in such a manner that the eye is stimulated only by stationary stripes. Yet the animal acts as though it were being stimulated by moving stripes. These results "seem significant in suggesting that the capacity for apparent movement vision is a fundamental aspect of mammalian vision and is not, as has been implied by some theories, a perceptual capacity based primarily upon some process of learning or acquired perceptual interpretation." The same results are obtained when the cerebral hemispheres are removed. This shows that the phenomenon, at least in guinea pigs and cats, is mediated by mechanisms in the brain stem or retina or both. An explanation in terms of retinal processes has been suggested by recent research.⁶

It has been clearly demonstrated that the illusion of apparent motion is not because of

eye movements, for, with two sets of lights like the pair in Figure 138, but one above the other, an observer simultaneously sees one light moving from *a* to *b* above, and one from *b* to *a* below. In other words, he perceives movement in two different directions at the same time, something which would be impossible if movement of the eyes from one position to the other were necessary. Nor is the phi-phenomenon due to images. If a light moved across the space from *a* to *b*, we might have after-images of it (p. 341). Since it does not actually move, there are no after-images representing intermediate stimulation. The phenomenon is apparently dependent upon some rather stereotyped reactions of our visual receptors, or nervous system, or both, to the stimulus relationships involved.

In addition to the groupings and illusions already mentioned, there are several other illustrations of primitive perceptual organization. One of these is *discrimination of relationships*.

Relational discrimination

Discrimination in terms of relationships has been demonstrated in monkeys and other animals, as well as children. Situations like those used are represented in Figure 139. In a discrimination apparatus, and following the discrimination procedure described above (p. 182), the animal is trained to go to the large circle (*a*) and to avoid the small circle (*b*). After it has learned this lesson well, the animal is confronted with the circle (*c*) and a still smaller circle (*d*). It now goes to (*c*), which is the area that it previously avoided. The animal is not responding to the specific area (*a*), but to the larger of the two areas. Likewise, if we present a larger area than *a* (the area previously selected), the animal now avoids *a* and selects the larger area.

This relational type of response is also found when brightnesses are used, the animal responding to the relation brighter-than or less-bright-than.⁷ Animals have been trained to make an absolute response to brightness,




Figure 139 Relational Discrimination


but the relational one is obviously more primitive and more easily demonstrated.⁸

CONTEXT

The total situation in which an object, situation, or event occurs is quite influential in determining what we perceive. We have already seen examples of this in the Muller-Lyer, Zollner, and Hering illusions. Outside of these particular contexts, the lines would be perceived as they really are.

The influence of context is especially evident in puzzles involving hidden pictures (p. 306). It may also be demonstrated by use of geometrical shapes. Look at the first form in Figure 140. It is concealed in each of the other figures. This figure is readily apparent in some, but you may have difficulty in locating it in others.

Still another example of the influence of

Figure 140. How Context May Conceal a Form
(After Gottschaldt.)

context is to be observed whenever we enter a moving picture in the middle. It is usually quite difficult to get the thread of the story and, until one does learn what has gone before, he is likely to have difficulty in getting the appropriate meaning from what he sees and hears. It is likewise difficult to identify a song when one merely hears a brief portion of the music, taken out of its context.

With the possible exception of illusions, the examples of context mentioned above illustrate the influence of past experience in perceiving. The items involved are difficult for us to locate or identify because we have been accustomed to experiencing them in another context, or, when they occur in isolation, because we have difficulty in fitting them into the framework of past experience.

PAST EXPERIENCE IN PERCEIVING

With the few possible exceptions provided by primitive organizations, all perceiving is dependent upon past experience — the so-called habit factor. Examples of this are legion, hence only a few need be cited. We shall emphasize perceptual development and the varied interpretations of comparable stimuli.

What we call the meaning of an object, situation, or event is in most instances dependent upon how it has stimulated us in the past, the general context in which this stimulation occurred, and how we reacted to it. Consider, for example, the perceptions which an apple may elicit at different stages of our perceptual development. Before we are old enough to eat an apple, one is perhaps rolled toward us in play. If this occurs sufficiently often, the apple means "something to play with." If balls have also been rolled toward us, the apple may be regarded as a ball. The apple is perhaps identifiable in terms of shape, size, weight, and color. Since all of these aspects stimulate us simultaneously, they may become associated so that any one or a combination of them arouses symbolic processes representing the other. Thus, something with a similar color arrangement and

shape (say a picture of an apple) might arouse perceptual experiences somewhat like those aroused by a real apple. After we have eaten an apple, its taste is also associated with its other characteristics. The taste not only enables us to identify the substance as apple, but also may arouse imagery representing other things previously associated with the taste of apple. Moreover, the apple now means something to eat, not merely something to play with. As we learn about Adam and Eve, drink apple cider, eat apple pie, take part in apple dunking contests, learn about apple tree swings, and have love affairs under apple trees, the object "apple" comes to have increasingly rich meaning. Any one of an apple's properties may arouse rich perceptual experience. This does not mean, of course, that we always perceive all of an object's meaning. The point is that we *may* perceive it, in terms of any experience formerly associated with it.

New situations are often fitted, as it were, into the individual's experiential background. Thus, a little girl who saw a caterpillar for the first time called it "a kitty bug." A boy whose dad taught at a college with a clock tower interpreted every other building with a clock tower as a college. Upon further contact with objects and situations, each of us modifies his interpretations. The girl learns that the "kitty bug" is a caterpillar, and the boy learns that not all buildings with clock towers are colleges.

The same object may have quite different meaning to different persons. What is illustrated in Figure 141? Essentially the same stimulation is involved, regardless of who looks at the picture. Some say that it is a crude lamp. It does have a certain similarity with oil lamps. Some say that it is a smudge pot such as those used in orange groves. Others say that it is some sort of bug. In short, the perceptual experience differs considerably from one person to another, although the retinal stimulation and sensory processes involved are similar for all. This difference lies in symbolic processes. The



Figure 141. What Is This?

From Croll, R. H., "Wide Horizons." Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1937, facing page 114.

present stimulation taps different past experience. Almost any native of Central Australia would say without hesitation that he perceives a honey ant, which is the correct answer. The native's salivary glands would perhaps work overtime, and his perceptual experience might be tinged with pleasure, for this ant, whose body swells up with honey, is a great delicacy for him. He takes the upper part of the body between his fingers and bites off the "honey pot," as we might bite a grape from its stem.

The same principle as that exemplified above — namely, that we often perceive different things although we are similarly stimulated — is quite obvious when reactions of different individuals toward the same person are concerned. A psychiatrist says:

Think of your mother. If you and I see her at the same time, we certainly see very different persons. I, of course, do not know what you see, but I may see an attractive, mature woman just designed for a pleasant evening, or a fat, frowsy, old bore, or an interesting example of some obscure skin disease.*

SET IN PERCEIVING

The sets which play a rôle in determining what we perceive are attentive sets or preperceptive attitudes. These have already been considered (pp 305-317) from the standpoint of their rôle in leading us to perceive. Some of the attentive sets are habitual while others are determined by immediate aspects of a

situation, including instructions concerning what we are to observe.

Habitual sets and how they influence what is perceived may be illustrated by reference to specialists in aspects of nature. The entomologist, being an expert on insects, perceives organisms which completely escape our observation. Likewise, an astronomer perceives much more in the heavens than those of us who are not astronomers, even though we too may be gazing at the sky through a telescope. Sometimes, in fact, the scientist's set may lead him to perceive aspects of nature not observed by other scientists. For example, an interesting controversy hinges upon the question of whether or not the planet Mars has canals. Some astronomers "see" these canals. Under comparable conditions of observation, others fail to see them. The different perceptions are probably due to a difference in what the respective astronomers expect to see.

The influence of nonhabitual sets is especially well illustrated by hallucinations. Because we have a set conducive to seeing or hearing certain things, we sometimes "see" or "hear" them when they do not exist.

I once had a colony of white rats in the attic of the psychology building. One afternoon I found several rats outside of their cages. Some were dead and partly eaten. It occurred to me that, however the rats had escaped, they must have been eaten by wild rats. I went downstairs to get some water and was climbing the stairs again when I saw before me, and directly in front of the cages, a large wild gray rat. It was standing tense and trembling, apparently having heard me ascend the stairs. Very slowly I raised a glass jar that was in my right hand, and aimed it at the rat. Much to my surprise, the animal failed to move. Upon approaching the object, I discovered it to be a piece of crumpled-up grayish paper. Without the set induced by my suspicion that gray rats were in the attic, I should undoubtedly have seen the paper for what it was, assuming that I noticed it at all.

Was this an illusion (pp. 321-324) or an hallucination? At least it was not an illusion in the sense of a universal inaccuracy or falsity of perception. One might question whether it




Figure 142. How Instructional Sets May Influence What We Perceive

(After Carmichael, Hogan, and Walter.)

was an hallucination because there was an obvious external stimulus present. Regardless of what we call such phenomena, they do illustrate the importance of set in determining what we perceive. In clear-cut cases of hallucinations, as when a person has delirium tremens and sees devils, snakes, or hell fire surrounding him, the particular set may not be apparent. However, since different individuals, and the same individual at different times, hallucinate different things, set probably plays an important rôle in determining what is perceived under such circumstances.

The influence of instructional sets is illustrated by experiments in which different observers perceive different things, depending upon what they are led to expect.¹⁰ In Figure 142 are shown some typical results. Ambiguous figures like those in the center were exposed briefly, one at a time. After each exposure, the subject made a reproduction of what he had seen. When subjects were told that the figure would be like a pair of glasses, they perceived glasses, as indicated by reproductions such as that on the left. When other subjects were shown the same figure under the same conditions, but told to expect a dumbbell, they drew reproductions like that on the right.

REDUCED CUES

As perceptual experience grows, parts of situations come to arouse the same response formerly aroused by the entire situation. This is the tendency to respond in terms of reduced cues, an aspect of which was considered in the discussion of remembering (pp. 157-158). Reading provides a good example. Our eyes fixate briefly on a word — too briefly to take in all of the details — yet we grasp the meaning of the word. This is why typographical

errors like those involved in this sentence often pass unobserved, unless one is looking for them. How many errors were there?

Many people in our culture have no difficulty in identifying *A* in Figure 143 from the cues given. On the other hand, very few are able to identify *B*. The reason is that few have had relevant experience with what is pictured. Only those who have observed a photographer kneeling with a graflex camera are able to see the photographer taking a picture. Even some who have had such experience have perhaps had it so infrequently that the cues provided do not arouse the appropriate perception

We observe instances of response to reduced cues on every hand. When *All Quiet on the Western Front* was shown in a Pittsburgh theater several years ago, and the boom of a cannon was heard from the screen, a "shell-shocked" veteran of World War I dove for the orchestra pit (somewhat like a dugout), then emerged, looking very sheepish. We perceive the approach of a friend in terms of his footsteps or his voice. We recognize acquaintances on the street in terms of some obvious characteristic, or narrow group of characteristics, rather than by a careful over-all scrutiny. As everyone knows, we sometimes "perceive" a friend, only to discover that it is not our friend at all. We have been misled, perhaps, by the

stranger's dress, her walk, her red hair, or some other aspect which she shares with our friend.

PERCEPTUAL CONSTANCY

The Müller-Lyer illusion and the phi-phenomenon illustrate that what one perceives does not always correspond with what is before him. The so-called "constancy phenomenon" is a further illustration of this fact, although it perhaps has a quite different explanation. It is the tendency to perceive objects as constant, even though they stimulate us in a variety of ways.¹¹

Size constancy is easily demonstrated. Look at some familiar object, say a coin, a pencil, or a book. Hold it close to your eyes. Does the object look smaller as you move it away (thus providing a retinal image of rapidly decreasing size) and larger as you move it closer? The chances are that it does not. It will look smaller only when it is moved much farther away than the length of your arm. Brightness constancy is illustrated by looking at a familiar object and failing to see its brightness change while changes in illumination are introduced. One can illuminate a piece of coal until the amount of light entering the eye is greater than that received from a white shirt, yet the coal will still appear black and the shirt white. Form constancy is



A



B

Figure 143. What Objects Are Here Represented?
(After Street.)

exemplified every time we perceive a plate as round when, because of its position with respect to the eye, the image is actually elliptical. Likewise, the square table top is continually seen to be the same square, although, as we look at it from different positions, the image on our retina undergoes a variety of changes. These constancy phenomena are taken into consideration when the artist wishes to create an impression of reality. For example, if he draws a square table top as square from a position in which it is actually impressed upon the retina as a diamond, it looks unnatural to us. He must draw it as a diamond for us to see it as a square.

How may we account for these constancy phenomena? Some have argued that the tendencies involved are inborn, and others that they are learned. Some attribute them to perception of whole situations instead of parts.

Constancy phenomena suggest perception in terms of reduced cues. It may be argued that the child has perceived familiar objects in many different positions, involving a variety of retinal sizes, illuminations, and shapes. Each of these different stimulations has been given the same name and reacted to in the same way. Thus, all of the different stimulating aspects have the same meaning. They are equivalent stimuli. In terms of response to reduced cues, we might argue that any one or a combination of these equivalent stimuli arouses comparable symbolic representations of the others. In other words, we might argue that the child is responding to what it knows about the object and not merely to what stimulation is being provided at the moment. If he knows that a plate is round, he perceives it as round, and treats it as round, even though the image on his retina may be elliptical.

PERCEIVING DIFFERENCES

How much must two stimuli differ before you can notice the difference? The answer depends on several things. Small differences may pass unnoticed — in other words, may be below the threshold of discrimination —

unless you are set to observe them. Let us assume, however, that you are set to observe small differences. Then the answer to our question depends upon (1) the relative magnitude of the stimuli to be compared and (2) the sense stimulated.

If three candles are burning in a room and you add one, there will be a perceptible increase in the illumination of the room. As a matter of fact, the change will clearly be perceptible. It will be far above the threshold. However, if one hundred candles are burning and you add one, there may be a just perceptible or just noticeable difference (*j n d*) in illumination. Suppose, now, that two hundred candles are burning and we add another. No matter how much you are set to perceive a small difference in illumination, you will not perceive the change. It will be below the threshold of discrimination. Likewise, one pound added to two or three pounds (or subtracted from two or three pounds) will lead to a clearly perceptible change in weight. The object will feel heavier or lighter, as the case may be. Add one pound to one hundred, however, and the difference in weight will not be noticed.

In an old psychology text¹² there is a description of an experiment carried out on a frog. The frog sat in water the temperature of which was gradually increased until it reached the boiling point. However, the animal failed to move. It was boiled alive without ever having made an effort to escape. Why? Because the increase in temperature was so gradual (was such a small proportion of the preceding temperature) that the frog could not at any moment sense an increase in temperature. The difference, in other words, was never above the threshold.

These simple illustrations suggest that, whether or not a difference in intensity is discriminated depends upon the ratio of the change in stimulus intensity to the intensity of stimulation existing prior to the change. In other words, whether one discriminates a difference between the intensity of stimulus *a* and stimulus *b* (or a difference in the corre-

lated experiences *a* and *b*) depends upon what proportion the change from *a* to *b* is of *a*. This is known as *Weber's law*, so-named because Weber, a German physiologist, first formulated it.

In experimental investigations of Weber's law, one stimulus intensity is held constant and referred to as the standard intensity. We then determine what stimulus intensity can be just barely discriminated from the standard intensity. If Weber's law applies, the increase required is a constant fraction of the standard intensity. This fraction is referred to as the *constant* (*C*). Where Weber's law applies, the j.n.d. is a function of $\Delta S/S = C$, where *S* is the standard stimulus intensity, ΔS , the change in *S* required to produce a j.n.d. in intensity, and *C* the constant ratio.

If one candle added to one hundred produced a just noticeable difference in brightness, *S* would be 100; ΔS , 1; and *C*, 1/100. Suppose that this ratio applied generally to brightness discrimination; then, how many candles would need to be added to five hundred in order to produce a j.n.d. in brightness? The answer is one to every hundred, or five. The increase (or decrease) must be one hundredth of the preceding intensity, the standard intensity.

The exact Weber fraction, even within the field of brightness vision, differs from one experimental condition to another. In a particular experimental situation, moreover, it differs from one subject to another. The fraction also differs for each sense department, as the following representative constants suggest: brightness, 1/100; loudness, 1/5; temperature, 1/3; and olfactory intensity, 1/5. Such ratios do not apply within the whole range of intensities. They have been found to hold only within the middle range. Ratios like those found in the field of intensity discrimination are also found for discrimination of pitch, length, area, and time intervals.

How are the Weber ratios determined? There are three common methods for determining such ratios. These are referred to as *psychophysical methods*.¹³ Only one of the

psychophysical methods will be considered here. It is often designated the method of just noticeable differences. This method is used with animals as well as human beings.

The animal is confronted, say, by two lines, one much longer than the other. These appear, one on the right and one on the left in a discrimination apparatus. The shorter line, let us suppose, is the standard length. It is held at this length throughout the experiment. The longer, variable, line is changed in length as the experiment progresses. The standard and the variable line appear on either the right or left side of the apparatus, the position in any trial being in accordance with random selection. This is so that the animal will not learn to go always to the right or always to the left. Other extraneous cues are also eliminated so that discrimination must be based upon the length of the lines and nothing else.

Whenever the animal approaches the shorter line, it is rewarded with a bite of food. Whenever it approaches the other line, it is given an electric shock.

After many trials, the animal, if it can clearly discriminate the difference in length of lines, exhibits a high frequency of correct responses, perhaps from 95 to 100 in 100 correct. We now begin to shorten the longer line, giving ten or more trials after each change. As this shortening continues, we eventually notice a drop in accuracy of discrimination. When the accuracy of discrimination drops to around 80 per cent, we give more trials at each step, the reason being that we are now closely approaching the threshold. When we decrease the longer line to the point where it is discriminated with an accuracy of 75 per cent, we take the difference in lengths to be the threshold. We may now repeat the experiment with different standard lengths, the aim being to see whether the ratio obtained with one length applies to others.

Essentially the same procedure is used with human beings. It is much abbreviated, however. We instruct our subject to indicate the shorter of two lines. We then pair the standard with each of several comparison lines. The difference in length between the standard line and the line discriminated from it with an accuracy of 75 per cent is taken to be the threshold.

The standard line, let us suppose, is 10 inches in length. A comparison line of 10 inches would, of course, be selected from this with no greater accu-

racy than 50 per cent, or chance. The standard length, let us say, is differentiated from a line of 10.1 inches with an accuracy of 95 per cent, from a line of 10.08 inches with an accuracy of 80 per cent, from a line of 10.06 inches with an accuracy of 75 per cent, and from a line of 10.05 inches with an accuracy of 70 per cent. In such a case, unless a finer determination were desired, we would take 10.06 - 10.00, or .06, as the threshold difference.

The psychophysical methods have been found useful in many other fields of psychology, including educational, social, business, and industrial psychology. They are useful whenever we wish to determine how much difference in something must be present before people can notice it. If some practical situation requires that certain differences be perceived, we make sure that the differences are well above the threshold of discrimination.

SUMMARY

Perceiving has its experiential and behavioral aspects. From the standpoint of experience, it is synonymous with observing differences, relationships, organizations, and meanings. The conscious experience itself is often spoken of as perception. From the standpoint of behavior, perceiving is synonymous with acting differentially, in terms of relationships, in terms of organized properties of the environment, and in terms of meaning. Perceiving, considered from either standpoint, involves receptor processes and it may also involve symbolic and affective processes.

Most situations of everyday life activate several receptor processes simultaneously. For example, we may see, smell, and hear at the same time. Symbolic processes are representative processes — that is to say, they represent past stimulation. Present stimulation arouses traces left by former associated stimulation. This underlies the imagery aspect of perceiving. Symbolic and affective processes aroused by a situation give meaning to that situation.

Some aspects of perceptual experience and behavior appear to be inborn rather than learned. These have been referred to as prim-

itive organizations. Among the examples presented were primitive groupings, some geometrical illusions, the illusion of apparent motion, and relational discrimination. In some instances, as in the illusions, we actually perceive as aspects of our environment certain phenomena which have no objective existence. Thus, we may see movement where none occurs, and we may see straight lines as bent, or lines of equal length as differing in length. Since the same illusions are experienced by persons who have never before been presented with such situations, and since animals react as though subject to the same illusory effects, there is good reason for believing that the organizations involved are independent of previous experience.

Illusions and other forms of primitive organization are apparently imposed upon us by the organism. The external situation activates certain receptor and neural processes, but what we perceive corresponds with these processes and not with the external situation. Thus, in the phi-phenomenon, we perceive movement because of some process within the eye or nervous system, not because of some external movement. A large amount of research is being focused upon primitive organizations with the aim of finding out what receptor and neural activities are responsible for them.

Context, or the setting of an object, situation, or event plays an important part in determining what we perceive. This is illustrated in certain illusions, but it is also illustrated in all perceiving which depends upon past experience. Some good examples are finding a hidden figure; locating familiar objects when, for purposes of camouflage, their surroundings have been changed; trying to get the meaning of what we see and hear when, as in entering a movie in the middle, we do not know what has gone before; and in identifying music when we hear only brief excerpts. In most instances the influence of context is related to past experience.

The rôle of past experience is especially evident when we trace the development of per-

ceiving in children. Any object familiar to us as adults has acquired a variety of meanings because of its association with other objects and events in the past. Thus, perception of an apple is eventually possible in terms of any one of its aspects (such as color, odor, taste), and any one of these is likely to arouse symbolic processes which represent former experiences or activities in which apples have played a part. Growth of meaning is also related to our tendency to interpret the new in terms of the old. Think, for example, of the little girl who called the caterpillar a "kitty bug" when she saw one for the first time. That the same object may have different meanings for different individuals, even though it stimulates them identically, can be illustrated by use of any object not familiar to all. One will recall the picture of the honey ant in this connection.

The influence of set in perceiving is another example of the rôle of past experience, for the set is itself determined by what has happened previously. Different expectations may lead different people to perceive the same object as different. Think of the "gray rat," which was really a piece of paper, and of the drawing that one subject saw as a dumbbell and the other as a pair of glasses, depending upon what expectations had been aroused.

If we had to examine every object or situation carefully before perceiving it, we should be greatly handicapped in reacting to our environment. What we do, characteristically, is to react to the whole in terms of a part. Some aspect of former experience, or some part of a present familiar object or situation, arouses symbolic processes which, as it were, "fill out" the experience. In reading, we

grasp the meaning of words by reacting to their most obvious letters, or parts of letters, rather than by reacting to all of the letters individually. We recognize familiar objects in terms of their parts, as in the locomotive example. False recognition of other persons illustrates the same phenomenon.

We perceive familiar objects as maintaining their size, brightness, and shape, despite great variations in retinal stimulation. This phenomenon is referred to as size, brightness, and shape constancy. The explanation of the constancy phenomenon is not definitely known, but there are reasons for believing that it depends upon past experience and that it is a further example of response in terms of reduced cues.

In order to perceive two forms of stimulation as different, it is necessary that the difference between them be a certain fraction of one, which is referred to as the standard stimulus. This is the essence of Weber's law. If you are to discriminate an increase in brightness, the increase in intensity of light must be about one hundredth of the intensity that you started with. This increase is necessary to bring the difference above the threshold of discrimination, or to produce a just noticeable difference (*j n d.*) in brightness. In hearing, taste, and the other senses, different ratios apply. In every field of reception, they apply only to the middle range of intensities, they vary somewhat from one individual to another, and they vary under different experimental conditions. Similar ratios apply to certain aspects of experience other than intensity — for example, length and area. One of the methods used to obtain Weber ratios is that of just noticeable differences.

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Chapter 19

Vision

WE HAVE ALREADY CONSIDERED the development of visual mechanisms in organisms ranging from the ameba to man, and we have observed that the organism's world becomes enlarged and diversified as such mechanisms become increasingly complex. We have also considered certain phenomena of visual perception. Among these are fluctuation of figure and ground in figures having reversible perspective, grouping of objects in the visual field, geometrical illusions, the phi-phenomenon, relational discrimination of size and brightness, constancy of visual perception despite changes in retinal stimulation, and discrimination of differences in visually perceived objects. In none of these discussions has emphasis been upon vision as such. Rather, we have emphasized general principles of perceiving which are applicable to certain other senses as well as vision. Moreover, our emphasis so far has been on the complex aspects of experience. We have not raised such questions as "What happens when receptor cells are stimulated and the effects of this stimulation are transmitted to the brain?" In other words, our discussion has not been analytical to a very high degree.

We now approach visual perceiving analytically. Some of the elementary aspects of vision are to be considered from the standpoint of their dependence upon stimuli, and upon receptor and neural structures and functions. What we are about to study is often referred to as the field of *visual sensation*, but the concept of sensation is so involved in controversy that an adequate consideration of it would require many pages. The reader who desires an

introduction to this interesting but perhaps endless controversy will find it in the group of textbooks to which we here refer.¹ In general, it is assumed that *sensations* are the elementary aspects of sensory experiences, like redness, sourness, and pain. One can refer to these as *receptor processes*. Perceptions are said to be patterns of sensations (or receptor processes) and of affective and symbolic processes, such as we discussed in the preceding chapter (pp. 318-320). One may refer to these complex aspects of experience as *perceptual experiences* or *perceptual processes*. To make the point somewhat clearer, we might say that experience of an apple is a perceptual experience which is reducible to redness, sourness, and several other relatively simple sensory experiences which some would call sensations, and others receptor processes.

Visual experience may be described in terms of its *hue*, *brightness*, and *saturation*, and possibly in terms of some other less generally agreed-upon characteristics. The hues are reds, greens, blues, and other colors. Brightness refers to the intensity of visual experience. We may experience reds (hues) of varying brightness, and we may experience different hues (say red and green) of the same brightness. Other terms commonly used for brightness are tint (brighter than average colors) and shade (darker than average colors). Artists prefer the term *value* to represent what psychologists refer to as brightness. Saturation refers to the amount of a given color present, to its purity, or to its richness. Thus, a yellow that is hardly distinguishable from gray, or a yellow that is greenish in appearance, is not a well-saturated yellow. On




Plate IV. Figure for the detection of color blindness. The normal eye sees the figure 5, the color-blind eye sees the figure 2 (see text). (Copied by permission from Ishihara's "Series of Plates Designed as Tests for Color Blindness," Tokio, 1920)

the other hand, a yellow that is very yellow, that is far removed from gray, and that is free of any other hue than yellow, is well saturated.

VISUAL STIMULATION

Our eyes are attuned to light waves ranging in length from slightly below four hundred millionths of a millimeter to slightly above seven hundred millionths of a millimeter. Plate 1 illustrates the visible spectrum

When sunlight is passed through a prism, as illustrated in Plate 2, the shorter waves are bent more than the longer. This differential bending of waves produces the series of wave lengths which underlies the visible spectrum. One will observe that the longest waves are at the red end and the shortest waves at the violet end of the visible spectrum. Purple does not appear in the spectrum, but is produced by stimulating the eye simultaneously with light from the red and the blue or violet bands of radiation.

Chromatic vision

Color vision is referred to technically as *chromatic*. It is represented by the various hues. Its direct physical correlate is, as we have seen, the wave length of light.

Wave length also influences brightness. Observe, for example, that yellow, when viewed under normal illumination, looks brighter than green. Under low illumination the situation is reversed. The basis of this shift in the brightness value of yellow and green will be considered later (p. 345).

Saturation is correlated with the complexity of light waves. Monochromatic light — that is, light of one wave length or of a narrow band of wave lengths — is most highly saturated. If white light (a mixture of wave lengths) is introduced, the color becomes "washed out" in appearance. Red, for example, takes on a pinkish appearance — it appears less red than before. We say that its saturation has been reduced. Saturation is also low under very low illumination. It is reduced to zero when objects lose their hue and appear only as white, black, or gray. A

colorless photograph has zero saturation. Saturation is also reduced when light from two or more diverse regions of the spectrum are mixed. Thus, red loses saturation when blue light is mixed with it. A highly saturated purple may be produced, but the red component has lost its redness, and the blue one has lost its blueness.

Achromatic vision

Vision of white, gray, and black is referred to technically as *achromatic* (without color). The chief variable in achromatic vision is brightness.

While hue is correlated primarily with the length of light waves and saturation with their complexity, brightness is correlated primarily with the height or amplitude of these waves. Figure 144 illustrates what we mean by amplitude. The physical intensity of light is greater as the amplitude of light waves increases. One should not assume, however, that experienced intensity, or brightness, is directly proportional to physical intensity and amplitude.*

The experience of brightness depends upon how our eyes and nervous system react to the physical intensity. For example, when you enter a moving-picture theater from bright sunlight, you cannot see the seats and people sitting in them. Several minutes are required before they become visible. The external in-




Figure 144. Wave Length and Amplitude
(a) length; (b) amplitude

* Modern physics has made great strides in the description of the basic phenomena of all radiation, including radiation in the region of the visible spectrum, but this is not the place to discuss the quantum theory of light or the electromagnetic basis of radiation.



Figure 145. A White-Black Continuum

This is not a complete representation of the continuum, for there are well over 500 discriminable steps in brightness from white to black.

tensity of the objects has not changed in those few minutes, yet the experienced brightness has gone from zero to above your threshold. This is because of a change in the sensitivity of your eyes — sensitivity which increases greatly within a period of minutes. You have become partially *dark adapted*. As you go in the daytime from the darkened theater out into snow, the brightness of the snow is almost blinding. Within a few minutes, however, its brightness has become bearable. You have become *light adapted*. Here, again, the external intensity has not changed. Changes in your eyes are alone responsible for this change in brightness.

Absence of a direct correspondence between physical intensity and experienced brightness is also exemplified by brightness constancy (p 328). A sheet of white paper under low illumination still appears bright, and a piece of black velvet under very high illumination still appears dim.

Brightness may be represented in several ways, but only one scheme will be considered here. It may be represented by using a continuum ranging from white and very bright gray at one end to very dark gray and black at the other. A continuum of this nature is illustrated in Figure 145. Neutral brightness is assumed to correspond with neutral gray, which is the midpoint in the continuum. Colors are said to have neutral brightness when their brightness aspect matches that of neutral gray. Likewise, two or more colors are said to be of equal brightness if the brightness of each can be matched with a particular gray in the continuum.

The color solid

The relation between hue, brightness, and

saturation is illustrated in Figure 146, which shows one type of color solid. Hues of neutral brightness and maximum saturation are represented on the circle where the two cones join. Note that the order of hues on this color circle is the same order observed in the spectrum. It is as though the spectrum were curved to form a circle. However, the ends of the spectrum are represented as though joined by purple, a color which, as we have already observed, does not occur in the spectrum, but is produced by mixing red with blue or violet. Brightness is represented by the line running through the center of the solid from white to black, with neutral gray at the midpoint.




Figure 146. A Color Solid Showing the Relation Between Hue, Brightness, and Saturation

This is the white-black continuum of Figure 145. The most highly saturated hues are represented as equivalent in brightness to neutral gray. As the brightness value of a hue increases (approaches white) or decreases (approaches black), the color becomes less saturated. Because it approximates the gray with which its brightness corresponds, it is represented as approaching the white-black continuum as it moves from neutral brightness in either direction. Any decrease in saturation is represented by a line running from the surface of the solid toward the center. This is why the most saturated hues are represented as falling farthest out on the surface of the figure — at the region where the two cones join. The least saturated colors are those at either end of the solid and those anywhere within the solid represented as close to gray.

SOME PHENOMENA OF COLOR VISION

Several phenomena of color vision have been investigated extensively in the psychological laboratory. Among these are color mixture, color blindness, peripheral vision, after-images, and simultaneous contrast.

Retinal color mixture

The color solid not only represents the rela-

tions between hue, brightness, and saturation, but it also represents the laws of retinal color mixture. These laws are easily demonstrated by utilizing an apparatus like that illustrated in Figure 147. Disks differing in color are interlocked as illustrated, and then rotated on the color mixer. Each point on the retina is stimulated now by one color and now by another. If the succession of the two kinds of stimulation is too slow, a marked flicker occurs. As the mixer speeds up, flicker disappears and a uniformly distributed gray, or a hue appears.

The first law of color mixture is demonstrated by mixing two complementary colors, like yellow and blue or red and a slightly bluish green. If these hues are mixed in the proper proportions, a uniform gray is obtained. The gray lies between the brightnesses of the respective colors. Thus, if we use a dull red and a bright blue-green, the resulting gray will be of approximately intermediate brightness. The first law may be formulated somewhat as follows: *Retinal mixture of complementary colors in the proper proportions produces a gray the brightness of which lies between that of the respective colors.* This fact is represented in the color solid by placing complementary colors opposite each other




Figure 147. Retinal Color Mixer

so that a straight line drawn from one to the other passes through a point on the white-black continuum. Thus, if you wish to know which color is complementary to another, just line up a straight edge with (1) the point on the color circle representing that color and (2) the center of the circle. The other point on the circle which falls in line with these two points represents the complementary hue.

The second law of retinal color mixture says that *if non-complementary hues are mixed in appropriate proportions, the resultant will be a hue which falls between them in the color circle*. For example, a mixture of blue and green produces blue-green, a mixture of red and yellow produces orange, and a mixture of red and blue produces purple. The brightness of the mixture lies between the brightness of the component colors. Its saturation depends on the predominance of one component. Thus, if the mixture is of blue and green and blue predominates, the bluish hue will be more evident than the greenish — in other words, blue will have a higher saturation than green.

The third law of color mixture takes us back to complementary colors. One will recall that a mixture of red and blue-green yields gray and that a mixture of blue and yellow also yields gray. The third law of color mixture points out that *a mixture of mixtures which themselves yield gray will also yield gray*. In other words, if we mix red, blue-green, yellow, and blue in proportions which correspond to those involved in the red and blue-green and yellow and blue mixtures, the result will be gray. If the two original grays differed in brightness value, the brightness of the mixture will lie between them in brightness. There are other laws of retinal color mixture, but the three cited are the most important.

Other methods of mixing colors

You may have been struck by the fact that retinal mixture of yellow and blue produces gray, whereas the artist mixes yellow and blue pigments to produce green. There is a simple reason for this difference.

Yellow pigment reflects many wave lengths

other than those which give rise to the experience of yellow. Among these are the wave lengths which underlie our experience of green. Blue pigment also reflects a wide range of wave lengths, and these include wave lengths which give rise to experience of green. Mixture of yellow and blue pigments leads to absorption of all waves but those in the green region of the spectrum. Thus, we see the mixture as green.

When lights of different wave length are overlapped by use of an apparatus like that in Figure 148, we obtain the results indicated in the figure. The area where red, blue, and green overlap is white. Where the green and red overlap, yellow appears. Overlapping of red and blue and of blue and green gives, respectively, purple and blue green. The obtaining of yellow from a mixture of red and green is of special importance for the Young-Helmholtz theory of color vision to be discussed later.

Yellow is also produced when one eye is stimulated with red and the other with green. These colors are transmitted by monochromatic filters, one over each aperture of a stereoscopic device (see p. 352). While his eyes are being stimulated, the subject is fixating a bright light equidistant from the filters. This light is backed by a white screen. What




Figure 148. Singerman's Color Mixture Apparatus

Three circles of light are projected onto the milk glass screen from color filters at the back of the box. The colors involved are green, red, and blue. Where the light from all three circles overlaps, white is seen. Overlapping of green and red produces yellow, overlapping of green and blue produces blue-green, and overlapping of red and blue produces purple. (Courtesy of Chicago Apparatus Company.)

the subject sees is a patch of yellow between patches of red and green. Since each eye is stimulated by only one color, red or green, the yellow cannot be generated by the eyes. It must come from some fusion process in the brain.²

Color weakness and color blindness

Many people have lower than normal ability to distinguish hues. Those who can see the various hues, but merely have certain difficulties in distinguishing them, are said to have a *color weakness*. Those who fail to see any hues are said to be totally *color blind*. Such individuals are quite rare. The few studied by psychologists have shown that the spectrum, for them, is equivalent to a series of grays. The color blindness which we hear about most frequently is *red-green color blindness*. A very much larger percentage of males than females is red-green color blind, but the percentages given differ greatly from one study to another.³ There are several kinds of red-green blindness, but all show inability to distinguish red, green, or red and green, from grays of corresponding brightness value. Blindness for blue, yellow, or both, is extremely rare.

Actually, as suggested above, it is not correct to say that some people have color vision and some do not, as if all could be divided into two types on this basis. There are, of course, the totally color blind. The rest of the population varies from those with extremely poor color vision to those with extremely good color vision. Most of those with extremely poor color vision are red-green blind to a high degree. Most of the remaining color defectives, rather than being color blind, are color weak, the particular weakness varying a great deal from one individual to another.

There are many tests of color blindness, but one of the most convenient is the Ishihara Test from which Plate 4 is reproduced. If you show this chart to a person with red-green blindness, he will see the figure 2. The person with normal color vision sees the figure 5. If you observe the chart closely, you will

notice that the disks which make up the figure 5 differ from the background in hue, but that their brightness differs in a random manner over a wide range and is not distinguished from the brightnesses of disks outside of the figure. This random arrangement of disks with respect to brightness makes it impossible for an individual who is red-green blind to see the number. Now look at the disks again. You may notice that certain disks of different brightness from the others are arranged systematically to form a figure of some kind. It is the figure 2. You will have difficulty in tracing this figure; your set for hue may make it impossible for you to do so. However, the individual who cannot see the hues, but who is especially set for brightness, cannot help seeing the figure 2. It stands out as plainly for him as the 5 does for you.

Many people with defective color vision do not recognize their defect. The reason that they are not aware of the deficiency is that they have learned to give color names to familiar objects in terms of the most characteristic brightness of these. Thus, red, to one type of red-green defective, is equivalent in stimulating value to dark gray. He calls either the red object or the dark gray representation of it red. This is because, when earlier stimulated by the "red" object, he has heard it called red. Likewise, a person with green color blindness will often call a brown sweater of a certain brightness value green. It looks no different to him from the way a green sweater of the same brightness value looks.

Color zones of the retina

As illustrated in Plate 3, a certain region of the retina is completely color blind and another region red-green blind. Moreover, as also indicated on the chart, one small area in each retina is completely or almost completely blind. This is known as the *blind spot*. It is situated at the point where the optic nerve leaves the eye.

The color zones of the retina and the area of the blind spot may be mapped by using a

perimeter such as that illustrated in Figure 149. With one eye closed and the other fixating a point in the center of the perimeter arm, the subject observes, out of the corner of his eye, the color of a small disk which the experimenter moves from the extreme periphery of the arm inward, or from the center of the arm outward.

Suppose, for example, that the colored disk is red. In the center of the retina (see chart) red, like all other colors, is readily observed. As the red disk is moved at a steady rate from the fixation point outward, it eventually reaches a region where the observer no longer sees it as red, although he may see it as dark gray, or as round, or as something moving. The number of degrees from the center at which red disappears is noted. Now the disk is moved from the periphery toward the center. The observer reports when he again sees red, and the position is noted. Sometimes the color disk is presented at the extreme periphery, and the subject does not know what color is being used until the disk is moved far enough in for him to observe it.

The procedure may be repeated several times on the same axis for each of the colors

and also on each of several axes of the eye — up-down, nasal-temporal, upper right and lower left, and so on.

Accurate results are obtained only so long as the observer keeps a constant fixation of the central point while he is observing, and so long as the illumination of the visual field remains constant. The color zones vary a great deal under different conditions of illumination, since they are extended as the illumination of the test object is increased. They also differ markedly from individual to individual.

Under constant conditions of illumination, the results obtained in measuring peripheral color vision are, in general, as follows: all colors are seen in the center of the visual field. As the red or green test object is moved from the center outward, however, it reaches a region where it is no longer observed as red or green. Yellow and blue are observed over a more extended area, but these also drop out. One of them sometimes drops out before the other. Beyond the region where blue and yellow are no longer seen, the observer still sees gray and white. He is also readily stimulated by visual movement. The shape of objects, however, is not clearly perceived



Figure 149. A Perimeter

The subject (left) is fixating the small white circle in the center of the perimeter arm, while the experimenter turns a small wheel which brings the color on the upper part of the perimeter arm toward the center. The subject's left eye is of course closed.



Figure 150

Close your right eye and fixate the cross with your left eye, holding the book before your face at a distance of about six inches. If you see the face under these conditions, move the book slightly closer to or farther away from your eye. When the book is at an appropriate distance, there will be a complete blank where the face previously appeared.

Eventually, a region of complete blindness is reached.

The blind spot is mapped by having the observer report the points at which a small object—for example, a white spot—disappears and then reappears as it is moved in various directions from the center of the visual field toward the periphery. You can easily demonstrate the existence of the blind spot for yourself, using Figure 150 and following the instructions in the legend.

After-images

When the eye is stimulated intensely, as by the flash of a clear hundred-watt lamp in a darkroom, one experiences a positive after-image of the stimulus. In the case of the lamp, one sees the yellow filament as if it were projected on the wall. One may also see the image with his eyes closed. This positive image is due to continuation of receptor and neural processes after the stimulus has gone. It has the same color and brightness that existed when the stimulus was present. However, the positive after-image, even of an intense light, seldom lasts more than a few seconds. Most positive after-images are even more fleeting than this. In everyday life we seldom experience such after-images.

When the positive after-image of a light disappears, the negative after-image takes its place. This after-image is complementary to the stimulus in both hue and brightness. Thus, if the filament is bright yellow, the negative after-image is dark blue.

You may demonstrate negative after-images to yourself, and also note the fact that they are complementary to the stimulus in hue and brightness. Look intently at the center of a well-illuminated

piece of colored paper for about thirty seconds, and then, pushing it aside, continue to fixate the background on which it appeared. After a short interval, you should see a patch of the complementary color. If you have no difficulty in seeing the after-image under these conditions, you may close your eyes and see it, or look at the ceiling, on the floor, or anywhere else in the room. It will probably be observed wherever you look, and it will grow in size as the background fixated is more distant.

Negative after-images are sometimes referred to as examples of *successive contrast*, to distinguish the phenomenon from that of *simultaneous contrast*, where the external stimulus and the complementary hue coexist, but in neighboring regions of the visual field.

Simultaneous contrast

When strips of gray paper cut from the same sheet are placed each on a different-colored background, they appear tinged with the complementary color of the background. Thus, the gray on red looks greenish, that on blue, yellowish, and so forth. If a thin sheet of tissue paper is placed over the gray and its background, thus reducing contours, the effect becomes much more pronounced.

Simultaneous contrast is often used in stage lighting. Yellow light at the edge of the stage makes gray objects on the stage appear bluish and it makes blue objects appear more blue. The latter effect is similar in some respects to the effect produced by looking at a blue area after you have been fixating yellow. The blue of the after-image is, as it were, mixed with the blue before you, and this makes for a more highly saturated color.

Now that we have considered the stimuli with which visual experience is associated, and some typical phenomena of achromatic and chromatic vision, it will be enlightening to turn our attention to the structure and physiology of the eye and of related neural mechanisms. The effectiveness of light waves in arousing visual experience and visually controlled behavior depends upon their activation of these mechanisms. Likewise, the

varieties of visual experience are explicable only by taking visual physiology into account.

SOME STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL CORRELATIONS

The gross anatomical characteristics of the human eye are illustrated in Figure 151. One can readily see that the eye is superficially like a camera. It is a darkened chamber entered by light only through a small aperture in front. This aperture is the pupil. The size of the pupil is reflexly controlled by the iris, a structure whose functions correspond with those of the diaphragm on a camera. When stimulation by light is too intense, the pupil is as small as the head of a pin. In low illumination it becomes quite large. The pupil not only controls the amount of light entering the eye, but it also determines, to some extent, the clarity of the retinal image. Think, for example, of the pinhole camera. One can get a clear image with such a camera, but the image becomes fuzzy when the hole is larger.

The structure which prevents light from

entering the eye, except through the pupil, is the *choroid coat*. This middle coat of the three which make up the wall of the eye is highly pigmented. Outside it is a tough protective covering, the *sclerotic coat*. The *cornea* is a modification of this coat, and protects the lens and iris. The inner coat of the three is the *retina*. It is in some respects analogous to a photographic film.

The shape of the eyeball is maintained by the toughness of the sclerotic coat and by the jellylike substance (*vitreous humor*) which fills it. This substance, like the *aqueous humor*, a watery substance between the cornea and the lens, is transparent.

The curvature of the lens is controlled reflexly by the *ciliary muscle*, attached to the *suspensory ligament*. Because of its natural elasticity, the lens bulges when tension from the suspensory ligament is relaxed. When the ciliary muscle is relaxed, as it is when we fixate distant objects, the suspensory ligament exerts unrestrained tension on the lens, making it relatively flat. When we fixate near-by objects, on the other hand, the ciliary




Figure 151. Cross-Section of the Human Eye

muscle contracts, thereby restraining activity of the suspensory ligament. Relieved from tension exerted by the ligament, the lens now assumes a more spherical shape.

Changes in lens curvature serve to change the focus of light rays on the retina, just as, in a camera, the focus on the photographic film is changed. There is one obvious difference in the focusing mechanism, however. In a camera, the changes in focus (as in certain animals, see p. 33) are produced, not by altering the curvature of the lens, but by changing its distance from the photosensitive surface.

The point of clearest vision in the eye — the point at which light rays normally come to a focus — is a small depression known as the *fovea*. This depression is especially characterized by its tightly packed receptor units and by the relative absence of blood vessels and connective tissues.

As in a camera, the image on the retina is upside down and inverted from right to left. When it is turned right side up by inverting the light rays with a lens system before they enter the eye, we see everything upside down. How we come to see right side up, even though our retinal image is upside down, is a problem that has puzzled many psychologists, especially since the optic fibers are not inverted so as to compensate for the upside-down retinal image. These fibers maintain the same relative position from retina to occipital lobe.⁴

The retina itself is actually an extension of the brain. It is derived from tissues which grow outward from the brain during early embryonic development (p. 60). Its receptor elements are modified neurons. These are of two types, as illustrated in Figure 152.

Cones

Cones are necessary for color vision, but they also function in achromatic vision at daylight intensities of illumination. Animals whose retinas lack cones are color blind. Human color blindness is usually attributed to some defect in the cones or in their neural connections. The reason that we fail to see




Figure 152. The Human Retina

(After Bartley, S. H. "Some Factors in Brightness Discrimination" *Psychological Review*, 1939, vol. 46, p. 347.)

hues in twilight is that the cones do not function under low illumination.

The cones are most thickly concentrated in the fovea, which contains no rods. As the periphery of the retina is approached, cones decrease in number, but the rods increase. Outside of the yellow-blue zone of the retina, as measured under high illumination, there are probably few, if any, cones. The entire retina is believed to have around seven million cones.

The cones and color theory. While it is definitely established that the cones mediate color vision, very little is known about how they do it. There are many theories, each attempting to explain color phenomena in terms of activities within the cones, within the nervous system, or within both. None of the theories accounts for all the phenomena of color vision, and at the same time conforms with the facts of physiology and neurology.

The theory most favored by present-day investigators of color vision is the *Young-Helmholtz theory*.

According to the Young-Helmholtz theory there are three kinds of cones. Each responds to all wave lengths in the visible spectrum. However, one kind of cone is especially responsive to wave lengths in the red region, another kind to wave lengths in the green region, and still another to wave lengths in the blue region. No cone for yellow is posited

because it can be shown (pp. 338-339, figure 148) that yellow results from simultaneous stimulation with wave lengths for red and green. The theory thus accounts very well for mixtures obtained from overlapping lights. It supposes that negative after-images arise from differential stimulation of the three kinds of cones. For example, wave lengths in the red region would maximally stimulate the red cones, but leave the blue and green cones relatively unaffected. The red cones would be fatigued and the other cones not. Stimulation with white light would now activate the blue and green cones more than the red. Instead of seeing white (the mixture of all three), one would now see blue-green (the mixture of blue and green). Other negative after-images are explicable on a similar basis. For instance, yellow appears after the removal of blue because of the predominance of activity in red and green cones.

This theory does not offer a satisfactory explanation of color blindness because those who are red-green blind (hence presumably do not have functional red and green cones) still see yellow, supposedly a resultant of activity in red and green cones. It also fails to account very well for the color-zone phenomena. If yellow is due to activity in red and green cones, how is it that one can see yellow in a region where there is no perception of red and green? Simultaneous contrast, according to the Young-Helmholtz theory, is a contribution from the brain rather than from the retina. It is said to be an illusion.

The chief weakness of the Young-Helmholtz theory, its inability to explain how experience of yellow can occur when red-green vision is absent, is overcome in the *Ladd-Franklin theory*, which supposes that red-green vision evolved from yellow.

It is assumed that the earliest forms of vision were achromatic. Some of the initial receptors were retained (as rods) while others underwent a development which produced two new kinds. These, according to the theory, were cones mediating blue and yellow. At this stage of evolution, animals would respond to blue and yellow and not to green and red. At a still later stage, some of the cones for yellow developed into two further kinds — cones for red and green. It is supposed, therefore, that the retina of higher animals and man has four kinds of cones, mediating red, green, yellow,

and blue, respectively. There is insufficient evidence from comparative psychology either to support or refute the view that such an evolution through blue and yellow vision to red and green occurred. However, this theory would account for yellow vision in the absence of red-green by supposing that individuals confined to blue-yellow vision (the red-green blind) and the regions of the retina which respond only to blue and yellow (the intermediate zone) have not reached the red-green stage of retinal evolution. Its ability to make this compromise is the Ladd-Franklin theory's only strong point. In its detailed explanation of specific color phenomena, the theory lays emphasis upon activity of color molecules which have not yet been discovered in the cones.

The other chief theory of color vision, the *Hering theory*, accounts for many facts of color vision, but it is refuted by what we know about the response of biochemical processes to stimulation and by what we know about the nature of nerve activity. There is thus no reason to consider it in detail. A few words will suffice to sketch its chief features, as far as they concern the functioning of the cones, and to show what is wrong with it, from the standpoint of modern physiology.

Two types of cones are posited, a red-green type and a blue-yellow type. Light of certain wave lengths is supposed to break down the chemical substance of a cone, while light of certain other (complementary) wave lengths is supposed to build it up. Thus, the wave lengths for yellow are assumed to break down the yellow-blue substance, while wave lengths for blue build it up. Likewise, wave lengths for red are supposed to break down, and wave lengths for green build up, the substance in the red-green cones. A similar process is supposed to occur in the rods, thus mediating white-black vision.

One difficulty with this theory is its claim that stimulation can build up a biochemical substance. Everything else we know from physiology indicates that external stimulation always breaks down. Recovery, when it occurs, takes place in the absence of external stimulation.

The other difficulty with the Hering theory is that two kinds of activity in the same neuron are assumed. From the all-or-nothing law of nerve ac-

tivity (see p. 38) we know that a single nerve fiber, if it conducts at all, always conducts the same kind of nerve impulse. Thus, the fiber attached to a red-green cone, for example, could not conduct one kind of impulse to the brain when the breaking-down process occurred, and another when the building-up process took place. It will be recalled that the same fiber can conduct at different frequencies; the more intense the stimulus, the greater the frequency. But this could not, as far as we know at present, account for differences in color vision. Recent work on single optic-nerve fibers shows that they conduct at higher frequencies when the intensity of light is increased. This might have some relevance to the explanation of brightness vision, but it would not have relevance for a theory of hue. The Young-Helmholtz and Ladd-Franklin theories, by attributing each primary hue to a different kind of cone, hence to separate nerve fibers, avoid this difficulty.

Our discussion of color theories suggests some of the problems, both psychological and physiological, which an adequate theory must meet. No theory will achieve final acceptance unless it can at the same time explain the phenomena of color vision (like color mixture, after-images, and color zones) and conform to the facts of physiology. The Young-Helmholtz theory comes closest to meeting these two criteria. That is why it is more widely favored than the other theories.

As we have seen, color theories stress the differential functioning of cones. However, nerve impulses set up by cones must be transmitted to the brain before color vision occurs. Everything that we know about the nerve impulse suggests that these impulses are alike, no matter what wave length of light and what type of cone are involved. This means that the brain itself, probably the occipital cortex, must react differentially to the impulses originating in different cones. It has been suggested that impulses from different kinds of cones go to different places in the occipital lobe. There is as yet no direct evidence of such a difference in locus for impulses from different types of cones. If such a difference occurred, it could perhaps help us to explain why, even though the impulses aroused

by different wave lengths and affecting different kinds of cones are similar, they give rise to different color experiences.⁵

Rods

It has been calculated that the retina contains over one hundred million rods. There are no rods in the fovea and relatively few immediately surrounding it. Rods increase in number as the periphery of the retina is approached.

Rod vision is solely achromatic. If you gradually decrease the illumination of the spectrum in Plate 1, the sensitivity of your cones will gradually decrease and an intensity of illumination will eventually be reached where all hues will disappear, leaving only a series of grays. This is the point at which your cones stop functioning. Under conditions of light-adaptation, your cones are highly sensitive, but under conditions of dark-adaptation they become completely insensitive. Your vision is then purely rod vision. Thus you observe brightness but not hue.

This shift from cone to rod vision under twilight conditions (increasing dark-adaptation) is the basis of a phenomenon known, after the man who first gave a scientific description of it, as the *Purkinje phenomenon*. You can observe this by looking for it as you very slowly lower the illumination of varicolored objects or while observing a varicolored garden or carpet as darkness falls. Note that the brightest colors under conditions of good illumination (when the cones are functioning maximally) are yellow and red. As darkness falls, however, these become less bright. Green and blue, which are relatively dark in daylight, now become brighter than yellow and red. The last objects that one can see, in terms of their brightness, are green and blue. We see the green leaves of a rosebush long after the red and yellow roses have disappeared.

This shift in the brightness value of different hues has been demonstrated in the laboratory under conditions of light and dark adaptation. Under conditions of light-adaptation, a lesser intensity of yellow than of any

other light is required to stimulate the eye. Under conditions of dark-adaptation, on the other hand, a lesser intensity of green than of any other light is required to stimulate the eye. In other words, sensitivity of the light-adapted eye (cone vision) is greatest for yellow; that of the dark-adapted eye (rod vision) for green.

The sensitivity to light in a theater or dark-room increases because of the changes which take place in the rods. That this dark-adaptation is not attributable to processes in the brain is proved by the fact that one eye can be dark-adapted while the other is being light-adapted. The increased sensitivity to light is associated with increasing concentration of a photochemical substance in the rods. Because of its purplish color, this substance is referred to as visual purple. The more technical term is *rhodopsin*.

Visual purple. When the visual purple is removed from the rods of animals under dim red light (which does not stimulate the rods), it retains its purplish color. Subjecting it to light bleaches it until it has a yellowish appearance. The bleaching effect is similar to that involved in stimulation of a photographic plate by light, and the same formula applies. The reaction of visual purple to light is thus a photochemical reaction.⁶

When visual purple is outside the eye, it fails to regain its color after stimulation. In the eye, however, bleaching is followed by recovery, for the purplish color is regained during dark-adaptation.

The cycle of events from stimulation to recovery in darkness is believed to be somewhat as follows: visual purple (rhodopsin) is decomposed by light to form a yellowish substance (retinene). This part of the process is photochemical. The yellowish substance eventually decomposes to form vitamin A and proteins. Vitamin A and the proteins then synthesize, under conditions of darkness, to produce visual purple.⁷

Vitamin A and night blindness. Many human beings do not readily become dark-adapted. These people are blind under condi-

tions of very low illumination, such as exist at night.

Night blindness was recognized by the ancient Egyptians, who used liver, preferably raw, as a remedy. We now know that the defect is caused by insufficient vitamin A and that liver is a rich source of this vitamin. It is also found in certain fruits and vegetables.

Army and Navy personnel who must see well at night are fed a diet rich in vitamin A. This enables them to adapt readily to the low night illumination. Sometimes the diet is supplemented with doses of vitamin A. You should not assume, however, that a person with no vitamin A deficiency will see better at night by taking additional vitamin A.

It takes about forty minutes to become completely dark-adapted, yet this adaptation is lost within a few minutes when one looks at brightly illuminated objects, like charts and instrument boards. How, then, can one who must look at charts, instrument boards, and the like, keep his dark-adaptation so that he can also respond readily to objects with low illumination? One solution is to use red light, which has only a negligible effect on the dark-adapted rods. The most convenient way to keep dark-adapted while at the same time carrying on activities which require response to illuminated objects is to wear special tight-fitting red goggles. Since the goggles admit only red light, the rods do not lose their adaptation. One takes the goggles off when he steps out into the darkness and puts them on again before he goes into the light. When such goggles are used, charts must be drawn in other colors than red, for red markings cannot be distinguished through red filters.⁸

Visual acuity

The closer two impressions may be on your retina, and still be seen as two, the greater your visual acuity. As intensity of illumination increases, acuity also increases. For example, observe the objects in Figure 153 under different intensities of illumination, but keeping the figure at a constant distance, say, six




Figure 153. A Test of Visual Acuity

Your acuity is greater the smaller separation you can see at a specified distance and with a specified intensity of illumination. The ability to observe a small separation of objects on the retina depends on the lens and refractive media of your eye, but it also depends on the separation of receptive fields in the retina. This is a part of the Landolt broken ring test.

feet, from the eye. You will observe that the smallest visible separation decreases as the intensity of illumination increases. Acuity is poorest under low illumination, when the rods alone are functioning. Under conditions of constant illumination, it becomes poorer as the periphery of the retina is approached. For example, fixate an object to the side of Figure 153 and look at the latter "out of the corner of your eye." You will observe that a larger separation must now occur in order to be visible. Given good illumination, acuity is at its maximum in the fovea — that is to say, in direct vision.

These facts concerning visual acuity closely

conform with what is known about the retinal distribution of rods and cones, and about the neural connections of each. The fovea, as we have already seen, is thickly populated with cones, but contains no rods. Two impressions could here be brought very close together, yet stimulate separate receptor cells.

Rods converge upon the bipolar cells and optic ganglia in the manner represented in Figure 154. The retinal field thus served by a particular ganglion is referred to as the *receptor field*. Stimulation anywhere within this field would produce a response in the same ganglion cell. Two separate points or lines, to be seen as two, would thus need to fall each in a different receptor field. This is another reason for the poorer acuity of the periphery than of the fovea.⁹

Retinal interaction

Notice in Figure 152 (p. 343), and again in Figure 154, that various parts of the retina are interconnected. This is especially true in the case of the rods. They not only converge upon bipolar cells as illustrated in Figure 154, but they are also interconnected by transverse neurons like those shown in Figure 152.




Figure 154. The Receptive Field of a Single Optic Nerve Fiber

The large circle in perspective is the surface of the retina. The small circles within it are receptor units. Fibers from these go to the bipolar cells, B. The bipolars themselves converge on the ganglion cell, G, the fiber of which carries the nerve impulse to the thalamus. (After Bartley, S. H., "Vision." New York: Van Nostrand, 1941, p. 78.)

Thus, stimulation of any receptor cell may have widespread effects. The impulse aroused may be transmitted across the retina, and several additional impulses may be sent to the ganglion cell or cells.

In an earlier discussion (p. 38), we observed that impulses from several nerve fibers converging upon a common path are, in effect, summated at the synapse. Whereas one impulse cannot get across, several impulses coming in together may bridge the synapse. We also pointed out that inhibition may occur. Impulses which bridge the gap at one moment may not bridge it at the next, when other impulses, as it were, get the right of way and block them off. Similar summation and inhibition phenomena occur at retinal synapses. Because the experimental work on retinal interaction is voluminous and highly technical, we can do no more than suggest the nature of this work and its outcomes.

Some of the experiments on retinal summation have been done on animal eyes and others on the human eye. The results are similar, whether animals or human beings are subjects, and whether the eye is intact or removed from the body, as it is in the case of animal experiments. That the effects observed are really retinal — in other words, that they do not depend upon some process in the brain — is shown by the similar results for eyes removed from the body and for intact eyes.

When the eye is removed with a section of the optic nerve attached, stimulation of the retina sets up nerve impulses in the optic nerve. These may be recorded with a galvanometer. Differences in the latency of response — the interval which elapses between stimulation and response — provide an index of the effectiveness of stimulation. Thus, when four disks of light stimulate the retina and the latency of optic nerve response is less than when one disk of light stimulates the retina, there is good evidence that summation at retinal synapses has occurred. The retina of the conger eel was used in experiments giving such evidence of summation.¹⁰ This retina, like our own, has transverse connections between the rods. The retina of the horseshoe crab, however, has no such neurons. Each receptor cell has its private path to the ganglia of the optic nerve. It is thus to be expected

that, if the results obtained with the eel's eye are attributable to retinal cross-connections, such effects will not occur in the eye of the horseshoe crab. Results are in accordance with expectations. Latency of retinal response is about the same whether 121, 33, 19, or 2 receptor cells are stimulated.¹¹

Results obtained with the peripheral region of the human eye are similar to those obtained with the eel's retina. On the other hand, results obtained in stimulating the human fovea, which is relatively lacking in cross-connections, are similar to those found in the crab's retina. In the case of human subjects, however, verbal reports rather than optic nerve responses have been used as indices of retinal function. Many of these experiments have used the flicker method. This requires brief description.

When a light flashes on and off at a sufficiently slow rate, we see the separate flashes. As the flash rate is speeded up — that is, the interval between flashes shortened — a frequency is reached where separate flashes are no longer evident. Flicker occurs. With a further increase in the frequency of flashes, a stage is eventually reached where it appears that we are stimulated by a constant light. The separate flashes of your sixty-cycle electric light are seen neither as separate nor as flicker. It appears that the light is constant. The frequency of flashes required to produce such a fusion is known as the *critical flicker frequency*, or *c f f*. This frequency is a function, among other things, of light intensity. It is low with a low light intensity and high with a high light intensity. Thus, an increase in *c f f*, with light intensity and other stimulating conditions held constant, would indicate an increased effectiveness of retinal response. In effect, it would be the same as if intensity of stimulation had been increased.

In experiments with human subjects, the *c f f* for four small flashing disks was 2.5 flashes per second higher than when one flashing disk alone was used. This difference in *c f f* for one as compared with four disks was found only in the peripheral retina. In the fovea, where transverse connections are rare, only a very slight difference in the *c f f*'s was found. These results are in line with those found for the excised animal eyes mentioned above, and they indicate that summation takes place in the peripheral retina.¹²

Retinal inhibition has also been observed, but only in the foveal region. It was found that the

c.f.f. of a darker flickering semicircle with a lighter flickering semicircle near-by was lower than its c.f.f. when it was presented alone. If a higher c.f.f. in the abovementioned experiments is indicative of summation, this lower c.f.f. is indicative of inhibition. When the experiment was repeated in the periphery, only summation was found.¹¹

The pathway from eye to brain

Observe in Figure 155 that fibers from the right side of each eye go to the right side of the brain and that fibers from the left side of each eye go to the left side of the brain. Thus, if your right optic pathway were severed between the optic chiasma and the thalamus, you would be blind in the right half of each eye. If the optic chiasma were cut where the fibers cross, you would be blind in the nasal region of both eyes.

The optic fibers terminate in various structures in and around the *thalamus*. They then make synaptic connection with fibers which carry them to the *occipital lobe*. There are actually four essential links in the pathway from eye to brain. First, there is the rod or cone. Second, there is the bipolar neuron. Third, there is the neuron running from gan-

glion cell to thalamus. Finally, there is the neuron connecting thalamus and occipital cortex.

If optic connections in your right thalamus were destroyed, you would be blind in the right half of each eye, regardless of the condition of your eyes as such. A comparable blindness would be produced by destruction of the right occipital lobe.

Some of the connections made in and around the thalamus are motor, since their function is to mediate control of the ciliary muscle which, as you will recall, regulates the curvature of the lens. Other near-by connections serve in control of head and eye movements associated with vision. Many fibers from the optic nerves make connections in the thalamus with fibers running to the occipital cortex in what is known as the *optic radiation* (Figure 20, p. 47).

You will recall, from our earlier discussion of thalamic and cortical functions (pp. 44, 49), that some visual functions in animals do not require the cortical connections. They are mediated at a thalamic level. Even detailed vision, such as that involved in discriminating between triangles and circles, is found in decerebrate birds. In man, however, all visual functions require cortical connections. As suggested above and in the earlier discussion of cortical functions, man is completely blind when both occipital lobes are removed. When the occipital lobe on only one side is destroyed, he is blind in the corresponding half of each eye.

How our visual cortex mediates the various visual phenomena discussed in this chapter is not known. We do not know, for example, whether color vision depends on impulses from different types of cones terminating in different parts of the brain. There is evidence, however, that yellow is produced by a response of the brain to impulses coming in from red and green receptors. There is a suggestion that brightness depends on the number of nerve impulses per second reaching the occipital cortex, but here again further research is necessary before such a possibility is




Figure 155. Schematic Representation of the Route Followed by Optic Fibers in Going to the Brain

VISION




Figure 159. The Principle of the Stereoscope

Observe that the prisms of the stereoscope throw the images toward the outer part of the retina, where they would fall if the object were straight ahead. The subject then sees the picture, with depth, at a point between the actual pictures, the point where the dotted lines meet. The small partition prevents the right eye from viewing the picture designed for the left eye, and the left eye from viewing the picture designed for the right eye.

prevents either eye from being stimulated in any way by the noncorresponding picture. The function of the prisms is to throw the disparate images on the same regions of the retina which would be stimulated were the original scene viewed by the two eyes under normal circumstances. The tridimensional image, produced by some fusion process in the brain, is projected, as it were, along the dotted lines. These lines are illustrated as extensions of the lines from prisms to retina.

You have perhaps observed another application of the retinal disparity principle, for it is sometimes used in store-window advertising and in the moving pictures. The pictures used are printed in two colors, usually red and blue. Instead of being printed as separate pictures, however, they are superimposed. But what would be seen with the right eye is printed in

red and what would be seen with the left eye in blue. You now look at the still picture, or movie, through spectacles having a red and a blue filter. The red filter over the left eye prevents you from seeing the red picture (appropriate for the right eye). Likewise, the blue filter over the right eye enables you to see the red picture but not the blue one (appropriate for the left eye). Under these conditions you observe depth, much as in a stereoscope. The result is so realistic in movies of a man pitching a ball toward the camera that most members of the audience "duck, as the ball comes toward them." It appears as though the ball is leaving the screen and is about to hit one between the eyes. These representations of the retinal disparity principle are known as *anaglyphs*.

Still another example of the retinal dispar-




Figure 160. A Device for Demonstrating Depth Perception Based upon Retinal Disparity

- (a) Leitz projector for showing 2' X 2' slides.
 - (b) Steroly attachment which splits light from projector into two beams.
 - (c) Polaroid screens that polarize the two beams, one vertically, the other horizontally.
 - (d) Pneumatically operated blind
 - (e) Window shade.
 - (f) Ground glass screen.
 - (g) Polarized images thrown by projector.
 - (h) Ruled cardboard indicating distances from screen.
 - (i) Child viewing the polarized images through polarized spectacles. The phenomenal position of the doll is revealed by the reaching responses of the child.
- (After Johnson, B., and Beck, L. F., "The Development of Space Perception: Stereoscopic Vision in Preschool Children," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1941, vol. 58, p. 250.)

ity factor is illustrated in Figure 160. This is especially interesting in that it demonstrates depth perception based on retinal disparity in children as young as two years. The principle of presentation is similar to that in anaglyphs. However, light coming from the stereograms is polarized as illustrated. Polaroid lenses prevent the right eye from seeing the left eye's view and the left eye from seeing the right eye's view. The object, in this case a doll, seems to stand out from the screen. The effect is so realistic that the child reaches out and tries to grasp the doll.¹⁴

We have recently seen many military uses of stereoscopic principles. Stereoscopic cameras take reconnaissance pictures which make it possible to tell not only that a building stands at a particular spot, but its height, and

many other characteristics. Visual range-finding instruments also make use of retinal disparity and the stereoscopic vision based on it.¹⁵

Psychological cues

Several psychological cues of distance are illustrated in Figure 161. All of these are monocular cues, and they could be represented on a photograph, as well as on the single retina. The relative size of objects is an obvious cue of distance, especially when the objects are familiar. If the size of an object is not familiar, however, we may be greatly misled. A huge mountain, for example, may appear to be only five miles away when, in reality, it is fifty miles away. Interposition is another obvious cue. The object which overlaps an-




Figure 161. Some Psychological Cues of Distance


other is of course judged to be closer. Linear perspective — the decrease in size or separation — of objects as they become more distant is often used by artists to represent distance. Railway lines converging as the horizon is approached provide a good example. When we do not know the actual distance of objects, aerial perspective, or clearness of details, is an important monocular cue. The clock tower, the mountain, or some other object which stands out from its surroundings, seems closer on a clear day than on a smoky or foggy one. Any unfamiliar object seems closer if we can make out its details. This is exemplified every time we use binoculars or a telescope. Shadows also provide cues of depth. Note in Figure 162, for example, that the impression of depth may actually be reversed if the picture is turned upside down, thus making the shadows slope in the opposite direction. The relative movement of objects is sometimes important in judging distance. Other things being equal, the object that seems to move by us rapidly is judged to be closer than that which moves by slowly.

Moreover, if we ourselves are moving, objects near-by seem to go past in the opposite direction to that in which we are traveling, but distant objects appear to move with us.

SUMMARY

The stimuli for vision are light waves ranging from about four hundred to seven hundred millionths of a millimeter in length. Long waves give rise to red, and short waves to violet. Achromatic vision is associated with stimulation of the eye by a mixture of all wave lengths. Chromatic, or color, vision depends upon stimulation of the eye by separate wave lengths, or narrow bands of wave lengths. The physical intensity of light, although also related to wave length, is especially dependent upon wave amplitude. Physical intensity and experienced intensity (brightness), while related, are not directly proportional. The same physical intensity, for example, arouses different experiences of brightness, depending upon dark or light adaptation of the eye.

Brightness differences are often represented



International News

Figure 162. The Influence of Shadows on Depth Perception

This is a photograph of the much-bombed Focke-Wulf plant. In this position the picture shows shell holes. Turn it upside down, however, and the shell-holes have become mounds. "Life" once printed a picture of the moon inverted, in which the craters were converted to mounds.

by the white-black continuum, a series ranging, by discriminable stages, from white to black with neutral gray at the midpoint. Color differences are often represented by a color circle. The spectrum is bent, as it were, to form a circle, but with purple, a nonspectral color obtained by mixture of red and blue or violet, bridging the gap between red and violet. The black-white continuum and color circle are combined in the color solid, one form of which is a double cone. Brightness is represented in this solid as varying from white at one end of the vertical axis to black at the other. Neutral gray takes the intermediate position. This position is the level of the color circle, or base of the two cones. Hues are represented here as at their greatest saturation, or purity. This represents the fact that the most highly saturated colors are of intermediate brightness. As brightness increases or decreases, the color is represented as having shifted above or below the brightness mid-

point, and thus as having moved inward toward the vertical axis of the figure.

Retinal color mixture involves rotation of overlapping disks so that the retina is stimulated in rapid succession by two or more colors. Retinal mixture of complementary hues (such as red and blue-green, or yellow and blue) produces gray, while mixture of non-complementary hues produces colors of intermediate hue. All colors and gray may be obtained by retinal mixture of red, blue-green, yellow, and blue, in appropriate pairs. In mixtures by means of overlapping lights and in binocular mixture, however, yellow is obtained from mixing red and green.

Among the phenomena of color vision discussed were: color blindness, and especially red-green blindness; retinal color zones, the loss of red-green vision in the periphery of the eye where blue and yellow are still visible; negative after-images, the images of complementary color which are aroused after a color stimulus is removed, and simultaneous contrast, the tendency for objects in the neighborhood of a color to assume the complementary hue.

Much of our detailed discussion of structural and functional correlations dealt with the retina. This is an outgrowth from the brain and it contains a highly complicated arrangement of receptor cells and neural connections. The receptor cells are known as rods and cones.

Rods mediate achromatic vision and make vision under conditions of low illumination possible. They contain a light-sensitive substance known as visual purple. This substance bleaches when exposed to light and recovers its purplish color in darkness. The properties of visual purple, and especially its ability to regenerate in darkness, are dependent upon vitamin A. Deficiency of this vitamin produces night blindness.

Chromatic vision is dependent upon the cones. There are probably at least three kinds of cones, mediating red, green, and blue vision. Whether or not there is another type mediating yellow is problematical, for yellow

can be obtained by mixing red and green. Cones cease to function under very low illumination; that is why all objects lose their color in twilight. Under such conditions, only the rods, which have no chromatic functions, are activated. As twilight approaches, the yellow-red region of the spectrum, the brightest in daylight, becomes relatively less bright. On the other hand, the blue-green region, not very bright under daylight conditions, becomes the brightest region. This shift in the brightness values of the yellow-red and blue-green regions is known as the Purkinje phenomenon. It is explained by the differential sensitivity of cones and rods to portions of the spectrum, and to the dropping-out of cone vision as darkness comes on.

The fovea contains only cones. These are packed tightly together and have relatively few interconnections at lower levels of the retina. The visual acuity of the fovea — its differentiation of fine details, such as separation of two points, or lines close together — depends upon the large number of closely packed cones that it contains, and upon the many cones that have individual connections with optic nerve ganglia. The poorer acuity of the peripheral retina is partly because it contains few cones. Its receptor cells are primarily rods, and many of these converge on a common ganglion. Thus, in order to stimulate two separate receptor fields, stimuli must be relatively far apart on the peripheral retina.

Some of the research on retinal interaction has been described, and its outcomes indicated. Interaction is especially evident in the periphery, where a number of rods converge on a common bipolar neuron, and where transverse fibers are connected with the ends of several rods. One effect of this neural interconnection is retinal summation, found in the peripheral retina. One line of evidence for summation is the shorter latency of optic nerve impulses as a greater number of receptor cells is stimulated. Summation is also evidenced when the critical flicker frequency, or c.f.f., is raised with an increase in the number of retinal regions stimulated. Inhibition has also been demonstrated in the retina, but only

in the foveal region. It occurs, for example, when addition of a bright flickering disk in one region lowers the c.f.f. of a darker flickering disk in a neighboring region.

In going from retina to brain, one half of the optic fibers cross to the opposite side. The right half of each retina sends impulses to the right side of the brain, and the left half of each retina to the left side of the brain. The thalamus is a way station on the route from retina to brain. In animals lower than man, some of the simpler visual functions are carried on at the thalamic level. In man, however, impulses must reach the occipital cortex before vision, even of the simplest kind, occurs. The rôle of the occipital cortex in mediating color and brightness vision is not known, although it has been suggested that brightness depends on the frequency of nerve impulses, and color vision upon the place in the cortex at which impulses from three (or possibly four) different kinds of cones terminate.

Although the image on our retina does not have depth, it contains certain cues which enable us to discern depth and distance. Some of these cues are monocular, requiring only one eye, while others are binocular, requiring both eyes. Some of these cues are physiological. The most outstanding of them are accommodation of the lens (monocular), size of the retinal image (monocular), convergence (monocular and binocular), and retinal disparity (binocular). The importance of retinal disparity is illustrated by the stereoscope and anaglyph, where two slightly different pictures, taken with lenses separated by the same distance as the eyes, are fused to produce a tridimensional effect simulating what we see with both eyes. Whether or not the use of retinal disparity as a cue of depth is innate, it at least occurs very early. This is shown by experiments on children as young as two years.

Certain other cues of depth are not related to special structures or functions such as characterize the physiological cues. Moreover, they definitely depend upon past experience for their interpretation. For these

reasons, they are referred to as psychological cues. Important among such cues are the following, all of which are monocular: relative

size, interposition, linear perspective, aerial perspective or clearness of detail, shadows, and relative movement.

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Chapter 20

Hearing

AUDITORY EXPERIENCES differ in a number of ways, but their most evident characteristics are pitch, loudness, and timbre.* *Pitch* refers to the lowness or highness of a sound; *loudness* to its strength or weakness; and *timbre* to its characteristic quality. Even when different instruments produce a note of the same pitch and loudness, the total effect is different. The 'cello, for example, produces a rich mellow sound, but the French horn produces one that is blaring. These are differences in timbre.

Differences in pitch, loudness, and timbre are produced by changing certain characteristics of sound waves. However, there is by no means a simple one-to-one relationship between isolated characteristics of sound waves and particular aspects of auditory experience. This will become apparent as we consider the physical correlates of hearing.

AUDITORY EXPERIENCE AND ITS PHYSICAL CORRELATES

Although light travels through a vacuum, sound requires an elastic medium like air, water, bone, or metal. This is neatly demonstrated by placing a bell, with electrical connections intact, under a bell jar and then withdrawing all air from the jar. As long as air remains in the jar, the bell can be heard

* Some other characteristics are volume (low tones seem to pervade a large amount of space while high tones seem restricted spatially); density (some tones seem more compact than others, and this compactness varies with pitch and loudness in a manner different from volume); brightness (some tones seem bright and others dull); and vocality (some pitches sound like vowels).

ringing. When all air is withdrawn, however, the bell continues to operate, but without being heard.

Under ordinary circumstances, the waves set up by a vibrating body are transmitted through air to the eardrum. There they arouse certain mechanical activities which stimulate nerve fibers. When the impulses thus elicited get to the brain, we hear.

The nature of sound waves

A method of recording simple sound waves, such as those produced by a tuning fork, is illustrated schematically in Figure 163. As the prongs of the fork move apart, they compress neighboring air molecules and a condensation moves outward. As the prongs swing back, however, air molecules in the neighborhood become less condensed. Thus, a rarefaction moves outward. There is a condensation for every outward movement of the prongs and a rarefaction for every inward movement. Condensation corresponds with the maximum separation, and rarefaction with the minimum separation of the prongs.

With every condensation there is a maximal inward movement of the eardrum for that particular vibration. With every rarefaction, on the other hand, there is a maximal outward movement of the eardrum for that vibration.

If a diaphragm like that illustrated is substituted for the eardrum, the condensations cause it to move inward and the rarefactions to move outward. An electrical and optical device represented schematically by the lever system in the diagram causes a beam of light




Figure 163. A Schematic Representation of the Oscillograph

A condensation striking the diaphragm is seen. Observe that the recording point (actually a beam of light in the oscillograph) is at the uppermost position. When the recording point returns to the intermediate position (which traces a straight line when the apparatus is not activated) a double vibration, or cycle, will have been traced on the record. This illustration is modified from one which appears in the Encyclopaedia Britannica film, "Sound Waves and Their Sources."

to move up and down on a moving photographic film. The beam moves upward with a condensation, and downward with a rarefaction of the air molecules. When the fork is at rest, the beam of light is exactly halfway between the extreme up-and-down positions. If the film on which the beam is projected is moved to the right at a constant rate while the tuning fork is vibrating, a regular succession of waves like that illustrated appears. Any such regular succession is said to be *periodic*.

Tone and noise

Tone is correlated with periodic vibrations; noise, with aperiodic vibrations. That is to say, vibrations that are irregular in their succession give rise to noise. The boom of a cannon, the hiss of escaping steam, the rustle of leaves, and the clatter of a typewriter are called noises because they produce a heterogeneous effect with no regularity and to which no definite pitch can be assigned.

Most of our auditory experiences, even those of a tonal nature, involve noise. At the same time as it is producing tone, a whistle, violin, a piano, or any other instrument may emit a certain amount of noise. On the other hand, although no definite pitch can be assigned to it, even a noise may be high, me-

dium, or low-pitched. The noise made by jingling keys is high-pitched, but the boom of a cannon is low-pitched. Thus, there is no clear-cut separation of tones and noises. What we experience is sound in which noise predominates (noise) and sound in which tone predominates (tone).

Frequency of sound waves

Tuning forks and other vibrating instruments differ in the number of complete waves or cycles produced each second. They differ, that is, in the frequency of the condensation-rarefaction cycle. One tuning fork is thus spoken of as having a frequency of 256 cycles per second, and another as having a frequency of 1024 cycles per second. As the frequency increases, the number of waves on the oscillograph are crowded closer together. Three records of sound waves differing in frequency, but recorded in the same time interval, are shown in Figure 164.

Pitch and frequency

Frequency is the chief physical correlate of pitch. Pitch rises and falls as frequency increases and decreases. This is true so long as the change from one frequency to the other is above the differential threshold, as defined in our discussion of Weber's law (pp. 329-331).




Figure 164. Sound Waves of the Same Amplitude but of Different Frequency

Pitch is also to some extent influenced by the physical correlates of loudness, which we will consider shortly. It has been demonstrated, for example, that a low pitch is made lower still if its loudness is increased beyond a certain point, and that a high pitch is raised still higher if its loudness is increased sufficiently.

The range of hearing

Our ears are not attuned to the whole range of frequencies. Auditory experiences in man are associated only with vibrations having from 20 to 20,000 cycles per second. A tuning fork vibrating at the rate of 15 cycles per second arouses no sound. A few people hear a very low tone before the frequency is increased to 20 cycles, but most do not hear anything until a frequency of 20 cycles or more is reached. All frequencies from this lower limit up to about 20,000 are heard by the normal ear. One method of testing this upper limit is to tap steel bars of successively higher frequencies. After the frequency gets to 16,000 cycles, a few fail to hear anything. As the 20,000 limit is approximated, more and more fail to hear the vibrating bar. At around 20,000 practically everybody fails




Figure 165. The Limits of Human Hearing
(From "Fundamentals of Acoustics." Courtesy of Encyclopædia Britannica Films, Inc.)




Figure 166. Sound Waves of the Same Frequency but Differing in Amplitude

to hear any sound emanating from the bar

Sometimes a whistle, the frequency of which can gradually be raised to 20,000 cycles

or more, is used to determine the upper limit. This is known as the *Galton whistle*, because it was devised by Sir Francis Galton, who used it to test the upper limit of animals in the zoo by noticing whether or not they made any response as the rubber bulb of the whistle was squeezed. Similar whistles are used to call dogs. The dog responds to a frequency much higher than our limit, hence it responds to a whistle which the neighbors cannot hear

The range of hearing in relation to frequency is illustrated in Figure 165. This figure also shows the range of frequencies utilized in the musical scale, as well as the differ-




Figure 167. Loudness of Some Familiar Sounds (Courtesy of Electronics.)

ential sensitivity of the ear to certain frequencies within the auditory limits. The latter phenomenon will be considered presently.

Loudness and the amplitude of sound waves

Sound waves differ in amplitude as well as in frequency. Amplitude is represented on the oscillograph record by the maximum displacement of the writing point in either direction from its intermediate position, where, with the source of vibration inactive, it traces a straight line. Two waves from one tuning fork, but differing in amplitude, are represented in Figure 166. Tuning-fork vibrations have their greatest amplitude at the beginning. Amplitude then decreases gradually and reaches zero as the prongs of the fork come to rest. Loudness decreases accordingly.

Amplitude of vibration determines the intensity of stimulation, the amount of pressure or energy involved. Psychological intensity, or loudness, increases as stimulus intensity increases, and decreases as stimulus intensity decreases, provided the changes in stimulus intensity are sufficiently large to satisfy Weber's law (p 329). However, loudness also varies with frequency. In order to make them just barely audible, low and high frequencies require much more intensity than those between 1000 and 5000 cycles per second. This relation between frequency and loudness (audibility) is illustrated in Figure 165.

Loudness is usually referred to as so many *decibels* (*db*) above a certain standard, usually threshold intensity at a frequency of 1000 cycles per second. One *bel* is ten times the threshold intensity (in energy units); two bels, one hundred times the threshold intensity; three bels, one thousand times the threshold intensity; and so on. A bel is thus the logarithm to the base 10 of the ratio of the higher to the threshold intensity. A decibel is one tenth of a bel.

The rustle of leaves in a strong breeze has a loudness of about one bel, or ten *db*. Its energy is ten times that required to make a 1000-cycle tone just barely audible. On the other hand, busy street traffic in New York

City has an energy level 10^4 , or 100,000,000 times that required to make a 1000-cycle tone just barely audible. It is thus eight bels, or eighty *db*, louder than threshold loudness. Figure 167 gives the approximate loudness of some familiar sounds.

Timbre and the complexity of sound waves

Analysis of sound waves, and especially those of great complexity, calls for an instrument much more delicate than the oscillograph, which we have already considered (p. 359). A widely used instrument for such analysis is the *cathode-ray oscilloscope*, the basic features of which are illustrated in Figure 168. How this device operates is discussed in the legend.

As we have already observed, a tuning fork produces a pattern of condensations and rarefactions which records as a simple curve. Two forks of different frequency, but activated at the same time, produce a complex wave which, in appearance, masks their separate waves. This is illustrated in Figure 169, where the separate waves and then the combined waves are shown.

A sound wave of still greater complexity is produced when a taut wire is activated. When the wire vibrates as a whole, this arouses a predominant pitch known as the *fundamental tone*. However, the wire at the same time also vibrates in halves, thirds, quarters, fifths, and so on. These vibrations within the vibrating wire as a whole are known as *partials*. Each of them has its own pitch, known as an *harmonic* or an *overtone*.

Overtones. When the wire is plucked, a loud complex sound is heard. However, if the vibrating wire is lightly touched (damped) in the middle with the tip of a camel's-hair brush, a simple tone of much higher pitch than the fundamental is heard. If the fundamental frequency of the wire is 256 cycles per second, the partial vibrations produced as above will have a frequency of 512 cycles per second, which is twice that of the fundamental. The tone heard is called the *first overtone*. If we now touch the vibrating wire




Figure 168. The Basic Features of a Cathode-Ray Oscilloscope

The cathode of the tube emits electrons which speed toward the anode. A small hole in the anode allows certain electrons to be sprayed on the fluorescent screen at the other end of the vacuum tube. A greenish spot of light appears where they strike the screen. The sweep oscillator produces changes in potential which cause the stream of electrons to be deflected in a right-left direction. The spot thus sweeps rapidly from one side of the screen to the other. It moves back and forth so rapidly, in fact, that we see not a spot but a line. The stream of electrons, and thus the line, is then deflected in an up and down direction by potential changes in the horizontally aligned plates. These are connected, through an amplifying system, with a microphone. A condensation striking the microphone deflects the stream of electrons upward and a rarefaction deflects them downward. Thus the line produced by the horizontally sweeping spot of light takes on a wavy appearance much like that of the oscillograph records already described. The record may be photographed for further study. (From Stevens, S. S., and Davis, H., "Hearing" New York: Wiley, 1938, p. 40.)

at one third of the distance from either end, a still higher tone will be heard. This has a frequency three times higher than the fundamental, or 768 cycles per second. It is known as the *second overtone*. If we touch the wire at one fourth of the distance from either end, a frequency of 1024 cycles per second predominates, and we hear the *third overtone*. We may continue in this manner, touching the wire at one fifth, one sixth, one seventh of its length, and so on. At each step, a tone of higher pitch than the preceding one is heard. Since amplitude is reduced as the vibration involves shorter lengths of wire, loudness decreases as the successively higher overtones are isolated. After the ear has been trained to identify the lower overtones, it is possible to attend to them one at a time while the whole string is vibrating. That is to say, one may listen for and discern the first overtone, then listen for

and discern the second overtone, and so on, up to perhaps the seventh or eighth.

All complex musical instruments give off many partial vibrations in addition to the fundamental. The pattern of condensations and rarefactions sent to our ear is extremely complex, and the pattern recorded on an oscilloscope is so complex that the eye is unable to discern its components. However, the component waves may be identified by mathematical or electrical analysis. Electrical analysis is obtained with the harmonic analyzer. Thus, the complex wave produced by an organ pipe is analyzable into the separate waves indicated in Figure 170. These are all simple sine waves like those produced by the tuning fork. Each has its own frequency, which is a multiple of the fundamental frequency.

Resonance. Different instruments not only produce different partial vibrations, but they also have different resonating qualities. In other words, they enhance certain overtones and deaden others. One instrument makes high overtones predominate, another the low overtones, another the intermediate overtones, and so on. The principle of resonance is easily demonstrated. Activate a tuning fork near a piano. Suppose, for example, that



Figure 169. Single and Combined Waves Produced by Two Tuning Forks of Different Frequency




Figure 170. Analysis of an Organ Pipe Wave into its Components

(From Miller, D. C., "The Science of Musical Sounds." New York: Macmillan, 1926, p. 125.)

the tone is middle C (256 cycles). Wires in the piano will take up the vibration (resonate), and the maximum vibration will be that corresponding to middle C. If the tuning fork is damped, the piano will be heard emitting middle C. You may have noticed that tuning forks used in the physics or psychology laboratory are mounted on boxes of different sizes, and that, when removed from their box (resonator), they emit a relatively weak tone. The box, with the column of air contained, is so arranged that it takes up the vibration of the fork and enhances it. Even a wineglass vibrates when an appropriate note is struck near-by. It is claimed that a person with a powerful voice singing that particular note

can shatter the glass at a distance, for its vibrations become so great in amplitude that it breaks.

Thus, the piano, violin, saxophone, and other instruments are constructed to provide resonance for certain of the partials and not for others, or to provide different resonance at different times, depending upon the needs of the moment.

That the difference in overtones gives different musical instruments their characteristic sound quality or timbre may be demonstrated by use of sound filters. These reduce the complexity of sound waves reaching the ear by eliminating partials, and consequently overtones. As more overtones are eliminated, differences in timbre become less noticeable. If the note middle C is produced on, respectively, a piano, a 'cello, and a French horn, each instrument has its easily recognizable timbre. However, when all of the overtones but the fundamental (256 cycles) are prevented from reaching the ear, the notes from the different instruments are almost alike, and, unless one knows which instrument is being played, he fails to recognize its note. As more and more overtones are admitted to the ear, the characteristic sound qualities of the respective instruments reappear. These facts are very neatly illustrated in a phonograph record produced by the Bell Telephone Laboratories

SOME OTHER AUDITORY PHENOMENA

The phenomena so far considered in this chapter are those related to determination of pitch, loudness, and timbre. We now turn to certain other phenomena aroused when the ear is *simultaneously stimulated* by different frequencies. These phenomena are beats, combination tones, and masking.

Beats

If two tuning forks differing by one cycle per second are activated simultaneously, there is a fluctuation in loudness which occurs once per second. This is known as a *beat*. The number of beats per second increases as the

difference in frequency of the two sounding bodies increases. Thus, forks of 256 and 257 cycles produce one beat per second; forks of 256 and 258 cycles, two beats per second; forks of 256 and 259 cycles, three beats per second; and so on. It is possible to hear these periodic fluctuations in loudness long after they have become too frequent to count.

The physical basis of beats is a difference in phase of the two sound waves. When two tuning forks of like frequency are activated simultaneously, they keep in phase. The crest, trough, and other positions of the wave are alike for each. They reinforce each other and make a combined tone louder than that produced by either fork alone. When two forks differing by one cycle per second are activated, however, they are completely in phase once per second (increasing the loudness of the sound), and completely out of phase once per second (approximating silence). In other words, the crests coincide once per second. Periodic facilitation and interference are illustrated graphically in Figure 171. The beat that we hear corresponds with the fluctuating phase relationship. As the difference in frequency of the two vibrating

bodies increases, there is a corresponding increase in the frequency of fluctuations.

Combination tones

When two sound generators separated by a frequency of thirty cycles or more are activated simultaneously, one may hear not only beats, but also (1) a tone corresponding to the difference between the generating frequencies and (2) another tone with a frequency which is the sum of the two generating frequencies. The first of these tones is known as the *difference tone* and the second as the *summation tone*.

Difference tones. When steel bars (or other devices) with the respective frequencies of, say, 2700 and 2800 cycles per second, are activated simultaneously, one hears a low hum with a frequency of 100 cycles per second. One hears this in addition to the two primary tones. If bars which have the frequencies of 2700 and 2900 cycles per second are now struck, the difference tone is much higher — almost bell-like in quality. Its frequency is 200 cycles per second. As the frequency difference between the two bars is gradually increased by steps of 100 cycles at a time, the




Figure 171. Wave Interference Producing Beats

Observe that the amplitude of wave C is reduced when the trough (lowest position) of wave A and the crest (highest position) of wave B coincide. There is similar coincidence per second for each cycle of difference between the two sounding bodies. (After E. G. Weaver in Boring, et al., "Introduction to Psychology." New York: Wiley, 1939, p. 583.)

intermediate tone rises correspondingly in pitch.*

Summation tones. When bars which have the frequencies of 2700 and 2800 cycles are struck simultaneously, one may hear a tone corresponding to a frequency of 5500 cycles. This, the summation tone, is difficult to hear. In order to hear it, one must listen for a tone of higher pitch than either of the generating frequencies, ignoring these and the difference tone. If one does hear a higher tone than the highest frequency generated, he is hearing the summation tone.

Difference and summation tones from harmonics. The harmonics, or partials, also produce difference tones and summation tones, although these are not easily differentiated from the total sound effect. Suppose, for example, that we simultaneously activate two wires having frequencies, respectively, of 256 and 356 cycles per second. There will be a difference tone of 100 cycles, and a summation tone of 612 cycles. However, the first wire also has a frequency of 512 cycles (first overtone), and the second also a frequency of 712 cycles (first overtone). The difference between these vibrations is 200. It will produce a difference tone of corresponding pitch. The sum of the two frequencies is 1224, and it will produce a summation tone of corresponding pitch. The differences and sums of each of the higher partials likewise produce difference and summation tones.

Masking

It is well known that one tone or noise may make another inaudible—that is to say, mask the other. The masking effect of a particular sound may be determined by observing how many decibels the masked tone must

* The difference tone is not the same as a very fast beat. Beats and difference tones are heard simultaneously when the difference between the two frequencies is relatively low. Moreover, long after one has ceased to notice the beats, the difference tone persists. Even when beats are not heard, the periodic fluctuations in amplitude associated with them are still shown in an oscilloscope record.

be raised above the normal level of intensity in order to make it audible in the presence of the masking tone. Some of the most important relationships between masked and masking tones are illustrated in Figure 172. The interpretation is given in the legend.

Low tones have a greater masking effect than high tones. The masking effect is increased as the two tones (the masking and the masked) come close together in frequency

SOME STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL CORRELATES OF HEARING

Sound waves must give rise to nerve impulses, and these must be transmitted to the brain before we hear. For this reason, psychologists are interested in the auditory mechanism and its functions. We are especially interested in discovering the physiological basis of pitch, loudness, timbre, beats, combination tones, and masking. Theories of hearing, three of which will be considered after the auditory mechanisms have been described, are attempts to correlate the phenomena of auditory experience with what is known about auditory structures and functions.

Auditory mechanisms

The gross anatomy of the ear is illustrated in Figure 173, which also shows the semicircular canals and the vestibular branch of the auditory nerve, neither of which has anything to do with hearing. We will consider the latter structures when we discuss the static sense.

Sound waves travel through the external canal until they strike the *tympanic membrane* (eardrum). Vibration of this membrane activates the attached *hammer* and, through it, the *anvil* and *stirrup*. Attached to the hammer is the *tensor tympani*, a muscle with which we are already familiar (p.309). This muscle adjusts the hammer and tympanic membrane for different intensities in such a manner as to prevent injury to the membrane. The stirrup, which also has a muscular attachment




Figure 172. Tonal Masking

This figure shows the masking effect of a 1200-cycle (primary) tone, with an intensity level of 80 db, upon frequencies (secondary) ranging from 400 to 4000 cycles. These frequencies are represented along the base (abscissa) of the graph. How much each frequency must be raised in intensity above its normal threshold (when the masking tone is not present), in order to overcome the masking effect, is shown at the side (ordinate) of the graph. The shaded portion of the figure indicates the intensity levels at which the respective frequencies are inaudible (masked). Above this shaded portion are the intensity levels at which no masking of the respective frequencies by the 1200-cycle tone occurs. Above these intensity levels, in other words, both the primary and secondary tones are heard. One will observe, for example, that a tone of 600 cycles per second need be raised above its normal threshold by only 3 db in order to overcome masking. On the other hand, a tone of 1600 cycles must be raised to 45 db above its normal threshold in order to become audible. Note that beats and combination tones occur when frequencies are close to the masking frequencies. Harmonics of the primary tone (2400 and 3600 cycles) also produce beats and combination tones with secondary tones near them in frequency. At the places where beats occur, the masking effect is slightly overcome, as represented by dips in the curve. In general, the results reproduced here show that frequencies much lower than the masking frequency are not masked as much as higher frequencies, especially those fairly close to the masking frequency. (After Wegel, R. L., and Lane, C. E., "The Auditory Masking of One Pure Tone by Another and Its Probable Relation to the Dynamics of the Inner Ear" *Physical Review*, 1924, vol. 23, pp. 266-285)

(not shown) presses against the *oval window*. Its movements press the membranous window in and out. Movements of the oval window cause waves to travel up the *vestibular canal* and back down the *tympanic canal* of the *cochlea*. Both canals are filled with liquid. A push of the stirrup is compensated for by an outward bulge of the *round window*, which appears at the lower extremity of the tympanic canal. Withdrawal of the stirrup causes an inward bulge of the round window.

What we have here is actually a single long liquid-filled canal which ascends, then descends. This is illustrated in Figure 174, where the cochlea is represented as uncoiled. The place at which the canal reverses its direction is the *helicotrema*, situated at the apex of the cochlea. The entire structure is coiled in

the form of a spiral with two and one half turns.

Separating the two large canals of the cochlea is a ledge of bone and other tissue. It contains two thin membranes which enclose a small channel known as the *cochlear canal*. It is in this that the true auditory receptors are located.

A cross-section of the uncoiled cochlea is represented in Figure 175. Here we see the relation of the three canals to each other. The cochlear canal is separated from the vestibular by *Reissner's membrane*, and from the tympanic by the *basilar membrane*. On the basilar membrane is the *organ of Corti*, the hair cells of which project up into the liquid which fills the canal. These cells connect with dendrites of nerve fibers which run along the center of the cochlea and then out into the cochlear





Figure 173 A Diagrammatic Cross-Section of the Human Ear
(Courtesy of the Otarian Company)

branch of the auditory nerve. The *tectorial membrane* is above the hairs, whose upper ends project into it.

The basilar membrane is set in motion whenever a disturbance occurs in the ascending (vestibular) and descending (tympanic) canals. This motion has been characterized as a traveling wave or bulge. Certain parts of the membrane are apparently attuned to dif-

ferent frequencies, so that, when these frequencies activate the ear, the corresponding parts are bulged to a greater degree than others.

The basilar membrane itself is a harplike structure with fibers ranging in length from short to long. Fibers are shortest at the base of the cochlea, where most of the bulk is merely connective tissue. They become pro-




Figure 174. A Diagrammatic Representation of the Uncoiled Cochlea




Figure 175. A Cross-Section of the Uncoiled Cochlea

gressively longer as the apex (which has very little connective tissue) is approached. The region containing short fibers bulges maximally when high frequencies are present, while the region containing long fibers bulges most in response to low frequencies.¹

Activity of the basilar membrane moves the organ of Corti, the hair cells of which are induced to bend. This bending excites the dendrites of nerve fibers associated with the hairs. Hair cells are activated to the greatest degree, presumably, in the region of the basilar membrane where maximal disturbance is taking place.

Nerve impulses aroused by the hair cells of Corti travel to the thalamus, where synaptic connections with fibers running to the temporal lobe of the cerebrum are made. The course followed by these impulses is illustrated schematically in Figure 176. Observe that each ear is connected with both sides of the cortex. Thus, loss of one temporal lobe does not produce complete deafness in either ear. Loss of both temporal lobes in man produces complete deafness. Some animals, however, continue to respond to noise after the entire cerebrum has been removed. In such instances it is apparent that the thalamic connections are alone necessary for response to noise.

The Wever-Bray effect

Frequencies which stimulate the ear are, within certain limits, faithfully reproduced in

the cochlea and auditory nerve. This is called the *Wever-Bray effect*, after the two psychologists who discovered it.² The phenomenon was first demonstrated with cats. Electrodes placed on an anaesthetized cat's auditory nerve led into a soundproof room, where they were connected with a radio amplifying system. This was in turn connected to a telephone earpiece. Various frequencies played into the cat's ear were faithfully reproduced. The corresponding pitch was heard by anyone listening at the earpiece. Even the human voice was reproduced. One experimenter spoke into the cat's ear and the other, seated in the soundproof room, heard clearly what he said.

Subsequent research³ has shown that the Wever-Bray effect is really two effects. One of these, now known as the *cochlear microphonic*, involves electrical phenomena originating in the cells of the cochlea as these are stimulated by external vibration. The other, known as the *auditory nerve potential*, is purely a neural response, although aroused, presumably, by the phenomena which produce the cochlear microphonic.

The cochlear microphonic. Sound waves sent into the ear produce electrical currents in the cochlea, perhaps through the activity of hair cells. This electrical response, the cochlear microphonic, is recorded from electrodes placed directly on the cochlea. By moving




Figure 176. Schema to Show How Each Ear Is Connected with the Cortex

(After Morgan, C. T., "Physiological Psychology." New York: McGraw-Hill, 1943, p. 236.)

the electrodes from place to place along the basilar membrane, it is possible to determine which region responds maximally to a particular frequency. It has been shown, by such methods, that the short fibers (base of cochlea) respond maximally to high, and the long fibers (apex of cochlea) respond maximally to low frequencies. The frequencies which generate cochlear microphonics range from 20 to 20,000 cycles per second. At high intensities, a pure tone produces a complex cochlear microphonic, showing the presence of harmonics in the cochlea itself. These are distinguished from harmonics in the sound source by referring to them as *aural harmonics*.

Auditory nerve potentials. With suitably shielded electrodes attached to the auditory nerve, it is possible to pick up the neural responses alone. Under these conditions, external frequencies up to around three thousand cycles per second elicit corresponding frequencies in the auditory nerve. If the stimulation of the ear is not too intense, the oscilloscope record obtained from the auditory nerve is quite similar to that obtained directly from the external frequency. This shows, of course, a faithful following of the external frequency by activities in the auditory nerve. When the intensity is high, the fundamental frequency is maintained in the auditory nerve, but the waves obtained from the nerve are complex. This is true even when pure tone, such as that from a tuning fork, is sent into the ear. The complexity of the auditory response, therefore, must come from harmonics produced in the ear (aural harmonics) and sent into the nerve.

It is especially interesting to observe that, while a single nerve fiber carries less than one thousand impulses per second (p. 38), the auditory nerve itself carries up to around three thousand per second. This fact, as we shall observe shortly, is important for theories of hearing. It is also of significance that the auditory nerve does not carry frequencies above three thousand per second. This suggests that some factor other than frequency of nerve impulses must account for our ability to

hear pitches corresponding to higher frequencies of vibration.

THEORIES OF HEARING

Theories of hearing attempt to fit together the facts of auditory experience on the one hand, and what is known about the structures and functions of the auditory mechanism on the other. They are especially concerned with the physiological basis of pitch and loudness. You should know something about the most important of these theories because, like the theories of color vision already discussed, they bring to a focus much of what is now known about an important avenue of contact between the objectively measurable external world and man himself.

Place theory

This was presented in its original form by Helmholtz, who thought that the fibers of the basilar membrane resonate to external frequencies somewhat like wires in a piano. In its present form the place theory supposes that each region of the basilar membrane is especially attuned to a certain frequency of vibration. Thus, a particular narrow region of the basilar membrane is supposed to react maximally to a certain frequency, although other parts are also to some extent activated. Our experience of pitch would depend upon the part of the basilar membrane which gives the maximal response to a vibration frequency. It is generally supposed, however, that impulses aroused in different regions of the basilar membrane go to different regions of the temporal lobe. Thus, the cortical region affected would be the most immediate correlate of a particular pitch experience.

We have seen that, although its fibers do not vibrate, the basilar membrane does act differentially to different frequencies. This was shown in our discussion of the cochlear microphonic. There is also evidence, although somewhat conflicting, that exposure of an animal's ear to loud sounds of high pitch, destroys the basal region of the cochlea,

where the short fibers — those assumed by the place theory to function for high pitch — are located. Low tones of great intensity produce widespread rather than localized damage to the basilar membrane.⁴

According to the place theory, loudness depends on how much of the basilar membrane is activated. Two tones of the same frequency and intensity would activate the same range of fibers. Moreover, the same particular fibers would be activated maximally. If the two tones of like frequency differed in intensity, however, the range of fibers activated would be greater in the case of the greater intensity, even though the fibers maximally activated would be the same. In other words, according to the place theory, pitch depends upon the place maximally activated, and loudness upon the spread of disturbance in either direction from the place most involved.

The place theory can also account for overtones, beats, combination tones, and masking. It does this by supposing that, when two or more frequencies are presented simultaneously, there is an overlap in activated regions of the basilar membrane. Different kinds of overlapping and their temporal relations can account for these complex auditory experiences.

Frequency theory

There are several frequency theories of hearing. One of these (Rutherford's) supposes that the ear works much like a telephone receiver. It assumes that a frequency of, say, ten thousand cycles per second, causes the auditory nerve to carry ten thousand impulses per second to the brain. Pitch is thus supposed to depend upon the frequency of nerve impulses reaching the brain. Loudness is assumed to depend on the number of auditory fibers activated. Overtones, beats, and the other phenomena of hearing are attributed to some sort of analysis by the brain of the impulses which come to it. However, unless the volley theory is invoked, frequency cannot

account for pitch experiences above one thousand cycles per second.

The volley theory

This is a modified frequency theory. It was presented by Wever and Bray to account for the Wever-Bray effect. One will recall, from our discussion of the Wever-Bray effect, that frequencies of vibration up to about three thousand cycles per second are somehow transmitted by the auditory nerve, even though no single fiber responds more frequently than one thousand times per second. This suggested that nerve fibers work in squads, different squads firing, as it were, at each condensation of the external stimulus, as illustrated in Figure 177. A group of fibers would discharge at one condensation, but not at the next. Some fibers in the group, because of their greater excitability, would discharge more often than others. Some might be in the refractory phase at the first condensation, but be ready to respond to the next. In other words, despite wide differences in the excitability of different fibers in the auditory nerve, there would be a spurt of impulses involving some fibers every time a condensation occurred. There would be some discharges between the peaks of these spurts, but there would be a peak for every condensation and a low point for every rarefaction of the stimulus. Thus, for a tone of three thousand cycles per second, there would be a spurt of activity in the auditory nerve every three thousandth of a second, with different groups of fibers responding each time, and some fibers, because of greater excitability, contributing to more of the spurts than others. Pitch, according to this theory, is thus dependent upon the frequency of volleys, not the frequency carried by the individual fibers.

Loudness is accounted for by supposing that, with an increase in the intensity of stimulation, more impulses occur in each spurt. We have already learned (p 38) that an increase in the intensity of stimulation causes more fibers to respond and also leads to a more frequent response in each fiber. Thus, a




Figure 177. The Volley Principle

By examining the upper part of the figure note that, for each condensation of the sound wave, some fibers, say 50, respond. Fiber a responds at every third condensation starting with the first, fiber b responds at every third condensation starting with the second, and so on. Although no one fiber responds at each condensation, all respond in synchronism with the external frequency. The mound at the bottom represents the sum of all impulses aroused by each condensation. Note that there is a mound for every condensation, because each condensation is assumed to produce its own spurt of neural activity. The frequency of these spurts or volleys is said to be the physiological basis of pitch. The lower part of the illustration shows that the sound wave, while of the same frequency as above, has greater amplitude. Here there is a reaction of fiber a, b, etc., to every second instead of only to every third condensation. The effect is to leave the frequency of volleys unchanged, but to add more impulses to each volley. The mounds at the bottom are spaced just like those above, but their height is greater. Although the illustration, for purposes of simplicity, fails to show it, a greater frequency of discharge would occur in some fibers than in others. Some might respond at every second wave while others were responding at every fourth wave. Moreover, an increase in amplitude of the stimulus might activate more fibers and arouse more frequent response in each. Greater frequency in single fibers is alone represented in the illustration. (From Wever, E. G., in Boring, Langfeld, and Weld's "Introduction to Psychology" New York: Wiley, 1939, p. 596.)

condensation of increased amplitude might activate one hundred instead of fifty fibers; and fibers which had been responding only five hundred times per second might now respond seven hundred times per second. The total effect would be to produce more impulses per volley, without changing the frequency, or temporal distance, of the separate volleys.

The present situation with respect to theories of hearing is somewhat as follows: Frequency alone could account for pitch up to around one thousand cycles per second, but the volley principle must be invoked to account for those above this frequency. However, the auditory nerve potential is synchronized with external frequencies only up to around three thousand cycles. This would leave the place principle to account for frequencies above three thousand cycles. That does not mean, of course, that any part of the basilar membrane can send more than one

thousand impulses per second to the brain. What it means is that the place in the temporal lobes to which the impulses go, rather than their frequency, might account for pitch above the level of three thousand cycles. On the other hand, only the place theory gives an adequate explanation of the complex aspects of auditory experience, even at frequencies lower than one thousand cycles per second. It is apparent, therefore, that the place and volley theories may be complementary.⁵

AUDITORY SPACE PERCEPTION

Our ears provide us with certain cues concerning both the *distance* and *direction* of objects, but judgments based upon these cues are in most instances quite crude, especially compared with judgments based on visual cues.

Distance

If a sound is familiar, we can usually judge

its distance in terms of loudness, since we associate increasing distance with decreasing loudness. Complexity is another possible distance cue. The sound of an airplane motor is far less complex at a distance than when near-by. When it is close, we hear a great variety of sounds. At a distance, however, only the low hum is audible. Likewise, the relatively faint higher overtones of musical instruments become inaudible with distance. Near-by sounds also have greater volume than more distant ones. The boom of a cannon a few yards away seems to fill all space. From a distance of several miles, however, the same boom appears to take up relatively little space. Moreover, it is heard as but one of several sounds. It does not drown out everything else.

Direction

Our ability to locate sound sources is partially dependent upon previous knowledge. We know, for example, that those traffic sounds are coming from the road over there, that the airplane is overhead, and that the cheering comes from the stadium. Vision also provides us with cues which aid in auditory localization. We hear a woodpecker, for instance. Looking up in the trees and seeing the bird pecking, we locate the source of the sound. It happens, of course, that vision sometimes deceives us. We "hear" sounds issuing from the mouth of the ventriloquist's dummy because we see its mouth moving at the same time as words are spoken. Likewise, we seem to see and hear an actor speak on the screen, even though the loud-speaker may be several feet above, below, or to the right or left of his mouth.

Under such circumstances as the above, only one ear is necessary for localization. All we need do is hear and recognize what we hear. When previous knowledge and vision are eliminated, however, two ears are necessary for localization. This is because we are not able to localize sounds in terms of auditory cues alone unless they stimulate each ear differently.

In a typical experiment on auditory localization, the subject sits with closed eyes, his head in the center of what is, in effect, a large sphere. This is illustrated in Figure 178. A click may be presented at any position on the surface of the sphere. As soon as he hears the click, the subject must name or point to the place from which the click came. His error of localization is measured in degrees. We find that he is able to localize the click fairly well so long as it is at a different distance from each ear. When it appears at *a*, the click is much closer to the right ear than to the left. The subject usually points directly to the right. Suppose that the click is presented at *b* — that is, to the front on the left side. It is closer to the left ear than to the right. Again the subject has good success in pointing to the source of the click. Suppose, however, that we present the click directly in front at a position equidistant from the ears — that is, at *c*. Now the subject may point up, back, down, to the front, or to any position in the median plane, which cuts through the head directly between the ears. His accuracy of localization within this plane is no better than could




Figure 178. Schema to Illustrate Situation Involved in Auditory Localization Experiments

occur by chance. This is because, at every position, the ears are stimulated identically.

What differences in stimulation at the ears are provided by a sound to the right or left of the median plane? There are three important possibilities. These are: (1) a difference in time of arrival of the sound wave at the ears; (2) a difference in the phase of the cycle activating both ears; and (3) a difference in the intensity of the stimulus at the ears. The sound wave, of course, reaches the nearer ear first; it may be in a different part of its cycle when it strikes the nearer ear than when it strikes the farther ear, and it may have a greater intensity at the nearer than at the farther ear.

Under conditions of everyday life, time, phase, and intensity differences are often simultaneously present, and we may use now one and now another, or all three combined, in localizing unfamiliar and unseen sounds. When the locus is familiar, or the sound source seen, these cues are not necessary, and they are probably not used. When a noise, such as a click, is involved, time is the most important clue as to direction. But when a tonal stimulus is involved, phase also becomes important, especially if the sound wave is of low frequency, hence relatively long. A long wave has a better chance of stimulating the two ears in a different part of its cycle than a short wave. One ear may be stimulated by the crest (condensation), and the other by the trough (rarefaction). In the case of high frequencies, or short waves, on the other hand, one ear may be stimulated by the crest of one wave and the other ear by the crest of the next wave. As far as phase is concerned, this is equivalent to stimulating both ears with the crest of the same wave. Experiments have shown that some individuals localize in terms of phase differences, but others do not.

Intensity is an important cue only at relatively high frequencies, above five thousand cycles per second.⁶ This is because intensity is not greatly reduced by small differences in the distance of a sound source from the ears. Significant differences in intensity are associ-

ated, rather, with the shadow of the head. In other words, a sound wave coming from the right must pass around the head to get to the left ear. Long waves (those of low frequency) bend easily and show little loss of amplitude. On the other hand, short waves (those of high frequency) are so greatly reduced in amplitude that the sound may be thirty db louder at the nearer than at the farther ear.⁷ When complex sound waves are involved, this bending around the head not only reduces their loudness, but it also decreases their complexity. Timbre is thus different at the two ears and may provide a localizing cue.

It is only under laboratory conditions that we are able to present one of these localizing cues while holding the others constant, and thus discover the relative importance of each.

When a blindfolded subject sits with a telephone earpiece over each ear, and a click stimulates one ear .001 second before it stimulates the other, he seems to hear a single click located on the side that was stimulated first. When the time relations are reversed, this phantom sound shifts to the other side. If the clicks stimulate both ears simultaneously, the sound seems to be right in front. Introduction of a time interval greater than .002 second leads to perception of two clicks, one following the other. No single localized sound is heard.

In an experimental test of the phase cue, the subject sits blindfolded with a tube running from a tuning fork to each ear. When the tuning fork is directly in front of him and the two tubes are of equal length, the subject localizes the sound as directly in front. If one tube is now lengthened slightly, the corresponding ear receives the waves slightly later than the other ear (and in a different phase of the cycle). Intensity is not significantly altered. The ear connected with the shorter tube, let us say, is stimulated by a condensation while the other is being stimulated by a slightly later portion of the wave, going in the direction of a rarefaction. Under these circumstances, the tone seems to shift to the side of the leading phase. If the right ear has the shorter tube, the tone is displaced toward the right; if the left ear has the shorter tube, the tone is displaced toward the left.

The importance of the intensity factor is studied experimentally by stimulating both ears simultaneously, but with a difference in intensity at the two

ears. Under these conditions, the subject hears a single sound localized toward the side of the greater intensity. The greater the intensity difference, within limits, the greater the angular displacement. In other words, with a slightly above threshold intensity difference in favor of the right ear, the sound shifts slightly to the right. As the difference in favor of this ear becomes greater, the sound shifts farther still to the right.

Under conditions of everyday life we are, of course, free to move our head, thereby changing time, phase, and intensity relations. In localizing a sound, we sometimes turn around until we face its source, thus equalizing stimulation of the ears. Sound locators like that illustrated in Figure 179 were used by the armed forces to locate planes, guns, and other objects. The apparatus consists, essentially, of two large "ears" separated by a wider than normal distance so that intensity differences




Figure 179. A Sound Locator
(Courtesy of Life Magazine.)



Figure 180. Young's Pseudophone

A tube conveys to the left ear sound waves which would normally stimulate the right ear, and to the right ear those which would normally stimulate the left ear.

are enhanced. The artificial ears are connected by telephone to the operator's ears. In finding the direction of a sound, the operator turns the "ears" until the sounds in his ears are equal in loudness. The source is then assumed to be in the median plane. The apparatus can then be worked in the vertical position, thus locating the direction of the sound within the median plane. This is equivalent to turning the operator's ears sideways, one up and one down.⁸

When one wears an apparatus like that shown in Figure 180, all the auditory localizing cues are reversed. If the eyes are closed, sounds actually coming from the right are heard coming from the left, and vice versa. If the eyes are open, however, and the sound source is within view, the sounds are properly localized. In other words, visual cues take precedence over auditory ones.⁹

Auditory perspective

In any complex situation, some sounds appear near and some distant; some appear to the right, some to the left, and some straight ahead. Not only this, but certain sounds

move in relation to other sounds or appear on a background of constant sounds. Radio engineers have had some success, although not commercially, in reproducing such *stereophonic effects* by radio. One method is to place two microphones on a dummy, one microphone in the position of the right ear and the other in the position of the left ear, maintaining the actual distance which separates the ears. The right-hand microphone is connected to the right earphone of a listener in another room. The left-hand microphone is likewise connected to the left earphone. Now someone walks toward or away from the dummy, around it, and so on, while talking. The listener with earphones has the illusion that someone is walking toward him, around him, and so forth.¹⁰

SUMMARY

Pitch is correlated with the frequency of sound waves, loudness with their amplitude, and timbre with their complexity. Noise differs from tone in that the sound waves correlated with noise are relatively lacking in periodicity. The range of frequencies to which human ears are attuned is from about twenty to twenty thousand cycles per second. Our ears are most sensitive to frequencies between one thousand and five thousand cycles per second. Within this range, relatively weak intensities are audible. Lower and higher frequencies become audible only when present at relatively high intensity.

Physical intensity and psychological intensity, or loudness, are correlated, but in no simple manner. Loudness is usually represented in terms of the ratio of higher energies to the threshold energy, thus taking into consideration such psychophysical relationships as were discussed in the chapter on perception. The unit of loudness is the decibel. This is ten times the logarithm of the ratio of any higher energy to the threshold energy — that energy required for bare audibility.

Every vibrating body, except simple instruments like tuning forks, vibrates as a whole and also in parts. The whole vibration de-

termines the fundamental tone. Partial vibrations, or harmonics, while relatively weak, add their contribution to the total sound experience. The sounds generated by partial vibrations are the overtones. Overtones may be picked out, as it were, by resonators, instruments which vibrate at the same frequency and amplify them. Musical instruments differ in the number and loudness of their overtones, the latter depending upon their resonant properties. When overtones are eliminated by sound filters, different musical instruments playing the same note sound much alike, the reason being that they lose their characteristic quality, or timbre.

Two instruments vibrating simultaneously, but differing in frequency, may generate beats and combination tones. Beats are particularly evident when the difference in vibration rate is small. There is one beat per second for every cycle per second difference in vibration rate. Combination tones become evident when the difference in frequency gets above about thirty cycles per second. There are two kinds of combination tones — difference and summation tones. The difference tone is lower than either of the generating frequencies, with a pitch which corresponds to the difference in frequencies. The summation tone is higher than either generating tone, with a pitch which corresponds to the sum of the frequencies. Beats, difference tones, and summation tones are generated by partial as well as by whole vibrations.

When two or more tones are presented simultaneously, one may mask another. The masking effect may be eliminated by raising the loudness of the masked tone.

Sound waves carried to the eardrum make it vibrate. Vibration is carried to the oval window of the cochlea by three small bones in the middle ear. As the oval window of the cochlea vibrates, liquid in the two outer canals is set in motion. This motion causes a bulge to travel up and down the basilar membrane, the lower part of the middle or cochlear canal. Movement of the basilar membrane causes small hairs in the structures above it to bend.

Dendrites connected with these hairs are activated and nerve impulses travel through the cochlear branch of the auditory nerve to the thalamus. Here they make synaptic connection with fibers running to the temporal lobes. Each ear is connected with both temporal lobes.

The basilar membrane responds differentially to different frequencies, its shorter fibers making a maximal response to high frequencies, and its longer fibers a maximal response to low frequencies. This is shown by the cochlear microphonic, an electrical effect produced in the cochlea during tonal stimulation and recorded by electrodes placed on different regions of the basilar membrane.

Although no single nerve fiber can convey more than one thousand impulses per second, the auditory nerve potential reproduces frequencies up to three thousand cycles per second. What happens, apparently, is that every condensation of the sound wave produces a volley of impulses in the auditory nerve. Thus, a vibration of three thousand cycles per second may produce three thousand volleys per second.

The place theory of pitch supposes that each part of the basilar membrane is so attuned that it responds maximally to only one frequency. Thus, the place in the basilar membrane maximally activated, and the place in the brain to which impulses from this maximally activated region go, would determine what pitch was heard. Loudness, according to this theory, is associated with the spread of excitation, a more intense stimulus affecting more of the basilar membrane than a weaker one.

The frequency theory of pitch supposes that the auditory nerve transmits whatever frequency is sent into the ear, the ear itself

merely acting like a telephone receiver. This theory could not account for frequencies above one thousand cycles per second unless the volley principle were introduced. But even with volleys in the auditory nerve substituted for impulses in individual fibers, the theory could not account for frequencies above three thousand cycles per second. Loudness may be accounted for in terms of the total number of impulses reaching the brain per second.

The present situation with respect to auditory theory is that the volley principle accounts for pitch up to three thousand cycles per second, but that the place principle is necessary to account for pitch above this frequency level. Loudness at whatever frequency depends, in the last analysis, upon how many impulses reach the brain per second.

We judge the distance of sounds in terms of their loudness, complexity, and volume. We often judge their direction in terms of previous knowledge of the source and in terms of visual cues. When these nonauditory cues are removed, our judgments are based upon the different stimulation at the two ears.

A sound source equidistant from the ears gives no auditory clue as to its location. When the source is at a distance from one ear different from that from the other, however, the wave (1) reaches the nearer ear first, (2) may lead in phase at the nearer ear, and (3) may be more intense at the nearer ear. These differences enable us to localize the source, but the significance of a particular clue depends on the frequency involved — time being important for localization of noises, phase for localization of low tones, and intensity for localization of high tones.

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Chapter 21

Our Other Senses

HOW MANY SENSES do we have in addition to vision and audition? Tradition, going all the way back to Aristotle, says that there are three other senses — *smell* (olfaction), *taste* (gustation), and *touch* (cutaneous sensitivity). It has become rather obvious, however, that we have many more senses than the traditional five. The *common chemical sense*, out of which taste and smell developed, has been retained in various parts of our body, including the moist nonolfactory surface of the nasal cavities. The skin itself mediates four specialized types of sensitivity instead of the traditional one. These are pain, pressure, cold, and warmth. Several senses not even hinted at in the old classifications have also been added to the list. Two of the most important of these are the *muscle sense* (kinesthesia) and the *static sense* (equilibrium). Then there are a number of *organic senses*, of which the most obvious are thirst and hunger. These senses are, in certain respects at least, complexes of forms of sensitivity already mentioned in this paragraph.

SMELL

Smell is very important in the adjustment of many lower animals. It might be of greater importance in everyday human life than it actually is but for the fact that our visual and auditory senses serve us so well. Like vision and audition, olfaction is a distance sense, informing us of the presence of objects before they touch our body. Its value as a distance sense is evident when gas is leaking or a skunk is in the neighborhood.

Although unimportant as compared with

vision and audition, olfactory sensitivity plays a more or less subtle part in many of our experiences and activities. We shall see later that the "taste" of substances is largely smell. Olfaction puts us on guard, too, when foodstuffs are unfit to eat. When food smells good, on the other hand, we eat it with increased relish. Smell may be one factor which enables babies to select appropriate foodstuffs in the cafeteria feeding situation (p. 203). In an experiment with hosiery of exactly the same quality, but lightly scented with narcissus in some cases and unscented in others, six times as many women preferred the narcissus-scented stockings as preferred the others, yet only six out of the two hundred and fifty subjects suspected that any of the stockings had been scented.¹ Perfumers emphasize the potency of their wares in attracting the male to the female, while soap manufacturers warn that annoying odors will prevent us from "making friends and influencing people."

In order to arouse olfactory experience, substances must be disseminated in gaseous or vaporous form. When the nostrils are completely filled with an odoriferous liquid, no olfactory experience is elicited, but when the liquid is removed and sniffed in the ordinary way, its odor becomes quite apparent. Some substances like ammonia arouse the common chemical sense as well as smell. They irritate the tissues of the nostrils, and sometimes even produce painful effects.

The question of primary odors

If one were to run through a dictionary, checking off every word that represents an

odor, he would perhaps find dozens. Most of these would refer to complex odors — that is, to mixtures of simpler odors. Several investigators have sought to discover the irreducible odors — the odors out of which all others might be compounded. Their efforts have resulted in several classifications, no two of which agree. The shortest classification is that of Crocker, an industrial chemist. He finds that he can produce any other odor by mixtures of four or less. The four primary odors, according to this system, are fragrant (musk), acid (vinegar), burnt (roast coffee), and caprylic (goaty or sweaty).² The most favored classification among psychologists is that of Henning, which lists six primary odors. These, and a representative of each, are as follows: fragrant (violets), fruity (lemon), spicy (cloves), putrid (bad fish), resinous (pine), and burned (tar). Efforts to correlate these, or any other "primary" odors with particular kinds of molecules, have met with little success.³ Attempts to correlate primary odors with particular kinds of olfactory receptors have met with no success at all, for all the olfactory receptors look sufficiently alike to prevent classification into types.

Olfactory receptors

The olfactory receptors are long threadlike structures leading from the *olfactory bulb* down into a small area at the extreme top of the nasal cavities. At their lower end, on which small hairs or cilia appear, the olfactory cells are embedded in the *olfactory epithelium*. Figure 181 shows the location of these structures and their relation to the olfactory bulbs. It also shows that the olfactory epithelium is above the main current of air going from nostrils to lungs. Only eddy currents reach the receptors. This is why sniffing is helpful in identifying an odor.

Nerve fibers run from the upper end of the olfactory receptors into the olfactory bulb. Here they connect with a highly complicated network of neurons. This network is linked by other fibers to various centers in the brain stem and cerebrum.⁴




Figure 181. A Cross-Section of the Nose, Showing the Location of Olfactory Receptors

(After Parker, as modified by Warren and Carmichael)

Olfactory acuity

Individuals differ greatly in their sensitivity to particular odors; some have no olfactory sensitivity at all, an abnormality known as *anosmia*. Moreover, we are normally more sensitive to certain odoriferous substances than to others. Minute quantities of musk arouse a keen odor perception while relatively large quantities of other substances, even when sniffed, arouse very weak odor experiences.

A widely used device for studying olfactory sensitivity is the *olfactometer*, a double form of which is illustrated in Figure 182. The single olfactometer is a calibrated glass tube bent at one end to fit into a nostril. An odor cylinder, covered with glass on the outside, but with its odorous substance exposed on the inside, is slipped over the olfactometer tube so that its end is flush with that of the tube. With this arrangement, no odor is apparent when air is drawn up the tube. But when the cylinder is moved outward, so that its inner surface is exposed to the inspired air, the odor may be smelled. The farther out the tube is moved, the greater the intensity of stimulation. A subject with good sensory acuity requires very little of the surface to be exposed, while one with poor acuity requires a large




Figure 182. A Double Olfactometer
(After Zwaardemaker.)

surface. How far the odor cylinder must be moved out in order to arouse an olfactory experience differs, of course, for different substances.

The double olfactometer makes it possible to present two odors at once and to vary the intensity of each in any desired way. Sometimes the two odors mix; sometimes one odor cancels the other, a phenomenon similar, in a sense, to masking in the field of audition, and sometimes rivalry occurs, the subject smelling one odor and then the other in regular alternation, although he is being simultaneously stimulated by both.

A more refined method of measuring olfactory acuity has recently been developed by a physician to use in locating tumors of the brain, since tumors in certain locations give rise to particular olfactory abnormalities.⁵ A psychologist has already carried out an extensive research with this technique, his primary aim being to determine the relation between olfactory sensitivity and the volume and pressure of the stimulus.⁶ The apparatus is illustrated in Figure 183, the legend of which describes how it is used.

Olfactory adaptation

This phenomenon is well known. Even the most obvious odors weaken and finally disappear if we are constantly subjected to the substance that gives rise to them. It is interesting to observe, however, that adaptation to one odor does not necessarily bring adaptation to others. This fact is often the basis of an interesting little experiment.

The instructor mixes two liquids differing in odor, but blending so that the components are indistinguishable when the mixture is smelled. A subject is then given a series of bottles, each of which contains a liquid of different odor. Two of the bottles contain the components of the mixture. The subject's task is to tell which odors produced the mixture. One bottle is sniffed until its odor completely disappears. Then the mixture is sniffed. If the odor to which adaptation has occurred is present in the mixture, the odor of the mixture smells different before and after adaptation. As a matter of fact, the other component than that for which adaptation has occurred will be quite evident. If the odor to which the subject has adapted is not in the mixture, the odor of the mixture will, of course, be unchanged after adaptation.




Figure 183. The Blast Injection Technique for Studying Olfactory Sensitivity

A stoppered container with water at any desired level is used. The odoriferous vapor is above the water and its volume may be increased or decreased by changing the water level. The outside glass tube is used in this connection. By using the syringe at the right, the volume of air in excess of the bottle volume is increased as desired, thus also increasing the pressure. When the nose pieces are inserted and the clamp which holds the vapor in check is released, the volume of gas in excess of the bottle volume is forced up the nostrils. The subject tells whether he smells the odor. Volume and pressure are increased until the subject gives a positive report. Volume and pressure may be varied independently — that is to say, the concentration of odorous vapor may be held constant while pressure changes, and vice versa. Recent research, using citrol as the stimulus, suggests that, within certain limits, stimulus effectiveness is related to pressure and not to volume. (After Eisberg and Jerome.)

Sometimes the odor of the mixture changes as it is smelled, adaptation to one component occurring before that to the other.

TASTE

When our numerous taste experiences are analyzed, it becomes apparent that much of the "taste" of familiar substances is, in reality, smell. With his nostrils blocked to prevent air from reaching the olfactory receptors, a subject has little or no success in recognizing substances placed on his tongue. Place a drop of lemon juice on his tongue, and he says merely that it is "something sour." A drop of Coca-Cola may elicit the response "bitter-sweet." Quinine is identified merely as bitter. As soon as the nostrils are opened, however, lemon juice is identified as lemon juice, Coca-Cola as Coca-Cola, and quinine as quinine.

Experiments have shown that we actually have but four fundamentally different taste experiences. These are salt, sour, sweet, and

bitter. All true gustatory experiences are either salt, sour, sweet, bitter, or combinations of these.

Although taste and smell are the primary contributors to what commonly passes as "taste," other senses sometimes play an important rôle. The characteristic "feel" of a substance in the mouth may be important. Some substances (like chili and mustard) actually arouse experiences of prick or burn, suggesting that common chemical sensitivity is activated. Other substances merely feel smooth or rough, suggesting cutaneous involvement. It is well known, too, that certain substances "taste" quite different at different temperatures. There is a marked difference, for example, between cold and hot coffee and cold and warm Coca-Cola. The resistance which substances offer to our jaws also brings the *kinesthetic sense* into play. Toffee might "taste" different if it were so soft as not to require chewing. Celery might also have a

different "taste" were it not for the kinaesthetic, and even auditory, stimulation involved in chewing it

It is common knowledge that one taste may blend with or cancel another. Thus, we have bitter-sweet and other blends. On the other hand, sweet substances in sufficient concentration may mask bitter.

Adaptation also occurs. After eating candy, an otherwise sweet-tasting fruit (grapefruit, pineapple, strawberry) may taste excessively sour, apparently because our sensitivity to sweet has been rendered dull by the preceding stimulation.

In order to arouse gustatory sensitivity, substances must be soluble. The reason for this is quite evident when we observe the nature of gustatory receptors. These are below the surface of the tongue and substances must seep down to them before stimulation occurs.

The taste receptors

Illustrated in Figure 184 is the surface of the tongue. The tongue has a number of slight elevations (papillae), the most evident of which are those aligned in the form of a chevron toward the back. These, the *circumvallate papillae*, contain taste cells especially sensitive to bitter. The *fungiform papillae*, evident along the sides and tip of the tongue, also contain taste cells. Those at the tip of the tongue are especially sensitive to sweet, those at the sides to sour, while others scattered all over the tongue except at the center are sensitive to salt. The central part of the tongue toward the front is not sensitive to any gustatory stimuli. Some papillae contain no taste cells.

The taste receptors proper are in *taste buds* at the sides of the circumvallate and fungiform papillae. These buds, because of the peculiar arrangement of their taste cells, were once referred to as "taste onions." The location of taste buds in the circumvallate papillae is illustrated in Figure 185, which also gives some idea of the structure of the taste cells and their neural connections. Each papilla contains several taste buds, and each of these




Figure 184 Papillae of the Tongue
(From Warren and Carmichael, after Wenzel)

has several taste cells. We can now see why substances must be in liquid form in order to stimulate the taste receptors. They must get into the crevices of the papillae, seep into the pore of a taste bud, and then reach the taste cells.

Dendrites which terminate around the base of the taste cells carry impulses back to the




Figure 185. Diagram to illustrate the Location and Nature of Taste Buds and Their Taste Cells

nerves shown in Figure 184. The impulses are carried to various parts of the brain stem over three separate nerves. From the thalamus, some of them go to the lower back part of the frontal lobe.

An investigation of electrical potentials in some of the fibers of the gustatory tracts of the cat suggests that acid (sour) placed on the tongue stimulates all fibers. Some of the fibers whose potentials were studied responded only to acid, others responded to acid and salt, but not to sugar or quinine, and still others responded to acid and quinine, but not to sugar and salt. There appear to be at least these three kinds of gustatory fibers. The taste of any particular substance may result from the pattern of discharge in different kinds of fibers rather than discharge in any particular kind of fiber.⁷

THE SKIN SENSES

All complex cutaneous experiences, such as itch, burn, roughness, smoothness, stickiness, wetness, and vibration, are reducible to one or more of the following: cold, warm, pain, and pressure. It is now generally accepted that these four are primary skin experiences.

You can easily demonstrate for yourself that there are four distinct skin senses. To observe them you need only touch point after point on your skin with the cold or warm tip of a nail or similar metal object, with the end of a coarse hair, and with the tip of a needle. As the cold object is applied, some points on the skin will respond with a "flash" of cold, while others merely yield a pressure experience. The points which give the cold experience are called *cold spots*. Some other points, when stimulated with a warm stimulus, will respond with a "flash" of warmth. These are designated *warm spots*. Touching various points on the skin with the end of a coarse hair will arouse pressure experiences. If pressure on the hair is light, "tickle" or contact will often be elicited. Still heavier pressure will arouse what has been called "neutral pressure." As the intensity of stimulation is increased, more of the stimulated points will respond with some sort of pressure experience. Heavy pressure with a blunt object will elicit experiences characterized as "dull pressure." The

points which respond to stimulation with a hair are called *pressure spots*. When stimulated with the point of a needle, most points on the skin give a "prick" or "pain" experience. These are called *pain spots*.

Research on cutaneous sensitivity utilizes techniques much more refined than those just described. An area is carefully mapped out so that the investigator knows beforehand which points are to be stimulated. He may stimulate the same points several times with the same or with different stimuli. The apparatus itself is especially designed to provide constant stimulation with respect to area, pressure, and temperature.

Almost all the body surface is thickly covered with pain spots. Pressure spots are also widely distributed, occurring to the "windward" side of hairs and also on hairless regions like the palms and soles. Cold and warm spots occur less frequently than pain and pressure spots, and a given area of the skin often yields many more cold than warm spots.

When we explore an area of the skin for cold, warm, pressure, and pain spots, and then re-explore it, we find that some spots lack stability. Some that previously yielded cold or warm now fail to do so. It often happens also that what was previously a cold spot is now a warm spot, what was previously a warm spot is now a cold spot, and what was previously only a pressure spot is now a cold or warm spot. Pain spots, on the other hand, are relatively stable.

The search for structural correlates of cutaneous sensitivity

When the cold, warm, pressure, and pain spots were discovered, physiologists and psychologists tried to locate correlated receptors. They found that the skin does indeed contain a variety of structures which might serve as specialized receptors. Some of these are illustrated in Figure 186.

Free nerve endings are almost everywhere, as also are pain spots. One notable exception is the mucous lining of the cheek, which has no free nerve endings and which fails to yield




Figure 186. Diagrammatic Representation of Some Cutaneous Structures
(Modified from Warren and Carmichael.)

pain. It appears, therefore, that pain is mediated by free nerve endings. Hair follicles and associated dendrites, appearing to the "windward" side of hairs, where pressure spots also occur, are apparently pressure receptors. Meissner corpuscles, sometimes referred to in physiology books as "touch corpuscles," are thought to mediate light pressure in hairless regions. Some free nerve endings also respond to pressure. These endings are believed to differ from those which mediate pain in that their fibers are thicker and carry impulses at a greater velocity. Heavy pressure stimulates the subcutaneous tissues, where Pacinian corpuscles are found. Pacinian corpuscles are thus assumed to be receptors for dull pressure.

The structural correlates of temperature sensitivity are not known. Encapsulated end organs lying deep in the skin, free nerve endings, and the microscopic blood vessels (capillaries) which run to every part of the skin, have each been mentioned as possible temperature receptors.

Krause end bulbs were once thought to be the sole receptors for cold, and Ruffian cylinders sole receptors for warm. Psychologists have located stable cold and warm spots,

however, and then had them cut out and sectioned histologically — only to find no Krause end bulbs or Ruffian cylinders. Free nerve endings alone were found.⁸

There is much to be said for a vascular (blood vessel) theory of temperature sensitivity.⁹ Every part of the skin is covered with a network of microscopic blood vessels. Free nerve endings terminate in the smooth muscles which surround these vessels and also in neighboring tissues. Lowering the temperature of the skin a sufficient amount leads to constriction of the blood vessels; raising it a sufficient amount leads to dilation. It has therefore been suggested that the pattern of neural excitation sent to the brain by constricting vascular muscles underlies the experience of cold, and that the pattern of excitation sent to the brain by dilating vascular muscles underlies the experience of warmth. There is much experimental evidence in favor of this theory, but also some evidence against it.¹⁰ It is difficult to predict how it will stand up as additional information about the skin and nervous system becomes available.

The cutaneous senses are mediated by nerve fibers which run into the spinal cord or brain

stem, depending on the level stimulated. All impulses eventually reach the opposite side of the brain. Impulses from pain and temperature receptors are shunted immediately to the opposite side of the spinal cord. They then travel to the thalamus in two separate nerve tracts. Upon reaching the thalamus, some of these impulses are switched to the somaesthetic area of the parietal lobe.

A disease known as *syringomyelia*, which produces a cavity at the center of the spinal cord, or brain stem, usually destroys temperature and pain sensitivity on both sides of the body at the level affected. This is because it destroys fibers which send impulses from each side of the body across to the opposite side of the cord. The individual may first learn of this disease when he cuts or burns his hand and feels no pain or heat. It is interesting to observe, however, that *syringomyelia* does not necessarily destroy pressure sensitivity. This is because impulses coming in from the pressure receptors travel up an outer region of the cord on the same side. They cross over at a higher level, then proceed to the thalamus and somaesthetic area of the cortex.

Cutaneous adaptation

The pressure and temperature senses show rapid adaptation to stimuli. When constant pressure is applied to a pressure spot, sensitivity gradually decreases until nothing at all is felt. Everyday examples of pressure adaptation are obvious. We cease to feel our clothing soon after putting it on, the ring on our finger might as well be nonexistent as far as pressure sensitivity is concerned, and our glasses are not felt to be pressing on the bridge of our nose. Temperature adaptation is also more or less commonplace. The cold air feels less cold after we have been out of the house a few minutes, and the warm air of the house seems less warm after we have been subjected to it for a while. If one hand has been in very cold water and the other in very warm water, then both are placed in lukewarm water, to one hand (from very cold water) this water seems quite warm and to the other (from very

warm water) it seems quite cool. Pain adaptation is questioned. It is true that if you stick a needle in your hand and keep it there, the pain gradually disappears. You may, however, have injured the free nerve ending, rendering it insensitive. An aching tooth, on the other hand, continues to ache until you either have it drugged or have it out.

CUTANEOUS SPACE PERCEPTION

There are two problems here. One concerns ability to localize a point that has been stimulated, and the other concerns ability to discriminate between one and two points. The latter is customarily referred to as the *two-point threshold*.

Localization

If somebody touches you anywhere on the body while your eyes are closed, you unhesitatingly name the general region touched. You know, for example, whether the stimulus has been applied to your right or left hand, your forehead or chest, your abdomen or back. You may be able to report the finger touched, or even the joint on a particular finger. The accuracy of such localization is investigated in two general ways.

Tactual-kinesthetic localization. This method requires the subject to make overt localizing movements — in other words, to touch the spot stimulated by placing the point of a stylus or pencil on it. The accuracy of tactual-kinesthetic localization depends on two factors. (1) the subject must know where he has been touched, and (2) he must be able to make muscular reactions of sufficient delicacy to touch the point that he knows has been stimulated.

Localization improves a great deal with practice, but the improvement may be due, wholly or in part, to greater accuracy of muscular movement. It does not necessarily follow, in other words, that knowledge of the point stimulated has improved just because the subject can now touch it more accurately. As a matter of fact, the subject often reports

from the outset that he knows perfectly well where he has been touched, but that he has difficulty in guiding the pencil point to this spot. If we allow him to do so, he may move the pencil around on the skin until the stimulated spot is reached. Even when such exploration is not permitted, however, the place touched usually differs from the place stimulated by only a centimeter or two. With practice, the error may be reduced to a few millimeters.¹¹

Tactual localization without overt localizing movements. The subject may indicate on a photograph of his arm the point just stimulated. This allows him to localize visually and removes the error introduced by trying to guide a pencil point to the stimulated spot. A still better method is to stamp on the subject's forearm a diagram like that shown in Figure 187. He is told that the stimulus will always be applied to the center of a square, the particular square differing, in a random order, from trial to trial. The experiment is conducted under low illumination and stimulation is lightly applied, the aim being to leave no impression on the skin which the subject can see. While the subject's eyes are closed, the experimenter touches the center of a square. Thereupon the subject looks at his

arm and says in which square (A 1, C 5, or so forth) the stimulus was applied.

The average error of localization under these conditions is about fifteen millimeters for adult subjects. This error is reduced to an average of around twelve millimeters after about five trials, in each of which all points have been stimulated once. With additional practice, some subjects reduce this error.¹²

Localization on other parts of the body is not as accurate as on the hand or forearm. In general, the error of localization decreases as one goes from relatively immobile parts of the body, like the thigh or back, to highly mobile parts, like the fingers.

How do we recognize so accurately the region stimulated? The answer usually given is that each region of the skin has a somewhat different feel and that this *local sign* enables us to recognize it. Much discussion has centered on the question as to whether these signs are inborn or acquired. The fact that tactual localization without overt localizing movements improves with practice suggests that we may learn to locate points of stimulation in terms of their different "feel," but it does not, of course, explain why different regions "feel" different. The question is, however, by no means settled.




Figure 187. Diagram for Localizing Without Overt Localizing Movements

The two-point threshold

How close together may two points of contact be, yet be clearly discriminated as two? The answer depends, primarily, on the region stimulated. If your fingertip is stimulated, sometimes with one point and sometimes with two points of an aesthesiometer (illustrated in Figure 188) and the points are two millimeters apart, you will have no difficulty in telling when you have been stimulated by one point and when you have been stimulated by two. Reduce the separation of the points to less than one millimeter, however, and you will not be able to differentiate between application of one point and application of two. The separation of two millimeters that was so easily discriminated on the fingertip will be re-




Figure 188. An Aesthesiometer
(After Spearman. Courtesy of C. H. Stoelting Company)

ported as one point when applied to the middle of your back. Here you will need a separation of seventy millimeters or more in order to be sure that you have been stimulated by two points instead of one.

In performing the two-point threshold experiment, it is customary to start with a separation that is easily discriminated and gradually reduce it, or to start with a separation that is not discriminated and gradually increase it. Sometimes both methods are used and the results averaged. Great variation from place to place is observed. For example, one millimeter is the average threshold on the fingertip, five millimeters on the red part of the lips, twenty-three millimeters on the forehead, thirty-one millimeters on the back of the hand, fifty-four millimeters on the back of the neck, and seventy millimeters on the middle of the back.

The two-point threshold, like the error of localizing a single point, is smallest on the most mobile parts of the body. It improves a great deal with practice, but there is probably an irreducible threshold for each region. In other words, the threshold on the back might be reduced by practice, but it is doubtful whether it could ever be reduced to, let us say, five millimeters. The problem is much

like that of visual acuity (pp. 346-347), where the smallest discriminable separation of two points of light depends upon the smallest distance between two receptor fields. The distance between cutaneous receptors is smaller on the tip of the finger than on the middle of the back. No amount of training could be expected to reduce the two-point threshold of the back to the same threshold found for the fingertip.

KINESTHESIS

Any normal individual with eyes closed can touch his nose, ear, or any part of his body with a high degree of accuracy. He can move his limbs in various ways and know their position from moment to moment. He can, by lifting them, discern the relative weight of objects. He can go directly to the familiar light switch in complete darkness, walk along the street without paying attention to what his legs are doing, carry on a conversation without thinking of the muscular movements involved, and, if he is an experienced aviator, fly "with the seat of his pants," giving no attention to the manipulation of controls. Likewise, the typist types without looking at or thinking of her fingers, the knitter knits without looking at her knitting needles, and so on. Many of these movements are carried out in the most automatic and stereotyped manner. If we turn our attention to them, they are often disrupted, as in the case of the centipede.

The centipede was happy quite

Until a toad, in fun,

Said, "Pray, which leg goes after which when
you begin to run?"

That worked her mind to such a pitch,

She lay distracted in a ditch,

Considering how to run.

The automaticity of such behavior and its independence of vision are made possible by receptors in the muscles, tendons, and joints. Pacinian corpuscles, with which we are already familiar (p. 385), are among these receptors. Others are structures like those illustrated in Figure 189.




Figure 189. Kinesthetic Receptors in Muscle
(After Warren and Carmichael.)

The kinesthetic receptors are subjected to pressure, or release of pressure, as our muscles, tendons, and joints are moved. They send impulses to the thalamus and then to the parietal lobe of the cerebrum, thus informing our brain of the position of our limbs. Incoming impulses are shunted over, in the brain stem or cortex, to motor fibers. These carry impulses back to the muscles, tendons, and joints, thus stimulating further activity. In this way, motor activities act as stimuli for their own rearousal, or for the arousal of other motor activity. This is why kinesthetically controlled habits can proceed so automatically.

We usually pay little attention to kinesthetic experience, but it exists, as anyone may observe for himself merely by contracting and relaxing muscles or moving joints. It has been characterized as strain, ache, pressure, tension, and the like. One can experience kinesthesia in pure form, of course, only when the skin itself has been anesthetized, for movement of any part of the body stimulates the skin as well as the underlying muscles, tendons, and joints.

Few people realize their dependence on kinesthesia until they are afflicted with *tabes dorsalis* or observe others so afflicted. The disease follows destruction of the dorsal tracts of the spinal cord or brain stem by syphilis. These tracts carry impulses from our kinesthetic receptors to the thalamus. When they are destroyed at any level, all kinesthetic sensitivity below that level is, in effect, destroyed. Impulses come into the spinal cord

or brain stem as before, but they now have no pathway to the brain. The individual thus affected sways considerably when his eyes are closed, cannot lift his foot up on the curb without looking at it, walks with a peculiar (tabetic) gait, and, if the destruction is high in the cord, cannot touch his nose or ear with his eyes closed without extensive exploration. If destruction is in the brain stem, the individual has little success in repeating such words as "electricity" and "episcopal." Phrases like "black bug's blood" are especially difficult. Even ordinary speech becomes "thick" and, in very serious cases, almost unintelligible.

STATIC SENSITIVITY

If stimulation of all other senses were eliminated, static sensitivity would still make it possible for us to discern whether we were right side up or upside down, falling or going up, spinning or standing still, moving forward or backward, or to right or left.

The receptors which mediate static sensitivity are in the nonauditory labyrinth, which, as illustrated in Figure 190, comprises three semicircular canals and two small sac-like chambers (sacculæ and utricle), known jointly as the *vestibule*. The relation of these




Figure 190. The Nonauditory Labyrinth

structures to the cochlea and other parts of the ear was shown in Figure 173 (p 368). A liquid known as *endolymph* fills the canals and vestibule.

Each semicircular canal is almost at right angles to the others. There is one canal corresponding to each of the three planes of space. Turning the head in a clockwise or counter-clockwise direction activates canal *a*. Canal *b* is activated when the head tips in a forward-backward direction. The remaining canal, *c*, is activated by tilting the head in a right-left direction.

At the base of each semicircular canal is a swelling (*ampulla*) into which a small structure containing hairs projects. The hairs of the *crista*, as this structure is called, are bent by rotary movement of the head. Their bending stimulates associated nerve fibers, which carry impulses thus aroused over the vestibular branch of the auditory nerve (Figure 173, p 368) to the medulla and cerebellum.

The hairs are activated only by changes in rotary movement. As one suddenly turns his head to the right, the liquid in canal *a* lags, causing the hairs to move to the left, or vice versa. As one suddenly tilts his head forward, the hairs in canal *b* are bent in an upward direction, or vice versa. As one tilts his head to the right, the hairs in canal *c* are bent to the left, or vice versa. If movement is constantly accelerated, as when a subject is rotated at a constant speed in a revolving chair, the hair cells of the horizontal canal return to their original position and remain there. The subject then feels that motion has ceased. When slowing down occurs, however, the hairs bend in the same direction as that in which the subject is moving, and he feels that he is moving in the opposite direction.

Rotary movement on the horizontal plane elicits compensatory head and eye movements. These result from reflex neural connections between the semicircular canals, brain, and eyes. The head and eyes drift, as it were, in the direction of movement and then snap back.

Rapid oscillatory eye movements (*nystag-*

mus) are particularly noticeable after rotation. If you observe someone who has been rotated several times and just stopped, you will notice that his eyes make quick back-and-forth movements. They "drift" in the direction in which he has been moving, then "snap" in the opposite direction. This is known as *post-rotational nystagmus*. Absence of post-rotational nystagmus arouses a suspicion that the semicircular canals or their neural connections are defective. In acrobats, flyers, ballet dancers, and others whose activities stimulate the semicircular canals a great deal over a long period of time, however, post-rotational nystagmus may be absent or of very brief duration. Experiments on animals and human subjects in the laboratory have shown that post-rotational nystagmus may be eliminated by repeated rotation, yet not impair static sensitivity.¹³

The dizziness which follows rotation is also reduced by training in rotation, probably in part, at least, because the eye movements are reduced. This dizziness, as well as nystagmic movements, can easily be induced by rotating an environment of black and white stripes without stimulating the semicircular canals at all (p 324). Thus, while there is normally a relation between static sensitivity and eye movements, it is not a necessary relation. Under such circumstances as we have described, one kind of activity may occur without the other.

The vestibule, at the base of the semicircular canals, is activated primarily by rectilinear motion — that is to say, motion straight up and down, straight forward or back, or straight to the right or left, in each case without rotation of the head. One form of rectilinear movement is experienced whenever we go up and down in an elevator. Sensitivity to rectilinear movement results from the bending of hairs in the saccule and utricle of the vestibule. These hairs are weighted with calcium particles (*otoliths*). Movement of the body in an up-down, front-back, or right-left direction is associated with a lag in adjustment of otoliths, hence a bending of hairs in the opposite

direction. Nerve impulses are aroused which, like those from the semicircular canals, go to the brain via the vestibular branch of the auditory nerve.

Under most conditions of everyday life, our semicircular canals and vestibules are stimulated simultaneously. Impulses which come from the separate structures are co-ordinated in the cerebellum. They play a major rôle in maintaining the tonus of muscles and the equilibrium of the whole body. It is the nice co-ordination of impulses from these mechanisms that enables the cat to land on its feet, regardless of the position from which it is dropped.

Unusual stimulation of the semicircular canals and vestibule is conducive, in many people, to a malady known, in general, as *motion-sickness*. Those of us who get seasick, airsick, carsick, or swingsick can, at least in part, blame our static mechanisms. Animals and human beings without active labyrinthine mechanisms do not get motion-sick.

Why some people with good labyrinthine mechanisms are susceptible to motion-sickness and others not is an unsolved problem. It is possible, as we shall see, that organic as well as static sensitivity is an important cause of motion-sickness.

Tests of susceptibility to motion-sickness have played a rôle in the selection of airborne military personnel. Rear gunners and glider troops are subjected to unusually intense stimulation of the labyrinthine mechanisms, and stimulation involving different directions of rectilinear and rotary motion at the same time. Thus, these, of all airborne personnel, should be least susceptible to airsickness. The tests involved long-continued subjection to motion in long swings, elevators, rotating chairs, and the like. Some subjects grew pale, began to perspire, and ended by being ill, but others stood the tests without any signs of sickness. These were, of course, the best prospects for airborne duties.¹⁴ Most people who experience motion-sickness get over it as the trip continues. This probably means that their static mechanisms have in some way

become adapted to the unusual movement.

The after-effects of unusual long-continued static stimulation are especially interesting. After leaving a plane or boat, many people feel that the ground is unsteady and that buildings are swaying in various directions. Such phenomena are often experienced by people susceptible to motion-sickness.

ORGANIC SENSITIVITY

Organic sensitivity is sensitivity of the visceral and other internal organs of the body cavity. The viscera include the stomach, intestines, internal sex structures, and kidneys. Nonvisceral inner structures are the throat, lungs, and heart. Activities of the internal organs excite sensory fibers connected with the autonomic nervous system (p 276).

Many experiences, most of them rather vague, are associated with the activity of internal structures. Some of these are thirst, hunger, nausea, bladder and intestinal tensions, sexual cravings and thrills, suffocation, and the feeling of fullness. In several instances these feelings have been reduced to varieties of pressure, pain, and temperature sensitivity. Thirst, for example, is associated with dryness in the throat; hunger is associated with pressures and pains resulting from stomach contractions; and nausea is reducible to aches and pains as well as dizziness.

Organic sensitivity is usually stressed in discussions of physiological drives, but it is given relatively little attention from the standpoint of experience. In fact, one will gather from our discussion of hunger, thirst, and sex (pp 200-207) that these organic activities contribute much more to motivation than to experience.¹⁵

Some of the nausea and other symptoms associated with motion-sickness are perhaps attributable to visceral disturbances. Sudden upward movement of the body, as in going up in an elevator, on a wave, or on an air current, leads to a lag in the visceral organs. Pulls are thus exerted on the membranes which keep the intestines in position. Pulls are exerted in the opposite direction when the body sinks

suddenly. Such pulls, when applied during an abdominal operation, cause nausea and vomiting.¹⁴ It thus appears that visceral tensions may play some part in production of motion-sickness. On the other hand, motion-sickness exists only in individuals with intact labyrinths. Since those without labyrinths are not motion-sick, yet subjected to visceral tensions, such tensions cannot be the sole cause of motion-sickness.

SUMMARY

Smell, like vision and hearing, is a distance sense. It plays a subtle rôle in everyday life, especially in its contribution to what commonly passes for "taste." The number of primary odors is not known, although the most commonly accepted classification lists six. Olfactory receptors are located high up in the nostrils and are stimulated only by substances in gaseous form. Olfactory acuity, which differs among individuals and for different odorous substances, is measured by means of an olfactometer or by a so-called "blast injector." Double olfactometry demonstrates cancellation by one odor of another, fusion of two odors, and odor rivalry. Olfactory adaptation is the loss of sensitivity as a result of continued exposure to an odor stimulus.

Taste, as such, consists of four primary qualities, namely, salt, sour, sweet, and bitter. The taste receptors are small buds located in the walls of certain of the papillae of the tongue. In order to stimulate cells in the taste buds, substances must be soluble. The tip of the tongue is most sensitive to sweet, the sides to sour, and the back to bitter. Salt arouses a response from all parts of the tongue except an area in the center toward the front. Most "taste" experiences are blends of the four primary tastes, plus smell, contact, temperature, and common chemical sensitivity. Among the well-known gustatory phenomena are adaptation, mixture, and cancellation.

The primary skin senses, once referred to in combination as the sense of touch, are pressure, pain, cold, and warmth. When the skin

is mapped with appropriate stimuli, pressure, pain, cold, and warm "spots" are located. Sensitivity to light pressure is mediated by hair follicles, Meissner corpuscles, and free nerve endings. Dull pressure involves the deep-lying Pacinian corpuscles. Pain sensitivity is mediated by free nerve endings, those at the end of relatively thin fibers. No specialized receptors for temperature sensitivity have been located, but there is evidence that cold is associated with the pattern of nervous discharge aroused when small blood vessels in the skin contract and that warmth is associated with the pattern of nervous discharge aroused when these small blood vessels dilate. This is the vascular theory of temperature sensitivity. Pressure and temperature adaptation are well known, but the existence of pain adaptation has not been established. Complex cutaneous experiences like vibration, stickiness, dryness, wetness, roughness, and heat are due to simultaneous arousal of two or more of the primary skin senses.

Stimulation of the skin arouses an awareness of the place touched, a characteristic "feel" that has been called the "local sign." One's knowledge of the place touched is usually more accurate than his ability to touch the same spot without use of vision, a feat which calls for kinesthetic as well as cutaneous sensitivity. Localization, both with and without overt localizing movements, improves with practice. The two-point threshold, which differs on different parts of the body, is smallest on the most flexible, and largest on the least flexible parts.

Kinesthetic sensitivity comes from activation of receptors in our muscles, tendons, and joints. It is of special interest that, because of these receptors, muscular activities provide the stimuli for their own rearousal or for the arousal of other muscular activities. Kinesthetic sensitivity underlies the automaticity of our well-established habit patterns. Our dependence on kinesthetic sensitivity for everyday activities is illustrated by cases of *tabes dorsalis*, where kinesthetic sensitivity normally associated with certain parts of the

body is absent. The parts affected are lacking in normal co-ordination.

The ability to tell the position of our body in space and the direction of movement comes from the static or equilibratory sense. This sense depends on activities of the labyrinthine mechanisms, namely, the semicircular canals (rotary movement in three planes) and the vestibule (rectilinear movement in three planes). Head and eye movement associated with rotary movement is called nystagmus. Post-rotational optic nystagmus is reduced by practice, yet without interfering with static

sensitivity. Motion-sickness is aroused in many people when the labyrinthine mechanisms are unusually stimulated.

Organic sensitivity is that associated with functioning of the internal organs. It includes hunger, thirst, sexual cravings and thrills, and bladder and intestinal tensions. Some organic sensitivity, at least, is reducible to complex patterns of pressure, pain, and temperature sensitivity. Stimulation of internal receptors plays an important rôle in motivation and emotion. Organic sensitivity may contribute to motion-sickness.

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Part 7

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

IN OUR DISCUSSIONS up to this point there has been little consideration of individual differences. We have focused successively on psychological development, learning, remembering, forgetting, thinking, physiological drives, common social motives, conflict, emotion, feeling, attending, perceiving, and the sensory processes. There are marked individual differences in all these aspects of behavior and experience, as we have at times suggested, but we have emphasized the similarities more than the differences.

We could study individual differences in any of the processes so far considered. Indeed, students of individual differences are sometimes concerned with the variations in particular processes. Likewise, we could focus on a particular process and look for sex differences, age differences, racial differences, national differences, regional differences, or occupational differences in the process. What we shall do, however, is to consider three complicated combinations of simpler processes — combinations known as *intelligence* (Chapter 23), *aptitude* (Chapter 24), and *personality* (Chapter 25).

If all individuals adjusted to given situations in the same way, the concept of intelligence would never have arisen. If all individuals were equally apt — if they could learn equally well the tasks of everyday life — there would be no concept of aptitude. Likewise, if all looked alike and acted alike in their relations with others, there would be no concept of personality.

Since statistical analysis plays a large rôle in the investigation and interpretation of individual differences, we will take time out, as it were, to consider some elementary statistical procedures and interpretations.

Chapter 22

Introduction to Statistical Analysis of Individual Differences

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, as we pointed out in Chapter 2, is an important aspect of psychological research. In the study of individual differences it is an indispensable tool. As a matter of fact, statistics developed in close relation to the research on individual differences.

This brief chapter is designed to do no more than give an elementary acquaintance with statistical techniques and interpretations. The reader who learns its contents will not be able to do any but the simplest statistical computations, but he will have some appreciation of the meaning of such statistical terms as *frequency distribution curve*, *normal probability curve*, *mean*, *median*, *mode*, *range*, *standard deviation* or *sigma*, *probable error*, *standard error*, *critical ratio*, and *coefficient of correlation* or *r*. This appreciation will facilitate his understanding of the literature dealing with the psychology of individual differences.

THE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION

Suppose that we give a psychological test to a large group of individuals and wish to know how the scores are distributed. We first arrange the scores into what is known as a *frequency distribution*.

The procedure involved in making a frequency distribution may be illustrated by using scores made by one hundred college students on a test of auditory memory span. Each score represents the longest list of words

recalled in correct order after being heard a single time.

4 5 5 5 4 6 6 5 7 6 5 5 5 7 6 5 4 5 4 5
6 5 6 3 7 6 7 6 6 8 7 6 7 6 7 7 6 6 6 6
7 8 6 7 5 5 7 6 6 5 6 7 6 5 7 5 6 7 6 4
8 6 6 5 7 6 5 7 7 8 5 6 5 6 5 7 7 6 6 7
7 6 7 7 6 6 6 5 4 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 7 6 9 5

Observe that the lowest and highest scores are, respectively, 3 and 9. These and the scores between them are arranged in a vertical column. At the side of each score a tally is placed to represent each occurrence of this score. When the tallies are added, the frequency of each score — that is, the number of times it has occurred in the experiment — is obtained.

Score	Tallies	Frequency
3		1
4		6
5		28
6		36
7		24
8		4
9		1
		<hr/> N = 100

With the frequency of each score apparent, it is possible to represent the distribution graphically. As indicated in Figure 191, the graph may be a frequency polygon, a histogram, or a bar diagram. The scores are arranged along the horizontal axis (abscissa).




Figure 191. Methods of Plotting a Frequency Distribution Curve

and the number of times each score occurs is indicated on the vertical axis (ordinate). Since there are one hundred subjects, the ordinate represents both the number and the percentage of subjects making each score. Sometimes a frequency distribution is plotted in terms of the number of subjects making each score, and sometimes in terms of the percentage of subjects making each score.

When the extreme scores differ by a large amount, it is necessary to group them into class intervals. Each point on the abscissa then represents not a particular score but a class of scores. Such a grouping is seen in Figure 192, which shows the per cent of children with I.Q.'s (intelligence quotients)

within the class intervals of 35-44.99, 45-54.99, and so on.

If the number of cases is very large, as in the data of Figure 192, a frequency polygon approaches the shape of a *normal probability* curve like that of Figure 193. The characteristics of such a curve are determined by so many factors that they are called "chance" factors. It is interesting to note that, when the population tested is very large, most psychological measurements, and such biological factors as height and weight, are distributed in approximate accordance with the normal probability curve.

Because it has definite mathematical characteristics, the normal probability curve is a




Figure 192. Distribution of I.Q.'s in 2904 Children

(From Terman, L. M., and Merrill, M. A., "Measuring Intelligence," Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937, p. 37.)




Figure 193. The Normal Probability Curve

If everything operated in accordance with chance, tossing 20 pennies (rattling them up in a box and tossing them out on a table) 1000 times would yield the normal probability curve shown in solid print. The number of heads from 0 to 20 appears on the abscissa, and the number of throws in which each number of heads appeared is represented on the ordinate. The curve which appears in broken print is the result of an actual experiment. Instead of the expected average of 10 heads, the average was actually 9.98. If the 20 pennies had been tossed 10,000 instead of 1000 times, the two averages would have been practically identical and the two curves would almost have coincided.

useful comparative device. Whenever a distribution of measurements closely approximates it, one is justified in using certain statistical devices based upon its characteristics. Some of these will be mentioned shortly. Plotting of frequency distribution curves, however, has several other advantages than determination of how closely the results conform with probability. If the number of individuals making given scores is greater at one end of the distribution than at the other, the amount of *skewness* is apparent. If the curve has a dip in the middle (is *bimodal*), this may indicate that the individuals tested fall

into two classes; for example, the dominant and the submissive. Several dips may indicate several types of individuals in the test group. If two quite different groups (two races, male and female, child and adult) have been tested, and a distribution curve plotted for each, the approximate amount of overlapping of scores in the two distributions becomes apparent from the graphs. Types of frequency distribution are illustrated schematically in Figure 194. Skewed, bimodal, and multimodal distributions are quite rare in psychological investigations which involve large randomly selected groups.

MEASURES OF CENTRAL TENDENCY

In determining the trend of measurements on the same subject or on different subjects, and in comparing the performance of different groups or of the same group at different times, it is necessary to obtain a measure which represents the typical performance. Measures of central tendency are for this purpose. These measures are the *mode*, the *median*, and the *mean*, or average.

The *mode* is the score of greatest frequency. It may be obtained directly from inspection of the frequency distribution, or a graphic representation of such. For example, the mode in the data of Figure 191 is 6. In Figure 192 it is halfway through the class interval 95–104.99, thus 100.

The *median* score is the middlemost one. If scores are arranged in rank order, one half of them will fall on each side of the median. The median of 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 is 11, and the median of 5, 6, 7, and 8 is 6.5, halfway between 6 and 7. When the scores repeat themselves, and there are a large number, calcula-




Figure 194. Types of Frequency Distribution Curves

A, skewed distribution; B, bimodal distribution; C, multimodal distribution; D, overlapping distributions

tion of the median is much more difficult than these examples would indicate.

The *mean* or average is the most widely used measure of central tendency. It is the sum of all scores divided by their number. The total of the scores on memory span (page 397) is 592. This, divided by the number of cases (100), gives a mean memory span of 5.92.

If the data are grouped, as in the frequency table on page 397, each score is multiplied by its frequency, and the total of the products is determined. The sum of the scores times their frequency is then divided by the number of cases. When a large range of scores is involved (as in the data of Figure 192) and the scores must be grouped into class intervals, the midpoint of each interval is multiplied by its frequency to obtain the mean.

In a completely normal distribution the mode, median, and mean are identical. It is very rarely, however, that actual measurements more than approximate a normal distribution. Hence, the three measures of central tendency, although often close together in value, are seldom interchangeable. The nature of a distribution usually indicates which measure is most appropriate for comparative purposes. When a distribution is markedly skewed, for example, the mode and median are better indices of central tendency than is the mean. This is because the mode and median are not affected by extreme scores. The mean, on the other hand, may be greatly affected by extreme scores.

The most widely used measures of variability, as well as certain measures of correlation, require determination of the mean. These measures assume existence of an approximately normal rather than a skewed or bimodal distribution.

MEASURES OF VARIABILITY

The central tendency does not tell all that it is important to know about a distribution. It indicates nothing about the range covered by the measurements nor how they are distributed. For illustrative purposes two differ-

ent distributions with identical means are represented in Figure 195. It is obvious that an investigator who determined only the means would be lacking important information concerning these distributions. In *a* the measurements are clustered around the mean, but in *b* they are scattered over a wider range. In *b*, moreover, the frequency of each measurement decreases gradually from the mean to the extreme end of the distribution. In distribution *a* this decrease is more rapid.

The amount of spread in a distribution is indicated by the *range*, which is the smallest score subtracted from the largest score. In the distribution for memory span which was discussed above the range is $9 - 3$, or 6.

All that the range indicates is the distance between extreme scores. It tells an investigator nothing about the way in which scores are distributed within this range. It cannot answer such questions as, "What are the chances that a particular individual's score will fall within a certain part of the range?" or, "What per cent of cases is within a certain distance of the mean?" The answer to such questions is provided by other measures of variability, the most commonly used of which are the *standard deviation of the distribution* (S D. or σ *, which we shall refer to merely as σ), and the *probable error* (P E), which may be calculated directly from σ .

The standard deviation and probable error are distances along the abscissa (the score




Figure 195. Two Distributions with Identical Means but Differing in Other Characteristics

* Sigma.

dimension). These measures, the calculation of which will be considered shortly, are not properly used unless there are many scores distributed in approximate accordance with the curve of normal probability. To the degree to which the distribution of scores approximates a normal distribution, to that degree are we justified in speaking of the probable location of given scores or percentages of scores within a given range. This is because, if we mark off 1σ on each side of the mean of a normal probability curve, 68 per cent of all scores will fall within this range. If we mark off 2σ on each side of the mean, approximately 95 per cent of the cases will fall within these limits. Practically 100 per cent of the cases will fall within the limits of plus or minus (\pm) 3σ . When 1 P.E. is laid off on each side of the mean, approximately 50 per cent of all scores fall within this range. Practically all scores fall within the limits of ± 4 P.E. These relations are shown in Figure 196.

It should be clear, then, that if σ is large, the scores are widely scattered from the mean. If it is very small, however, scores are piled up, or concentrated closely around the mean. Distribution *a* in Figure 195, for example, would have a much smaller σ than distribution *b*.

What are the chances that a given score will




Figure 196. Normal Probability Curve Showing Sigma and P.E. Ranges

fall within $\pm 1\sigma$? The answer is 68 in 100. What are the chances that it will fall within $\pm 2\sigma$? The answer is about 95 in 100. The chances are approximately 100 in 100 that it will fall within $\pm 3\sigma$. Similar information is provided by the P.E., except that ± 1 P.E. marks off 50 per cent, and ± 4 P.E. marks off approximately 100 per cent of a distribution.

A formula for calculation of σ from ungrouped data is

$$\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{\sum D^2}{N}}$$

where $\sum D^2$ is the sum of the squared deviations, each deviation being taken from the mean. N refers to the number of cases. Keeping in mind that σ is meaningful only in terms of an approximately normal distribution and that approximation to such a distribution is possible only when there are many randomly selected cases, we may illustrate its calculation by using a few simple figures. Let 5, 8, 9, 13, 14, and 17 represent scores. The sum of these is 66. Since there are 6 cases, the mean is $66/6$, or 11. We now obtain the deviation of each score from the mean — that is, $11 - 5$, $11 - 8$, and so on. Since the deviations are to be squared, there is no need to indicate whether they are in a plus or minus direction from the mean — that is, above or below it. The deviations are respectively, 6, 3, 2, 2, 3, and 6. Squaring these, we have 36, 9, 4, 4, 9, and 36. The sum of the squared deviations is 98. Thus,

$$\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{\sum D^2}{N}} = \sqrt{\frac{98}{6}} = \sqrt{16.33} = 4.04 \text{ (approx.)}$$

Calculation of σ from a large number of scores, where the data may have to be grouped, and where the mean may have decimal places, is much more laborious than the simple example that we have given would indicate.

The probable error (P.E.) is calculated by means of the formula¹

$$\text{P.E.} = .6745 \sigma.$$

The P.E. of our illustrative figures would be .6745 (4.04), or 2.72.

Reliability of a mean. Suppose that we wished to know how well our memory span of 5.92, obtained on a group of one hundred college students, represents the memory span of all (or an infinitely large group) of college students. Since our distribution roughly approximates a normal one, we are able, in terms of the properties of the normal probability curve, to determine how much the mean would be likely to change upon repetition of the experiment. Reliability of a mean is indicated by its *standard error*, σ_M . The formula for σ_M takes into consideration the two chief factors, other than errors of measurement, which would affect the reliability of the mean. One of these is the *number of cases*. Obviously, the larger the group tested, the greater the probability that the obtained mean is representative of all college students. It can be shown that the square root of the number, rather than the number itself, is significant here. One hundred subjects give not 100 times the reliability obtained with one subject, but $\sqrt{100}$, or 10 times. The other factor which influences reliability is the *standard deviation of the distribution*, σ or σ_{dist} . It will be recalled that σ shows how closely scores cluster around the mean. One can readily see that, if the σ of our memory span results were small, which would mean that scores were closely piled up around the mean, our measure of central tendency would be more likely to be representative of students as a whole than if the scores were widely scattered — that is, σ were large. The formula which takes cognizance of these two factors is

$$\sigma_M = \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{N}}$$

where σ represents the standard deviation of the distribution and N the number of cases.

What is σ_M of our data on memory span? The σ_{dist} , not calculated in the preceding discussion, is 1.0. The number of cases is 100. Hence σ_M is $1/10$, or .10. We may now say that the mean memory span is $5.92 \pm .10$. Reference to a table giving the properties of

the normal probability curve shows that we are warranted in saying that the chances are 68 in 100 that the true mean (for an infinitely large sample of college students) would not be likely to fluctuate from the obtained mean more than plus or minus 10. In other words, there are 68 chances in 100 that the true mean is between 5.82 and 6.02. Again referring to the characteristics of the normal probability curve, we note that the chances are almost 100 in 100 that the true mean will be within the limits of 5.92 plus or minus three times σ_M , or between 5.62 and 6.22. Precisely why σ_M makes possible such determinations will not be apparent until one has a greater knowledge of statistics than can be presented in an elementary course in psychology. At this stage it is necessary only to get some idea of the kind of information which statistical analysis provides concerning the reliability of the mean.

Reliability of a difference between means. Suppose an investigator wished to determine whether there is a difference in the learning ability of white and Negro children, of males and females, or of rats deprived of vitamin B₁ and rats fed a normal diet. He would apply a comparable test to a large number of comparable individuals from each group. His next step would be to determine the mean for each group. Suppose that the mean of one group were 95 and that of the other 105. Is this difference of ten points a reliable one? Perhaps in a repetition of this experiment, the difference in means would disappear or even be reversed. Statistical analysis provides a way of determining the probability that the true difference is greater than zero. The measure used is the standard error of the difference between two means, or σ_{Diff} . It makes use of σ_M . The reason for this is rather obvious, for the more reliable the two means, the more probable is it that the difference between them is also reliable.

The formula for σ_{Diff} is

$$\sigma_{Diff} = \sqrt{\sigma_{M_1}^2 + \sigma_{M_2}^2}$$

where $\sigma_{M_1}^2$ is the squared standard error of the

mean of one distribution and σ^2_M is the squared standard error of the mean of the other.

For purposes of illustration, let us suppose that the standard deviations of the two distributions referred to above have been determined, and that the standard errors of the means of 95 and 105, respectively, have been found to be .6 and .9. The further calculation is as follows

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma_{Diff} &= \sqrt{(6)^2 + (.9)^2} \\ &= \sqrt{36 + .81} \\ &= \sqrt{36.81} \\ &= 6.07\end{aligned}$$

The next step is to work out the ratio of σ_{Diff} to the actual difference. This *critical ratio*, or C.R., is

$$\frac{\text{Diff.}}{\sigma_{Diff.}} = \frac{10}{6.07} = 1.65$$

Because of the properties of a normal probability curve, a C.R. of 3 or more indicates that the chances are 99.9 in 100 that the difference between the two means is greater than zero. Thus the difference in our example would clearly be a reliable one.²

CORRELATION

Correlation technique is one of the most useful of all statistical devices. Among the many kinds of information provided by its application to psychological data are the following four

(1) The relation between two or more different performances. What is the relation between scores on an intelligence test and grades in school? In what way, if any, is skill demonstrated in a test of mechanical aptitude related to skill in the workshop? The answer to these and similar questions is of practical and theoretical value. If we can predict an individual's likelihood of success or failure in college before he matriculates, or his possible success or failure in a given occupation before he enters it, we may save him from becoming

a misfit. Vocational guidance has this aim. Information concerning correlation of performances also has theoretical significance by offering a means of determining to what degree different kinds of performance (like intelligence test performances) depend upon comparable abilities, or common factors.

(2) The relation between physique and psychological characteristics. What is the relation, if any, between the height of the forehead and intelligence? Is there any relation between tallness and a tendency to dominate others? What relation exists between measurable aspects of physique and measurable aspects of temperament? The answer to such questions is obtained by application of the correlation technique.

(3) The degree to which different groups are alike in psychological traits. Are identical twins more alike than fraternal twins in intelligence, personality, and other characteristics? Are the psychological characteristics of children related to those of their parents? Answers to such questions provide information on the rôle of heredity and environment in determining psychological characteristics.

(4) Correlation technique is also used to discover the validity and reliability of intelligence, aptitude, and personality tests. A test is valid when it measures what it is said to measure. For example, a test for selecting college scholars is valid if scores on the test are correlated highly with college grades. A test is reliable if results obtained in measuring different individuals, or the same individuals at different times, are comparable — as different measurements taken with a yardstick, say, are comparable. One method of determining reliability is to test the same individuals twice and correlate the two sets of scores. If the correlation is very high, the test is said to be highly reliable.

An understanding of some of our later discussions will depend upon understanding the fundamental concept of correlation and upon appreciation of the meaning of given coefficients of correlation. A good way to illustrate the nature of correlation is to show how a co-

efficient is calculated. By selection of simple figures which require a minimum of clerical work for their correlation, one is able to illustrate clearly at the same time both the meaning of correlation and the essential nature of the correlation technique. The chief danger involved in the selection of these figures is that the reader may overlook the conditions which justify the use of correlation techniques. To offset this danger, we shall state at the outset under what conditions use of correlation technique is justified. An investigator is justified in correlating data only when: (1) these have been obtained under adequately controlled conditions by means of reliable measuring instruments and (2) they have been obtained in relatively large random samplings of the populations concerned.

Let us suppose, purely for illustrative purposes, that subjects A, B, C, D, and E were given problems X, Y, and Z to solve. Let us suppose, furthermore, that the number of errors made in learning each problem was as indicated below. Suppose, in other words, that subject A made only 1 error before learning problem X, 2 before learning problem Y, and 9 before learning problem Z.

Subjects	<i>Errors Made in Learning Three Problems</i>		
	X	Y	Z
A	1	2	9
B	2	3	6
C	3	4	3
D	4	5	8
E	5	6	4

One will note immediately that subject A made the lowest number of errors in X and also the lowest number in Y; that subject B made the next to lowest number of errors in X, and the next to lowest number of errors in Y; and so on, down to subject E, who made the greatest number of errors in both X and Y. The correlation here, as we shall see in a moment, is plus 1.00. Were we to have a large number of actual scores obtained as indicated above, and were these arranged in exactly the manner illustrated, the correlation would be perfect and positive. This is exactly what a

correlation of 1.00 means. No correlation with actual psychological data is ever as perfect as this. A close approximation to a correlation of 1.00 in psychological material is .98 (for scores on a repetition of the Stanford-Binet Test). But correlations as nearly perfect as this are quite rare.

Suppose, now, that we should have the error scores for X (or Y) in reverse order — that is, with 5 at the top and 1 at the bottom. In other words, suppose that the person who made the smallest number of errors in X made the greatest number in Y, the person who made the next lowest number of errors in X made the next to highest number in Y, and so on. Such an arrangement would give us a perfect negative correlation — a correlation of -1.00 . A perfect negative correlation in psychological investigation rarely, if ever, occurs.

A positive correlation would often become a negative one if the question were differently framed. For example, the correlation between the personality trait of extraversion and the trait of dominance is about .40. Suppose we should ask, "What is the correlation between extraversion and submissiveness?" With the same data arranged to answer this question, we would now get a correlation of $- .40$.

The more closely a correlation approaches 1.00, the greater is the relation (positive or negative) between the two things correlated. The meaning of this may be illustrated graphically by using scatter diagrams like those in Figure 197. Here we utilize the selected figures for subjects already mentioned. A scattergram based on actual data is illustrated in Figure 198.

The fact that two or more things are correlated does not, of course, mean that one is necessarily the cause of the other. They might be dependent upon a third factor. In growing children, for example, weight and intelligence are correlated, but intelligence is not the cause of weight, nor weight of intelligence. Height and intelligence are correlated under these circumstances because they both increase




Figure 197. Scatter Diagrams Showing Different Degrees of Correlation

In A is shown the scattergram for the correlation between X and Y. It is interpreted as follows. Subject A made one error on X and two errors on Y, so we represent him with a point at X one and Y two. We do this with each subject. When the scores thus arranged slope toward the right as illustrated in A, the correlation is a perfect positive one. The diagram shows at a glance that the higher a subject's score on X the higher his score on Y. If we reverse the figures, assuming that A, who made one error on X, made 6 on Y, and so on, we get the scattergram shown in B. This represents a perfect negative correlation. In other words, the fewer the errors made in solving one problem the more required in solving the other. In C the correlation, as one can judge from inspection, is negative, but of doubtful magnitude. We know that it is negative because three of the cases slope definitely to the left as in B. Calculation shows that the correlation in C is actually $-.52$.




Figure 198. Scattergram Showing Relation Between I.Q.'s on Two Forms of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test

Each dot represents the intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of one subject on Form M and his I.Q. on Form L. Each child was of course given one form, then the other. High I.Q.'s on M go with high I.Q.'s on L. Here, r is obviously positive and high, actually around $.90$. (From Terman, L. M., and Merrill, M. A., "Measuring Intelligence." Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937, p. 45.)

with a child's age. We see this when we correlate the intelligence and weight of children of the same age, for we then obtain a negligible correlation between weight and intelligence.

Cursory inspection of the table or scatter diagram for the X and Z data in our example does not tell us what correlation, if any, exists. We shall calculate this coefficient as well as that for the X-Y data presently.

There are several methods of calculating a coefficient of correlation. All give similar results, although, under given conditions, certain of them are more conveniently used than others. The *product-moment* and the *rank-difference* methods are those most widely used. The product-moment method is used when the number of cases is large and distributed in an approximately normal manner. The rank-difference method is not ordinarily used with more than thirty cases.

One formula for the product-moment method is:

$$r = \frac{\sum xy}{n \sigma_x \sigma_y}$$

where r is the coefficient of correlation calculated by the product-moment method; x and y , the deviations of X and Y scores from the respective means; n , the number of cases, and σ_x and σ_y , the standard deviations, respectively, of the x and y series of deviations. The application of this formula is as follows:

Subjects	Errors		Deviations			Calculation of σ_x, σ_y	
	X	Y	x	y	xy	x^2	y^2
A	1	2	-2	-2	4	4	4
B	2	3	-1	-1	1	1	1
C	3	4	0	0	0	0	0
D	4	5	1	1	1	1	1
E	5	6	2	2	4	4	4
	15	20			$\sum xy = 10$	$\sum x^2 = 10$	$\sum y^2 = 10$

$$M = \frac{15}{5} = 3 \quad M = \frac{20}{5} = 4 \quad \sigma_x = \sqrt{\frac{10}{5}} \quad \sigma_y = \sqrt{\frac{10}{5}}$$

$$= \sqrt{2} \quad = \sqrt{2}$$

$$r = \frac{10}{5(\sqrt{2} \times \sqrt{2})} = \frac{10}{(5 \times 2)} = 1.00$$

As already indicated by inspection, r is 1.00. By reversing the figures in either X or Y and following the same procedure, one comes out with $-10/10$ or -1.00 . As calculated by this method, the r between X and Z scores is approximately $-.52$.

We shall illustrate the rank-difference method by correlating the X and Z columns. The formula for calculating a rank-difference coefficient, Rho (ρ), is

$$\rho = 1 - \frac{6 \sum D^2}{N(N^2 - 1)}$$

where $\sum D^2$ is the sum of the squared differences between the ranks of scores in the two series and N the number of cases. It is first necessary to determine separately the ranking of individuals in each of the performances to be correlated. The computation is as follows:

Subjects	Errors		Ranks		D	D ²
	X	Z	X	Z		
A	1	9	1	5	4	16
B	2	6	2	3	1	1
C	3	3	3	1	2	4
D	4	8	4	4	0	0
E	5	4	5	2	3	9
					$\sum D^2 = 30$	

$$1 - \frac{6(30)}{5(25 - 1)}$$

$$1 - \frac{180}{5(24)}$$

$$1 - \frac{180}{120}$$

$$1 - 1.50$$

$$= .50$$

The coefficients r and ρ are seldom identical, although they are usually similar. The difference occurs because the formula for ρ , unlike that for r , ignores the differences in actual magnitude of the scores, dealing with them merely in terms of rank. Tables have been worked out so that one can read off the value of r for a given value of ρ . The value of r for a ρ of .50 is, for example, .518. If our figures had been for actual data, and based on a sufficient number of cases, we should say that the ρ of $-.50$ was equivalent to an r of $-.518$.

Here are some approximate correlations, gathered from specific studies, which utilized specific tests of the phenomena correlated: intelligence test scores of identical twins, .90; intelligence test scores of fraternal twins, .70; group intelligence test performance and college grades, .60; scores on a stylus form of the Maier reasoning test and intelligence test scores, .60; scores on a mechanical aptitude test and rated performance in a mechanical job, .58; intelligence test scores of parents and those of their children, .30; intelligence test scores and performances on a stylus maze, .20; and height of the forehead and intelligence, .00.

Before a coefficient of correlation is accepted as indicating a relationship between the variables correlated, it must be evaluated from several angles. One such evaluation is in terms of its reliability. An r is not regarded as reliable unless it is at least four times its probable error.

What does a reliable r of a certain magnitude indicate concerning the variables correlated? Students very frequently, and quite erroneously, think of r as indicating the per cent of relationship between the two variables. Under certain circumstances, it is possible to calculate from r what per cent of dependence of one variable upon another is present. Unless r is nearly 1.00, this per cent is much less than r itself suggests. Suppose we found an r of .50 between intelligence test performance and mathematics grades. It has been calculated that an r of this magnitude indicates 37 per cent dependence of mathematical performance on intelligence, not 50 per cent. According to this manner of interpreting r , an r of .50 means that 37 per cent of the ability required to master mathematics is due to intelligence and 63 per cent to other variables, or that 37 per cent of the factors that contribute to the intelligence test score also contribute to mathematical performance. In order for the dependence to be 50 per cent, r would have to be .707. An r of .95 would indicate only 75 per cent dependence of one variable on the other, and an r of .99, only 88

per cent dependence. An r of 1.00, however, would indicate 100 per cent dependence of one variable on the other.³

There are several other ways in which r may be interpreted. One of these considers r from the standpoint of what percentage of improvement in prediction it allows above the prediction made possible without it—in other words, by guessing. Suppose, for example, that we wish to predict how well a student will do in mathematics. The best guess that we can make is that he will do as well as the average student. He may do better work and he may do poorer work, but the best guess we can make is that his work will be average. Suppose, however, that we have a test of intelligence and that performance on this test is correlated .50 with grades in mathematics. How much better can we predict the student's performance in mathematics if we give him the intelligence test and predict in terms of his score? The answer, worked out by calculations which we cannot describe in an elementary discussion, is 13 per cent better. In other words, an r of .50 between intelligence score and mathematics improves our guess that an individual's performance will be average by 13 per cent. Following this manner of interpreting r , an r of .60 is 20 per cent better than a guess; an r of .80, 40 per cent better than a guess; an r of .90, 56 per cent better than a guess; and an r of 1.00, 100 per cent better than a guess.⁴

It should be apparent, therefore, that one must not take a particular r purely on its face value. It is subject to different interpretations, and its "value" varies accordingly.

SUMMARY

We have reviewed statistical procedures and illustrated them with simplified figures which, because they reduce the sheer computation involved in actual statistical analysis, highlight the main features of statistical analysis. Our goal has been to arouse an appreciation of the value of statistical analysis and to facilitate interpretation of statistical termi-

nology rather than to develop a mastery of statistical techniques.

From what we have presented in this chapter it should be apparent that, once data on individual differences have been accumulated, a frequency distribution enables the investigator to observe the general trend of his findings, and, particularly, to observe how closely they conform to the normal probability curve upon the characteristics of which more refined statistical procedures are frequently based. If the investigator wishes to obtain a more accurate indication of the trend of his findings than is given by the frequency distribution and its graphic representation, he derives measures of central tendency and of variability.

The most obvious and least accurate index of central tendency is the mode, or most frequently occurring score. Other measures of central tendency are the median (middlemost) and the mean (average) scores. We have suggested the manner in which these are derived and also their use in interpreting data on individual differences.

Measures of variability indicate the degree to which scores are scattered from, or concentrated around, the mode, median, or mean. The simplest and least revealing of these is the range, which indicates the degree to which the lowest and the highest measures differ. The standard deviation of the distribution (σ) and probable error (P.E.) receive their interpretation from characteristics of the normal probability curve. They are extremely useful measures of variability. They may be used to mark off the limits, respectively, within which certain percentages of the scores are likely to fall. A small σ or P.E. based upon the mean indicates that scores are piled up near the mean, while a large σ or P.E. reveals that scores are widely scattered from the mean.

We have pointed out that only limited samples of a group (such as Negro or white, male or female), and only limited numbers of measurements on a particular subject (such measures as might indicate his memory span), can be involved in an investigation. For this rea-

son students of individual differences need some index of the reliability of results obtained with particular samples. Such an index is provided by the standard error of the mean (σ_M). This allows us to estimate the chances in one hundred that a particular mean will be likely to change within specified limits. A small σ_M signifies that, were we to repeat the investigation under comparable conditions, the mean obtained would be likely to differ by only a small amount from that already found.

We may also use σ_M to calculate the reliability of a difference between means. The symbol which represents this reliability is the standard error of a difference (σ_{Diff}). If the difference between the means were at least three times the σ_{Diff} we could regard the difference as a reliable one. The index used here is the critical ratio (C.R.) A critical ratio of 3 indicates practical certainty that a difference actually exists; in other words, that a difference would continue to be obtained, were we to repeat the investigation indefinitely.

Correlation techniques, of which we have illustrated two, provide a means of determining the relation between such variables as, for example, the size of the brain and intelligence, and performance on an intelligence test and success in school. The coefficient of correlation (r) is the most widely used index of correlation; hence, it is referred to frequently in psychological literature. The coefficient of rank difference correlation (ρ) is used when there is a small number of cases. The more closely r (or ρ) approximates plus or minus one (± 1) the higher the relationship between the variables correlated. But a coefficient of correlation does not mean per cent of relationship. Percentages of dependence of one variable on another, or of both on some third variable, are calculated from r , but, except when r is very high, these percentages are much lower than r . Coefficients of correlation are also interpreted in terms of the degree to which they improve prediction beyond the guess that performance will be average. Prediction is considered further in Chapter 24.

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Chapter 23

Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE is a function which we may define as "flexibility" or "versatility" of adjustment.¹ It is a function of living organisms in much the same sense that maneuverability and speed are functions of an airplane.

Why is one plane more maneuverable than another? The answer, obviously, is that it has structures which, for purposes of maneuvering, are better than those of the other. The intelligence of living organisms likewise depends upon their structures, chiefly upon the nature of their response systems.

The airplane analogy is, of course, a crude one. There are many differences between even the most complex inanimate machine and a living organism. One difference which is important in the present connection is that the organism's functions are dependent, not only upon its original structures, but also upon modifications of these which have occurred during its lifetime. The modifications referred to are produced by maturation and learning. Intelligence is thus a function which changes as the organism grows and as the organism is modified by what happens to it.

Intelligence is not a function of any particular set of structures, such as the receptors, the effectors, the nervous system, or any part of the latter, but of the entire organism. This does not mean, however, that all parts of the organism are of equal importance, or that their functions play an equally significant rôle in intelligence. Our discussion of response systems has already disclosed that functions of the central nervous system predominate in all psychological processes. The cerebral

cortex is especially important for what we call intelligent behavior.

When organisms at different levels of evolution are observed, it is clear that behavior at one level differs from that at another. The behavior of rats in response to problems in their environment is, for example, much more flexible and much more versatile than the behavior of worms under comparable circumstances. Psychologists say, therefore, that rats are more intelligent than worms. For similar reasons, they say that man's behavior is much more intelligent than that of monkeys and apes.

On a particular level of evolution, one finds large differences in flexibility of adjustment. This is true even on the worm level.² Some worms learn to adjust to new environmental conditions more readily and in a more fitting manner than do others. We may conclude, therefore, that these worms are more intelligent than others.

As we go from worm to man, however, greater individual differences are found in the complex learning processes than in the simpler ones. What might be a good test of learning ability in worms would not be adequate as a test of human learning ability. It would be at or near the limit of learning ability for worms, but elementary for human beings. The genius and the moron would learn it equally well.

Tests which most clearly measure differences in the versatility of human adjustment involve such complex processes as symbolic recall, reasoning, understanding concepts,

and learning and using language. These processes play the major rôle in human adjustment and tests built around them provide the best measures of human intelligence. We may say, therefore, that, so far as human beings are concerned, *intelligence is flexibility or versatility in the use of symbolic processes.*

BEGINNING OF INTELLIGENCE TESTS

Early tests

Some of the earliest of "mental tests" were devised and used in studies of individual differences among college students.³ They involved measurements of speed of reaction, sensory keenness, memory, and various other relatively simple psychological processes. Interest was primarily in noting the extent of individual differences, but not in diagnosing the level of intelligence in particular individuals. The tests were not put to any practical use.

As early as 1896, however, a French psychologist named Binet, who had been studying psychological processes in school children, suggested the creation of special classes for those children who, because of low intelligence, were unable to progress as fast as others. Eight years later, Binet was asked to serve on a commission formed for the express purpose of determining which children in the public schools had insufficient intelligence to profit from the usual instruction. Obviously it would be impossible, without doing an injustice to many children, to segregate them on the basis of teachers' judgments. Teachers would almost surely have prejudices and be subjected to various influences from parents and others. They could not be relied upon to make objective judgments. What was needed was a set of objective tests, tests which would measure the intelligence of all children on a strictly comparable basis without the influence of teachers and parents. Binet felt that a graded series of psychological tests could be devised which would, like a metric measuring device, indicate the level or degree of each child's intelligence.

Development of the first "scale" of intelligence

By experimenting with children who were making average progress in school, Binet and a collaborator named Simon determined which of many attention, memory, discrimination, and other tests could be performed by average individuals. He devised a scale comprising thirty tests arranged from the simplest to the most complex. By applying the scale to individuals known to be feeble-minded, Binet and Simon were able to obtain norms for these. They determined, in other words, how many tests in the average scale could be done by idiots and other individuals classified as feeble-minded.

By applying their intelligence test to school children, Binet and Simon attempted to discover each child's mental development. If a child of five did only the first nine tests in the scale, the tests performed by a normal three-year-old, it was obviously retarded about two years. If a school child failed to go beyond the first six tests, those passed by idiots, he was designated an idiot. As Binet and Simon put it, they wished "simply to show that it is possible to determine in a precise and truly scientific way the mental level of an intelligence, to compare the level with a normal level, and consequently to determine by how many years a child is retarded."⁴

The Revised Binet-Simon tests

There were many defects in their original scale, hence Binet and Simon eventually devised improved scales.

The chief differences between the first Binet-Simon scale and the final revision were: (1) An increase in the number of items. There were thirty items in the original scale. The final scale contained fifty-four items. (2) An attempt to eliminate all items which would require special schooling for their performance. Binet realized that, if the test were to measure ability to acquire, and not merely information, it must comprise items which any normal child, regardless of whether or not he had received training in special fields of knowledge, could be expected to per-

form. (3) Arrangement of the items in age groupings. There were definite tests for various age levels from three years to adulthood.

The test items to be used at a particular age level were not decided upon in an arbitrary fashion. They were tried out on individuals at different age levels. For illustrative purposes, let us consider the items at age five. These comprised weight discrimination, copying a square, repeating a sentence of ten syllables, counting four pennies, and fitting together the halves of a divided triangle. Each of these items was included at this age level because the average five-year-old could do it.

More specifically, Binet and Simon proceeded somewhat as follows: An item was regarded as adequate for testing five-year-old intelligence if from about 60 to 75 per cent of children at this age were able to perform it accurately, if less than about 60 per cent of four-year-olds could do it correctly, and if it was mastered by more than 75 per cent of six-year-olds. In other words, the item had to be too difficult for the age level below and too easy for the age level above, in order to be included at the intermediate level.

The concept of mental age

In line with their arrangement of the scale into age groupings, Binet and Simon developed the concept of *mental age*, or M.A. A child who could do the five-year tests, but who could not go on to the six-year level, was credited with a mental age of five years. The child of chronological age (C.A.) five who achieved an M.A. of five was, of course, regarded as having average or normal intelligence. However, the child with an M.A. of five might actually be ten years old (C.A., ten years). He would, of course, be extremely dull for his age. On the other hand, a child with an M.A. of five and a C.A. of three would be extremely bright. The concept of M.A., therefore, indicated the level of intelligence achieved, but it gave no indication of the brightness or dullness of the individual concerned. A person is not regarded as bright

unless we know that his level of performance is better than others of his own age. He is not thought to be dull unless his performance is below that of others of his own age.

The intelligence quotient

It was later suggested that an intelligence quotient (I.Q.), derived by dividing C.A. into M.A. and multiplying by 100 (to remove decimal places), would be much more meaningful than M.A. alone.⁵ Such a quotient would show the rate with which M.A. was increasing in relation to C.A. In a child of average intelligence, whose M.A. equaled the C.A., the I.Q. would be 100, regardless of the actual age. A child of ten years whose M.A. was found to be 10 would have an I.Q. of $10/10 \times 100$, or 100. A child of ten years whose M.A. was 5 would have an I.Q. of $5/10 \times 100$, or 50. This child would be fifty I.Q. points below average. However, a child of ten years with an M.A. of 14 would have an I.Q. of $14/10 \times 100$ and this would place him forty points above the average child of his own age.

THE STANFORD-BINET TEST

The Stanford-Binet Test was developed along lines laid down by Binet and Simon in their final scales. It is called the "Stanford" Binet because Professor Terman of Stanford University revised it. The latest revision appeared in 1937.

Contents of the test

The 1937 Revision of the Stanford-Binet Test has items arranged for age levels from two to fourteen years.⁶ There are both yearly and half-yearly tests from two to four years and yearly tests from four to fourteen. In addition, there are four groups of tests for adults — one for average adults and three for superior adults. Six items are included in all but the adult levels. The number of items at the adult levels ranges from six to eight. The test materials are illustrated in Figure 199. Some idea of the nature of items at widely




Figure 199. Materials Used in Administering the Stanford-Binet Test

different age levels is given by the following selection.

Items Illustrating the Stanford-Binet Test

Year II

1. Three-hole formboard. (Places forms in holes.)
2. Identifying objects. (Points to each as it is named.)
3. Identifying parts of body. (Indicates named parts of doll.)
4. Block building Tower. (Builds tower from model after demonstration.)
5. Picture vocabulary. (Names common objects.)
6. Word combinations. (Spontaneous word combinations noted.)

Year VIII

1. Vocabulary. (Defines eight words from list.)
2. Memory for stories.
3. Verbal absurdities. (Tells what is foolish about statements.)
4. Similarities and differences. (Tells how certain objects are alike.)
5. Comprehension. (What to do when . . .)
6. Memory for sentences.

Average Adult

1. Vocabulary. (Defines twenty words from list.)
2. Codes. (Writes message in code provided.)
3. Differences between abstract words.
4. Arithmetical reasoning.
5. Proverbs. (Tells their meaning.)
6. Ingenuity. (Reasoning test.)
7. Memory for sentences.
8. Reconciliation of opposites. (Tells in what respects certain opposites are alike.)

How the test was standardized

The procedure followed in standardizing the Stanford-Binet Test of intelligence is similar to that followed in standardizing any good test of individual differences in psychological functions. In general, standardization requires that appropriate items be selected; that a uniform procedure for their administration and scoring be worked out; that they be given a preliminary tryout on a representative sampling of the population on which they are eventually to be used; and that age norms and other relevant norms or standards be determined.

Many items were taken over from the ear-

lier test, itself based upon the Binet-Simon scales. Some were borrowed from other tests. A survey of the literature of child psychology suggested a number of items. Others were included on the basis of experiments carried out by graduate students in the Stanford University psychological laboratory. In this preliminary selection of items, the following criteria were used: (1) the test must be interesting to the child, so much so that he will regard it as a game; (2) the items must not require special schooling; (3) they must really call for use of intelligence; and (4) they must require no more than a reasonable amount of time for their performance and scoring.

Thousands of possible items were gathered before the real problem of sifting was undertaken. The most promising items from all these were still too numerous. However, a large number of items were tried out on one thousand school- and five hundred preschool children in the neighborhood of Stanford University. Some of the items were found too easy and others too difficult. Since they failed to differentiate, these items were dropped. After a sifting had taken place on this basis, there were enough additional items to form two comparable tentative intelligence scales. The items in these two provisional scales were arranged into age groupings upon the basis of the results actually obtained in using them. For example, those which average seven-year-olds successfully performed, but which were too difficult for six-year-olds and too easy for eight-year-olds, were placed at the seven-year level.

A uniform procedure for the administration and scoring of each item was carefully worked out, again on the basis of results obtained in the preliminary administration. Instructions were worded to avoid ambiguity and suggestions concerning the correct response. Seven psychologists who were to give the test in its final standardization were trained for two months, so that, in the administration and scoring of the provisional scale, they would follow, as closely as possible, an unvarying procedure.

The uniform procedure is of extreme importance in standardization. It is just as important in administration by any tester. Those who administer the Stanford-Binet Test usually receive, in college or in graduate school, a course of instruction which familiarizes them with the theory and technique of testing. They learn the various items of the test, how to administer them correctly, and how to score and interpret the results. They are, in addition, usually required to administer from twenty-five to fifty tests under critical supervision before placing any reliance upon the results of their testing.

The importance of standardization in administration of tests may be illustrated by the following hypothetical case. Suppose one tester says to the child who is to be tested, "Well, Johnny, today we are going to see how bright you are", while another says, "Well, Johnny, how would you like to play some games?" One can see quite readily that the attitude of Johnny might be quite different in one case from that in the other. Suppose, moreover, that an item in the test requires the child to tell how he would find a ball if it were lost in a field. Without standardized administration of the item, one tester might say, "How would you find your ball?" The other might say, "What system would you follow in finding your ball?" A systematic procedure would be suggested in the latter case and not in the former. If a systematic procedure were required in order to obtain credit for this item, one child might pass and the other fail, the scores differing because there was a deviation in administration of the test item, not because of a difference in intelligence.

Both in standardizing tests and in administering their final form, one is, in a sense, performing an experiment. The test is the independent variable, the child's performance the dependent variable, and the standardized procedure the set of controls or constants.

What we have said about the administration of tests applies to their scoring. The scoring is as objective as possible. This means that every person who scores a test uses the same criteria. Such criteria are set up beforehand, and testers are trained to apply them correctly.

The provisional forms of the Stanford-Binet Test were administered by the trained examiners to approximately three thousand individuals ranging in age from two to eighteen years. These individuals, from seventeen

different communities in eleven states, were selected as representative of the entire country. The schools from which they came were judged to be average ones. Selection of the persons to be tested was such that they proportionally represented the various socio-economic groups (professional, skilled labor, unskilled labor, and the like). All individuals were American-born whites.

The examiners determined the average scores made by age and sex groups. Average M.A.'s attained by groups of various chronological ages were found to be close to the chronological age. The average I Q's, therefore, were approximately 100 at each age level. Moreover, the average I Q of boys and girls was approximately the same. Only a few slight changes in the test were suggested by the tryout. We have already (p 398) shown how the I Q's were distributed in a group of 2904 children.

How a child is tested

The tester places little reliance on the I.Q. obtained unless the child being tested is at his ease. Those who administer the Stanford-Binet and other individual tests of intelligence

are instructed to win the child's confidence and attempt to overcome any nervousness or timidity. One way in which this may be accomplished with young children is to suggest that the tester and the child are playing a game. The tester also encourages the child by praising his performance. Such encouragement is given, whether the responses are right or wrong. The child is never told, "That is wrong." He is encouraged by such comments as, "That's very good, now we'll try the next one." An ideal relationship between the tester and the child is illustrated in Figure 200.

After the child is at his ease, the tester administers the test items in accordance with established procedure. If the child is judged to be far below normal, the tester begins with test items far below those designed for the actual C.A. level. Should the child appear about average, however, the first items administered are those for children one year below the actual C.A. Take a child of nine years and two months, for example. If he appears about normal or above, he is given the items for year VIII. If he passes the six items at this level, he is next given those for year IX. Should he pass these, the child is




Figure 200. A 5-Year-Old Being Given the Stanford-Binet Test
(from the film "Testing the I.Q.," distributed by Warden and Gilbert, Columbia University.)

next given the items for year X. Here, perhaps, he passes only four of the six tests. At the next level, year XI, he succeeds in doing two tests. The child does one test, say, at the XII level. Let us suppose, furthermore, that he fails to perform any test at the thirteen-year level. The test terminates at this point. The child's I.Q. is then calculated as follows:

<i>M.A. in months</i>		
Year IX	All tests passed	108
Year X	Four tests passed	8
Year XI	Two tests passed	4
Year XII	One test passed	2
Year XIII	All tests failed	0
		<hr/> 122 months

$$\text{I.Q.} = \frac{\text{M.A.}}{\text{C.A.}} \times 100 = \frac{122}{110} \times 100 = 110.9, \text{ or } 111$$

Observe that the child is credited with all the months of mental age prior to the highest level at which he passes all items. This is called the basal age. In the present example, it is nine years, or 108 months. He is then credited with an additional two months for each item passed between this age and the level on which he fails all items. The credit per item is two months because there are six items at each level. In our example, the child gets an additional eight months credit at year X, an additional four at year XI, and an additional two at year XII.

The psychologist is not satisfied to determine the I.Q. and stop there. He notes the various items passed and those failed. Moreover, he observes the "quality" of the various responses. In this way, he makes an inventory of the strong and the weak functions which combine to yield the child's particular score. For diagnostic purposes, this analysis is often much more useful than the mere determination of an I.Q.

In calculating I.Q.'s for individuals older than thirteen, one does not divide the M.A. by the actual C.A., but by a figure which has been decided upon in the light of standardization results. The divisor increases gradually from 13 to 15. When the individual is over fifteen years of age, the divisor is always 15. The reason for disregarding

actual C.A. at the upper age levels is that yearly increments in M.A., as determined by the Stanford-Binet Test, gradually decrease after the age of thirteen years. From the age of fifteen years on, there is no further increase in M.A. with an increase in C.A. The significance of this will receive further consideration later.

Interpretation of Stanford-Binet I.Q.'s

The I.Q.'s obtained with tests other than the Stanford-Binet, although they are based upon the same fundamental concepts as those involved in this test, are not always comparable with Stanford-Binet I.Q.'s. It is customary, therefore, to designate the test with which the I.Q. was determined.

M.A. and I.Q. are comparative rather than absolute measures of intelligence. The reason for designating I.Q.'s as "Stanford-Binet I.Q.'s" is that their significance is purely comparative. When we say, for example, that the abovementioned child has an M.A. of 122 months, we are pointing out merely that he has reached a level of intelligence roughly equivalent to that reached by children of C.A. 122 months in the group on which the test was standardized. We are justified in saying that he has a particular M.A. or I.Q. only when: (1) he has had educational opportunities comparable with those of the children who formed the standardization group; (2) the standardized procedure of administration and scoring has been followed; (3) he has been at his ease and has co-operated to the best of his ability while taking the test; and (4) he has suffered no physical or social handicaps (glandular defects, home conflicts, and so on) which might have prevented him from making the best possible use of his educational opportunities.

We see, therefore, that the value of an M.A. or an I.Q. is relative rather than absolute. It is relative to the standardization group and the conditions under which this group was tested. We shall have something to say later about the question of whether the I.Q. indicates anything about native capacity for intelligent behavior.

Keeping the above facts in mind, we can proceed to a discussion of the meaning of Stanford-Binet I.Q.'s. When a child is said to have an I.Q. of 111, this indicates merely that the rate at which his M.A. increases is slightly in advance of the rate at which his C.A. increases. If his I.Q. remains at 111, or thereabouts, year after year, we are justified in concluding that he remains at the same level above the average of other children of his age, or that his initial advantage is maintained year after year. It does not mean, however, that his intelligence remains the same year after year, only the rate of mental growth is constant when the I.Q. is constant. From our previous discussion of the I.Q., it will be recalled that, when M.A. and C.A. increase at the same rate, the I.Q. is 100. An I.Q. below 100 indicates that M.A. is increasing more slowly than C.A. The amount by which the I.Q. exceeds 100 is a rough index of the degree of mental precocity; the amount by which it fails to reach 100, a rough index of the degree of mental retardation. If the individual's I.Q. remains the same at yearly age levels, we can say that he maintains his relative position in the group.

It is customary to refer to levels of intelligence in terms of I.Q. ranges as indicated in Table 9.

TABLE 9. LEVELS OF INTELLIGENCE IN TERMS OF STANFORD-BINET I.Q. RANGES

	<i>I.Q. Range</i>
Idiot .	0- 25
Imbecile	25- 50
Moron .	50- 70
Borderline.	70- 80
Low normal	80- 90
Normal ..	90-110
Superior..	110-120
Very superior 120-140
Near genius 140 and over

HOW CONSTANT IS THE RELATIVE LEVEL OF TEST PERFORMANCE?

Before answering this question specifically with reference to I.Q., we might, with advan-

tage, turn our attention to the consistency of brightness and dullness as evidenced in everyday life. In other words, does a child who is bright tend to remain bright and the child who is dull tend to remain dull, or do bright children ever become dull and dull children become bright? The answer is rather obviously that the bright tend to remain bright and the dull tend to remain dull. We might, with advantage, put this in another way. The child who shows a high initial level of achievement in relation to other children usually maintains a relatively high level of achievement. Likewise, the child who is initially below the average level of achievement usually remains below it.

We do not need intelligence tests to indicate that extreme cases of brightness and dullness tend to maintain their relative status. Such cases as the following illustrate later accomplishment that was foreshadowed by early accomplishment.⁷

Childhood precocity

John Stuart Mill, the great English philosopher, logician, and economist, began the study of Greek at three, read Plato at seven, studied Latin, geometry, and algebra at eight, and at twelve was studying philosophy. At the age of six years he began a history of Rome, part of the first paragraph of which was as follows:

We know not any part, says Dionysius of Halicarnassus, of the History of Rome till the Sicilian invasions. Before that time, the country had not been entered by any foreign invader. After the expulsion of Sicilians, Iberian (?) kings reigned for several years; but in the time of Latinus, Aeneas, son of Venus and Anchises, came to Italy, and established a kingdom there called Albania. He then succeeded Latinus in the government, and engaged in the wars of Italy. The Rutuli, a people living near the sea, and extending along the Numicius up to Lavinium, opposed him.

Charles Dickens was reading such books as *The Vicar of Wakefield*, *Don Quixote*, and *Robinson Crusoe* before he was seven years old. He wrote a tragedy before he was seven. Similar feats could be cited for most of the

three hundred geniuses whose careers have been studied by psychologists.

Follow-up studies of children whose I.Q.'s were very high when first determined have shown that, in most instances, the promise of childhood has been fulfilled. A girl whose I.Q. was found to be 188 wrote the following prayer at the age of seven:

Oh, Master of fire! Oh, Lord of air,
Oh, God of waters, hear my prayer!
Oh, Lord of ground and of stirring trees,
Oh, God of man and of pleasant breeze,
Dear Father, let me happy be —
As happy as a growing tree!

At twelve she wrote the following fable of the missionary and the untutored child of nature:

Now, behold, there was once an Untutored Child of Nature whose abode was in the wildest wilds of Africa, whose name was Itchy-galoop. And he lived in primitive bliss and ate mangosteens and fried pig, and his drink was the limpid waters of the brook. And he wore a neat but not gaudy garment of leaves, and used no hair tonic.

And it came to pass that a Missionary came unto those wilds and when he beheld Itchy-galoop with his incumbrous garments he was aghast and said unto him:

"Untutored Child of Nature, the way thou goest thou wilt inevitably end up in perdition, so come to my tent and be baptized tomorrow at nine A.M."

And Itchy-galoop was awed by the majestic and noble aspect of the Missionary's nose, and consented.

And the Missionary was glad, and said unto him: "I will now proceed to civilize thee." So he got out his second-best pair of pants and a violet shirt and arrayed Itchy-galoop therein.

And it came to pass that when Itchy-galoop had learned to read, the Missionary presented him with a book of the science of medicine and hygiene. And Itchy-galoop looked therein and was dismayed. He saw plainly that it was a miracle he had survived so long, and began industriously to study.

And he boiled the limpid water of the brook before he quaffed thereof, and partook no more of fried pig which is hard to digest, and washed his mangosteens before he ate of them. And he thumped his chest doubtfully and felt of his pulse, and foresaw that he was dying of tuberculosis and

heart disease. And he said, "Yea, it is a certainty that I have every disease in this book from appendicitis on." So he took unto a folding couch that the Missionary had brought and groaned when he thought he ought to.

And when he had survived for a week in this precarious state he awoke one morning with a feeling of unaccountable happiness. And he said unto himself, "This is verily the light-heartedness before the end," and felt his pulse. And suddenly it came to him that the sky was blue and that he was feeling better than ever in his life before. A great conviction dawned on him and he arose and went in search of the Missionary and said to him with menacing aspect, "Get out of here on the double-quick, and if you come into my vision perambulating around in this vicinity again I will immediately examine into the contents of your cranium with my primeval stone hatchet."

And Itchy-galoop stood on a high hill and when the speck of Missionary had faded into the distance he took the book and wrapped his trousers around it and threw it far out into the sea. And he sighed with happiness and went and ate some mangosteens without washing them.

This child, whose real name is not disclosed, is reported to have become a writer of poetry and fiction which ranks with that of the greatest writers.

Only one more case of consistent precocity during the years from childhood to adulthood can be cited here. We shall take the case of Winifred Sackville Stoner, who could talk and knew colors at the age of six months.⁸

At sixteen months she could read, and at two years she wrote her own name on hotel registers and began keeping a diary. At three years, she amazed adults by her spelling, and learned to use the typewriter as an aid in learning to spell and to memorize. At four, she learned the Latin declensions and conjugations, and received a diploma in Esperanto. When five years of age, she wrote stories and jingles for newspapers, spoke eight languages, translated "Mother Goose" rhymes into Esperanto, and learned to waltz, two-step, and three-step. At seven, she learned the Greek, Roman, and Scandinavian mythology, and at nine, passed the entrance examination to one of the largest western universities. At eleven, she began to specialize in music, art, and dancing, continuing

her academic work and physical training. At twelve, she was pronounced ready for graduate work in any university in the country.

Consistent retardation

Each case of precocity could be matched with one of continued retardation during childhood and on into adulthood. One case will suffice to illustrate the general picture presented by such mental retardation.⁹

Grace was seven when she entered kindergarten. Here she did very good work. During her early years of schooling she learned well, but needed drill before she could retain. During her pre-adolescent period she became a problem child, getting into difficulties and finding it impossible to get along with the other children. In formal school work she was making little, if any, progress. At fifteen, she read poorly from the second reader, recognized words slowly, and could not tell new words from their sound. During her seventeenth year, she worked a period a day for four weeks in an attempt to memorize a poem of five verses. Even then she could not recite it twice in the same way. She was doing third-grade work in spelling and reading. She learned to tell the time, but had difficulty in grasping the idea. Problems involving arithmetical reasoning were beyond her. From the age of twenty, she has been a sex problem. At the last report she was a waitress. Her general mental level as an adult is about eight or nine years.

Constancy in the I.Q.

If mental growth is constant, the Stanford-Binet I.Q. will, under certain conditions, remain constant. The test is constructed in such a way that this will be true, provided it is properly administered and scored, and the children tested have had opportunities comparable to those of the standardization group. Thus, if a child's level of performance on the test at six years is equivalent to that of average six-year-olds in the standardization group, his level of performance at seven years will be equivalent to that of the average seven-year-olds in the standardization group. If his mental growth is constant, in other words, his I.Q. will remain around 100 at each yearly level up to that at which mental growth, as measured by

the test, ceases. Likewise, the child of six whose test performance is ahead or behind that of other six-year-olds will, if his mental growth is constant, be the same relative distance ahead or behind the performance of seven-year-olds, eight-year-olds, and so on. His I.Q. will be approximately the same number of points above or below 100 at all of these ages.

On the average, there is less than a five-point (plus or minus) change in the I.Q. from year to year after about the fifth or sixth year.¹⁰ Children whose I.Q. is 100 at six will probably not have an I.Q. of less than 95 or more than 105 at seven, eight, nine, and so on. We have said "probably" because there are certain exceptions to the rule.¹¹

Changes in the I.Q.

Two cases exhibiting a progressive change in I.Q. have recently been reported.¹² One child, whose initial Stanford-Binet I.Q. was 123 (C.A. five years, six months) had an I.Q. two years later of 126. The I.Q. then changed at yearly intervals as follows: 133, 150, 143, 147, 151. The child's school progress also showed a spurt. Another child, first tested at the age of six years, had an initial I.Q. of 94. One and one half years later her I.Q. was 100. However, annual tests over the next three years yielded successively smaller I.Q.'s. These were 89, 80, and 74. The child's school record also exhibited a decline. In neither of these cases was there any evidence of changes in health, in schooling, or in the home environment which might have accounted for the change in I.Q.

Adverse physical conditions may affect the I.Q. Sometimes removal of an adverse physical condition, like deficient thyroid function, is followed by a change in the I.Q.¹³

Consider the case of an allegedly feeble-minded boy, who, at the age of twelve, had a mental age comparable to that of a child of eight. The boy's intelligence quotient (I.Q.) — the ratio of his performance to the average for his actual age — was 67, as compared with the norm of 100. When he took an intelligence test for the first time, he was

stunted in physical growth and had been leading a very quiet life at home, where there had been no systematic attempt, for several years, to stimulate his mental development. He was then taken to an expert diagnostician who made practically all the tests of metabolism known at that time to medical science. The boy was prescribed a special diet, given thyroid treatment, and at the same time placed in the hands of a trained teacher. Within two years he had grown considerably more than could have been expected without medical treatment and the soundness of his physical condition had vastly improved. He was tested again, this time at the age of fourteen, when his mental age was twelve, and his intelligence quotient was 86. How much of his improvement was ascribable to medical treatment is uncertain, but the boy was able to meet new problem situations which he had never solved before, demonstrating that his mental development was not the consequence of mechanical drill.

A possible interpretation of this case is that the thyroid defect, perhaps through the lethargy that goes with it, prevented the child from learning as much as children of his age, but of normal health, are able to learn. When his defect was corrected, his motivation became better. With a teacher provided to guide his learning, he was able to come closer to the performance norms for children having normal health and opportunities to learn.

Unusual environmental conditions lead to changes in I.Q. The average Stanford-Binet I.Q. of children, like the Kentucky mountaineers, who are isolated from normal educational opportunities, is below the average for children given normal schooling.¹⁴ The I.Q. of these children usually declines with age. This decline probably occurs because a poor environment does not handicap so much on the simpler tests at the lower age levels as it does on the more complex tests at the upper age levels, where language plays a bigger part in the test. When given normal educational opportunities, these children, despite their initial handicap, often show a marked increase in I.Q.

Certain racial groups, like the Indian and the Negro, are similarly handicapped educa-

tionally. The average I.Q.'s of Indian children range between 70 and 80. The I.Q. of northern Negroes has ranged, in the various groups studied, from around 80 to 90. Groups of southern Negroes, on the other hand, usually have average I.Q.'s between 75 and 80.¹⁵ One of the very few individuals with an I.Q. of 200, however, is a Negro child. Her father is an electrical engineer (Case School of Applied Science and Cornell University) and her mother a normal-school graduate and a former school-teacher. This child, by contrast with most Negro children, has had an excellent home environment and has attended a good city school for both Negroes and whites. She is a full-blooded Negress.¹⁶ Chinese and Japanese children tested in California have average I.Q.'s of around 100. These, however, are highly selected groups with good home environment and good schooling.

Some of the differences in I.Q.'s between the above groups and more privileged groups may be attributed to differences in educational opportunity. The fact remains, however, that the Stanford-Binet Test was standardized on white children in schools rated in their community as average. Since children living in relative isolation do not have average schooling, and since the Negro and the Indian also frequently suffer educational handicaps, the Stanford-Binet Test is not applicable to them. In fact, an I.Q. determined with the test would, for them, be practically meaningless.

After they attend nursery school a year or two, children often show an increase in I.Q. Several studies have shown no increase, but several others have shown an average increase of seven points after one year, and of ten points after two years of nursery-school attendance.¹⁷ These studies have been criticized from almost every conceivable angle, including the point that I.Q.'s determined for preschool children change under any circumstances.¹⁸ The crucial fact, however, is that nursery-school children (depending somewhat on the particular nursery school attended) have educational opportunities not enjoyed

by children on whom the Stanford-Binet Test was standardized. This applies, also, to other tests not standardized with adequate representation of nursery-school children. The advantage which nursery-school children (as a group) have over the standardization group may well be reflected in a rise of seven to ten points in the I.Q., at least during the preschool and early school years.

What basis is there for the rise in points? A child who has been in nursery school a year usually has learned to co-operate with adults other than his parents much more than before he went to nursery school, and much more than another child who has not gone to nursery school. He is often given tests of one kind or another, especially if connected with a university nursery school, which may get him accustomed to test situations. He is sometimes used by graduate students as a subject in their experiments, which may also add to his preparation for taking the Stanford-Binet, or a comparable test. In many nursery schools, if not all, the child builds with blocks, threads beads, listens to stories being read, puts simple jigsaw puzzles together, and, among many other things, learns to dress himself. Many of these activities are directly or indirectly involved in the test at the early age levels. The preschool children in the standardization group did not, as a group, have such opportunities to learn things which would be helpful in the testing situation.

In short, regardless of whatever other criticisms are made of the nursery-school studies, an I.Q. determined for nursery-school children does not mean the same thing as an I.Q. determined for the same child before he went to nursery school, or for other children of the same age who have not gone to nursery school. The Stanford-Binet I.Q., as we have already said, is meaningful only when used with children who have had approximately average educational opportunities for their age level.

Although the I.Q. fluctuates markedly in cases like those cited, the general picture is one of relative constancy. Granting continuance of average educational opportunities in

the school system and in the home, and reasonably good health, the child with an I.Q. of 100 will probably maintain average status, the child with a higher than average I.Q. will probably maintain higher than average status, and the child with a below average I.Q. will probably maintain below average status. These children will probably have the same I.Q. within a range of about five points in either direction, between the years of, say, six and twelve. Below six and above twelve, the Stanford-Binet Test is not so good a differentiating instrument as between the year levels indicated, and fluctuations of I.Q. above and below these levels may be attributed to this fact rather than to actual changes in relative status.

But the student may well ask, "Does the I.Q., which has so far been dealt with only as an index of relative performance, really indicate how much intelligence a person has?" The answer to that question is that the concept of intelligence is a relative concept. Intelligence is a function which, as we pointed out earlier, we infer from individual differences in performance. The test does not measure intelligence in any absolute sense — it measures relative performance. But the student may say, "I recognize that intelligence cannot be measured directly as one measures a person's height or weight, but how about the differences in I.Q. — do they not indicate a difference in intelligence, a difference in this versatility function?" The answer is that, under conditions which make the Stanford-Binet Test applicable, differences in I.Q. do represent differences in intelligence. All children with I.Q.'s of 100, who have had average opportunities to learn and whose health is not seriously defective, may be said to have approximately the same intelligence, or the same versatility in the use of symbolic processes. Likewise, all children who, under comparable conditions, have an I.Q. of 120, may be said to be more intelligent or versatile symbolically than all children who, under comparable conditions, have an I.Q. of 100. We may say, too, that all these children are

equally in advance of the average level of intelligence. We do this without measuring what some have called raw intelligence.

HEREDITY AND ENVIRONMENT AGAIN

Closely tied in with the question of what the Stanford-Binet Test measures and the constancy of the I.Q. is the question of whether differences in I.Q. represent, or reflect, differences in heredity or in environment. This is an issue on which there has been more heated controversy than on any other issue in psychology.

We have defined human intelligence as versatility of adjustment, especially in the realm of symbolic processes. We have said that its growth is a function of maturation (primarily an hereditary influence) and of what has happened to the individual, or what he has learned (primarily an environmental influence). Defined in these terms, intelligence is obviously attributable to both heredity and environment.

But how about differences in intelligence? It is obvious that differences in intelligence would also result from heredity, from environment, or from both. Differences in I.Q. — in relative versatility — may reflect an hereditary or an environmental influence, or a combination of these influences.

When heredity is constant, as in identical twins (pp. 76-77), any difference in I.Q., assuming that the conditions of the standardization group have been met, represents a difference in environment and in environment alone. If we could hold the environment constant (which we cannot do in any strict sense), average differences in I.Q. greater than plus or minus five points would represent average differences in heredity and in heredity alone.

One will recall, from the discussion in Chapter 5, that rats reared in the same environment differ greatly in maze performance, and that the difference is attributed to a difference in their inheritance. There is no doubt in the writer's mind that, were we able to hold the environment of human beings constant, there would be marked differences in intelligence

which we would be justified in attributing to differences in inheritance. The closest we can come to the requirement of a constant environment in human beings is to give them comparable opportunities to learn the kinds of things involved in the Stanford-Binet Test. We can then assume that, within certain limits which cannot completely be specified, the differences in I.Q. among these individuals would represent a difference in their inheritance.

The reason for not being dogmatic about this statement is that we cannot even be certain that individuals in the same school and home always have comparable opportunities to learn. They may differ in health. The teacher may treat one child kindly and the other harshly. The parents may take different attitudes, helping one child with his studies and not helping the other. How much difference in the I.Q. these variations in health, in school, and in the home would produce is not known. That they would produce some effect is almost certain.

Those who define intelligence as an innate capacity and regard the I.Q. as an index of this capacity might not agree with the above conclusions, so it is well to see how their point of view could, in a sense, be reconciled with that expressed here. Let us, first of all, consider two definitions of intelligence which invoke the concept of inherited capacity. One writer defines intelligence as "An inherited capacity of the individual which is manifested through his ability to adapt to and reconstruct the factors of his environment in accordance with the most fundamental needs of himself and his group"¹⁹ Warren's *Dictionary of Psychology* gives, among other definitions, the following: Intelligence is "the capacity of certain organisms to meet a novel situation by improvising a novel adaptive response"²⁰ Both definitions suggest that versatility, especially with respect to symbolic processes, is an aspect of intelligence, but intelligence is defined as the capacity for such versatility. The first definition says that intelligence is an innate capacity, while the

other does not. But the dictionary from which the latter was taken defines capacity as innate. It says that capacity is "the full potentiality of an individual for any function, as limited by his *native constitution* and as measured, theoretically, by the extent to which that function would develop under optimal conditions" 21

If intelligence is an innate capacity, then it cannot be affected by environment, and, if the I.Q. is a measure of innate capacity, which is, of course, determined at fertilization, it cannot fluctuate. We avoid this obviously ridiculous predicament if we define intelligence in terms of what we actually measure, or sample, by use of the intelligence tests — namely, versatility. Some who have said that "intelligence is what the intelligence tests measure" have just this predicament in mind.

"But," the student may ask, "don't those who define intelligence as an innate capacity have any basis for this definition?" The answer is that they do have a basis, but a somewhat precarious one. They reason somewhat as follows: with educational opportunities approximately constant, as in standardization of the Stanford-Binet Test, I.Q.'s do differ widely from one child to another. With the assumption that educational opportunities (environmental factors) are constant, there follows the conclusion that what underlies a given I.Q. is inherited, or that the differences in I.Q.'s reflect inherited differences in capacity. They then define intelligence as an innate capacity.

One avoids much confusion, however, if he speaks of intelligence as versatility, which is measurable, or possible of sampling, by use of tests, rather than as a capacity, which is not measurable directly.

One may then ask, "Are differences in versatility (or in I.Q. which is said to be an index of it) the result of differences in capacity to *develop* intelligence?" We would answer in the affirmative, but specifying, of course, that the standardized conditions of the test be met, and that it be recognized that some fluctuation in I.Q. may occur as a result of inability

to hold educational opportunities exactly constant.

One may then ask, "Is the capacity to develop intelligence due to heredity or environment, or both?" We would unhesitatingly answer, "Both."

"But," the student may ask, "which produces larger differences in this capacity to develop intelligence — heredity or environment?" We would answer this question, as we did in Chapter 5, by saying that larger differences in intelligence — or capacity to develop it — can be produced by variations in heredity than by variations in environment.

There are no experimental data on human beings to support this view — because we cannot hold environment strictly constant for them — but the results of animal experiments and inferences which may be drawn from the evolution of intelligent behavior unqualifiedly support it. An old saying, which is quite to the point, is that "you can't make silk purses out of sows' ears." What you have to begin with (heredity) always places very large limitations on what you can develop from it by means at your disposal (environment). A rat in a human environment responds only to the grosser aspects of it. A monkey is more responsive than a rat to what a human being's environment has to offer. A chimpanzee is still more responsive. But the most favorable human environment could never make a genius out of a chimpanzee any more than out of a monkey or a rat. The differences in intelligence from one of these levels to another are obviously ascribable to the inherited makeup of the organisms involved.

Likewise, a congenital idiot, whose idiocy results from defective inheritance or defective prenatal environment or both (pp. 74-75), will also make relatively little of the opportunities for development offered by a human environment — even the finest that one might provide. His mental growth may be no more influenced by the educational opportunities available than would be that of a chimpanzee. On the other hand, a child with superior en-

dowment may make the fullest use of the opportunities provided by his environment. He may even get out of a nonstimulating educational environment, whereas the idiot could not if he wanted to.

We say that the initially superior individual *may* make the fullest use of his opportunities because there are many instances, especially at the upper school ages and in college, where those of superior endowment do not make the best possible use of their opportunities. Those of low initial ability could not, even if they would, respond to these opportunities. Those of high ability, on the other hand, can make use of these opportunities if they are so inclined.

THE VALUE OF DETERMINING A CHILD'S I.Q.

We have seen that, provided a child has had average or normal opportunities to learn, his I.Q. gives us an approximate index of his level of achievement. Of what use is such information? Three uses are of outstanding importance:

(1) If the child's I.Q. is lower than that of the least successful children in the school system, we can keep him from going through the regular educational channels, where he will fall farther and farther behind his schoolmates. Many school systems provide so-called "opportunity classes" where special attention is given the mentally backward child. He can go farther this way than in the regular classes — without being made to feel inferior and without detracting from the attention other children should receive from the teacher. Moreover, there can be an increasing emphasis, as the child gets older, on practical things that he can learn to do instead of increasing emphasis on symbolic activities that are beyond him.

Those children who are too low mentally to profit from any regular schooling can be put in institutions where, with others of their kind, they can be reasonably well adjusted. One will recall, from what was said earlier, that the tests were first devised for this purpose.

Some of the higher-grade feeble-minded make useful citizens if properly trained. Most institutions for the feeble-minded train the higher-grade inmates to do useful work around the institution and, in some instances, to do housework in homes where they are placed and supervised.

(2) Children with exceptionally high intelligence are often a problem to their parents, to their teachers, and to their other associates, unless sorted out and given opportunities to use their abilities. Teachers without special training are not always good at recognizing superior intelligence. Here is a case in point. The Negro girl of 200 I.Q. mentioned earlier in this chapter was rated lower in intelligence by her teacher than a child whose I.Q. turned out to be 100. Inability of the teacher to recognize genius in her pupils sometimes leads her to report as "trouble-making" what, for the gifted child far more advanced than she is in intelligence, is only natural. Consider the following statement by the late Doctor Leta Stetter Hollingworth, a genius who became a psychologist especially interested in the education of mentally gifted children:²²

As a form of failure to suffer fools gladly, negativism may develop. The foolish teacher who hates to be corrected by a child is unsuited to these children. Too many children of I.Q. 170 are being taught by teachers of I.Q. 120. Into this important matter of the selection of the teacher we cannot enter, except to illustrate the difficulty from recent conversation with a ten-year-old boy of I.Q. 165. This boy was referred to us as a school problem. "Not interested in the school work. Very impudent. A liar." The following is a fragment of conversation with this boy:

What seems to be your main problem in school?
Several of them.

Name one.

Well, I will name the teachers. Oh, boy! It is bad enough when the pupils make mistakes, but when the teachers make mistakes, oh, boy!

Mention a few mistakes the teachers made.

For instance, I was sitting in 5A and the teacher was teaching 5B. She was telling those children that the Germans discovered printing, that Gutenberg was the first discoverer of it, mind you. After

a few minutes I couldn't stand it. I am not supposed to recite in that class, you see, but I got up. I said, "No; the Chinese invented, not discovered printing, before the time of Gutenberg — while the Germans were still barbarians."

Then the teacher said, "Sit down. You are entirely too fresh." Later on, she gave me a raking-over before the whole class. Oh, boy! What teaching!

It seemed to me that one should begin at once in this case about suffering fools gladly. So I said, "Ned, that teacher is foolish, but one of the very first things to learn in the world is to suffer fools gladly." The child was so filled with resentment that he heard only the word "suffer."

"Yes, that's it. That's what I say! Make 'em suffer. Roll a rock on 'em."

Before we finished the conversation, Ned was straightened out on the subject of who was to do the suffering. He agreed to do it himself.

I will cite another conversation, this time with a nine-year-old, of I.Q. 183.

What seems to be your main trouble at your school?

The teacher can't pronounce.

Can't pronounce what?

Oh, lots of things. The teacher said "Magdalen College" — at Oxford, you know. I said, "In England they call it Modlin College." The teacher wrote a note home to say I am rude and disorderly. She does not like me.

Just one more conversation, this time with an eight-year-old, of I.Q. 178, sent as a school problem.

What is your main trouble at school?

My really main problem is not at school.

Where is it, then?

It is the librarian.

How is that?

Well, for instance, I go to the library to look for my books on mechanics. I am making a new way for engines to go into reverse gear. The librarian says, "Here, where are you going? You belong in the juvenile department." So I have to go where the children are all supposed to go. But I don't stay there long, because they don't have any real books there. Say, do you think you could get me a card to the other department?

One can readily see that children like this might get into many difficulties, perhaps drift into delinquency, unless treated by parents,

teachers, and others with due regard to their intelligence.

There are now special schools in some cities where children with very high I.Q.'s learn the three R's in about one quarter of the time required in regular schools and spend the rest of their time on projects which whet their almost insatiable curiosity.

At the Speyer School in New York City there is a class for "rapid learners" established by Mrs. Hollingworth. Seven- to nine-year-olds in this class work together under teacher guidance. At the time when Mrs. Hollingworth last wrote, they were, among other things, preparing a series of handbooks entitled "The Evolution of Common Things"; they had cards to the New York Public Library and did their research there under teacher guidance; they worked on a project dealing with biography in which they "biografied" (a term of their own invention) one hundred people, they studied French language and literature; they took trips to places of educational interest; they studied nutrition; played games involving intellectual skill (chess and checkers); they studied handicrafts; and they studied a number of other things. No home work was assigned.

Mrs. Hollingworth looks upon such children as possible benefactors of the human race who might, without such opportunities, become clever rogues and thieves — aggressively set against the society that, in the shape of their teachers, frustrated them unduly. Think of the child who wanted to make the teacher suffer.

Mrs. Hollingworth says that

The intellectual interest and capacity of young children who test from 160 to 200 I.Q. is incredible to those who have had no experience with the teaching of such children. We have in our classes about a dozen of such extreme deviates. They are the truly original thinkers and doers of their generation. A book could be made of the incidents constantly occurring which denote the qualities of their minds. It is these children who suffer most from ennui in the ordinary situation.

For instance, recently in the discussion of the

biography of Madame Curie, the question was raised by a pupil as to what "radium really is." One suggested that "radium is a stone." Another said that "radium is a metal." The person in charge of the class then said, "What is the difference between a stone and a metal?" A pupil of an extremely high degree of intelligence rose and said, "The main difference is that a metal is malleable and ductile, and a stone is not." He then enlarged very precisely upon "what these properties are." At the moment of this discussion, this boy was nine years six months old. The others listened attentively and understood the elucidation.²³

Follow-up studies have shown that mentally superior children who receive the intelligent treatment they deserve from parents, teachers, and others usually make superior citizens. The child's brightness is actually a handicap to him, however, if it leads him into conflict with his parents and teachers. Because of his brightness, the superior child can exert a powerful influence in society either for good or ill.

(3) The writer has seen many a student unhappy and maladjusted in college because his parents set a level of aspiration for him, or encouraged him to develop one, which was far above his level of accomplishment. There are boys, for example, whose I Q.'s are far below the minimum requirement for successful college work, yet who have their hearts set on becoming physicians. One girl of the writer's acquaintance whose parents wanted her to have a college education was so unhappy because she could not make the minimum grades required for graduation, and to get into a sorority, that she committed suicide, leaving a note saying that she was unable to do the things which people expected of her. Much of this grief would be prevented if parents would find out the level of a child's intelligence before encouraging him to develop levels of aspiration beyond the possibility of accomplishment. Many boys and girls who go to college would do better, for their own happiness and the good of society, if they went to a trade or business school instead.

Intelligence tests offer help to parents and

others in the vocational guidance of youth. They are recognized quite generally among psychologists as tests of aptitude for successful school performance. Such performance is, of course, a prerequisite for the professions. Vocational aptitude tests of a more specialized nature are also helpful, but these are considered in the following chapter.

PERFORMANCE TESTS OF INTELLIGENCE

Strictly speaking, all tests of intelligence are measures of performance. However, the term *performance* is customarily applied to tests which call for a minimal understanding and use of language. These tests provide a measure of fundamental psychological processes, such as reasoning and seeing relationships, without at the same time depending upon particular cultural or educational opportunities. They enable us to measure the intelligence of individuals: (1) who are too young to have learned a language; (2) who are illiterate through lack of educational opportunity or feeble-mindedness; and (3) who speak only a foreign tongue. They have been used in numerous places where tests of the Stanford-Binet variety would be useless. Since performance tests do not require use of the English language or of anything peculiar to our culture, some of them have been used to compare the intelligence of Australian aborigines and African bushmen,²⁴ to compare the intelligence of different European groups,²⁵ to compare the intelligence of isolated mountaineer children with that of children given normal educational opportunities,²⁶ and to compare the intelligence of Negroes and whites.²⁷ The simplest performance tests are of course those used with infants.²⁸

Performance tests covering the period from early childhood to maturity

Several performance tests have been devised for use with individuals between early childhood and maturity. Such tests have usually been standardized along lines already described for the Stanford-Binet Test. Most of them provide norms based upon average

performance at yearly age levels. Thus, M.A. and I.Q. may be derived. Sometimes, as in the Stanford-Binet Test, there are different items at the various age levels. In other instances the same items are used at a number of age levels, but with different time and error norms for each level. Thus, the average time for replacing the blocks of the Seguin Form Board, illustrated in Figure 201, is 222 seconds at 33 months, 109 seconds at 38 months, 72 seconds at 44 months . . . and 35 seconds at 69 months.²⁹

One well-known performance test merely requires the child to draw a man.³⁰ The child is instructed to "Make a picture of a man. Make the best picture that you can." Scoring is in terms of how many important parts of the man, such as eyes, fingers, nose, mouth, and so on, are included in the drawing. No importance is attached to artistic qualities. Age norms are available for four thousand children. The range covered by the scale is from three to thirteen years. Norms are in terms of the average number of points, out of a possible 51, at each level. M.A. and I.Q. are derived by use of these norms. Two drawings, and how the scores for them were derived, are illustrated in Figure 202.

Another interesting performance test of intelligence is that of Porteus, which utilizes a series of mazes used at age levels from three to

fourteen years.³¹ There is one maze at each level except thirteen. The subject is instructed to trace with a pencil the correct pathway from entrance to exit. When his pencil crosses a closed path, he is given a new copy of the maze and must start again from the beginning. If an error is made on this second trial, the child is regarded as having failed the test at that age level. (At the twelve- and fourteen-year levels, four instead of two trials are given.) As in the Stanford-Binet scale, a child is allowed to proceed until he fails the test at a particular age level. His score is then derived in a manner which we shall not take space to describe here. M.A.'s and I.Q.'s are determined for performance on this test. Porteus believes that the maze test gives a measure of processes such as power of sustained attention, foresight, and prudence, aspects of intelligence which, he claims, are not measured by the Stanford-Binet Test. He regards his test as supplementary to, rather than a substitute for, the Stanford-Binet. Porteus has shown its usefulness in situations where the Stanford-Binet would be useless; namely, in the measurement of primitive intelligence. Recent studies have shown that patients tested before and after psychosurgery (pp. 189-190) do not show much decline in Stanford-Binet performance, but a large decline in Porteus maze performance—apparently because of a decrease in "prudence and forethought and ability to profit by experience."³²

Only one other performance test for use with children can be mentioned here; that is the Pintner-Paterson battery.³³ The test includes several form boards, the Seguin and others, several items reminiscent of the jigsaw puzzles, a picture-completion test, and an imitation test where the child is required to copy movements demonstrated by the tester. One of the more complicated formboards, the picture-completion test, and a jigsaw puzzle type of test from the Pintner-Paterson series are illustrated in Figure 203. Ages from four to fifteen years are covered by this test, but a particular item, like the Seguin form board, is



Figure 201. The Seguin Form Board




Figure 202. Sample Drawings from Goodenough's Drawing-a-Man Test

A. Italian boy. C.A. 5 years, 6 months. Gets one point for each of the following: head, legs, eyes, mouth. Total score, 4. M.A. 4. I.Q. 73.

B. Armenian girl. C.A. 9 years, 3 months. Obtains one point for each of the following: head, legs, arms, trunk, length of trunk greater than breadth, shoulders definitely indicated, attachment of arms and legs, legs and arms attached to trunk at correct points, neck present, outline of neck continuous with that of head, eyes, nose, mouth, nose and mouth in two dimensions, nostrils, hair, hair in proper relation to head, clothing, at least two articles of clothing, drawing free from transparencies, at least four articles of clothing, costume complete without incongruity, fingers, hand shown as distinct from fingers or arm, arm joint, leg joint, head proportion, arm proportion, leg proportion, feet proportion, two dimensional proportions, heel, motor coordinating (3 points), ears, ears in correct position and proportion, eye details (4 points), chin and forehead, projection of chin, profile. Total points, 44. M.A. 13 or above. I.Q. 141 or above. (From Goodenough, F. L., "The Measurement of Intelligence by Drawings." New York: World Book Co., 1926, pp 120 and 159.)

not used at all age levels. Scoring is in terms of time and errors, and since age norms are available, M.A.'s and I.Q.'s may be determined.

GROUP TESTS

Value of group tests

Administration of individual tests, both verbal and performance, is usually laborious and time-consuming. Administration of the Stanford-Binet Test requires a highly trained tester to spend an hour or more with each individual. Whenever it is necessary to obtain a quick estimate of intelligence in large numbers of individuals, as was the case in 1917-18, when 1,750,000 draftees were tested, and in 1941-45 when over 10,000,000 selectees were tested, the testers used a simpler and more rapid method than that provided by individual tests.

Prior to 1917, psychologists had begun to

devise group tests of intelligence, but such tests had not been published. When psychologists were asked to investigate the intelligence of draftees, they formed a committee which considered all earlier intelligence tests and finally developed two, a verbal and a non-verbal, which could very quickly be administered to large groups, and just as readily scored. These were known, respectively, as the *Army Alpha* and *Army Beta* tests. Principles underlying selection of items for the tests were similar to those followed in the development of the Stanford-Binet Test. In other words, the items were such as to measure those psychological processes regarded as important aspects of intelligence, the tests were intrinsically interesting, and their performance did not require special schooling. Administration and scoring of the tests was quickly mastered, hence a long period of training and practical experience such as that




Figure 203. Three Tests from the Pintner-Paterson Battery of Performance Tests

A, modified Healy-Fernald Mare and Foal Test; B, Casulist Form Board (Pintner-Paterson modification of form board by Sprague and Knox); C, Healy Pictorial Completion Test. (Courtesy of C. H. Stoelting Company.)

required for administration and scoring of tests like the Stanford-Binet was not required. During the recent war, as a matter of fact, tests were machine scored. The test blank, marked with a special electrolytic pencil, was inserted in a machine, and the score was read from a dial.

Administration of the tests to draftees enabled psychologists to select the feeble-minded (of which there were several thousand); those who, due to defective intelligence, should be given relatively simple tasks to perform; those whose intelligence indicated

that they might be good officer material; and those whose intelligence fitted them for other types of work.²⁴

The value of group intelligence tests became so apparent, as a result of the army experience, that many other group tests, designed for school and college use, soon appeared.

The chief disadvantage of group tests as compared with individual tests is that those who administer the group tests cannot be sure that each individual is at his ease, that he is in a fit condition to be taking the test on that particular day, or that he is co-operating to

the best of his ability. In situations where large groups are to be tested in a hurry, these shortcomings must be overlooked.

When group intelligence tests are used in school and college, they serve two main purposes. In the first place, they may be used to select those who will be admitted. The correlation of around .60 between scores on such tests and college marks suggests their predictive value. In the second place, they may be used for guidance purposes. Most students take such a test when they enter college, and their scores are filed away in the registrar's office or the office of the dean. If a student made a very low score on the test, he may have been asked to take an individual test, perhaps the Stanford-Binet Test, as a check on his group test performance. In any event, if he gets into scholastic difficulties, and a record of test performance is available, it may be used in counseling him concerning his special difficulties. If the record shows low intelligence, he may be asked to leave school or to change his course to one more in keeping with his specific aptitudes. If the record shows a high score on the intelligence test, however, the personnel assistant to the registrar or dean may investigate his motives for being in college, his study habits, or perhaps consult with him concerning personal problems which might interfere with his school work. The investigator may even give him some personality tests of the kind to be discussed in the final chapter of this book.

Typical group tests illustrated

Although group tests measure psychological functions similar to those measured by individual tests, they usually include a large number of items pertaining to each psychological process. These items are arranged in such a way as to objectify answering and scoring. The items are, for example, true-false questions, completion exercises, and matching problems. They are answered by underlining a word or a number, by putting a cross in a square, by drawing in the missing

parts, or by writing a number. Scoring is then accomplished either by placing a key with the correct answers against the answers of the person tested and checking off the discrepancies, or by using a scoring machine.

The following is a selection of items from verbal and nonverbal group tests.³⁵

Illustrative Items from Group Tests of the Verbal Variety

Make a cross in the square which represents two times the sum of two plus three less one half the square of four —

☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5

15 16 14 17 13 18 Which two numbers should come next? (1) 12 and 19? (2) 13 and 20? (3) 14 and 20? (4) 19 and 20? (5) 12 and 5? Put a cross in the appropriate square —

☐ 1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5

If $5\frac{1}{2}$ tons of bark cost \$33, what will $3\frac{1}{2}$ tons cost? ()

A train is harder to stop than an automobile because

☐ it is longer ☐ it is heavier ☐ the brakes are not so good

If the two words of a pair mean the same or nearly the same thing, draw a line under SAME. If they mean the opposite or nearly the opposite, draw a line under OPPOSITE.

comprehensive-restricted	same	opposite
allure-attract	same	opposite
latent-hidden	same	opposite
deride-ridicule	same	opposite

If, when you have arranged the following words to make a sentence, the sentence is true, underline true, if it is false, underline false.

people	enemies	arrogant	many	make	true	false	
never	who	heedless	those	stumble	are	true	false
never	man	the	show	the	deeds	true	false

The pitcher has an important place in — tennis football baseball handball

Underline which.

Dismal is to dark as cheerful
is to — laugh bright house
gloomy


Truth is to gentleman as lie
is to — rascal live give
falsehood

Underline which.


Underline which.

*Illustrative Items from Group Performance
Tests*


Instructions for these are given by the examiner
and procedure is demonstrated on a blackboard.
The question below each item will serve to indicate
to the reader what procedure is to be followed.



Which is the shortest path through the maze?



How many cubes in each pile? Write number in appropriate square.



Complete the series.


1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
—	H	コ	L	U	O	^	X	=

9	3	8	6	4	1	5	7	2	6	2	4	8	1	3




Substitute the correct symbols in the bottom row

6543920817. . .6543920871
7611348879. . .78111345879

Indicate whether the last number is the same as the first.



Indicate the missing parts.



Make lines in the square to indicate the position taken by the parts fitted into it.

Interpretation of scores from group tests

Group tests are customarily scored in terms of the number of items correct. A particular score is then compared with norms determined for a large group of individuals. In many instances the score of an individual is interpreted in terms of what per cent of other

individuals make scores above (or below) his score. If only 20 per cent of the large group on which the test was standardized exceeds an individual's score, we say that he has a percentile rank of 80. A score at the 98th percentile, to give a further illustration, would be one which only 2 per cent of the group betters

and one which 98 per cent fails to reach. It is seldom that M.A.'s or I.Q.'s are derived for group tests. When they are derived, the procedure is an indirect one.

Many group tests taken in high school and college are not intelligence tests, but *achievement* tests in algebra, trigonometry, or other specific subjects. There are also high-school achievement tests which provide an index of what one has learned in a variety of subjects taught at the high-school level. These tests are standardized, administered, and scored along lines similar to group intelligence tests. The level of performance on these tests is often highly correlated with intelligence-test performance, but the tests measure special knowledge which only those who have had the courses in question could be expected to know. It is obvious, therefore, that a highly intelligent student might fail a test on achievement in algebra, American history, French, or some other high-school or college subject.

Aptitude tests are also to be distinguished from intelligence tests, which are themselves often considered to be tests of general aptitude for school work. Some are even called "scholastic aptitude tests." The distinction between such general aptitude tests and tests of special aptitude will be clear after you have read the following chapter. Examples of these special aptitude tests are found in such special fields as music, graphic art, and mechanics. A student might do miserably on one of these special tests, yet rate as a genius on a general intelligence or "scholastic aptitude" test.

The so-called "Intelligence Tests" and "I.Q. Tests" which appear in popular books, in the press, on the screen, and on the radio should not be confused with the intelligence tests of which we are speaking. The chief difference is that the popular tests are not standardized. Since they have not been tried out on large representative groups, no norms are available. The writer was once traveling in a Pullman with two well-known writers of popular psychological material. They were working on a book the title of which was something like "Testing your I.Q." Each would think up trick questions. They would

then try them on each other. If both thought a question good, it was included. That was the only criterion for inclusion. These trick questions do not come within the range of everyone's experience. Items involved in scientific tests of intelligence are those which every person in the population on which the tests are used has had an opportunity to learn. They measure, not information as such, but ability to acquire and use information that is readily available to all who are tested.

GROWTH OF INTELLIGENCE

As the child grows older, his intelligence, like the innate and modified structures of which it is a function, undergoes a gradual increase. There is, in other words, an improvement with age in the child's versatility of adjustment — that is, in the readiness with which he gathers information and acquires new skills which enable him to adjust to the changing circumstances of his environment.

The rate of such growth in childhood is, as we have already seen, approximately constant under normal conditions. Mental age does not, however, increase without limit. The increments in M.A. with yearly increases in C.A. begin to decline in the early teens. This fact has already been mentioned (p. 416) in connection with determination of the I.Q. Stanford-Binet M.A.'s begin to show smaller increments beginning at around thirteen years. After the age of fifteen years, the average Stanford-Binet M.A. does not increase with increases in C.A.

The upper limit achieved by groups of different I.Q. differs significantly. Whereas normal individuals (I.Q. 90 to 110) reach the upper level at about fifteen years, the superior (I.Q. 110 to 120) reach it at around eighteen, and the inferior (I.Q. 70 to 90) reach it at fourteen or earlier. After the upper level is reached, M.A. remains approximately constant for a period of some ten to twenty years. It then shows a decline.

What we have said so far concerns the results obtained with Stanford-Binet tests. Similar results are found with other tests.

The age at which scores cease to show an increment, however, differs somewhat from one test to another. Different tests have yielded indices of maximal growth at ages ranging from thirteen to twenty.

Since the tests do not measure raw intelligence or "sheer brain power," there is no way of knowing the actual age at which intelligence stops growing. All one can say is that, somewhere between the early teens and the twentieth year, individuals reach a level of intelligence-test performance which shows no further improvement with age.

Group intelligence tests have been given to large groups ranging in age from ten to ninety years, to determine how intelligence-test score changes as old age is approached. The results of two such investigations are shown graphically in Figures 204 and 205. The data in Figure 204 show that scores on the Army Alpha Test increase until around the nineteenth year and then decline gradually. In Figure 205 we see a somewhat similar increase in Otis Test scores, until the late teens, then a decline. The decline, however, is more rapid than that found with Army Alpha. Moreover, Figure 205 includes data for the years beyond sixty. It shows that the middle seventies bring a very rapid decline in Otis Test scores. This decline is less rapid for some psychological functions than for others.

What we have said about the changes in test performance as old age approaches applies, of course, to groups. It sometimes happens that older persons demonstrate a high degree of test ability. Such persons are rare. What the experiments show is not that the older person knows less as he reaches the higher age levels, but that the readiness with which he acquires further knowledge decreases. When the older adult competes with younger ones and, as is often the case, reaches a similar level of achievement, he usually does so by putting forth a disproportionate amount of effort. It takes him longer to acquire knowledge, and he tends to be more handicapped than the younger person in applying what he has acquired.




Figure 204. Curve Showing Changes in Army Alpha Scores as a Function of Age

(After Jones, H. E., and Conrad, H. S., "The Growth and Decline of Intelligence," *Genetic Psychological Monographs*, 1933, vol. 13, no. 3, p. 241)




Figure 205. Curve Showing Changes in Otis Group Test Score as a Function of Age

(After Miles, W. R., and Miles, C. C., "The Correlation of Intelligence Scores and Chronological Age from Early to Late Maturity," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1932, vol. 44, p. 51)

FACTORS IN INTELLIGENCE

Versatility in intelligence-test performance is obviously not a unitary process. We have already suggested that intelligence tests measure memory, reasoning, and other processes discussed in earlier chapters. But how many really different abilities are measured? What, in other words, are the primary abilities? Statistical analysis of test performances offers a means of answering this question.

Spearman observed that when different tests are intercorrelated, or parts of tests correlated one with another, the correlations are

usually positive.³⁶ This suggested that the different tests and test items are measuring some common factor. This he called *general intelligence*, or *g*. Spearman claimed that many widely different skills dip, as it were, into this common factor, *g*. Mechanical ability, musical ability, arithmetical ability, spelling ability, and many other abilities which show even a slight positive correlation with each other do so, he said, because they all require a certain amount of *g*. According to Spearman, each skill, in addition to *g*, calls for specific abilities, or *s*'s. Thus, in addition to requiring a certain large amount of *g*, mathematical skill would require specific mathematical skills (or abilities) which might be facility with numbers, ability to factor, ability to multiply, and so forth. These would be the *s*'s in mathematical performance. Mechanical skill, according to this view, would require a relatively small amount of *g* in addition to mechanical abilities, *s*'s.

Certain other psychologists have taken exception to the claim that there is a single general intelligence factor. They claim that what Spearman has called *g* is analyzable into a number of subsidiary abilities or factors.

Thurstone, for example, has given large batteries of tests, verbal and performance, to high-school and college students. All the students have done all the tests. The score on each test has been correlated with the score on every other test and a table of intercorrelations arranged.

Although most tests correlate somewhat with each other, some tests correlate among themselves much more highly than others. It is assumed that any tests which correlate highly with each other are to a high degree measuring the same ability.

Following this line of reasoning, but using statistical and other devices too complicated for presentation here, Thurstone has recently defined seven factors involved in the performance of a battery of sixty group tests, both verbal and nonverbal.³⁷ These factors have been designated *verbal comprehension* (V), *word fluency* (W), ability to handle *spa-*

tial relations (S), *number ability* (N), *memorizing* (M), *reasoning* (R) and *perceptual ability* (P). The following samples are from a test designed to measure these primary abilities. The samples indicate the general nature of the skills involved, but they are from some of the preliminary tests, hence the easiest ones. There are twenty-one different tests in the battery, three for each factor. Each of these tests has a large number of items.

Verbal Comprehension (V)

Think of a sentence using the words below. Then mark the first and last words in that sentence.

was late he school for

The following sentence has a word missing at the place indicated by the parentheses. You are to think of the word that best completes the meaning of the sentence. The number in parentheses is the number of letters in the missing word. Mark the first letter in the missing word.

A (9) is a place or building for athletic exercises.

C— D— G— H— T—

Word Fluency (W)

Each of the words in the list below has four letters and begins with B.

bear bone bald bent

Write as many words as you can which have four letters and begin with C.


Look at the words in the following list. Each of them ends with *able*.

capable valuable comfortable

Write as many words as you can which end with *tion*.



Spatial Relations (S)

Look at the row of figures below. The first figure is like the letter F which is right side up. All the other figures are like the first, but they have been turned in different directions.



Satisfy yourself that all these figures look like the first one if they are turned right side up.

In each row of figures below, mark the figure which is like the first figure in the row. Do not mark the figures which are made backward.



Number Ability (N)

In the row of numbers below, 10 is marked because it is three more than the number 7, which is just before it. The number 8 is also marked because it is three more than the number just before it.

5 7 10 12 14 11 3 5 8 12

In the row below mark every number that is

exactly three more than the number just before it. Work as fast as you can.

15 19 21 26 29 22 25 5 8 7 11 4

Below are two multiplication problems which have been worked out. Multiply the numbers for yourself to see if the products are correct.

$\begin{array}{r} 64 \\ 7 \\ \hline 448 \\ R \\ \hline W \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{r} 39 \\ 4 \\ \hline 166 \\ R \\ \hline W \end{array}$
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
The first answer is right, so the R below it is marked. The second answer is wrong, so the W is marked.

Below are two columns of numbers which have been added. Add the numbers for yourself to see if the sums are correct.




$\begin{array}{r} 16 \\ 38 \\ 45 \\ \hline 99 \\ R \\ W \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{r} 42 \\ 61 \\ 83 \\ \hline 176 \\ R \\ W \end{array}$
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Memorizing (M)




Study the figures below so that you can recognize them when you see them again.



In the list below put a check mark (✓) after each of the figures that are listed above.



The list below is studied in a similar manner so that the testee can check these figures when he sees them again on the next page of the test.



In each row below is written a name. You are to learn the names so well that when the last name is given you can write the first name. On the next page the last names are listed in a different order. You will be asked to write the first names.

<i>First name</i>	<i>Last name</i>
Mary	Brown
John	Davis
etc.	

Reasoning (R)

Look at the groups of letters below

AABC ACAD ACFH AACG

Three of the groups have two A's. The group which does not have two A's is marked.

Here is another problem. Three of the groups are alike in some way. Can you find three groups which are alike?

XVRM ABCD MNOP EFGH

Read the row of letters below

abababab _

The next letter in this series would be *a*. Write the letter *a* in the blank at the right.

Now read the next row of letters and decide what the next letter should be. Write that letter in the blank.

cadaeafa _


Perceptual Ability (P)

Here is a row of faces. One face is different from the others. The face that is different is marked.



Look closely to be sure that you see why the middle face is marked. The mouth is the part that is different.

Here are some more pictures. In each row mark the face which is different from the others.



Look at the two words below

cat **tsa**

The first word is *cat*. The second is also *cat*, but it is printed backward.

In each column of words below, mark the word printed backward which is the same as the first word.

lamp	purse	horse	most
<u>look</u>	<u>purse</u>	<u>more</u>	<u>more</u>
<u>lamp</u>	<u>horse</u>	<u>most</u>	<u>most</u>

The tests from which these samples have been taken were each designed to measure one primary ability and little else. These seven primary abilities are not the only factors involved in intelligence-test performance, but Thurstone feels that they are the ones most clearly identifiable in the batteries of tests analyzed by him over a period of several years. Speed, learning ability, and several other functions which one might expect to be involved in intelligent behavior are not identified, but this is perhaps because the tests have not been designed to measure these functions.

The value of measuring primary abilities instead of a heterogeneous integration of such abilities as in most intelligence tests is probably obvious. There are certain skills, like mechanical skill, which have a low correlation with scores on tests of "general intelligence," yet which might correlate highly with a particular primary factor (or group of primary factors). A test of this factor (or group of factors) might then be useful in selecting those with mechanical skill. It might serve, in other words, as part of a battery of tests, some of which measure more specific mechanical skills.

SUMMARY

Intelligence is a function which, in general, we have defined as versatility of adjustment. We have stressed the fact that human intelligence is superior to that of animals, especially along symbolic lines.

The first intelligence tests were designed to select children who had insufficient intelligence to profit from regular education. Intelligence tests have continued to be useful in this respect. The first tests were devised by Binet and Simon. They were later standardized for use in testing American school children. Although there were many standardizations in addition to the American (English, German, and so on) and several American standardizations, we have described only the Stanford-Binet, which is most widely used in this country.

Items for the test were not selected arbitrarily, but were selected only after a tryout on many school children. The nearly three thousand school children on whom the final forms of the test were standardized attended schools rated as average in their community. This is an important point to remember, for, unless a child has had average opportunities to learn, the mental age (M.A.) and the intelligence quotient (I.Q.) determined with this test are practically meaningless. A child whose educational opportunities have been average, and who does as well on the Stanford-Binet Test as the average child of his age, has

an I.Q. of 100. If the child exceeds his age group in performance, his M.A. is higher than his C.A. and consequently his I.Q. is higher than 100. On the other hand, a child who does more poorly than children of his age group, has an M.A. lower than his C.A. and an I.Q. below 100.

When a normally healthy school child whose educational opportunities have been average is tested year after year, his I.Q. remains fairly constant. I.Q.'s determined before the school age tend to fluctuate a great deal, hence are generally not regarded as reliable. Changes in educational opportunities lead to fluctuations in I.Q. There are cases on record, too, where the I.Q. rose considerably after glandular therapy.

Our consideration of the claim that intelligence is an innate capacity led us to conclude that the ability to develop intelligent behavior (that is, the ability to develop versatility of adjustment) may be innately determined to a large degree, but that intelligence as such is dependent upon both heredity and environment. We expressed an hereditarian bias here, by claiming that, in general, differences in heredity are responsible for larger differences in intelligence than can be attributed to differences in environment.

The chief values of determining a child's I.Q. are that (1) those of low I.Q. can be weeded out for special education in line with their capacity to acquire intelligent behavior; (2) those of very high capacity can be selected for education in keeping with their capacity, and (3) parents and others may more wisely give vocational guidance if they know a child's I.Q.

Performance tests require a minimal degree of verbal ability. There are tests of this variety for individuals ranging in age from infancy to the adult level.

Group tests (verbal or performance) can be given and scored by individuals with little training, and they may be given to large numbers at a time. They are especially useful when conditions preclude giving the more reliable, but time-consuming, individual tests.

The scores on group tests are usually reported in terms of percentiles. One's percentile score indicates the per cent of individuals whom he excels on the test.

Intelligence-test performance improves with age, up to somewhere between the early teens and the twentieth year. The age of maximum performance differs within these age limits for different tests. There is eventually a decline in intelligence-test performance with age. This decline usually becomes very rapid as old age approaches.

Factor analysis is an attempt to determine how many primary abilities are involved in intelligence-test performance. It starts with

tables of intercorrelations and involves procedures too complicated for presentation to beginners in psychology. Spearman believes that there is a general intelligence factor (*g*) involved in all intelligence-test performances, and in many other skills. According to this view, there are also specific factors, or *s*'s. The more widely accepted view today is that "general intelligence" is a composite (or integration) of several primary functions (or factors). Among the primary functions already identified are: verbal comprehension (V), word fluency (W), spatial relations (S), number ability (N), memorizing (M), reasoning (R), and perceptual ability (P).

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The value of measuring primary abilities instead of a heterogeneous integration of such abilities as in most intelligence tests is probably obvious. There are certain skills, like mechanical skill, which have a low correlation with scores on tests of "general intelligence," yet which might correlate highly with a particular primary factor (or group of primary factors). A test of this factor (or group of factors) might then be useful in selecting those with mechanical skill. It might serve, in other words, as part of a battery of tests, some of which measure more specific mechanical skills.

SUMMARY

Intelligence is a function which, in general, we have defined as versatility of adjustment. We have stressed the fact that human intelligence is superior to that of animals, especially along symbolic lines.

The first intelligence tests were designed to select children who had insufficient intelligence to profit from regular education. Intelligence tests have continued to be useful in this respect. The first tests were devised by Binet and Simon. They were later standardized for use in testing American school children. Although there were many standardizations in addition to the American (English, German, and so on) and several American standardizations, we have described only the Stanford-Binet, which is most widely used in this country.

Items for the test were not selected arbitrarily, but were selected only after a tryout on many school children. The nearly three thousand school children on whom the final forms of the test were standardized attended schools rated as average in their community. This is an important point to remember, for, unless a child has had average opportunities to learn, the mental age (M.A.) and the intelligence quotient (I.Q.) determined with this test are practically meaningless. A child whose educational opportunities have been average, and who does as well on the Stanford-Binet Test as the average child of his age, has

an I.Q. of 100. If the child exceeds his age group in performance, his M.A. is higher than his C.A. and consequently his I.Q. is higher than 100. On the other hand, a child who does more poorly than children of his age group, has an M.A. lower than his C.A. and an I.Q. below 100.

When a normally healthy school child whose educational opportunities have been average is tested year after year, his I.Q. remains fairly constant. I.Q.'s determined before the school age tend to fluctuate a great deal, hence are generally not regarded as reliable. Changes in educational opportunities lead to fluctuations in I.Q. There are cases on record, too, where the I.Q. rose considerably after glandular therapy.

Our consideration of the claim that intelligence is an innate capacity led us to conclude that the ability to develop intelligent behavior (that is, the ability to develop versatility of adjustment) may be innately determined to a large degree, but that intelligence as such is dependent upon both heredity and environment. We expressed an hereditarian bias here, by claiming that, in general, differences in heredity are responsible for larger differences in intelligence than can be attributed to differences in environment.

The chief values of determining a child's I.Q. are that (1) those of low I.Q. can be weeded out for special education in line with their capacity to acquire intelligent behavior, (2) those of very high capacity can be selected for education in keeping with their capacity, and (3) parents and others may more wisely give vocational guidance if they know a child's I.Q.

Performance tests require a minimal degree of verbal ability. There are tests of this variety for individuals ranging in age from infancy to the adult level.

Group tests (verbal or performance) can be given and scored by individuals with little training, and they may be given to large numbers at a time. They are especially useful when conditions preclude giving the more reliable, but time-consuming, individual tests.

The scores on group tests are usually reported in terms of percentiles. One's percentile score indicates the per cent of individuals whom he excels on the test.

Intelligence-test performance improves with age, up to somewhere between the early teens and the twentieth year. The age of maximum performance differs within these age limits for different tests. There is eventually a decline in intelligence-test performance with age. This decline usually becomes very rapid as old age approaches.

Factor analysis is an attempt to determine how many primary abilities are involved in intelligence-test performance. It starts with

tables of intercorrelations and involves procedures too complicated for presentation to beginners in psychology. Spearman believes that there is a general intelligence factor (g) involved in all intelligence-test performances, and in many other skills. According to this view, there are also specific factors, or s 's. The more widely accepted view today is that "general intelligence" is a composite (or integration) of several primary functions (or factors). Among the primary functions already identified are: verbal comprehension (V), word fluency (W), spatial relations (S), number ability (N), memorizing (M), reasoning (R), and perceptual ability (P).

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Chapter 24

Aptitudes

APTITUDES are inferred from individual differences in acquiring proficiency. A student who takes to college work "like a duck to water," making good grades with only reasonable effort, is said to have a high degree of aptitude for college work. On the other hand, a student who, despite the best efforts he can put forth, and despite the best efforts of his teachers, cannot "make the grade," is said to have little aptitude for college work.

One child takes quickly to musical training, and progress is evident almost from the start. Another child given the same training makes little or no progress. The first may be said to have musical aptitude to a high degree and the second little musical aptitude. If the first child should turn out to be a musical prodigy, we should say that he had exceptional aptitude for music. We might be even more complimentary and say that he was musically talented or gifted.

To use one more illustration, consider a girl who goes to business school in order to become a stenographer. If she progresses rapidly with her typing and shorthand and is graduated, in the minimum time, to a job which she carries out efficiently, we may say that she has a high degree of aptitude for stenographic work. If, on the other hand, she fails to meet the minimum standards for stenographic work in the time allotted, we are justified in saying that she has little aptitude for stenographic work.

Aptitude, like intelligence, is inferred from relative levels of achievement. If individuals given comparable opportunities to acquire

some skill differ in the ease of acquiring it, or if they differ in the level of proficiency attained, we say that they differ in their aptitude for that particular work. Again like intelligence, aptitude is distributed over a wide range. At one extreme are those with little aptitude for the work in question. These are few in number. At the other extreme are those with maximum aptitude for that work. They are also few in number. Those with an intermediate degree of aptitude for the activity in question are, of course, most frequent. A distribution of degrees of aptitude is illustrated in Figure 206. This shows the per cent of 438 men making particular scores on a number-checking test, which is part of an aptitude test for clerical workers. A normal distribution curve is superimposed upon the actual frequency distribution curve to demonstrate how closely such a curve is approximated in the group tested.




Figure 206. Distribution of Scores Made on a Number-Checking Test by 438 Men Compared with a Normal Distribution

(From Green, H. J., Bergman, E. R., Paterson, D. G., and Trabue, M. R., "A Manual of Selected Occupational Tests," Bulletin of the University of Minnesota Employment Stabilization Research Institute, 1933, vol. II, no. 3, p. 28.)

Aptitude, moreover, is more or less specific. That is to say, an individual may have aptitude for one line of work, but not for certain others. One may have a high degree of aptitude for college work, but a low degree of aptitude for music; a high degree of aptitude for bookkeeping, but a low degree of aptitude for mechanical work; or a high degree of aptitude for teaching, but a low degree for flying. Some people have a wide range of aptitudes and others a very narrow range. The former can learn to do many things well; the latter can learn to do only a few things well.

Just as performance on a test of general intelligence may be factored into a variety of mental activities (pp. 434-438), so tests of aptitude for a particular vocation may usually be factored into a number of subsidiary aptitudes. As a matter of fact, aptitude for most vocations is often measured, not by one test, but by a battery of tests.

APTITUDES, INBORN CAPACITIES, AND PRESENT ABILITIES

Aptitude does not necessarily mean innate capacity. You might have an I Q. of 180 resulting, in part, from superior native endowment. But this would not necessarily give you aptitude for college work. Your early training may have given you a slant on college work and college people that makes college distasteful to you. If your parents coerced you into going to college, you might spend your time on extraneous activities and make poor progress. A student with much lower intelligence, but who wanted to go to college and who used his ability to the best advantage, might easily outdistance you in the quality of his work. His greater aptitude would come, not from superior endowment, but from the attitude that early training contributed.

It should not be gathered from this, however, that aptitudes are completely independent of inborn capacities. It may well be that musical aptitudes and mechanical aptitudes of various kinds are closely related to innate endowment.

Some have claimed that ability to profit from musical training — that is to say, aptitude for music — is limited by the sort of ear, and perhaps brain structure, with which the individual has been born. Suppose, for example, that your basilar membrane or its neural connections with the brain were so constituted that you were unable to discriminate fairly small differences in pitch and intensity. No amount of musical training would make a good musician of you.

Long before the days of aptitude tests in music, the writer was given a piccolo and an opportunity to join the school band. Although he practiced assiduously, the bandmaster was always accusing him of making the sour notes which disturbed the total symphonic effect. He was soon asked to leave the band, and even his parents finally persuaded him that production of pleasing music was not in his line. More than twenty years later, he took the Seashore Test of Musical Talent and found himself in the lowest percentile in pitch discrimination. In other words, almost anybody has better pitch discrimination than he. If the test had been given before the piccolo was bought and the training begun, he could have avoided much discomfort to others and much disappointment to himself.

Some children are endowed with longer fingers and more dexterous hands than others. When it comes to such skills as making watches, playing the piano, or perhaps even performing certain kinds of surgical operation, these individuals have an inborn advantage over those with short stubby fingers and clumsy hands — the so-called “ham-handed.”

But not all psychologists would agree that there is anything to the idea of innate differences in aptitude, or innate capacities for particular lines of work. Here is what Watson, one of the most extreme of the dissenters, has to say about the idea:¹

Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own special world to bring them up in, and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any kind of specialist I might select — doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief, and, yes, beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents,

penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and the race of his ancestors.

Watson tacitly admits inborn differences in structure, however, when he speaks of a child who, in the present nature of things, could not become a skilled pianist.

*His fingers were not long enough and the muscular arrangement of the hand was not flexible enough. But even here we should be cautious — the piano is a standard instrument — a certain finger span and a certain hand, wrist, and finger strength are needed. But suppose the father . . . had said, "I want him to be a pianist and I am going to try an experiment — his fingers are short — he'll never have a flexible hand, so I'll build him a piano. I'll make the keys narrow so that even with his short fingers his span will be sufficient, and I'll make a different leverage for the keys so that no particular strength or even flexibility will be needed." Who knows — the . . . son under these conditions might have been the world's greatest pianist.*²

We cannot, of course, remake the artistic, business, or industrial world to fit the peculiar needs of individuals like the child mentioned by Watson. Judged by present standards, that child would be said to have little or no aptitude for piano playing. It is immaterial whether such ineptness results from an inborn hand structure, making for poor manual dexterity, or from lack of a suitable instrument. As the case is stated by Watson, it results from both. Likewise, aptitude for any of the aspects of the world's work might depend on inborn characteristics, acquired interests, early training, or a combination of these. The fact would still remain that some acquire certain skills more readily than others and reach higher levels of accomplishment than others. In saying that they have greater aptitude than others, we are merely putting these facts in a nutshell without saying to what degree the differences are innate or acquired. As one of our leading authorities on aptitude testing has so well pointed out: ³

We want the facts about a person's aptitudes as they are at present: characteristics now indicative

of his future potentialities. Whether he was born that way, or acquired certain enduring dispositions in his early infancy, or matured under circumstances which have radically altered his original capacities is, to be sure, a question not only of great theoretical interest, but of profound importance to society at large; for the answer has a bearing on public policy in regard to universal education, the functions of the school, and eugenic legislation. But it is of little practical moment to the individual himself at a time when he has already reached the stage of educational and occupational planning. His potentialities at that period of his development are quite certainly the products of interaction between conditions both innate and environmental. His capacity for gaining manual skills, his intelligence, his emotional makeup, his moral character, indeed all aspects of his personality, are in varying degrees subject to limitations that have been imposed by opportunities for growth and exercise, as well as by his original nature. No matter what his constitution may at first have been, it has unfolded, taken shape, been encouraged here and thwarted there, during the impact of favorable or unfavorable stimulation from the environments in which he has developed. And so, when appraising his aptitude, whether for leadership, for selling, for research, for artistic design, we must take him as he is — not as he might have been.

From what we have already said, it is perhaps clear that aptitude and present ability do not mean the same thing. You may have no present ability to fly a plane, but you may have a high degree of aptitude for flying — which means that your chances of being a successful flyer are good, provided you receive the proper training. The chief value of aptitude testing is, in fact, that it enables us to pick out from those who do not yet have the ability to perform certain skills those who, with a reasonable amount of training, will be most likely to acquire the skills in question and acquire them to a desirable level of proficiency.

There are two main general reasons for attempting to measure aptitudes. One of these is to advise youth concerning the fields of activity in which they are most likely or least likely to be successful. The other is to select those best fitted for particular jobs. The

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There are two main general reasons for attempting to measure aptitudes. One of these is to advise youth concerning the fields of activity in which they are most likely or least likely to be successful. The other is to select those best fitted for particular jobs. The

first-mentioned application of aptitude testing is in the interest of *vocational guidance*; the second is in the interest of *vocational selection*. Although these aims are different, the tests used may be identical. The difference lies in the reason for giving the tests and the uses to which they are put.

APTITUDE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE

Performance on intelligence tests is sometimes indicative of aptitude for certain lines of work. Indeed, the use of intelligence tests in both world wars was for the purpose of selecting, from the millions drafted, those who would be most likely to profit from specialized forms of training. Selectees in the recent war were given an opportunity to enter the pilot training programs only if they made higher than a certain score on specially devised intelligence and information tests. Individuals allowed to participate in the Army Specialized Training Program and other college training programs were also selected partly by use of intelligence tests.

High scores on good general intelligence tests do tell us about the probability of success in college work. Here is an illustration of what happens when only those making high grades on intelligence and achievement tests enter college. The writer taught a class of 76 ASTP Premedical Students and, on objective examinations which usually yielded a normal distribution, with percentages of correct answers ranging from about 40 to 95, these students all rated above 75 per cent. Most of them made scores of 80 per cent or better. One instructor, who apparently did not know that these students were selected on the basis of college aptitude tests, worried because he was not able to "grade on the curve." In one of his exams in chemistry, all made around 90 per cent or better.

One of the best single aptitude tests for college work is a good test of "general intelligence," designed for selection in terms of scholastic aptitude. Where such tests are used to pre-select students, the per cent of students dropping out in their freshman year

or later is cut to almost a minimum. With personality and interest tests added, it might be cut still more. There are, of course, always some who drop out for other reasons than lack of aptitude for college work.

General intelligence is also related, but not in so obvious a manner, to many other lines of endeavor. For certain kinds of work, high intelligence might even be a handicap. Some concerns will not employ persons for certain jobs if their intelligence-test performance is above average. Although they are able to do the work satisfactorily, those with above average intelligence tend to become discontented and to leave the job for something else.

Then there are certain jobs which cannot be performed successfully by most individuals below a certain minimum intelligence. A suggestion of the limits of intelligence of individuals employed in various kinds of work ranging from unskilled to professional work is given by the data in Figure 207, which are based upon Army Alpha Intelligence Test scores. Observe, for example, that engineers have a median test score (not I Q) of about 160. The twenty-fifth percentile is around 110 and the seventy-fifth percentile around 180. Overlapping of the range of scores is typical of many occupational groups.

In using the results of intelligence tests for vocational guidance purposes, we might well say to an individual whose score is 75 (Figure 207) that the chances are high that he will not succeed if he attempts, say, to become an engineer or a doctor. We might say to him, on the other hand, that he possesses sufficient general intelligence to consider going into occupations from the level of stock clerk down to laborer.

Other things than intelligence would also be important, but at least there appears to be an approximate minimum intelligence required for success in certain occupations. If the individual were below that minimum, we would certainly advise against attempting to enter that occupation. If he had above the minimum intelligence, we would then examine other performances that seem important in




Figure 207. Army Alpha Scores for a Selected Group of Occupations

The range indicated is that between the 25th and 75th percentiles — the interquartile range. The vertical bar represents the median score for that occupation. (Drawn from data in Fryer, D., "Occupational Intelligence Standards." *School and Society*, 1922, vol. 16, pp. 273-278)

that occupation. We might want to test for mechanical aptitude, medical aptitude, art aptitude, or the like, depending upon what it is the individual is interested in doing.

In selection of individuals for certain jobs, a minimum intelligence score is sometimes set and all those who fail to reach it are denied admittance. This score is usually set at a point higher than the minimum for the occupation. There is the danger that some are eliminated who might succeed despite their low score. But what the personnel director tries to do is to set a score which, as indicated by preliminary experimentation, will give him the highest percentage of potentially successful workers, without eliminating too many who might be successful.

APTITUDE AND INTERESTS

One of the best single indicators of possible success in certain occupations is the way in which the interests of candidates compare with those of people who are successful in these occupations. It is, of course, possible for a person to be interested in something, like being a salesman, yet have little or no aptitude for it. Nevertheless, in choosing a group of salesmen who would, as a group, be

successful, the interest inventories are very useful.

The best-known and most widely used vocational interest inventory is Strong's Vocational Interest Blank. In filling out this blank, one indicates his "like," "dislike," or "indifference," for a wide range of occupations, amusements, school subjects, sports, undertakings, and so on. There are 400 items in all. The responses are then scored with keys designated "Teacher," "Real Estate Salesman," and so on. There are separate blanks and scoring keys for men and women. The key for "Teacher" is based upon the predominant reactions of successful teachers to items in the interest blank. Likewise, each of the twenty-seven keys for male occupations and the seventeen keys for female occupations is based on the predominating reactions of individuals in those occupations.

Strong found that those who succeed as real estate salesmen, for example, have a pattern of likes, dislikes, and indifferences which differs from that of those successful in certain other occupations. A person whose pattern of interests closely coincides with that of successful real estate salesmen has a leaning, at least, in the direction of being a good real estate

salesman. This leaning does not guarantee, of course, that he will succeed in that occupation, but it suggests the probability that he will like that work and succeed in it better than in other occupations where his interests do not lie.

MECHANICAL APTITUDES

We now have several widely used tests of mechanical aptitude, designed not to select individuals for special jobs, but to select those mechanically inclined in certain ways. Some of these tests are of the individual variety; that is, one individual is tested at a time. The tests illustrated in Figure 208 A and B are of this nature.

There are also pencil-and-paper tests of mechanical aptitude. These are designed to be given to large groups and scored with keys or scoring machines. One of these is the Revised Minnesota Paper Formboard, an item from which is shown in Figure 209. The individuals being tested are required to indicate whether the pieces in the upper left-hand corner, when fitted together, produce A, B, C, D, or E. There are sixty-four problems like this, but much more complicated, in each of the two forms of the test. Figure 210 gives one of the simpler items from a form of the Bennett-Fry Mechanical Comprehension Test, a test widely used to select those best fitted for a variety of mechanical occupations, including flight performance. In each case the individual being tested is asked to make a response requiring mechanical judgment. Here he must tell which man can lift more weight.

MUSICAL APTITUDES

Musical aptitude tests, of which there are now several, are on phonograph disks. The subject sits, listens, and attempts to discriminate. In taking the Seashore Tests of Musical Talent, for example, he is tested for pitch discrimination, intensity discrimination, discrimination of rhythm, discrimination of timbre, time discrimination, and tonal mem-

ory. Instructions for the pitch discrimination test are as follows: ⁴

You will hear two tones which differ in pitch. You are to judge whether the second is higher or lower than the first. If the second is higher, record H, if lower, record L.

The individual then listens and reacts to fifty pairs of tones, the second tone of each pair following the first by a very short interval. Other tests in the series are performed in a fashion somewhat similar to that described.


Actual scores on each test are translated into percentile scores. As one may recall from our earlier discussion of percentiles, the individual with a percentile score of 90 is equaled or exceeded by only 10 per cent of those tested when the test was standardized. A person with a percentile score of 1 is equaled or exceeded by 99 per cent of those tested. An idea of how the test differentiates extremes of musical talent is given by the musical talent profiles in Figure 211.

It is conceivable that a person might score high on such a test as the above, yet, because of poor finger dexterity, make a poor pianist or violinist. No matter what his dexterity, however, he could hardly hope to be successful in any aspect of musical performance without at least reasonably good pitch, intensity, and time discrimination.


The Seashore Tests of Musical Talent and others of its kind are widely used in school systems to help in selecting the most musically gifted. A teacher of psychology who gives the test to his classes sometimes comes across a student who, although he had never had any musical training, scores exceptionally high on the test. In schools which use musical aptitude tests, such individuals may be discovered early and encouraged to take up some musical pursuit. On the other hand, those children who have little aptitude for music can be discouraged from attempting to become highly proficient musical performers.

DEVELOPING TESTS OF APTITUDE FOR PARTICULAR JOBS

It often happens that general aptitude tests



A



B



C

Figure 208. Some Individual Tests of Mechanical Aptitude

A. A form of the Minnesota Assembly Test. Each common article (electrical plug fixture, mousetrap, etc.) is to be assembled as rapidly as possible. (See Paterson, D. G., Elliott, R. M., Anderson, L. D., Toops, H. A., and Heidbreder, E., "Minnesota Mechanical Ability Tests." Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1930.)

B. The O'Connor Tweezer Dexterity Test. The individual picks up the small pegs and places them in the holes in a certain order as fast as possible. (See O'Connor, J., "Born That Way." Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1928.)

C. Two-Hand Co-ordination Test. Here the individual attempts to move both handles at the same time in such a manner as to keep the upper disk over the lower one, which moves in an unpredictable manner. One method of scoring is to record the time, in a standard period, that one disk is over the other. (From Melton, A. W., "The Selection of Pilots by Means of Psychomotor Tests." *Journal of Aviation Medicine*, 1944, vol. 15, p. 119.)




Figure 209. A Sample from the Minnesota Paper Formboard

(Courtesy of Likert, R., Quasha, Wm. M., and the University of Minnesota Press.)

like those already described must be modified or supplemented with other tests before a satisfactory measure of aptitude for certain skills can be obtained. In the second World War, the Army Air Force psychologists, for example, did not have ready-made tests of aptitude for the jobs of pilot, bombardier, and navigator. It was necessary to devise such tests. Psychologists in the Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy Department had to do likewise. Psychologists in business and industry, when called upon to select people for special jobs, must also adapt tests already in use, combine these tests into new batteries, or devise completely new tests.

In devising an aptitude test, or battery of such tests, the general procedures followed are: (1) analysis of the job for which the tests are to be used; (2) tentative selection and arrangement of items which appear to measure the psychological processes disclosed by the job analysis to be important for that job; (3) development of a standardized method of administration and scoring; (4) administration of the test to a large and representative group of individuals from the population on which




Figure 210. Sample Item from a Form of the Bennett-Fry Mechanical Comprehension Test
(Courtesy of the Psychological Corporation, New York City.)




Figure 211. A Portion of the Musical Talent Profiles of Two Individuals Differing Markedly in Musical Ability

A is an unmusical person. One sees that his percentiles for various items in the test are all below average. He is in about the 7th percentile for pitch discrimination, the 31st percentile for intensity discrimination, the 10th percentile for sense of time, and so on. B, the musically talented man, on the other hand, is well above the average in everything. His pitch discrimination score, for example, is in the 97th percentile. (Data in Seashore, C. E., "The Psychology of Musical Talent." New York: Silver, Burdett, pp. 23 and 25.)

it is finally to be used; and (5) analysis of results to determine whether the tests are good predictors of success in the occupation for which they are designed.

Job analysis Regardless of whether an aptitude test is devised for vocational guidance or for vocational selection, the first thing that the psychologist usually does before designing it is to make a detailed analysis of the psychological processes required in successful performance of the job in question. Before designing certain tests of flying aptitude, psychologists went aloft with experienced pilots, bombardiers, and navigators. While aloft, they observed the pilot, bombardier, or navigator's performance. Some of them went through the training process themselves, paying particular attention to the kinds of processes they were called upon to use. After gathering relevant information on the requirements of the job in this and other ways, they

were then ready to design batteries of aptitude tests for pilots, bombardiers, and navigators. Similarly, psychologists have gone into industry and observed skilled performance or learned the performance themselves. One psychologist who was called on to develop a test of aptitude for streetcar operators observed skilled operators and also learned to operate a streetcar himself before developing his test.⁵

Tentative selection of test items. After a job analysis has been completed and some insight into the nature of the processes required has been gained, the psychologist then selects tests from those already available or devises tests to measure these processes. Suppose a certain level of intelligence seems important, then he may try out one or more of the many intelligence tests available. Suppose that calmness under conditions of stress is one of the requirements, then he may try out some of the devices used in the laboratory to record physiological changes in emotion. Suppose




Figure 212. A Hand-Steadiness Test

Without resting her arm, the subject holds the stylus in a small hole. Every contact with the side of the hole is recorded on the electric counter.

that hand-steadiness is involved, then he may try out a test of hand-steadiness like that illustrated in Figure 212. Suppose that ability to react quickly to a stimulus seems important, then he may test speed of reaction with a standard chronoscope like that illustrated in Figure 213. Suppose that a certain kind of finger dexterity seems to play an important rôle,

then he may try out tests like those illustrated earlier (p. 447). If certain personality traits seem to be important, then he may try out one or more of the personality tests already available. If the individual's interests in the occupation, or in a group of occupations, seems to be important, then he may try out one of the available occupational interest



Figure 213. Measuring Reaction Time

The subject (above) sits with finger on a reaction key. As soon as possible after a specified signal (light) is presented, the key is pressed down. The experimenter (below) sits in another room ready to give the signal for response. Pressure on the experimenter's key presents the signal and at the same time starts the chronoscope revolving at the rate of 100 units per second. As soon as the subject responds, the chronoscope stops. The earphones are used to indicate when to expect the light and also to give an auditory signal, with the light as a warning, when a response to sound is required.

This figure shows a discrimination reaction: a click signaled that either another click or a light would be presented. The subject was to respond only to the light. Her reaction time, according to the chronoscope, was about 55 hundredths of a second. (This form of chronoscope is manufactured by the Standard Electric Time Company, Springfield, Mass. Posed in the Psychological Laboratory of the Florida State College for Women — Photo, courtesy of F. S. C. W. Publication Office.)

questionnaires. And if the individual's past experience, his social obligations, and similar biographical data appear to be important, then the psychologist may try out biographical inventories already available. He also may have to devise tests that are entirely new.

After tests have been selected from those available, or special tests have been devised, the next move is to try them out and see how well they work in practice.

Development of a standardized procedure for administration and scoring. We have already (pp. 414-415) shown how important it is that psychological tests be given and scored in the same way for every individual tested. Anyone who uses a micrometer in a novel fashion or who reads off the measurement in some manner of his own choosing might just as well not use an accurate measuring device at all. Not only would his own readings differ from time to time, but they would certainly not agree with those taken by somebody who knows how to use a micrometer. Likewise, in the attempt to measure anything, a standardized procedure must be used. Usually, in preparing any sort of psychological test, it is necessary to try it out on a few individuals to see the best procedure to follow, how best to score it, and so on. If it is a pencil-and-paper test, requiring answers to questions, one has to do some preliminary testing with it to weed out ambiguous questions and questions that are obviously too difficult or otherwise unsuitable.

Administration to a large representative group. Because a test seems to measure the processes which a job analysis suggests are important for a particular job, and because it is standardized in administration and scoring, one cannot assume that it is necessarily a good test. One must check to see whether it really does select the kinds of individuals needed.

During the first World War some psychologists decided, on the basis of a crude job analysis, that a pilot needs, above all else, to be a quick reactor and to be able to "keep his head" under conditions of stress. So they and the military authorities of the

countries concerned decided, quite arbitrarily, that any candidate for pilot training who failed to reach a specified speed of simple reaction (see Figure 213), and who changed his breathing and his hand-tremor more than a certain amount when a shot was fired unexpectedly, or an ice-cold cloth slapped unexpectedly on his head, could not be a good prospect for pilot training. This proposition seemed so reasonable that several Allied countries used these tests to pre-select pilots. Hundreds of prospective pilots were told that their reactions were too slow or their emotional reactions too unstable for them to succeed as pilots. Then some investigators checked up to see whether there was actually any correlation between simple reaction time and tremor on the one hand and skill as a pilot on the other. They found the correlations negligible. This being the case, as many good pilots were being eliminated as poor ones and as many poor ones were being selected as good ones. Those in charge of selecting pilot material would have been just as well off without using these reaction time or tremor tests.⁶

Tests must be evaluated by trying them out on a group representative of a particular occupation. There are several technical considerations in selection of this group, for it must be representative of a normal population, and so on — but we must waive this discussion in an introductory course.

In devising selection tests for pilots, the psychologists in the Army Air Forces and Bureau of Aeronautics of the Navy Department gave their tentatively selected tests to thousands of prospective pilots and then allowed these individuals to enter training, regardless of scores made on the tests. In this way they could determine what would have happened had they eliminated those below certain possible critical scores. Likewise, those who devised the medical aptitude tests used to select medical school students at first gave the tests to students whom they allowed to continue into medical school, regardless of the outcome.

Evaluation of test results. To evaluate test results in terms of actual performance in an occupation, one must have criteria of success. In the case of pilots, the criteria might be

ground-school grades, time taken to reach the solo, passing or failing, success in combat — number of planes shot down, and so on. Where medical students are concerned, the criterion might be the average medical school grade, passing or failing, rating given the individual by his medical school teachers, or rating as an interne. In the case of workers in a certain occupation, the criterion might be how quickly the requisite skills are learned, the average daily output, how many accidents the individual has, or how long he stays on the job before being fired or quitting to get another job. In the case of life insurance salesmen, the criterion might be how much insurance is sold. One must decide beforehand, of course, which of these things he wishes to predict by use of his test. The test might predict one criterion better than another. Different test batteries might be needed for different criteria.

One method widely used to determine the relation between the test results and the criterion is that of correlating one with the other. A high positive correlation indicates that success on the test and success in terms of the criterion selected go together. The correlation between scores on the medical aptitude tests and grades made in medical school is approximately .60. This suggests that the test is highly useful in selecting a *group* most of whom will make high grades. If it were 1.00, we could also safely select individuals with it. In other words, we could predict with practical certainty that the individual who made the highest score on the test would make the highest grade in medical school and that the individual who made the lowest grade on the test would make the lowest grade in medical school. The lower the correlation, the less likely we are to be correct in making predictions about what individuals will do (see pp. 407, 454).

One criterion in which those who had to select pilots were particularly interested was that of passing and failing the course. Anybody who entered training and failed to become a pilot was, of course, wasting his own

time, wasting the time of his instructors, wasting government money, and wasting equipment. There was thus a determined effort to eliminate such waste by selecting a group most of whom would pass.

When such an arbitrary all-or-none criterion as pass-fail is used, the usual correlation techniques discussed earlier will not work. Other techniques must be used. Nevertheless, we can illustrate the selective value of the tests by graphical means. In Figure 214 we have the pass-fail data for 9823 young men who took a battery of selection tests and then entered pilot training.⁷ The battery of tests included several like those already discussed in preceding pages and another to be mentioned shortly.

The candidates' aptitude rating, in terms of test scores, is given at the left side of the graph. The highest aptitude rating is 9, and the lowest is 1. Over 80 per cent of those who made the lowest aptitude rating failed. Less than 6 per cent of those who made the highest aptitude rating were eliminated. Without exception, the successively higher aptitude ratings had a decreasing number of failures.




Figure 214. Per Cent Eliminated from Elementary Pilot Training for Flying Deficiency for Each Aptitude Rating

(From Melton, A. W., "The Selection of Pilots by Means of Psychomotor Tests." *Journal of Aviation Medicine*, 1944, vol. 15, p. 116.)

It is obvious, without any detailed statistical analysis, therefore, that this is a good battery of tests for selecting those who will probably pass the pilot training course.

One test in the battery was almost as good as the whole battery. This, the School of Aviation Medicine *Complex Co-ordinator*, was one of the few tests devised especially for selection of pilots. It is illustrated in Figure 215. Of those who made the aptitude rating




Figure 215. The S.A.M. Complex Co-ordinator

The apparatus is in part a simulated cockpit with rudder bar and stick. The individual being tested sits with his hand grasping the stick and his feet on the rudder bar. The panel before him has parallel sets of bulbs. The three groups of 13 pairs each are used in the test. In one row of each pair is a red light which stays fixed when the lights come on. As the stick is moved from the central position to the left, green bulbs light up successively to the left in the lower top row. As it is moved to the right, they light up successively to the right. The candidate's job is to match a green light with the red, so that one appears directly below the other. Likewise, by moving the stick forward or pulling it back, he controls the lighting of green bulbs in the central column, and must get a green light opposite the red one. Likewise, the rudder bar is manipulated with the right and left foot to match red and green lights in the bottom group. As soon as all three red lights are matched with green ones by appropriate manipulation of stick and rudder bar, the red lights shift to new positions. Then the procedure just described is repeated. This continues until 40 settings of three red lights each have been matched. Motor dexterity, speed of reaction, and several other processes are tested simultaneously by this device. (From Melton, A. W., "The Selection of Pilots by Means of Psychomotor Tests," *Journal of Aviation Medicine*, 1944, vol. 15, p. 117.)

of 9 on the S.A.M. Complex Co-ordinator, 11 per cent failed the course. But of those who made the lowest aptitude rating, over 70 per cent failed.

A further illustration of the value of aptitude tests is given by the data in Figure 216. Medical aptitude ratings of students who were allowed to enter medical school are shown in tenths (deciles). Average grades and the per cent of each group which failed to graduate from medical school are also shown. Generally speaking, the grades increased as the aptitude scores increased. We have already mentioned that the correlation between test scores and average four-year grade in medical school is around .60. It is apparent, too, that all who made the highest aptitude rating graduated, and that the lower the aptitude rating, the greater the percentage of failures. Of those rating in the lowest tenth, over 50 per cent failed to graduate.

Medical course graduates were also rated as internes. Of those in the highest aptitude group, 41 per cent received the highest rating as an interne. On the other hand, of those who made the lowest aptitude rating, only 10 per cent received the highest rating as an interne. While none of those with the highest aptitude rating rated as low as 4 or 5 as an interne, 37 per cent of those with the lowest aptitude rating rated this low as internes.⁸

The experimental and evaluation procedures discussed in the preceding pages are actually validation procedures. A valid test is, as we have already suggested (p. 403), one which actually tests what it is designed to test. The tests selected for illustration are valid tests because they do differentiate the successful and the unsuccessful in the occupations involved. If they failed to differentiate significantly, they would not be used in actual selection. As a matter of fact, many of the tests which look good — which have "face validity" — turn out to be of little or no use when they are evaluated. We have already given, as an example of this, the simple reaction-time and tremor tests used to select pilots in the first World War.




Figure 216. The Relation Between Medical Aptitude Rating and Success in Medical School
(After Moss.)

VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE AND SELECTION

How are test results actually used in guidance and selection? Several hints have already been given, but this is a good place to discuss guidance and selection more directly.

When an individual comes to the vocational counselor for guidance concerning a vocation, he may be given one or a number of the tests mentioned in this chapter, or other tests not mentioned here. After comparing his score with that of others on whom the tests have been validated, the vocational counselor may then be able to offer such advice as: "You have sufficiently high intelligence to do well in any of these fields, but this is the field that seems to interest you most. It is a field which requires a high degree of mechanical aptitude and the test shows that you are not handicapped there. The chances are that, if you apply yourself, you will succeed in that field." On the other hand, he might have to say, "Your responses on some of these tests (in-

telligence) do not offer much hope of your being successful in getting an M.D. degree, but these other tests (mechanical aptitude) show that you have exceptional ability along mechanical lines, that you have a high probability of success in some industry where mechanical talent like yours is required." There are, of course, some who have little aptitude for anything, and others who have aptitude for a wide variety of vocations.

The vocational counselor does not tell an individual that he will or will not succeed in a given line of work. There are many other things which contribute to success or failure in any line of work besides those measured by tests. The availability of training and of work in various occupations also has to be considered. Sometimes there are very few jobs available along the line of one's predominant aptitudes. What the vocational counselor attempts to do, however, is to deal with possibilities and probabilities as they relate

to the individual's tested aptitudes. Unless correlations between test results and actual performance are very high, any definite predictions about what individuals will do are precarious.

In the case of vocational selection, on the other hand, predictions can be made with greater certainty than in the case of individual guidance. The psychologist can say with a high degree of assurance, for example, that if individuals who fall in the lowest aptitude rating are admitted to flight training, only about 20 per cent of them will become pilots, and if those in the uppermost rating are admitted, over 90 per cent of them will become pilots. If John Doe's score alone is involved, one can say merely that he will probably pass, or fail, or that the chances are 90 in 100 that he will pass or 10 in 100 that he will fail. Observe that some in the lowest aptitude rating do succeed, and John Doe might be one of them. Observe, too, that some in the highest aptitude rating do fail, and John Doe might be one of these.

It is well to observe, finally, that even the best aptitude test used for selection purposes eliminates some individuals who, if admitted to the occupation in question, would have succeeded. We do not know who these people are unless we give everyone a chance, but if we do give everyone a chance we waste time, money, equipment, and manpower in attempting to train a group of whom many will fail. In order to save this wastage, we sacrifice a few who might have succeeded. What the user of selective tests does is to determine which critical score (the score below which individuals are not admitted to the occupation) will eliminate the greatest number of potential failures while at the same time eliminate as few as possible of the potentially successful.

How high the critical score may be set depends, too, upon how many individuals are needed and how many are available. Setting an aptitude rating of 9 as the standard for admittance to pilot training would eliminate all failures but a few, but very few individuals

make an aptitude rating of 9. If only a few pilots were needed and the source of supply were large, such a rating might serve one's purposes. But if the number of pilots needed were high and there were only a limited number of candidates, one would have to lower his standard of admittance to a level where a sufficiently large number could be admitted.

SUMMARY

Aptitudes are inferred from the differences with which individuals acquire proficiency in certain kinds of activity, and also from differences in the degree of proficiency. Most individuals have a high degree of aptitude for certain vocations and only a low degree for others. A few have aptitude for a narrow range of occupations, and a few have aptitude for a wide range of vocations.

Aptitudes are not necessarily inborn, although some — like musical and mechanical aptitude — may depend to a certain extent upon inborn characteristics. Generally speaking, when we say that a person has a high degree of aptitude for a certain vocation, we are merely stating that, in terms of what he now is — regardless of the cause — it is highly probable that he will succeed in the vocation if given appropriate training.

General intelligence is related to some aptitudes (like aptitude for college work) more than to others. Moreover, many occupations require a minimal intelligence level. Interests are also related to aptitude. Those who succeed in certain occupations have a pattern of interests somewhat different from those of people who succeed in certain other occupations. For example, an individual with the same interest pattern as successful life insurance salesmen shows some bias in the direction of success in that occupation. Mechanical aptitude of one kind or another is required for many occupations, hence general tests of mechanical aptitude are given wide application. Musical aptitude tests measure musical aptitude in the most general sense. For special musical skills, like piano playing, more specific aptitudes are also necessary.

Aptitude tests for use in guidance or selection with respect to specific jobs must be standardized and evaluated for the jobs in question. In general, the procedure followed is to make a job analysis, to tentatively select or devise tests which possibly measure psychological processes shown by the job analysis to be relevant, to develop a standardized administering and scoring procedure, to administer the test or test battery to a large group representing the group from which applicants are to be selected, and finally to evaluate the test in terms of how closely test scores are related to actual success in the occupation. In the latter instance, criteria of success must be available, such as passing or failing, or time to reach a specified level of proficiency. To the degree that scores on the test are positively related to variations in a criterion — to that degree the test provides a valid measure of success in terms of that criterion. Tests

selected for illustrative purposes were the Army Air Corps Classification tests, used in selecting pilots, and the medical aptitude tests, used to select medical school students.

A certain aptitude rating has different predictive possibilities in the cases of individual guidance and selection of groups. We might be justified merely in saying that John Doe will probably succeed or fail in a particular occupation. On the other hand, we might be justified in saying, of a group with the same rating, that about 80 per cent will in all probability succeed, and 20 per cent in all probability fail. In setting a critical score and eliminating all those who make a lower score, we eliminate some individuals who might succeed if they were given a chance. What the psychologist tries to do is to eliminate as many potential failures as possible, and at the same time eliminate the smallest possible number of those who might succeed.

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Chapter 25

Personality

IN TURNING TO THE STUDY of personality we are putting together much of what has already been considered in this book. So far we have looked at individuals from this angle and that, usually with emphasis on what is more or less characteristic of human beings — not of Tom Smith or Mary Brown. Now the focus is on particular individuals, for no two persons have the same personality.

The principles underlying development of your personality and mine may have been the same, but the end product is different. Likewise, the methods of testing our personalities may be the same, but what these tests reveal is, of course, also different.

Personality is, in a sense, the completed jigsaw puzzle — the whole individual considered as a whole. Our statement is qualified with the words “in a sense” because personality is not a mere juxtaposition of parts or segments — it is an integration, a blend, a merger, an organized whole in which particular functions, unless we attend to them separately for purposes of analysis, lose their identity within the total pattern.

Personality may be defined as *the most characteristic integration of an individual's structures, modes of behavior, interests, attitudes, capacities, abilities and aptitudes*. We say “characteristic integration” for two reasons. In the first place, you are characterized, or distinguished from others, by your personality. In the second place, only those aspects of you and your behavior which we regard as more or less permanent — as characteristic of you — are embraced by the term *personality*.

If you are usually calm in situations of stress, but happen to “blow up” once or twice in a long while, the calmness rather than the irritability is regarded as part of your personality. Calmness is characteristic of you, while emotionality is not characteristic.

Although personality is the characteristic integration of every aspect of the individual, some aspects give more weight to the total product than others do. Your sensory and perceptual processes, your ability to learn, your ability to remember and to reason, and certain of your motor reactions are, as it were, pushed into the background by such aspects of behavior as how well you get along with other people, your susceptibility to irritation because of what others do and say, your manner of speech, the way you dress, your motives, and the degree to which your behavior conforms to what other people regard as moral or good. The last-mentioned is the basis for speaking of your character, which is personality viewed from the standpoint of the ethical or the moral. Your most enduring characteristics which have social and ethical significance are often referred to as “character traits,” to distinguish them from characteristics of no particular social or ethical significance. Honesty would thus be a “character trait,” and your speed of reaction a “personality trait,” not further differentiated as in the case of honesty.

Your physical appearance is also important — whether you are large or small, handsome or ugly, fat or thin, tidy or untidy. This is important in a rather peculiar way. It de-

termines to a large degree how others react to you — which in turn also determines how you react to them. If they avoid you or cause you to suffer indignities because of your appearance or behavior, you may respond by becoming aggressive, or you may “crawl into your shell” and live in a world of phantasy where you are all that you would like to be. If they lionize you — if you find yourself the “cock of the walk” — you also respond accordingly. You may become conceited, domineering, or merely patronizing. It is not your physique as such which is important, but how people react to it. In certain regions of Europe a goiter is a sign of beauty; in central Africa, a protruding abdomen is a sign of beauty; and masculine-looking women are preferred in some societies.

The aspect of the personality picture that predominates is always the social aspect. Those who say, quite incorrectly of course, that someone “has no personality” are saying, in reality, that they do not like him, or that they are indifferent to him. When they say, on the other hand, that someone “sure has a personality!” they are actually saying that they like him — that they are attracted to him rather than repelled or left indifferent. Popular terms like “it” and “sex appeal” further illustrate the point that, whatever your personality may be in cold abstract scientific terms, to others it means your social self. Indeed, the term *personality* was probably derived from the name of the mask (*persona*) which actors once wore to indicate to the audience whether they played the villain’s or the hero’s rôle in a drama.

Although we are dealing with the person as a whole when we consider his personality, we need descriptive terms more discriminating than the over-all term *personality*. We look at the individual in different ways, from different angles, or in different lights, and we need terms to represent these different facets or, as they have been so aptly called, “dimensions” of personality. We speak of these dimensions as *traits*.¹ Some sample personality traits are intelligence, aptitude, emotionality, introver-

sion, dominance, pugnacity, vivacity, and sociability. Most of our personality tests are designed to measure such traits rather than the entire personality.

How many different traits are there? Around eighteen thousand trait names have been located in dictionaries, but many are different names for the same thing.² Even personality tests devised to measure different traits sometimes correlate so highly with each other that it is apparent that they are measuring the same trait under different names. The factor analysts have started to work on personality tests as they have on tests of intelligence and aptitude, in order to discover, if possible, how many really different personality traits are being measured. Ultimately, they hope, the primary — the irreducible — traits of personality will become apparent. As the situation stands at present, however, one is perhaps justified in saying that the individual has as many different personality traits as there are different ways of scrutinizing him and what he does.

Personality, of course, changes with age. It changes rapidly during the early years of life, and then more slowly, and less markedly, as we grow from adulthood into middle and old age. Some aspects of its growth will be considered after we have described methods of investigating personality.

METHODS OF INVESTIGATING PERSONALITY

Although it is possible to classify these methods in various ways, the following will do for our purposes. (1) case history; (2) rating; (3) pencil-and-paper personality measuring devices; (4) behavior tests; (5) interviews; (6) free association and dream analysis; and (7) projective procedures.

Case history

The aim of the case-history approach is to gather relevant data about the individual’s ancestry, his home environment, his relations with his parents, his friendships, his illnesses, his sexual experiences, and, in short, anything

which offers hope of throwing light on his personality. Gathering such case histories requires special training. Many schools of social work offer courses in psychiatric case work.

Rating

We have put this method early in the list because it is often used with infants as well as adults. Infants may be rated as underactive, normally active, or overactive; as nonco-operative, normally co-operative, or exceptionally co-operative; as having or not having temper tantrums; as thumbsuckers or non-thumbsuckers, and so on. One well-known scale for rating child behavior lists a series of items and, after each, the following seven possible ratings: trait absent, very slight, slight, average, marked, very marked, extreme. It then requires the observer to rate her own judgment as doubtful, fairly certain, or very certain. Some of the items rated on the seven-point scale are: Does he tease other children? Is he noisy in eating? Does he climb for objects? Has he good looks? ³

Rating scales have been developed for use in studying many personality traits in adults. Here are some samples.

Emotional Maturity ⁴

- S (subject) chooses his course of action with reference to his own maximum satisfaction ———
- S passes rapidly from one interest or attachment to another ———
- S is conscience-ridden, anxious lest he violate the sanctioned codes ———

On this rating scale, which includes sixty items like the above, the individual may regard himself as S, checking the items which characterize him, or rate some S with whom he is acquainted. Norms obtained with a standardization group are given and the composite rating is compared with these.

The following might be used to rate a friend or acquaintance for appearance, manner, and a number of other traits.

Appearance and Manner ⁵

Sought by others	Well-liked by others	Unnoticed by others
_____	_____	_____
Tolerated by others	Avoided by others	No opportunity to observe
_____	_____	_____

There are also check lists prepared for rating individuals on their commendable habits and on improvable aspects of personality.

Survey of Outstanding Traits ⁶

<i>Commendable</i>	<i>Improvable</i>
Has very good health	Bad breath
Is enthusiastic	Use less cosmetics
Listens attentively	Use less profanity
Controls temper well etc.	Attend more social affairs etc.

Sometimes individuals are ranked rather than merely rated in regard to the trait. By this means a group of sorority sisters or fraternity brothers might be ranked for the trait sociability, by giving the most sociable a rank of 1, the next a rank of 2, and so on, down to the least sociable. Other traits might be ranked in a similar fashion. Each person is then rated, as it were, in terms of where he stands with respect to the particular trait in the group to which he belongs.

Pencil-and-paper personality measuring devices

Following the pattern of test standardization already described in the two preceding chapters, psychologists have developed a large number of so-called personality "tests," in each case validating the test against some other index of the trait to be measured.

The pencil-and-paper tests are so designated because the subject answers various questions or indicates certain alternatives by marking the test form with a pencil. Many of these "tests" are merely questionnaires, check lists, and inventories. For purposes of convenience, we shall refer to all of them as "tests." The following excerpts from some of the better-known personality tests will indicate their general nature and suggest a

few of the outstanding personality traits measured by pencil-and-paper devices. Each test is scored with a standard key, and individual scores are interpreted in terms of group norms. Percentile scores are usually given.

One widely used personality test is the George Washington test of so-called "Social Intelligence."⁷ Social intelligence is defined simply as "ability to get along with others." Scores on the test as a whole are generally high for those who are popular and well adjusted in social situations. The revised form of the test has five parts, each measuring a different aspect of social life.* These are: judgment in social situations, recognition of the mental state of the speaker, observation of human behavior, memory for names and faces, and sense of humor. The part of the test having to do with memory for names and faces is very much like the recognition test given on pages 159, 167, where, as you will recall, you saw twelve faces and were later required to recognize them in a larger group. In the Social Intelligence Test, twelve names are also given, one with each face, and the testee is to indicate which of the faces in the larger group (presented a half-hour or so after the first group) goes with each of the given names. Sample items from other parts of the test are given below.

Judgment in Social Situations

A young man invites a young lady to go to a show with him. On approaching the theater he discovers he has left his pocketbook at home. It would be best to:

- Try to get tickets on credit by offering to leave his watch as security.
- Try to find some friend from whom he can borrow money.

* This test has been criticized on the ground that it is too heavily "loaded with abstract intelligence." Correlations with general intelligence tests have ranged from .25 to .75. For a critical evaluation, see Thorndike, R. L., and S. Stein, "An Evaluation of Attempts to Measure Social Intelligence," *Psych. Bull.*, 1937, 34, pp. 275-285.

- Decide with her on a course of action.
- Find some plausible excuse and go home to get his money.

Recognition of the Mental State of the Speaker

Eighteen different terms, like ambition, disappointment, admiration, love, envy, suspicion, and so on, are given and numbered from 1 to 18. The person taking the test is to put in the parentheses the number which represents the mental state of the person making the statement.

- () There is something in the way he deals that makes me want to cut the cards.
- () And to think that I had looked forward to this party for days!

Observation of Human Behavior

If the statement is true, encircle the T; if it is false, encircle the F.

- T F A good way to keep on friendly terms with two people who are enemies is to attempt to reconcile them.
- T F The majority of people appreciate a candid criticism of their faults.

Sense of Humor

The subject is to indicate for a number of items like the following (but not all as obvious) which alternative makes the best joke.

- "Johnny, if you eat more cake you'll burst."
 (1) "Why, I've eaten this much before" (2) "No, I have a tough stomach." (3) "Then, I'll be able to take still more." (4) "Well, pass me some and get out of the way."

Another widely used personality test is the Allport A-S Reaction Study, which is designed to measure ascendancy-submission.⁸ There are two forms, one for men and one for women. Each form has a large number of items like the following.

- In general, are your most intimate friends
 younger than yourself ——
 older than yourself ——
 about the same age ——

At a stupid party something must be done to

inject some life. You have an idea. Do you take the initiative in carrying it out?

invariably —
occasionally —
never —

The Pressey X-O Test is used to get an index of emotionality.⁹ One part of the test has groups of words like. suck, meanness, eat, ugly, and black. Any unpleasant word is crossed out by the subject. The subject then goes back to each group and, without changing his former marking, encircles the least pleasant word. In another part of the test a word appears in capital letters, for example, BATH, GIRL, DEATH, and so on. At the side of each capitalized word are five words in lowercase letters. Every word associated in the individual's mind with the capitalized word is to be crossed out. Here are two samples:

GIRL health figure wrong soft clmb
DOCTOR scream baby head sale immoral

Then the individual goes through the list and encircles the one word that, in his opinion, is most closely associated with the word at the left. The third part of the test has groups of words in each of which the subject is to cross out everything he considers wrong. Here are two sample lists.

begging swearing smoking flirting spitting
dirt idle conceited tough smutty

After crossing out all the things he believes to be wrong, the subject then encircles the word representing the worst thing in each list. Other tests in the group are similar in nature to those described.

The Allport-Vernon Study of Values is in two parts.¹⁰ The first part contains statements which the individual is to mark in terms of the alternatives given. Thus he says "yes" or "no" to the statement

The main object of scientific research should be the discovery of pure truth rather than its practical applications.

In the second part of the test the subject indicates which of certain alternatives appeals to him most, which seems next most important, which seems next important to that, and which represents his least interest or preference. He is also called upon to respond to items like the following.

When you go to the theater do you, as a rule, enjoy most —

- plays that treat the lives of great men
- ballet or similar imaginative performance
- plays with a theme of human suffering and love
- problem plays that argue consistently for some point of view

This test is designed especially to determine the weight given by a person to things theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, and religious. The person who gives a very high place to social things and a relatively low place to others is sometimes referred to as the "social man." According to the psychologist on whose work this study is based, there are six "types" of men, each of which gives the highest value to one of the spheres of life indicated above. A mixed type that balances the values is also recognized.

One of the most widely recognized dimensions of personality is what everyone is familiar with as introversion-extraversion.* The introvert may be characterized briefly as "shut-in" and introspective; the extravert may be characterized as overtly expressive, "doing, more than thinking." Actually, as the introversion-extraversion tests have shown, there is a distribution of these traits closely approximating the normal frequency distribution, the extreme introvert at one end and the extreme extravert at the other, with most individuals, designated as ambiverts, near the center of the distribution. There are many tests of this general dimension. The following items from Root's Introversion-Extraversion Test illustrate both the nature

* The term *extroversion* is often used in place of *extraversion*.

of the test and the differentiation between introvert, ambivert, and extravert.¹¹ The first alternative is that most typically introvert, the middle one that most typically ambivert, and the last one that most typically extravert.

How do you like to be a leader at a social affair?

- Do not want to be and avoid it
- Prefer not being a leader
- Never give the subject much thought
- Would accept leadership at a social affair
- Enjoy being a leader at a social affair

How do you prefer spending your odd moments?

- Always spend odd moments reading and planning
- Prefer to spend odd moments reading and planning
- Time equally divided between reading and physical activity
- Prefer to spend odd moments in physical activity
- Practically all odd moments spent in games and sports

As a final example of pencil-and-paper personality tests, we shall take one based upon factor analysis of responses to a large number of personality tests. It is Guilford's Inventory of Factors STDCR.¹² The factors represented by these five letters are social introversion, thinking introversion, depression, cycloid tendencies (ups and downs of mood), and rathymia (a happy-go-lucky disposition). Guilford says that these factors, "taken together probably cover the area of personality generally encompassed by the concept of introversion-extraversion." It is pointed out, further, that "Each factor actually represents a dimension of personality with two opposite poles." The same answers are scored in five different ways to disclose the degree to which the five different factors are present. The following items are typical of the 175 items in the inventory:

Each item is to be responded to by encircling one of the three alternatives.

Do you express yourself more easily in speech than in writing? Yes ? No

Do you have frequent ups and downs in mood, either with or without apparent cause? Yes ? No

Are you sometimes so blue that life hardly seems worth living? Yes ? No

Do you like to play pranks upon others? Yes ? No

Are you frequently "lost in thought"? Yes ? No

Now that we have a fairly good idea of the nature of pencil-and-paper personality tests and of the kind of traits measured by them, let us see how test results may be used to get an over-all view of the person's relative standing in the traits tested

The personality profile or psychograph. If a number of personality tests are given and the scores all put on a comparable basis, a personality profile or psychograph like that illustrated in Figure 217 may be drawn. This, drawn in terms of percentile scores, enables us to see at a glance how the individual's performance compares with the central tendency (50th percentile) of the group on which the test was standardized, and also to see at a glance his relative standing with respect to the various traits tested. Some individuals are consistently close to the central tendency, some are consistently above, and some consistently below. The separate traits of most subjects, however, vary between average and extreme positions like those of the subject whose personality profile is given. The tests used in obtaining these scores were the already mentioned Inventory of Factors STDCR and also Bernreuter's Personality Inventory.¹³

Behavior tests

In taking tests like most of those so far considered, the subject has to say what he usually does, what he thinks he would do, or what he thinks ought to be done in certain situations. The behavior tests are designed to discover what an individual actually does when confronted by particular situations. Thus, in a behavior test of introversion-extraversion for




Figure 217. A Personality Profile

This subject equals or exceeds 60 per cent in rhythymia (happy-go-lucky disposition), equals or exceeds 15 per cent in cycloid tendencies (ups and downs of mood), equals or exceeds 10 per cent in depression, and so on. The 50th percentile represents the median score for the standardization group.

use with children, certain standard situations are presented and the tester records the reactions of the subject. Two examples will be given, one from an introversion-extraversion test and the other from a test of honesty.

Introversion-extraversion. Children were taken into a natural science museum the ground plan of which is shown in Figure 218. The path followed by each child was traced and the time that it spent at each exhibit was recorded as in the illustration. Slowness in moving from one exhibit to the other and poor attention to exhibits were taken as indications of introversion. The child who showed a great deal of spontaneous interest in the exhibits, who moved rapidly from one to the other, and went back to look at exhibits again, got a high rating for extraversion. Several other behavior tests were included in this study.¹⁴

Honesty. Each child was given a sheet of paper with ten circles, varying in size and position. The average and range of circles marked by blindfolded subjects were determined before the experiment proper began. In the test situation each child was asked to

close his eyes and place a specified number in the center of as many circles as possible. He was given a trial with each of five sheets. The child then recorded as his score the number of circles marked. If a child had a higher score than the best that could be done by the blindfolded group, there was, of course, evidence of cheating. Several other tests of this general nature were used to measure honesty and also altruism.¹⁵

The chief difficulty with such behavior tests is that they are greatly limited in scope. They can, in the first place, only be used successfully with children. Adults readily "see through" them. Moreover, they deal with specific situations which may not be at all representative of the many situations which an individual meets, each situation perhaps calling out a somewhat different reaction. Some people, for example, would not cheat their next-door neighbor for anything, yet would falsify their income-tax statement if they thought there was a good chance of "getting away with it." One cannot sample every situation that the individual meets and, since there is often much inconsistency be-




Figure 218. Different Behavior of an Introverted and an Extroverted Child in a Museum Situation

A. The path of an extremely introverted child. The child refused to move without the experimenter, whose path is represented by the broken line. Crosses indicate stops. Shaded areas represent exhibits. The figures show the subject's position at the end of each minute.

B. The path of an extremely extroverted child through the museum. The long distance traveled and the stops are characteristic of the extrovert. (From Marston, L. R., "An Experimental Study of Introversion and Extroversion," University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare, 1925, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 68 and 71.)

tween behavior in one situation and behavior in another, one cannot reliably characterize, on the basis of a few samples, the individual's personality, even with respect to a specified trait¹⁶

Interviews

In business, industry, and medicine it is customary to estimate personality by having an interview with the individual.

The best interviews from the standpoint of the reliability of the results obtained are standardized. That is to say, the interviewer knows beforehand what questions he is going to ask and in what order he is going to ask them. This puts every person interviewed on

a somewhat comparable footing as far as these aspects of the interview are concerned. Sometimes the interviewer uses a rating scale which enables him to estimate the degree to which the individual has particular traits. When the interviews are carried out for research purposes, as in a research on physique and temperament which we will consider later, the subject may be given a series of interviews and the ratings revised from time to time as the interviewer gathers new information. There have been a few instances in psychological research where the subject was rated separately by each member of a board of interviewers and the ratings then averaged. The chief difficulty with interviews is that so

much depends upon the judgments of the interviewer. These cannot be standardized as scoring of tests is standardized.¹⁷

Interviews sometimes have therapeutic as well as informational objectives. In the so-called "nondirective" interviews the patient not only reveals certain of his personality traits, but also, at times, gets insight into his own difficulties and how to solve them. This is called a "nondirective" interview because the psychologist does very little more than listen and direct the conversation to this or that point. He does not, in other words, give advice. The following excerpt from a phonographically transcribed nondirective interview is typical of such procedure.¹⁸

Excerpt from first interview

S (subject). Well, it's just reached the point where it becomes unbearable. I'd rather be dead than live as I am now.

C (counselor) You'd rather be dead than live as you are now? Can you tell me a little bit more about that?

S. Well, I hope. Of course we always live on hope.

C. Yes.

S. But — No, I don't have any conscious suicidal urge or anything like that. It's just that — looking at it rationally, I feel that I'm — that I'm in the red now and I wouldn't want to keep on living in the red. (Pause)

C. Well, can you tell me in any more detailed way what — in what way it blocks you so much that you really feel sometimes that you'd be better off dead?

S. Well, I don't know if I can any more accurately describe the sensation. It's just a — a very impressive and painful weight as if an axe were pressing on the whole abdomen, pressing down, I can almost — I can almost sense the position and I feel that it is oppressing me very radically, that is, that it goes right down to the roots of my dynamic energy, so that no matter in what field I assay any sort of effort, I find the blocking.

Excerpt from eighth and final interview

S. Well, I've been noticing something decidedly new. Rather than having fluctuations, I've been noticing a very gradual steady improvement. It's

just as if I had become more stabilized and my growth had been one of the hard way and the sure way rather than the wavering and fluctuating way.

C. M-hm.

S. I go into situations, and even though it's an effort, why I go ahead and make my progress, and I find that when you sort of seize the bull by the horns, as it were, why it isn't so bad as if you sort of deliberate and perhaps — well, think too long about it like I used to. I sort of say to myself, "Well, I know absolutely that avoiding the situation will leave me in the same old rut I've been taking," and I realize that I don't want to be in the same old rut, so I go ahead and go into the situation, and even when I have disappointments in the situation, I find that they don't bring me down as much as they used to.

C. That sounds like real progress.

S. And what pleases me is that my feelings are on an even keel, steadily improving, which gives me much more of a feeling of security than if I had fluctuations. You see, fluctuations lead you from the peaks to the valleys, and you can't get as much self-confidence as when you're having gradual improvement.

C. M-hm.

Free association and dream analysis

This, the typical psychoanalytical approach, has already been mentioned on various occasions. Like the interview techniques, it may be used as a means of gathering information about personality as well as a means of psychotherapy.

The patient reclines on a comfortable sofa and is encouraged to say everything which comes to mind, the analyst occasionally directing association by asking certain questions. The patient may reach a point where blocking occurs or where ideas seem too ridiculous, or too filthy, or too horrible for expression. Here the analyst urges the patient to express the ideas in question. Many such séances may eventually lay bare the significant aspects of the individual's life history. Sometimes, in the course of these séances, the individual breaks down emotionally — weeping, cursing, and so on. This emotional flareup is often found to have therapeutic value. In dream analysis the patient relates his dreams

and these are analyzed for what they may reveal about his motives and other aspects of his personality.

Psychoanalytic techniques are more directive than nondirective. The analyst usually makes the interpretations and tells the subject what is wrong with him and what to do about it. These interpretations and the advice given are usually strongly colored by certain psychoanalytic theories which are regarded as highly questionable by many psychologists. From the standpoint of getting information about deep-lying personality traits, however, the psychoanalytic technique is often quite revealing.¹⁹

Projective methods

There are several methods of studying personality which fall within the projective classification. They are called "projective" because the individual "projects" himself, as it were, into the test situation. What he projects is believed to indicate certain "depth" factors in his personality.

Perhaps the best-known of the projective tests is that of Rorschach, which utilizes a group of ten standard ink blots.²⁰ An ink blot made in the same manner as those in the Rorschach Test is reproduced in Figure 219. The subject is shown the ten ink blots, one at a time, in a standardized order and position. He is asked, "What could that be?" or, "What do you see?" The subject is allowed to turn the blot and look at it from different positions. Different people, of course, "see" different things. Responses are scored in terms of the total number of items seen, whether the items involve the whole ink blot or only parts, qualities perceived (color, form, movement), and the kinds of things reported (like anatomical parts, animals, plants, people, and so on). Some aspects of personality allegedly revealed by the response to the ink blots are suggested by these excerpts from the report of an expert Rorschach tester: "rich mentality," "illogical procedure and peculiarity of thinking," "ability to grasp relationships," "creative capacity," "breadth of in-




Figure 219. An Ink Blot, and What Two Subjects Saw In It

"It's obviously a pair of old witches facing each other. As to their complete form, they seem to be encased in a cocoon-like blanket fold."

"The skull of a bird. The open end is the beak, the rugged projections are the teeth. The projection from the rounded end resembles the handle of a knife. The dark line down the center is the blade. The skull seems flattened as though squeezed."

terest," "relatively few emotional experiences that come to expression," "expresses special fantasies peculiar to his own need," "large amount of self-will," "resistiveness," "introversive personality."²¹

Up to the present time interpretation of Rorschach results is poorly standardized — so that different persons trained to analyze the subject's responses are likely to give somewhat different interpretations. Efforts are being made to standardize the test procedure and scoring in order to increase the test's reliability. Some, including Rorschach, frown upon such efforts, for they feel that the test gets at aspects of personality which cannot be treated in a statistical fashion without destroying the meaning of the test as a whole. Group forms of the test have also been devised.²²

The Thematic Apperception Test²³ requires the subject to interpret each of a

standard series of pictures, one of which is reproduced in Figure 220. Each individual interprets these pictures quite differently. His interpretation is analyzed to see what it reveals about his personality. Sometimes the idea of trouble, of suicide, of tragic love, of death, and so on recurs again and again in the series of interpretations given by a subject.




Figure 220. A Picture from the Thematic Apperception Test and Some Interpretations

The subject is shown the picture and asked to make up a story for which the picture may serve as an illustration. The tester says, "Tell me what events have led up to the present occurrence, what the character in the picture is thinking and feeling, and what the outcome will be." Here are four interpretations given by students in a beginning psychology course: "The girl appears to be nauseated. She may have eaten something disagreeable or she may have suffered a disappointment. At any rate, she is about to be sick." "The girl is distressed because she has to tell her mother something horrible she has done. Her mother is trusting up to this point, and the girl hates to disillusion her." "From the depths of poverty she has risen above the level of her common surroundings only to find that she is by social pressure forced back into poverty." "This woman has just been consumed with anger and, while in a fit of rage, has killed her husband. She suddenly comes back to her senses and realizes what she has done. Being a good woman at heart, she is stricken with remorse and decides to give herself up." (Reproduction of picture, courtesy of Dr. Henry Murray and the Harvard University Press.)

It is claimed that the subject, in responding to this test, reveals some of his innermost fantasies without being aware that he is doing so. The criticisms of the Thematic Apperception Test are basically those already mentioned in connection with the Rorschach Test. The interpretation of results has not yet been put on the quantitative basis which scientific procedure demands.

There are several other projective tests, but all follow the same general principle as the Rorschach and Thematic Apperception tests — in other words, the individual is called upon to interpret pictures, stories, or situations which lend themselves to a variety of interpretations. The interpretations are then reviewed by the tester to see what, in his opinion, they reveal about aspects of personality.

All of the methods mentioned here — case history, rating, pencil-and-paper tests, behavior tests, interviews, free association and dream analysis, and projective techniques — have their place in the study of personality. Personality is so complex a phenomenon that any method which offers the possibility of throwing significant light upon any aspect of it is worth at least a trial. Quite often, however, those who use psychoanalytic and projective techniques accuse those who use tests and rating scales of dealing merely with surface aspects of personality. Their own methods, they often claim, are getting under the surface — into the depths — of personality. Those who measure the so-called "surface traits," on the other hand, point out that psychoanalytic and projective methods are not so well standardized as personality tests, hence are less reliable than other personality measuring devices.

THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF PERSONALITY

Differences in "looks" and in behavior are apparent at birth — one baby is judged good-looking, the other homely; one hardly emits a murmur, while the other squawks during almost every waking moment; one is active, kicking vigorously and thrashing his arms

about, while the other lies relatively still; one sucks at the breast tenaciously, while the other sucks with seeming indifference. Although all babies may look alike and behave alike to anybody who observes them only superficially, to the one who observes them closely there are marked differences such as those we have just described — but are these personality traits? Some psychologists call them personality traits, but others say that they are not sufficiently stabilized to be regarded as consistent aspects of the individual.

Gordon Allport, one of our outstanding students of personality, stresses the view that only the relatively stable aspects of behavior are to be designated as personality traits. But he also believes that only those stable traits adopted by the individual as a means of adjustment should be regarded as aspects of personality. He says:

From the evidence now in hand, four important conclusions may be drawn. (1) personality defined as the distinctive mode of adjustment adopted by each individual in his efforts to live, is not formed at birth, but it may be said to begin at birth. (2) The earliest distinctive adjustments in respect to which infants can be said to differ are in the intensity and frequency of their spontaneous activity (motility) and in their emotional expression (temperament). Both these factors are primarily products of inheritance. (3) Probably not before the fourth month is there sufficient learning and maturation to form distinctive habits of adjustment or rudimentary traits, but by the second half of the first year adaptive responses to the physical environment and to people show marked distinctiveness. (4) Distinctive qualities noticed early in life tend to persist; the child seems predisposed to learn certain modes of adjustment and to reject others. Even before these adaptive forms are clearly defined an observer can often by the method

of "prophecy" predict later traits. Irrespective of the methods used to study the consistency of early development the evidence is positive in virtually every case.²⁴

The author goes on to say that he does not mean to imply that personality traits are definitely fixed in early childhood. Changes in social stimulation, illness, accidents, and many unpredictable situations may arise from time to time during early life and lead to marked unpredictable changes in certain personality traits.

Although it is a legitimate question to ask whether a newborn baby has a personality (the answer, of course, depending to a large extent on how personality is defined), there is no question about the fact that infants have few distinguishable personality traits. The situation is somewhat similar to that dealt with in our discussion of emotion in infants, where we found only one emotion at birth, but an increasing number of emotions as a function of increasing age. In the case of personality, as suggested by the above quotation, the first personality traits to appear are few: motility, temperament, and perhaps a few habitual modes of behavior. As the child grows older, however, we find that such characterizations as dominant, persistent, sociable, selfish, introvert, bright, negativistic, sulky, and dozens of others are applicable with respect to his traits. In the adult there is almost no end to the trait terms which seem applicable. This suggests a gradual differentiation of the personality pattern. Topological psychologists (pp 244-245) represent this differentiation as in Figure 221. Each of the regions within the whole figure, which stands for personality, represents a distinguishable personality trait.²⁵




Figure 221. Topological Representation of Personality Growth
(After Lewin.)

We may regard the development of personality as resulting from two general influences — the biological and the situational. Much of the consistency, or the persistent core, of personality is attributable to our biological makeup. Some of the consistency, nevertheless, comes from the consistency of social situations — what kind of parents we have and their characteristic way of treating us, our socio-economic status, the region or community in which we live. Most of the changes in personality, however, are attributable to changes in our relations with parents, teachers, companions, and others.

THE BIOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

Generally speaking, three biological influences are important in development of personality. These are (1) *secretions from the endocrine glands*, (2) *physique*, which is largely determined by glandular constitution, and (3) *neural constitution*.

Secretions from the endocrine glands

As we have mentioned previously, the endocrine (ductless) glands pour their secretions (hormones) directly into the blood stream, which of course carries them to all parts of the body. We are, as one well-known endocrinologist has said, "terribly at the mercy of our endocrine glands." Unless endocrine secretions are poured into our blood stream in appropriate amounts, the whole bodily economy




Figure 222. A Sketch Showing the General Locations of the Principal Endocrine Glands



Figure 223. A Boy with Puberty Praecox

The child is shown between his brother of nine and his sister of eleven. His chronological age is six years and one month and his mental age six years. Sexual development is equivalent to that of an adolescent (From McClure and Goldberg, 1932)

is disturbed and marked changes in appearance, physique, temperament, intelligence, and other aspects of personality may result. Each of these changes may have social reverberations — leading us to repel rather than attract others, with resulting changes in our own social habits and attitudes.

It is well to know, at the outset of any discussion of endocrine functions, that the endocrines comprise what, in effect, is an interlocking system. Disturbing the function of one gland may lead to disturbances in the functions of other glands. Overactivity of the adrenal medulla, producing adrenin in excess amounts, raises the blood-sugar level, thus counteracting insulin, the hormone from the Islands of Langerhans in the pancreas, which normally keeps the blood sugar at a constant level. Adrenal and pituitary disturbances influence functions of the sex glands (gonads). In Figure 223, for example, we

have a six-year-old boy whose sexual development is that of an adolescent. Similar sexual precocity has been observed in females. It is often attributed to overactivity of the outer part of the adrenal gland (adrenal cortex) in early childhood. Pituitary disturbances also produce sexual abnormalities. Insufficient secretions from the pituitary may lead a male child to be fat and effeminate instead of normally developed sexually. We have already (p. 206) mentioned that secretions of the adrenal, the pituitary, and the thyroid gland affect the sexual behavior of rats.

The interlocking nature of glandular functioning makes it difficult for endocrinologists to determine at all definitely the particular functions of certain glands. In some instances there is much difference of opinion among the authorities. Another thing that increases the difficulty is the fact that some glands secrete several different hormones. The pituitary gland is said to secrete at least eight hormones, the adrenal gland two, and the gonads of each sex at least two.

The chief functions of particular glands that

are of special importance for personality may be summarized as follows: the *gonads* are responsible for sexual drive and secondary sex characteristics (in collaboration with the pituitary and adrenal glands). The *adrenal medulla* secretes adrenin and thus influences emotional behavior. The *thyroid* secretion has an influence on vigor and temperament. Overactivity may produce "nervous tension" and underactivity may produce lethargy. Underactivity of the thyroid in early childhood is associated with cretinism — characterized by low intelligence and the physical appearance illustrated in Figure 224 A. Administration of thyroxin, the thyroid hormone, leads to normal development if it is given sufficiently early and continued throughout childhood. What a few months of such treatment can do is illustrated in Figure 224 B. Secretions from the *anterior pituitary* are largely responsible for general bodily growth as well as certain sexual functions. The giant that you see at the circus probably has an overactive anterior pituitary; the dwarf probably has an underactive anterior



Figure 224. Cretinism

The same child is shown as a cretin and again after four months of treatment with thyroxin. (From Nicholson, H. O., *Archives of Pediatrics*, 1900, vol. 17, pp. 433 and 436.)

pituitary. There is no reliable evidence that the *posterior pituitary* has anything specific to do with personality. It appears to function chiefly in controlling certain metabolic processes. The glands that we have failed to mention by name — pineal, parathyroid, and thymus — have no functions of special importance from the standpoint of personality.²⁶

It might be well to say a word of caution about endocrine functions. Although an underactive thyroid tends to produce lethargy, one must not jump to the conclusion that every lethargic person has an underactive thyroid. Nor should we conclude that any obviously nervous individual has an overactive thyroid. Likewise, even the most frigid person sexually as well as the most sexually driven may have normal gonads. In other words, while specific glandular malfunction may produce certain changes in personality, similar changes are often produced by other conditions — disturbance of other glands, malnutrition, and earlier conditioning.

Physique and temperament

Your physique, as has already been suggested, is probably more important from the standpoint of how others react to it than for its own sake.

Some have tried to type individuals in terms of physique and have claimed that each physical type is characterized by a certain type of personality.²⁷

The most recent, and most ambitious attempt to correlate personality traits with physique avoids the mistake of trying to fit individuals into a few fixed classes. It also substitutes anthropometric measurements of many body parts for the general over-all estimates of earlier investigators.²⁸

Hundreds of individuals were required to assume a standard posture while being photographed from front, side, and back. After one thousand photographs were available, these were arranged in series, in order to see whether types were evident or whether there was a distribution. Actually, there were no types in the ordinary sense of the word, but

"there were obvious dimensions of variation."

As various arrangements of the photographs were made, three "dimensions" were discerned. These were designated: (1) *endomorphism*, greater or less prominence of the abdominal region or digestive viscera; (2) *mesomorphism*, greater or less prominence of bone, muscle, and connective tissue; and (3) *ectomorphism*, greater or less prominence of fragile structure — long delicate bones, large surface area in proportion to mass. The extreme ectomorph is "in one sense overly exposed and naked to his world. His nervous system and sensory tissues have relatively poor protection."²⁹ Extremes of endomorphy, mesomorphy, and ectomorphy are illustrated in Figure 225. The same individual is photographed from three standard angles while assuming a standard pose. An average physique, with respect to all three dimensions, is also given for comparative purposes.

After these three dimensions had been abstracted from the thousands of photographs, anthropometric devices were utilized in an effort to

objectify these differences so that precise allocations of physiques on the tridimensional distribution could be made. . . . It was found that the measurements most valuable for the purpose were certain diameters expressed as ratios to stature, and that most of these diameters could be taken with needle-point dividers from the film more accurately (more reliably) than from the living subjects, provided the photographs were posed in a standardized manner.³⁰

Each of the primary dimensions or components are represented on a seven-point scale. The individual's *somatotype* is given in terms of his degree of endomorphy, mesomorphy, and ectomorphy, each number representing the respective degree of each. The predominant endomorph represented in the figure is somatotyped, 7-1-1½, meaning a maximum degree of endomorphy, a minimal degree of mesomorphy, and a close to minimal degree of ectomorphy. The predominant mesomorph illustrated has the somatotype 1-7-1½; the predominant ectomorph, the somatotype




Figure 225 Predominant Endomorphy, Mesomorphy, and Ectomorphy Compared with Average Physique
 These somatotypes (see text) are, respectively, $7-1\frac{1}{2}$, $1-7-1\frac{1}{2}$, $1\frac{1}{2}-1\frac{1}{2}-7$, and $4-3\frac{1}{2}-4$. (From Sheldon, W. H., and Stevens, S. S., "The Varieties of Temperament" New York: Harper, 1942, between pp. 8 and 9.)

$1\frac{1}{2}-1\frac{1}{2}-7$; and the average individual, the somatotype $4-3\frac{1}{2}-4$. In the latter case the three dimensions are approximately at the center of the dimensional extremes. These are the main variables, but certain secondary ones are also taken into account.

If an investigation of physique in relation to personality will yield any degree of correlation, this careful investigation should do so. The somatotypes within a group of two hundred young men were correlated with temperament scores derived from a rating scale for temperament. The rating was done during twenty standardized interviews and revised

from time to time as the interviews continued. Some tests were also used. Altogether, there were sixty traits on which the individuals were rated. Within this group, as indicated by factor analysis, were three rather well-distinguishable clusters of traits.

One cluster, subsequently named *viscerotonia* because of the predominance of digestive and related visceral functions, had the following traits or dimensions of variation: relaxation, love of comfort, pleasure in digestion, greed for affection and approval, deep sleep, and need of people when troubled. A second cluster, subsequently named *somatotonia* be-

cause of the obvious somatic characteristics, such as muscular readiness for action, had the following dimensions: assertive posture, energetic characteristic, need of exercise, directness of manner, unrestrained voice, overmaturity of appearance, and need of action when troubled. The third cluster, subsequently named *cerebrotonia* because of the apparent prepotency of higher centers of the nervous system, had the following dimensions: restraint in posture, overly fast reactions, sociophobia, inhibited social address, resistance to habit, vocal restraint, poor sleep habits, youthful intentness, and need of solitude when troubled.

The book in which these findings are described includes extensive case histories for many of the two hundred individuals involved and also gives, on a 7-point scale, as in the case of physique, the degree to which each has the three dimensions of temperament. For example, the predominantly viscerotonic individuals get 7 or close to it for the first dimension, and 1 or close to it for the other dimensions. The predominantly somatotonic have the largest value for the central number and the predominantly cerebrotonic have the largest value for the third number.

Here, for example, are three of the briefer characterizations for individuals who are dominant, respectively, in the viscerotonic, somatotonic, and cerebrotonic dimensions. It should be recognized, of course, that certain details in these characterizations will not be found in every individual who represents the extreme of that dimension. Marked individual differences are evident even among individuals similarly "typed."

*Viscerotonia predominant*²¹

Somatotype 5-3-3. Temperament 6-3-2

He has integrated his life around the supposedly popular *persona* of joviality, gluttony, and expansive complacency. He is known as a "bluff," or as a "bag of wind," but is a good-natured, well-meaning, and tolerable person in his rôle. He plans a journalistic career. He reads widely but superficially, and blandly reveals an astonishing igno-

rance in complex fields at every opportunity. He knows he is a bluff, but feels that journalism has lots of room for a good bluff.

*Somatotonia predominant*²²

Somatotype 3-6-2. Temperament 2-7-1

One of those vigorous little fellows (short stature) who makes up for his lack of size by boiling over with energy. He wears hard heels and makes the house shake when he walks. A star basketball player, his short legs move so fast when he runs that they can hardly be seen. His posture is so straight and upright, and his chest is typically thrown so aggressively forward, that he suggests a pigeon in mating season. He is aggressive, but for some reason, which is not altogether clear to us, he is not offensively aggressive. Almost everybody knows him, and likes him. He is often called Napoleon, but always good-naturedly.

*Cerebrotonia predominant*²³

Somatotype 2-4-5. Temperament 1-3-7

So pitifully cerebrotonic, so tense and apprehensive, so schizoid and overwhelmed with restraint that interviewing him is a painful experience. No vocational adjustment seems possible for him except one of the most protected nature. Library work has been suggested, but this involves graduation from college, which seems nearly impossible. We believe that such a situation as this can sometimes be met successfully by keeping the boy out of college until he is two or three years older than the average of his class, then sending him to a small college where girls predominate numerically.

Some of the most interesting outcomes of this research are the correlations between somatotype and temperament ratings. For the two hundred cases of this research the *r*'s are: endomorphy and viscerotonia, .79; mesomorphy and somatotonia, .82; and ectomorphy and cerebrotonia, .83. These high correlations suggest that "temperament may be much more closely related to the physical constitution than has usually been supposed."²⁴ But the investigators say:

In a sense . . . we deliberately put the three components into the scale, and the skeptic may conceivably be justified in pointing out that it is not surprising that we get them out again in the analy-

sis of individuals. . . . Now we are far from denying that some oogeny may attach to such a criticism in the present instance. Indeed, we suspect that this factor may be present. But the question is, to what degree is it present . . . [arguments against the possibility that this factor is responsible for the correlations are given] . . . it seems probable that the correlations between temperament and morphology are not due entirely to the "error of bias" or the error of overenthusiasm for a point of view.³⁵

In considering the high correlations, it is well to remember also that such correlations do not warrant the assumption that physique determines temperament or that temperament determines physique. Both are probably to a large degree determined by glandular constitution. It is possible, too, that temperament is to some degree influenced by how others react to our physical characteristics during childhood.

The neural influence

It is obvious that our intelligence, our insight into social situations calling for new adjustments, and the readiness with which we "adopt" new modes of response are related to the plasticity — or susceptibility to modification — of our nervous system. Injury to the brain (see pp. 53, 189) is often followed by very extensive personality changes, partly through its obliteration of the traces of what we have learned and partly through interference with memory and thinking.

Some have sought to associate certain personality traits, and especially the temperamental, with functioning of the autonomic nervous system. One psychiatrist has built up an elaborate theory of personality, normal and abnormal, in which a major place is given to "segmental cravings" resulting from conflict between the two autonomic nervous systems.³⁶ Many such cravings stem from the physiological drives that we discussed in earlier chapters. These cravings do exist and they are dominated, in a sense, by the autonomic system, but the abovementioned psychiatrist seems to overemphasize their significance for personality.

THE SITUATIONAL INFLUENCE

From the time of birth until the time of death, the individual is thrown into one social situation after another, each of which may leave its imprint upon his personality. Some of these situations and certain events demanding adjustment are represented along the abscissa of Figure 226, which is designed to illustrate schematically the growth and integration of personality as a result of situational influences.

Beginnings of response to social situations

The baby is usually a month or more old before it becomes responsive to social situations as such. It is only then that it smiles at an adult, ceases to cry when picked up, and differentiates between human and nonhuman sounds. Later, it learns to differentiate the familiar and the unfamiliar. At about the middle of the first year, it differentiates friendly and unfriendly vocalizations and gestures.

When babies of the same age are placed in a crib together before the age of four months, they pay no attention to each other. They are well beyond the half-year before they overtly interact in such ways, for example, as offering each other toys and copying each other's actions. Domination of one by the other appears at about this time. The child is usually a year or more old before he keeps up social contact with more than one child at the same time. What he does, usually, is to react to one and completely ignore the other. Not until the age of five or six years are groups of three interacting children much in evidence.³⁷

Home influences

The most important early contacts are, of course, those of the home. If the parents are repressive and without overt affection for the child, this may lead to introvert tendencies, the child withdrawing into a world of fantasy where, perhaps, he does things which his parents do not allow him to do in real life and where his desire for affection is satisfied. This




Figure 226. A Schematic Representation of Personality Development and Integration

Along the abscissa are examples of significant situations and events requiring adjustment as the individual grows. On the ordinate are some examples of integrations involved in the total personality. Some of the points which this diagram serves to illustrate are. (1) Hierarchical organization. Conditioned reflexes predominate soon after birth; then habits (some as integrations of conditioned reflexes) appear. These are organized into more inclusive patterns still, referred to as "traits." Personality as a whole is the over-all integration of conditioned reflexes, habits, traits, and "selves." (2) The higher integrations (traits and "selves") are represented as appearing relatively late in the chronological sequence. Traits and "selves" are shown as becoming well established only after the preschool age. (3) There is a series of crises to be met as the individual grows and these may leave their impression. Psychological weaning, the onset of sex life, the need for finding a vocation, and marriage are critical events. (4) Each person may, to some extent, be regarded as having different "selves" rather than a completely integrated "self." He manifests one "self" at home, say, and another "self" in his place of business, in his church, in his club, and so on. Normally there is much overlapping of the different "selves," as they are integrated one with another, but some individuals, like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, develop widely dissociated "selves" — so much so that we say that they have "dual personalities." Cases of as many as four rather widely different personalities in the same individual have been reported. One integration dominates, the others of course playing a minor rôle. While one personality is dominant, the individual may recall nothing of the others. The chief integrating factor in personality may be a predominant motive, represented by the enclosing dotted line D. This (see pp. 232–233) may be a desire for recognition, to serve, or the like. (After Allport, G., "Personality." New York: Holt, 1937, p. 141; for further implications of this diagram, see his pp. 141–147.)

is not the inevitable reaction to suppression and lack of affection, however, for the child's temperament, which is doubtless partly in-born, plays a rôle. The same situation, although fraught with the possibilities suggested, may actually lead to resistance and a show of defiance. "The same fire that melts the butter hardens the egg."²⁸

On the other hand, the parents may be overindulgent or overaffectionate, and they may encourage the child to "show off" in the presence of others, making it more extraverted than it might otherwise be. Then, too, they may encourage the child to look to them for important decisions, creating a dependence that, with continued encouragement, may

carry over into adult life. One mother may ask a child what kind of cereal he would like for breakfast, what book he would like to have read to him, which suit he would like to wear, and so on, requiring him to make his own decisions early. Another mother may give him what she thinks he ought to have and herself decide what he ought to wear and what he ought to have read to him. The second mother, wittingly or unwittingly, is encouraging dependency rather than independence.

How the parents react to curiosity about sex, what they say about relatives, about neighbors, and so on, all have possible effects. One child heard his mother talking in the most reprehensible terms about a philandering

uncle. He became so set against that uncle, and men of "his kind," that he was a mature adult before he developed a sufficiently tolerant attitude to shake hands with the uncle and treat him as a fellow human being.

Some parents continually go bull-headedly into conflict situations within the home, while others, like the mother elsewhere mentioned (p. 246), get around them in a manner conducive to eventual harmony and a minimal display of emotion. Children are greatly influenced in their attitudes toward the parents by the attitudes assumed by the parents in such situations.

There is literally no end to the examples of home influence that one might give. The few illustrations that we have given serve to point out that the home situation is very important for development of personality, but that the same home situation does not always have the same effect. The child may become like the parent or just the opposite, he may conform or not, depending upon the sort of individual he is constitutionally and upon influences outside the home.³⁹

The only child

There has been much talk about only children having "spoiled" personalities, but psychological investigation has shown that, while some only children may be "spoiled," the personality of only children as a group is not different from that of children with sisters and brothers. One method has been to match only and not-only children for age, sex, socioeconomic status, family organization and I.Q. Personality tests were then given to the matched groups, which consisted of thirty children each. Teachers also rated the children for various traits. There were small differences, sometimes in favor of the only children and sometimes in favor of the not-only children. The chief difference was that the only children had a few more "sissies" and "tomboys" among them than did the not-only children.⁴⁰ The tests have not measured such aspects of personality, however, as egocentricity, selfishness, and the like. What

tests along these lines would show is problematical.

Onliness has possibilities fraught with danger to normal development, but these are only possibilities. What is more important than onliness as such is how the parents handle the situation. If the child has other children to play with — at home, in the neighborhood, or in a nursery school — and if his parents do not center too much attention upon him, there is no reason why he should be handicapped by his onliness.

Much has been written also about the youngest child and the oldest child in a family. Testing of children in different positions of the family hierarchy, however, has failed to show any evidence that birth-order is related in any significant manner to the kind of personality developed.⁴¹

Other social situations

After the family situation there come, of course, the influences of the neighborhood, community, Sunday School, preschool, school, church, gang, and so on. Each such situation may leave its mark. Comradships within any of these situations have, of course, possibilities for good or ill. The situations themselves, like the home situation, may have unpredictable effects on personality. School makes scholars out of some children, while it makes other children haters of school and anything relating to it.

In high school, college, and business or professional life, the situations that we meet may have an influence on certain of our personality traits. But we are more resistant to change at these levels than earlier because, once certain habits and attitudes are acquired, they are somewhat resistant to change. This resistance to change has already been mentioned in connection with so-called "force of habit" (pp. 234-235). Even though many individuals could change their personality in certain respects, especially by reacting differently to social situations, they seldom do so. One reason is that they are often pretty well satisfied with themselves as they are. This prevents

them from recognizing that they may have traits which could be improved. Here, in this connection, is some good advice from a radio talk on "How to Grow a Personality" given some years ago by one of our most famous psychologists:

But what can we poor adults do for ourselves, all encrusted over as we are with years of thwarted personalities? Adult personalities are hard to change. There are some things we can do, but you must have "guts" to go through with it, for it will take a long, long time

The first thing to do is to make a vocational and emotional survey of yourself. Take a piece of paper and put down your assets on the vocational side. How many things can you do, well enough to earn your living provided you lost your major job? Can you tell stories well? Can you take a group of children and entertain them? Can you play some musical instrument well enough to have a group gather around you and sing and play with you? Can some hostess call you in and depend upon you to help entertain her guests? Can the community depend upon you to help out in its problems? Then put down your liabilities. In your job what are your weaknesses? Do you watch the clock to see how soon the day will be finished? Do you take to criticism kindly? Do you contribute new ideas, or do you slavishly follow a routine? Are you growing and is your job growing?

In a similar way put down your emotional liabilities and assets. Is your besetting sin grouchiness? Are you fretful over delays because things are not going ideally? Must you constantly be having commendation from your boss? In other words, must you have notice from those over you? Are you fretful and irritated at home with your wife or children? Do you feel that life has engulfed you and that you haven't a chance, and that the world owes you a living and is not giving it to you?

When you have made this inventory of yourself you will be in a position to tell why you are not getting along better on your job, in your home, and in life generally. Begin to enlarge your inventory. If you are a moper at home, playing cards every evening, make plans to go out. Begin reading real books instead of trash, seeing good plays or good movies. Get yourself a few hobbies, be they wood carving, tooling leather, or carpentry. Add two or more sports that you have to play with others.

Your emotional side is very difficult to handle alone, but even here you can do something. In the first place you can organize your life so that your emotional liabilities get less in the way. . . . In your strife for a new personality keep your efforts to yourself, don't let anyone know about it. In a year or two — not sooner — you will find that your old personality has begun to crack around the edges. Soon you can shed it. Your new personality won't be perfect — you can't get rid of your past completely — but it will please you more than your present one because you yourself made it to fit your present environment.⁴²

A value of personality tests, rating scales, and inventories is that they aid in making inventories of strong points and liabilities. Unless the weaknesses are recognized by the person who has them, he stays in his "rut," and may even be complacent and self-satisfied about it. Sometimes, however, the situation forces a new type of adjustment, or, if it doesn't force a change, at least becomes conducive to such a change. One of the most interesting examples of this is the following experiment:

A small group of college men agreed to co-operate in establishing a shy and inept girl as a social favorite. They saw to it . . . that she was invited to college affairs that were considered important and that she always had dancing partners. They treated her by agreement as though she were the reigning college favorite. Before the year was over she developed an easy manner and a confident assumption that she was popular. These habits continued her social success after the experiment was completed and the men involved had ceased to make efforts in her behalf. They themselves had accepted her as a success. What her college career would have been if the experiment had not been made is impossible to say, of course, but it is fairly certain that she would have resigned all social ambitions and would have found interests compatible with her social ineptitude.⁴³

NORMAL AND ABNORMAL PERSONALITY

What is a normal personality? What is an abnormal personality? The answer to these questions is not easy to find, for the words

"normal" and "abnormal" have different meanings to different people. From the so-called normative view, anybody who is different from the one making the judgment is abnormal. In terms of the statistical view, however, anybody is abnormal who diverges very much from the average. In other words, the average person, according to this view, is the most normal one. From the purely social viewpoint, the normal person is the one who is adjusted to his environment to such an extent that he finds life enjoyable, and the abnormal one is the unadjusted — the one, in extreme cases, who would like to "get away from it all." To complicate the matter further, each of us may toe the normative, statistical, or social line with respect to some traits and not with respect to others. Moreover, we may be adjusted at times and not at others: for example, in a case of emergency or disaster. Generally speaking, however, the individual is regarded as normal if he has some socially acceptable goal around which his activities are integrated, if he finds the pursuit of his goal worth while, and if, in general, he gets pleasure out of living. The person who has no socially acceptable goal, who is at cross-purposes within himself and with his group, and who does not enjoy life as it is, but tries to shut himself off from it, is, generally speaking, regarded as having an abnormal personality.

It is well to recognize, however, that what passes for a worth-while goal in one society or social group does not necessarily pass for a worth-while goal in others (pp. 224-227). Moreover, what is perfectly normal behavior in one society may be abnormal in another. The Central Australian aboriginal goes naked all the time, and this casts no reflection on his personality. But if you follow his example in "civilized society," you will be regarded not only as abnormal but as a criminal as well.

Although it is difficult to draw any well-defined line between what is normal and what is abnormal, there are certain well-characterized abnormal personality types. These, as suggested in Chapter 1, are classified in two

ways. One classification is in terms of whether the abnormality is *structural* or *functional* and the other in terms of whether it is a *psychoneurosis* or *psychosis*.

The structural or organic personality disorders are those which have a known organic basis, like syphilis of the nervous system or hardening of the arteries of the brain.

Functional disorders, on the other hand, have no known organic basis, except acquired modifications of the nervous system which underlie the individual's peculiar attitudes toward himself and others.

Psychoneuroses (or neuroses) are much more prevalent than psychoses (known legally as insanities). Psychoneurotics are not institutionalized. We find them in our homes, our churches, our schools, and scattered throughout any community. Although they may be a nuisance to those who have to associate with them, psychoneurotics are by no means dangerous. The psychotics, on the other hand, although not all in institutions for the mentally ill, are for the most part institutionalized. They occupy more hospital beds in this country than all the other ill put together. Each year, almost six hundred thousand individuals spend time in mental hospitals in the United States. This is about one out of every two hundred persons in the general population.⁴⁴ Some psychotics get well, but there are always many more coming along to take their places. Not all these people are dangerous, but they are either unable to look after themselves or they are a burden upon those who must look after them, so that institutionalization is usually necessary.

All of the psychoneuroses are generally believed to be functional in origin. Some of the psychoses are believed to be functional and others are known to be structural, or organic. As suggested elsewhere (p. 12), functional disorders are based on acquisition of habits and attitudes rather than upon any destruction of nerve tissue, toxic interference with neural activity, or the like. The latter conditions underlie organic disorders.

The psychoneuroses

The classification of psychoneuroses most widely recognized until recent years was that which differentiated *neurasthenia*, *psychasthenia*, and *hysteria*. Today there is a tendency to break these down into a number of subclasses like anxiety hysteria, conversion hysteria, traumatic hysteria, and so on. For our purpose, which is merely to suggest some of the kinds of abnormal personality, the threefold classification will serve.

Neurasthenia. Literally, this is nerve weakness. It is characterized, in general, by lack of energy which is often accompanied by complaints of backache, headache, and the like. Here is an illustrative case from the files of a psychiatrist.

Ever since I have been married I've been nervous. If I didn't have the finest husband in the world and one who takes wonderful care of me and puts up with all of my complaining and all my sickness, I'd be a grass widow. . . . I haven't been a wife to him at all. I've been too sick. First there was that awful headache. Oh, I can't tell you how terrible it was. It just knocked me down, and I thought the end of the world had come. . . . But there's been a lot of other things. There's a sort of internal trembling, you know, a kind of inward nervousness, and I feel as though all my organs were quivering. One doctor told me my nerves were tied in knots.

I don't know why it is, but I can't stand anything. I haven't strength enough to walk from here to the streetcar and back. I may get up in the morning feeling pretty good, but by the time I get breakfast for my husband and have started on my morning's work, I'm nearly exhausted, and by noon I'm just completely played out. . . .

I guess I told you about my sweating and getting so hot and then so cold. Did I tell you about that funny twisting feeling? It runs right through my right side down into my leg. I think it's a nerve loose or something like that. None of the doctors know what to make of my case. I've been to dozens of them. Yes, and I've tried osteopaths and chiropractors. I even went to the new psychology school and I don't know what all else. Some say I ought to try Christian Science, but you can't tell me these things are imaginary, and they are not in my mind either. I'll admit I'm nervous, but,

there's a cause for these things somewhere. I know I never had 'em before I was married."

Sometimes the individual with neurasthenia is helped by psychoanalysis. Sometimes all that is necessary is a goal toward which the individual can direct his thinking instead of concentrating on bodily feelings. As a matter of fact, there are many successful treatments for such ailments. Many patients, however, "hang onto" these ailments with grim earnestness like the shipwrecked sailor hangs onto a raft. Sometimes their ailments are "all they have." In many instances their ailments give them a good excuse for failing to meet their obligations or to attain their level of aspiration in marriage, the business world, or elsewhere. Like anybody else, these unfortunates are trying to adjust to the situations of life. But instead of facing their problems in a realistic manner, they find escape through sickness. They do not do this intentionally, but they perhaps learned early in life that sickness excuses one from many things, and even brings sympathy. They drift gradually, and unthinkingly, into these mental disorders. Sometimes they are merely following a pattern set in the home.

Psychasthenia. This term, which means "mental exhaustion," covers a variety of disturbances. Among these are extreme difficulty in making decisions, compulsions (to wash one's hands almost continually or to commit such acts as stealing or setting fires), and doubts and scruples. Quite generally there is a condition of morbid anxiety — anxiety that something terrible is about to happen, that one has not done what he ought to have done or has done something that he ought not to have done, and so on.

Since it covers so broad a field, the term "psychasthenia" has largely been given up, and we speak, instead, of compulsions, anxiety neuroses, and so on. Many of the specific abnormalities which fall within this general grouping have origins similar to those mentioned in connection with neurasthenia. In many instances, too, the treatment is like that used with neurasthenics.

The following case is typical of the indecision and doubt that sometimes plagues a person and which led to assignment of the term "psychasthenia" to such cases.

A boy in high school was supplied with some second-hand books. He began to doubt the accuracy of them, for, as they were not new, he thought they might be out of date, and what he read might not be the truth. Before long he would not read a book unless he could satisfy himself that it was new and the writer of it an authority. Even then he was assailed with doubts. For he felt uncertain as to whether he understood what he read. If, for example, he came across a word of which he was not sure of the exact meaning, he could not go on until he had looked up the word in a dictionary. But likely as not in the definition of the word there would be another word with which he was not entirely familiar and he would have to look that up, so that at times half an hour or more would be taken up in reading a single page, and even then he would feel doubtful as to whether he had got the exact truth.⁴⁶

Hysteria. This term also covers a variety of symptoms, some of which are often considered under their special names instead of under the general classificatory label. What holds all of these maladies together is the fact that they involve what has been called "dissociation." This may be defined as a state in which certain activities are no longer integrated with the rest of the personality. These activities are like bits of behavior "split off" from the rest, yet often coexisting with the rest. Most of these conditions may be simulated in the hypnotic trance, which is a fine example of dissociation (pp. 235-236).

Many so-called "shell-shock cases" are cases of hysteria. Shock produced by shells has nothing to do with their origin. Some of the symptoms of hysteria are sensory, such as hysterical blindness, deafness, and anesthesia (loss of cutaneous sensitivity). There are functional motor disorders, like twitching of muscles, paralysis of facial muscles or of limbs, and muscular spasms which may involve the whole body in such a manner as to

lift the individual completely off his bed. There are memory disorders, like amnesia and fugue. The former is loss of memory such as one often reads about in the newspapers. A person with amnesia may wander off, forgetting his name and where he came from. The latter is a confused state in which an individual may commit some deed, perhaps murder, but later have no recollection of it. Multiple personality (Fig. 226, p. 475) also falls within this general classification. Finally, there may be so-called "hysterical fits," where the individual laughs or cries uncontrollably, perhaps goes into spells of uncontrollable rage.

Although there are many theories concerning the origin of hysteria, it is now generally conceded to come from mental conflict of the kind considered in an early chapter (pp. 252-254). Sometimes it leaves spontaneously when the conflict situation which produced it has been resolved. Thus, soldiers stricken with hysteria often get well after the war is over. A man who was engaged and otherwise obligated to a girl with whom he was no longer in love disappeared and was found wandering around in the Midwest, having forgotten his name, the girl, and everything which would identify his past. The girl finally jilted him and he gradually recovered his memory. These and many similar cases may look very much like malingering, but there is ample evidence that assumption of such states is beyond the individual's control. He drifts into them gradually, perhaps wishing that a slight wound would send him home and out of danger, that he were not the person he is with the obligations he has, and so on. One interpretation is that he suggests or even "hypnotizes" himself into the states in question. Most of them, as we have already suggested, may be produced under hypnosis and they may also disappear while the person is hypnotized.

The treatment of such cases varies considerably. It is with such people that psychoanalysis, Christian Science, chiropractic, faith healing, autosuggestion, hypnosis, and self-hypnosis all have a degree of success.

The psychoses

The organic psychoses most clearly recognized are *paresis*, *senile psychosis*, and *alcoholic psychosis*. The chief functional psychoses are *manic-depressive psychosis* and *schizophrenia*, or *dementia praecox*.

Paresis. Paresis is due to syphilis of the brain. But only a relatively small proportion of people who contract syphilis become parietic. If syphilis is treated and cured early, paresis never occurs. Paresis usually comes several years after all evidences of untreated syphilis have disappeared.

Here is the case of a person who contracted syphilis and was not cured, although all symptoms eventually disappeared and he thought he was cured. His paresis came on about thirteen years after he thought he was cured of syphilis. Brought before a class in abnormal psychology, he showed absence of certain reflexes and exaggeration of others, his speech was thick and he could not distinctly say such things as "black bug's blood." Moreover, he swayed slightly when his eyes were open, and a great deal when his eyes were closed. His walk was slightly tabetic (p. 389).

"Mr. —, how are you feeling today?" "Fine, never felt better in my life!" "How are you off financially?" "Oh, I'm doing quite well. I have one billion dollars in the — bank and another billion in the — bank." "Have you any children?" "No. We had one, but it died at birth. I'm going to pick up a half dozen at — Hospital on my way back to —. I'm going to get four girls and two boys." "What are you going to name them?" "Well, I guess I'll name the four girls after the Dionne quintuplets." "Which ones?" "All of them." "But aren't there five quintuplets?" "Five! Well, what the hell!"

Before this patient came into the hospital, he was threatening to kill people who "had done him some wrong." He said he was not now mad at anyone. He was being given malaria and drug therapy and had shown considerable improvement since entering the institution. This is not necessarily a typical

case, for every case is different in many respects. But delusions of grandeur (billions in the bank, picking up six children on the way home, and the like) are often found in such cases.

Senile and alcoholic psychoses. These also present a variety of patterns. Quite often there are delusions of one sort or another. One old man asked the doctor to bore a hole and let out some of the air that was pressing down on his brain, talked of people trying to poison him, and so on. Such delusions are common in senile cases. There are also defects of memory. The individual may forget recent events. False memories may occur, as when the individual tells you he did something a few moments ago that he could not have done because he was sitting before you in the room. Quite often there is disorientation, the individual not knowing where he is, what year it is, how long he has been in the institution, and so on. The picture for alcoholic psychosis is similar to that for senile psychosis. Both diseases result from damage to the brain tissues, in one instance through the results of age and in the other through alcohol poisoning.

Manic-depressive psychosis. This disorder is characterized by extreme ups and downs of mood. In the manic stage the individual may be extremely happy, singing at the top of his voice, dancing around, working on inventions that will "shake the world to its foundations." He may also be so obstreperous that he must be kept under restraint of some kind. Delusions (p. 180) and hallucinations (p. 327) are often present. In both men and women, vile language, curses, sexual allusions, and sexual displays are common. Sometimes there is a "flight of ideas," the individual going off on one tangent or another as each idea occurs to him.

In the depression stage, these people present an even more pitiful picture. Many of them cry continually, accuse themselves of all kinds of sins, refuse to eat or drink because "it would be a sin to keep this evil body alive" and try to commit suicide. Such patients are,

of course, tube-fed and watched closely to see that they do themselves no harm. The manic and depressive stages alternate in a variety of ways. Some manifest only one stage, with periods of normalcy in between. Others have a period of depression followed by normalcy, and then by mania.

Many people with manic-depressive psychoses get well. Some of them have written books about themselves, describing in detail their experiences in mental hospitals. Perhaps the best of these books are Clifford Beers's *A Mind that Found Itself* and Jane Hillyer's *Reluctantly Told*. Beers was largely responsible for improving the conditions in mental hospitals in this country, and indeed throughout the world. He was also largely responsible for the mental hygiene movement, the aim of which is to prevent the conditions and ways of thinking which produce manic-depressive and the other psychoses. Occupational therapy is one of the outstanding treatments for these patients. Some of them show great skill in weaving, carving, painting, and other arts.

Schizophrenia. This, literally, is a "splitting of the mind." It is now more widely used than the early term, *dementia praecox*, which means "youthful insanity." While this disease does usually make its appearance in youth, it often occurs in individuals ranging in age up to the middle years of life. There are four "types," but often so much overlapping that psychiatrists have difficulty in saying what type is present in a particular case.

Simple schizophrenia is characterized by general mental retardation. The patient sits and stares into space, has no ambition, would just as soon be riding freight cars, walking the street, or living in the institution as doing anything else. These individuals give the appearance of being extremely introverted, living within themselves, and taking no interest in what goes on around them. It is seldom that anything can be done for them, and they stay in the institution until they die, sometimes at an old age.

Hebephrenic schizophrenia is characterized,

above all else, by silliness and general incongruity of actions. A woman so classified was found in the men's room at the bus station with all of her clothes off, washing them, in fact, in the washbowls. She was laughing and generally silly about it. She even treated it as a big joke when it was discussed with her before a class. During the course of the session, she grimaced, made peculiar silly gestures, and failed to respond in a reasonable way to the questions asked her. She would probably giggle if told that her mother had died.

Catatonic schizophrenia is characterized by peculiar postures, waxy flexibility, and negativism. The patient may hold a particular posture for many hours. Sometimes, if the posture is changed by anyone else, he resists the change, and when he is released, resumes the former position. Sometimes he may be molded, hence the term "waxy flexibility." If his arm is put in a certain position by the doctor, he holds it in that position for a long while. Sometimes the patient has not talked for years. The negativism which underlies this mutism is illustrated by the following example: The psychiatrist who was giving a clinic could not get the patient to speak and turned to the class saying, "This patient has not spoken for ten years," whereupon the patient said, "What do you want me to say?" These patients often have to be tube-fed and also carried around, when they refuse to eat or to walk. Sometimes, while sitting like a statue, they smile to themselves as if amused at something that is running through their heads. They are the most extreme examples of introversion that one could see. "Shut-in," "encapsulated," "insulated," are terms which aptly describe them.

Paranoid schizophrenia. This is in many ways the most spectacular of the four types of schizophrenia. It gets its name from the fact that paranoid delusions (delusions of reference) are often present. Cases similar to these were described in our discussion of direction in thinking (pp. 179-180). The patient has the idea that people are poisoning him, that ground glass is being put in his food, that

his organs are all made of rubber, that he has no blood, that the F.B.I. is spying on him, and so on. Many cases so classified have delusions of grandeur rather than, or in addition to, those of reference. Quite often there is a wide variety of symptoms.

Mrs. — was a successful nurse, but began to get the idea that she was being spied upon by her neighbors, that men were hiding in her attic at night with a view to seducing her, "an honorable woman." She is a great inventress, having invented a powderless, triggerless, shell-less, reportless, barrel-less gun — in fact a peace gun. She has sold it to the government, but German spies are everywhere in the institution and the superintendent is in league with them. She has the idea that there may be some spies in the class, so she asks everyone to raise his right hand and say, "God Save America." Then she is satisfied and continues with her harangue, hinting that even greater inventions are coursing through her mind. She switches to religion, telling what a pure righteous woman she is. She was "monkied" with ten years ago and is to give birth to five monkeys. She says her term is a long one because hers is a Caesarian case. Then she thinks of the boys at the front, and has everyone bow his head in prayer while she prays tearfully that God will "protect our boys." She then hands out some poetry that she has written. When the doctor says, "All right, Mrs. —, you may go back now," she becomes quarrelsome, accusing him of not wanting these boys and girls to know that he is keeping her, a perfectly sane woman, in this place. She is edged out of the room, but slips a piece of paper to a girl sitting near the door. It says, "This is a house of ill repute, you had better get out of it while you have a chance."

Another patient has the delusion that he is dead. Asked, "Do dead people bleed," he replies, "No, of course not." His finger is then pricked and a drop of blood oozes out. "There, now," he is told, "you bleed, so you can't be dead." He replies, "Well, all that shows is that dead people *do* bleed."

Various treatments are used with schizophrenic patients, the most publicized of which are the insulin, metrazol, and electric-shock treatments.⁴⁷ All of these produce some "cures," but some schizophrenic patients, especially those in the types most

helped by these treatments, get well anyhow. Some that are "cured" or get well spontaneously come back again. There seems to be little doubt that more are "cured" than get well spontaneously, but how long they will be able to stay well is a question that cannot be answered until the treatments have been in use longer. Why these treatments work is also problematical.

Then there is the treatment known as "psychosurgery." We have discussed this elsewhere (p. 189). It is infrequently used, and only as a last resort, for it involves serious brain operations. The results reported so far have been highly encouraging.⁴⁸

SUMMARY

Personality has been defined as the most characteristic integration of an individual's structures, modes of behavior, interests, attitudes, capacities, abilities, and aptitudes — especially when considered from the standpoint of adjustment in social situations. Methods of investigating personality are divided, for convenience, into the following kinds: case history, rating, pencil-and-paper personality measuring devices, behavior tests, interviews, free association and dream analysis (psychoanalysis), and projective methods. Material used to illustrate these methods also illustrates a number of traits or dimensions of personality, including some of the so-called "depth" factors. Although some of these methods, depending on the purpose for which they are used, are more valid and more reliable than others, our discussion has not stressed evaluation. All methods that throw any light on personality are of some value.

Whether the newborn child does or does not have a personality is controversial, but there is no doubt that clearly recognizable personality traits are present in the first few months of life. More appear with age and experience, seeming to differentiate out of a pre-existing whole. Biological and situational influences are both significant for personality.

The biological influence is represented most clearly through the effect of glands on phy-

sique and temperament, the relation between physique and temperament, and the rôle of the nervous system in acquisition of personality traits. Injuries to the brain, as in syphilis, senility, and alcoholism, often lead to marked changes in personality. The autonomic nervous system also plays a rôle in personality, but how much weight should be given to its influence is problematical.

The situational influence begins soon after birth, especially when the child begins to respond to the behavior of others, and continues throughout life. Parents, friends, and teachers exert a powerful influence on personality, but exactly how the child will respond (whether positively or negatively, for example) is not determined by the social situation alone. It is influenced also by his biological makeup and what he has learned in other situations. Onliness does not doom a child to distortion of personality so long as social contacts with other children are provided and parents do not focus too much attention on the child. Habits of self-reliance can be started quite early in life as also can habits of dependence. Personality changes are greatest, of course, during childhood and adolescence, but they may also occur in adults. It is only rarely, however, that the personality of normal people changes very much after the adult level has been reached. Some suggestions for improving personality were quoted.

The normal person has some socially ac-

ceptable goal around which his activities are integrated, he finds pursuit of his goal worth while, and, in general, enjoys living.

Clinical types of abnormal personality are classified: (1) as structural or functional, and (2) as psychoneuroses (neuroses) or psychoses (insanities). All the psychoneuroses are believed to be functional. Some psychoses are apparently functional and some are structural. Functional personality disorders are due primarily to the mode of living and thinking acquired by the individual, but structural personality disorders are due primarily to damage within the nervous system, and especially within the brain.

As examples of psychoneuroses we described neurasthenia, psychasthenic disorders, and hysteria. Examples of structural psychoses were paresis and senile and alcoholic psychoses. The functional psychoses discussed were manic-depressive psychosis and schizophrenia, or dementia praecox. Of the latter, four types, simple, hebephrenic, catatonic, and paranoid, were described. Although our survey of abnormal personalities was primarily for the purpose of showing the kinds of disorder that occur, we mentioned briefly some of the causes and treatments. The whole topic of abnormal personality, with its description, origin, and therapy, is treated more thoroughly in the study of abnormal psychology, mental hygiene, and psychiatry.

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